So what should the major focus of the USN be right now?
These are my opinions, and I am open to discussion/debate and am not rigid in all of my suggestions, although for some I am.
Is it improving strike capabilities?
This should not be a Navy priority until the replacement for the CGs is needed around 2024. That means over the next 17+ years, the Navy needs to be able to develop a class of ships that replaces both the role and capability of the current CGs.
Why 2024? When the US Navy deploys the last of the DDG-51s around 2012, the US Navy main battle line will consist of 22 CGs and 62 DDGs. If you add up the total VLS cells and Harpoon missiles, and combine them with SSN and SSGN VLS cells it represents over 10,000 precision munitions aim points the US Navy can bring to bear against any enemy. That number of 10,000 represents more than the total of the next 17 largest Navies in the world.
Between today and 2024, 372 VLS cells will be retired from the fleet. All of them will be the VLS cells on the 688 submarines. It is unreasonable to assume that any country, even China and its substantial growth, will be able to match the firepower of the US Navy by 2024, so building a class of ships designed for strike warfare would be a misappropriation of funding in my opinion.
Is it overcoming the anti-access/access denial threat?
The question isn't a matter of simply overcoming a future A2/AD threat; it is defining what would constitute the elements of one, and developing reliable strategies that are deployable under those conditions. That isn't a call for more equipment of the battle line, nor is it a call for an expansion of simulation; rather it is a call for more realistic systems for validation of theory. The only way to know for certain how stealthy a 14,000 ship could be is to build one and find out. That doesn't mean you build 7 and hope for the best.
Is it preserving the national shipbuilding base?
Build strategies should do exactly that, at least when possible. The LHD and CVN are good examples, a certain number are needed and the hulls have so many reliable years, so divide by requirement and presto. These ships have continuously represented the best bang for your buck in airpower carriers, and but their funding models don’t necessarily apply to the rest of the fleet. However, building 1 LPD-17 9 years in a row, skipping a year, then building a 10th after a one or two year break represents the polar opposite, which would be an unreliable strategy for construction.
During Rumsfeld's career as SECDEF, this year was the first year the Navy went with the previous years predicted shipbuilding plan. In other years, for the last 6 years the Navy has predicted it would build X ships of Y type the next year, and always changed the plan. With reliability like that, or rather the complete absence of reliability like that, is there really any wonder why shipbuilding has been in such an obvious state of price turmoil? As an American, I certainly hope the Navy can plan a battle better than they can plan a fleet.
In a word, yes. The GWOT is generational, and will define the current era of the Navy. There is no blue water fleet out there, not even on the mid term horizon, that is anywhere near a head to head challenger for the US Navy, much less a group of challengers to the US and its primary strategic allies at sea. It is a reasonable expectation the GWOT will last at least the next few decades, so building a ship with a 25-35 year hull life to address the unique needs of the conflict isn't a waste of money, rather it is an allocation of funds to a present day priority.
The Navy cannot afford to sit this conflict out. The fights are in littorals, in rivers, at delta's, and in strategic choke points. The American way of war is to have the right equipment, more than enough of it, with motivated, well trained sailors and puts them in a position to deliver the most firepower the furthest, faster than the opponent.
Based on what I can tell, the Navy can't even get focused enough on the GWOT to deploy a River Squadron yet, despite having almost 2 years to do so. A 3000 ton frigate may or may not be effective in the GWOT, but if it can't sail up the Niger River to help the Nigerian Navy kick some tail when called upon, the Navy isn't focused to fight this war.
Is it doing more with less dollars?
No, it is about being smart with the dollars available, and rebuilding platforms that are in need of replacement instead of spending money to build more of what isn't needed. Aircraft have been heavily deployed in the Middle East, many airframes expected to last the next couple decades have already been stressed beyond their limit, and retired. Resetting the Naval air elements, resetting the submarine fleet, and resetting the logistical arm of the US Navy would be the prudent, wise thing to do. The Navy has instead chosen to wait until funding is required to reset retiring surface vessels and SSBNs to also reset the stuff that needs to be reset today, and use the funds today to build more surface vessels that are not intended to replace what is out there today.
Is it improving Marine expeditionary capabilities?
This is very much an issue, for this war, the next war, and non war situations. The Navy is operating in an era where there are fewer forward bases to cover a larger, more disperse area of operations, fighting lightly armed but well funded groups that do not function as traditional militaries. The primary methods of counter strategy include rapid deployment of military and non military assets to troubled regions as required by conditions. This may represent a MEU deployment to Southeastern Asian islands or a humanitarian mission to Pakistan, but regardless of mission, the best platform for response is the L class ships and its unique capability.
I am very encouraged by the concept, the proposed idea, and particularly the limited description but large scope in the Global Fleet Station concept. I see it as potentially a very wise adaptation of the Sea Basing idea that I have been a strong critic of over the last few years.
The requirements of a Global Fleet Station could vary from the need to put brigades of troops into combat from an offshore position, securing oil platforms and other territories at sea, neutralizing island locations that offer adversaries freedom of deployment of SSMs in strategic choke points, humanitarian missions to natural or manmade disasters, offshore support capability in a NBC environment, or most importantly, a new way to preempt war by providing a series of systems designed to enable local authorities with regional partners with both political and military options in areas of potential crisis before the crisis occurs.
Regardless of the requirement though, no platform in the US Navy is better suited for such a variety of roles than a platform that can support both ships and aircraft, from well decks and flight decks respectfully.
The US Navy should build up its Marine Expeditionary capability to the minimum 2.5 MEBs, and see what it can do to get to 3 or beyond. One of the things that has been missing in the whole Sea Base concept is a real debate, discussion, and evaluation of options. If you were putting together "Macarthur's Navy" today, what would it look like and why? Would it be Joint Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine like Macarthur's Navy was? Would it bring its aviation capabilities with it like Macarthur's Navy did? Would it have the logistics train for any contingency like Macarthur's Navy had? The Sea Base concept has none of that, not even scaled down to the 1 MEB the 15 proposed ships would support.
Again, just one more example how the large lead enjoyed by the US Navy today is best utilized developing important new strategies, and building realistic technology demonstrators, that are relevant to both today's war, and tomorrows.
Again, sorry so long. I'm in a ranting mood this week.
