Australian M1A1 Abrams technology

eckherl

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Yeah. Light wheeled units are good for operarions like in Iraq.
But of you have to go cross country with your IFVs and operate together with your tanks you have a problem.
You would talk more about the armor and cross country perfomance if you would face real threats like other IFVs.
I totally agree that vehicles like the Piranha design are good for Iraqi and UN oversea style missions but if you go again hayve forces you have some things to think about.
Yep - this is one of the reasons that the Russians went with Bmp`s to replace the BTR series, also we have had some issues with the Strykers not being able to negotiate some of the terrian in Iraq, this could have deadly results on the battlefield if you have to turn around so to speak because you cannot get thru a certain area. (Choke point)
 

Waylander

Defense Professional
Verified Defense Pro
The problem is that you have to do more basic development than established producers.
So the development process should be more expensive and take more time than for example for an established company.
So an self developed vehicle is likely to be more expensive and later ready than a vehicle with similar capabilities bought off the shelf.
 

FutureTank

Banned Member
The problem is that you have to do more basic development than established producers.
So the development process should be more expensive and take more time than for example for an established company.
So an self developed vehicle is likely to be more expensive and later ready than a vehicle with similar capabilities bought off the shelf.
I can't agree, if only because of German expereince!

The SdKfz251 in WW2 used the MOTS approach, as did many other infantry and support vehicles. The earlier German tanks relied on tractor manufacturing industry for this approach. Same for USSR.

I think with Cold War over, AFV engineers will be forced to rediscover more cooperative designs if they are to achieve scales and sales :)
 

Waylander

Defense Professional
Verified Defense Pro
I do not talk especially german experience.
I do talk of basic economical facts.
There are companies out there who have experience, test data, etc.
Every developed first world country should be able to cope with them but first they have to solve the gap and this takes time and money.

Nothing more, nothing less.
 

rickshaw

Defense Professional
Verified Defense Pro
Firstly, what I said was that I was surprised at LAV selection AT THE TIME, because wheeled recon vehicles were being abandoned AT THE TIME.
Were they? According to whom? At the same time as the LAV was being adopted, you had the Luchs, various Panhard and AMX-10RCs being adopted, the Fox CVRT(W), the South Africans the Rooikat and so on. Some nations were, to wit the US Army with the M3 and the Russians with their BMP-R. I'd actually suggest it was pretty much a mixed bag, with some armies giving up on wheels, some going back to them AT THE TIME, Futuretank. You really should stop making sweeping statements, particularly ones based upon such a subjective viewpoint.

Wheeled vehicles have problems with ground pressure, and this can't be changed. They will not have the capability to negotiate some terrains, particularly when soil type is subjected to inundation, or some of the sandy desert terrains. However these are far and between so far as ADF probable AOs are concerned. They are MUCH better on fuel economy on harder surfaces.
Wheeled vehicles can have tyre inflations changed to largely overcome those problems. While they can't negotiated all terrains they can and do come very close to the ability of tracked vehicles and of course confer higher speeds, lower fuel consumption and greater strategic mobility on the vehicles.

If Australia is unwilling to take on domestic IFV design and production, and if there are no ideas that would contribute to advancing IFV design over the 1950s cross of APC and light tank, then alsmost any current crop of overseas built IFV will do.

ADF deploys inbattalion battlegroups. The reality is that regimental associatio is a legacy org which does not function on deployment, so I think the whole force structure needs to be rethought.
The ADF hasn't, since the Boer war, used regimental organisations for deployment of its infantry units.
 

FutureTank

Banned Member
Were they? According to whom? At the same time as the LAV was being adopted, you had the Luchs, various Panhard and AMX-10RCs being adopted, the Fox CVRT(W), the South Africans the Rooikat and so on. Some nations were, to wit the US Army with the M3 and the Russians with their BMP-R. I'd actually suggest it was pretty much a mixed bag, with some armies giving up on wheels, some going back to them AT THE TIME, Futuretank. You really should stop making sweeping statements, particularly ones based upon such a subjective viewpoint.
All the models you listed were designed and put into production in mid to late 70s. ASLAV (not even ASLAV then) was first acquired in 1990.

I have my subjective views and you have yours :) Being objective all the time requires having someone else's views.

Wheeled vehicles can have tyre inflations changed to largely overcome those problems. While they can't negotiated all terrains they can and do come very close to the ability of tracked vehicles and of course confer higher speeds, lower fuel consumption and greater strategic mobility on the vehicles.
Absolutely. With tyre deflation the ASLAV comes close to the M113 in speed, and requires a new set of tyres after the expereince.

The ADF hasn't, since the Boer war, used regimental organisations for deployment of its infantry units.
Did I say organisation?
The suggestion was, if you read more carefully, that ALTHOUGH the PREDOMINANT Corps (Infantry) deploys in BATTALION battlegroups, other Arms and Services do not maintain their regimental ASSOCIATION (within the battlegroup), such as the Armour, helicopters, signals, arty, supply, etc. None of these supporting arms and services ever deploy as regiments, so why have them as such. When is the 2nd Cav ever going to deploy as a regiment?
Keep the regimental associations as administrative/legacy orgs, but the constituent parts shoudl go to battlegroups on permanent basis.

Not sure why you need to be so aggressive in a forum Rickshaw. :confused:
 

gf0012-aust

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Absolutely. With tyre deflation the ASLAV comes close to the M113 in speed, and requires a new set of tyres after the expereince.
??? M113 cannot compete with an ASLAV at road speeds - look at what the SECDET blokes are saying - and they have real world "I'm getting shot at" experience.

BTW, modern wheeled vehicles (for the last 20+ years) have been able to inflate and deflate tyres from within.

Look at the way we operate with an emphasis on recce - tyred vehicles walk all over tracks for noise mitigation, speed and agility.

Please show links on where ASLAVS and their kin requirenew sets after deflated runs.

Any info you have would be interesting as it certainly contradicts the exhaustive testing done in Oz (and I would hazard a guess all of our principal allies and warfighting partners) prior to selection.
 

FutureTank

Banned Member
??? M113 cannot compete with an ASLAV at road speeds - look at what the SECDET blokes are saying - and they have real world "I'm getting shot at" experience.
I was refering to off-road speed (per previous posts) with tyres deflated to suit certaint soil conditions. Commonly wheeled vehicles slow down to 30-40km/h.
 

gf0012-aust

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
I was refering to off-road speed (per previous posts) with tyres deflated to suit certaint soil conditions. Commonly wheeled vehicles slow down to 30-40km/h.
Any vehicle that is compromised in a convoy and that can't drive off at speed will trigger "circling the wagons" - be it tyred or tracked.

the fact that tyred vehicles were given an absolute workout in Oz and were directly compared against tracks, seems to me to suggest that Army were far more confident of value across a broader set of selection matrices.

Some of the stuff you're suggesting seems to me to be similar to the arguments of Sparks/Meyers and co - who have been a little cavalier with their data.
 
A

Aussie Digger

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All the models you listed were designed and put into production in mid to late 70s. ASLAV (not even ASLAV then) was first acquired in 1990.
ASLAV may have been acquired by AUSTRALIA in the early 90's but the design had been in-service with the USMC and others for 5-10 years before Australia chose it. The first ASLAV's we required were in fact USMC LAV-25 variants.

I have my subjective views and you have yours :) Being objective all the time requires having someone else's views.
Being objective doesn't require ANYONE's views, or to put it another way, requires EVERYONE's views.

Absolutely. With tyre deflation the ASLAV comes close to the M113 in speed, and requires a new set of tyres after the expereince.
What does this mean exactly? What speed? Over what environment? ASLAV's have an internal tyre inflation/deflation system. They can raise and lower their tyre pressures as required. One thing they are not however, is as quick over "difficult" ground, which is why IMHO wheel armoured vehicles will never entirely replace tracked vehicles.

Did I say organisation?
The suggestion was, if you read more carefully, that ALTHOUGH the PREDOMINANT Corps (Infantry) deploys in BATTALION battlegroups, other Arms and Services do not maintain their regimental ASSOCIATION (within the battlegroup), such as the Armour, helicopters, signals, arty, supply, etc. None of these supporting arms and services ever deploy as regiments, so why have them as such. When is the 2nd Cav ever going to deploy as a regiment?
Keep the regimental associations as administrative/legacy orgs, but the constituent parts shoudl go to battlegroups on permanent basis.

Not sure why you need to be so aggressive in a forum Rickshaw. :confused:
The problem with this is you are only giving consideration to deployed forces. Australian forces' primary responsibility are DoA operations. Should Army ever be required to undertake these operations they will fight as per their "paper" structure.

Australia forces on operations deploy taskforces not "battalion battlegroups". They form battlegroups for training and operational purposes, but I fail to see the benefit of "permanently" grouping these forces together.

The predominant training conducted by Army is the Corps specific training necessary to generate the necessary capability each Corps is required to provide. Joint training is vitally important and the ability to generate combined arms forces is essential to modern combat, but the basis for this is each unit comprising such achieving mastery of it's own particular role.

This along with efficiency's gained from grouping limited numbers of assets in combined accomodation (ie: ARH tigers and M1A1 tanks based together in regimental sized formations) is the reason it's done. With such small forces, I can't see any benefit in making what we have even smaller by spreading it out more.

I CAN see that it would cost a lot more.

You are also taking a narrow view of the predominantly "limited" deployments we are currently undertake.

Remember Army's strategic guidance under White Paper 2000. It is REQUIRED to maintain the ability to deploy a brigade sized formation (ie: Internet sized force) AND a battalion group to different theatres simultaneously. IF such a scenario occurred, then 2 Cav (along with the rest of 1 Brigade) may indeed deploy as an entire Regiment.
 

FutureTank

Banned Member
Any vehicle that is compromised in a convoy and that can't drive off at speed will trigger "circling the wagons" - be it tyred or tracked.

the fact that tyred vehicles were given an absolute workout in Oz and were directly compared against tracks, seems to me to suggest that Army were far more confident of value across a broader set of selection matrices.

Some of the stuff you're suggesting seems to me to be similar to the arguments of Sparks/Meyers and co - who have been a little cavalier with their data.
gf, I was not talking about convoy ops.
I had seen data from several wheeled LAV-like types that suggest deflated tyre 'optimum' speed of around 30km/h, and I can find it for you again.

I'm aware of the 'Gavin' sites of course. What I said however has nothing to do with either their arguments or data. I was told that early Australian experience with LAVs led to ADF having to replace some wheel assamblies and increase stock in tyres. However my understanding is that this was due to operationg over unusual soil conditions (no further info I'm afraid).
 

rickshaw

Defense Professional
Verified Defense Pro
All the models you listed were designed and put into production in mid to late 70s. ASLAV (not even ASLAV then) was first acquired in 1990.
The Mowag Piranha design had been around for at least 10-15 years before that, FT. The US Marines had adopted it at least five years earlier. The US Army had attempted to adopt it but hadn't really been interested in it and botched the effort - perhaps deliberately. The Canadians had adopted it even earlier than the US Marines (and they'd got it from the Canadians).

I have my subjective views and you have yours :) Being objective all the time requires having someone else's views.
I'd suggest your views tend to be very subjective.

Absolutely. With tyre deflation the ASLAV comes close to the M113 in speed, and requires a new set of tyres after the expereince.
Does it? The South Africans after they adopted the Rooikat reported that the maintenance problems associated with tyres was about on par with tracked vehicles and the conditions in the RSA are similar to Oz.

Did I say organisation?
The suggestion was, if you read more carefully, that ALTHOUGH the PREDOMINANT Corps (Infantry) deploys in BATTALION battlegroups, other Arms and Services do not maintain their regimental ASSOCIATION (within the battlegroup), such as the Armour, helicopters, signals, arty, supply, etc. None of these supporting arms and services ever deploy as regiments, so why have them as such. When is the 2nd Cav ever going to deploy as a regiment?
I think you are confusing Regiment and Corps. Units are not broken up because it increases the administration burden for specialised units. Therefore they tend to deploy as units, not as parts there of.

Keep the regimental associations as administrative/legacy orgs, but the constituent parts shoudl go to battlegroups on permanent basis.
Doesn't work because infantry units do not understand the administrative needs of specialised units and specialised units do not understand the administrative needs of infantry.

Not sure why you need to be so aggressive in a forum Rickshaw. :confused:
I am not being aggressive. You want to see me being aggressive? :flame
 

FutureTank

Banned Member
ASLAV may have been acquired by AUSTRALIA in the early 90's but the design had been in-service with the USMC and others for 5-10 years before Australia chose it. The first ASLAV's we required were in fact USMC LAV-25 variants.
Yes, which is why I said that I was surprised. By the time USMC got them, they were virtually the last to do so.

Being objective doesn't require ANYONE's views, or to put it another way, requires EVERYONE's views.
Well, somone has to be right. Sometimes one has to take a subjective view of something YOU believe in even if objective arguument suggests otherwise.

What does this mean exactly? What speed? Over what environment? ASLAV's have an internal tyre inflation/deflation system. They can raise and lower their tyre pressures as required. One thing they are not however, is as quick over "difficult" ground, which is why IMHO wheel armoured vehicles will never entirely replace tracked vehicles.
Yes, I know all this. I also know that there was work done on the ASLAV wheels. I think the problem was tyre overheating?

The problem with this is you are only giving consideration to deployed forces. Australian forces' primary responsibility are DoA operations. Should Army ever be required to undertake these operations they will fight as per their "paper" structure.
Under what circumstances?

Australia forces on operations deploy taskforces not "battalion battlegroups". They form battlegroups for training and operational purposes, but I fail to see the benefit of "permanently" grouping these forces together.
Ok, 'taskforce' refers to the command of the mission, and can be any size from company to brigade. However it is 'likely' (I would say preferable) that whole battalion is deployed as the core taskforce combat component.

The predominant training conducted by Army is the Corps specific training necessary to generate the necessary capability each Corps is required to provide. Joint training is vitally important and the ability to generate combined arms forces is essential to modern combat, but the basis for this is each unit comprising such achieving mastery of it's own particular role.
Corps training is done all over the place. Joint trainign can only be done with a specific unit training area. The ADF commonly moves individuals and small groups around to train in Corps skills. Shifting whole units is what increases costs.

This along with efficiency's gained from grouping limited numbers of assets in combined accomodation (ie: ARH tigers and M1A1 tanks based together in regimental sized formations) is the reason it's done. With such small forces, I can't see any benefit in making what we have even smaller by spreading it out more.
When tank aquadrons were sent to Vietnam, they brought all required service personnel and equipment with them. There was no way out of that.
All I'm saying is that given we are at war, and are likely to remain in a state of war for some time, ADF should accep tthe realities of wartime posture and structure its assets accordingly. Unfortunatelly in some ways it will cost more.
Now consider what mayham happens if and when a battalion-sized taskforce should be required to deploy. All kinds of people are pulled out of their jobs and moved to the battalion in question. Equipment is coming from all over the place because Army usually doesn't (sadly) have the 'paper strength'. This is also cost. Of course lately quite a bit has been spent on Defence so maybe I'm wrong and all is well (at least with 1 Brigade).

I CAN see that it would cost a lot more.
Yes, so can I.

You are also taking a narrow view of the predominantly "limited" deployments we are currently undertake.

Remember Army's strategic guidance under White Paper 2000. It is REQUIRED to maintain the ability to deploy a brigade sized formation (ie: Internet sized force) AND a battalion group to different theatres simultaneously. IF such a scenario occurred, then 2 Cav (along with the rest of 1 Brigade) may indeed deploy as an entire Regiment.
Yes, but I'm asking how realistic this is?
In 2000 the US DoD was postulating having a capability to fight TWO Major Theatre Wars simoltaneously. How realistic was that?
You know as well as I do that the ability to deploy a brigade in one theatre and a battalionsized taskforce in another would strain ADF to the last man. If this scenario happened, we would be in a WW2-type environment (Japanese in Port Moresby), and not current deployments.
 

FutureTank

Banned Member
The Mowag Piranha design had been around for at least 10-15 years before that, FT. The US Marines had adopted it at least five years earlier. The US Army had attempted to adopt it but hadn't really been interested in it and botched the effort - perhaps deliberately. The Canadians had adopted it even earlier than the US Marines (and they'd got it from the Canadians).
So do the math.

I think you are confusing Regiment and Corps. Units are not broken up because it increases the administration burden for specialised units. Therefore they tend to deploy as units, not as parts there of.
Specialised units (squadrons, battalions, troops) are broken up or form detachments to support core combat force usually based on infantry battalion.

Doesn't work because infantry units do not understand the administrative needs of specialised units and specialised units do not understand the administrative needs of infantry.
Yes, that's what they have administrative staff for (attached to taskforce HQ)

If you have excess aggression I suggest going for a run or maybe signing on as a contractor in Iraq to work it off.
Here I think even if you don;t agree with somone, and do think they are subjective, and maube even haven't got a brain at all in your opinion, you need the skill to say so in a civil way.
Then again I am neither a moderator, not your parent, so you can disregard whatever I say altogether, and trust me, it won't bother me a bit.
:flame is probably going to be taken care of by moderators anyway, who are usually :sniper :D
 
A

Aussie Digger

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Ok, 'taskforce' refers to the command of the mission, and can be any size from company to brigade. However it is 'likely' (I would say preferable) that whole battalion is deployed as the core taskforce combat component.
Taskforce literally means a force deployed to conduct a particular task. The command element is irrelevant. DJFHQ controls ALL operations OS, whether they be a platoon or brigade level formation. The "core" component will be whatever is considered sufficient to achieve the task at hand. A battalion as the "set" standard is a poor option, if a platoon is sufficient (ie: Tonga recently).

Where a battalion is required to deploy most often it is a single battalion group from the "same" battalion that is deployed. The only time it's NOT AFAIK, is in a situation where (due to our low numbers of battalions) soldiers from a particular battalion are required to deploy to more than 1 theatre (ie: 6RAR is currently deployed to Timor AND Afghanistan).


Corps training is done all over the place. Joint trainign can only be done with a specific unit training area. The ADF commonly moves individuals and small groups around to train in Corps skills. Shifting whole units is what increases costs.
As to your "Joint training can only be done with a specific unit training area" I'm sorry but this is straight out wrong. What sort of training are you referring to? I've done a platoon level attack on the main oval at Gallipoli barracks Enoggera with a combined arms team formed from 2/14LHR and 25/49RQR!!! Corps specific training CAN be done almost anywhere IMHO (obviously with some limitations on the TYPE of training, ie: live firing etc), not the other way around. Simon9 can probably tell you about Charlie Coy 9RQR and the "Corps" specific training it conducts (or at least used to) in the back streets of Loganlea on the Southside of Brisbane!!! The "Joint training", you refer to is similar except perhaps when it's conducted on a large scale. Most "joint training" occurs during CPX's anyway.

When tank aquadrons were sent to Vietnam, they brought all required service personnel and equipment with them. There was no way out of that.
Yes. So? They sent a particular force for a particular threat level and one designed to achieve a certain level of capability. Are you trying to suggest 1 Armd would have been more effective in Vietnam if it had been embedded with battalions all along? There is such a thing required as "concentration of force" in military operations you know...

All I'm saying is that given we are at war, and are likely to remain in a state of war for some time, ADF should accep tthe realities of wartime posture and structure its assets accordingly. Unfortunatelly in some ways it will cost more.
Now consider what mayham happens if and when a battalion-sized taskforce should be required to deploy. All kinds of people are pulled out of their jobs and moved to the battalion in question. Equipment is coming from all over the place because Army usually doesn't (sadly) have the 'paper strength'. This is also cost. Of course lately quite a bit has been spent on Defence so maybe I'm wrong and all is well (at least with 1 Brigade).
"We are at war". I'd argue against that proposition merely because we are not ACTUALLY conducting combat operations. We are conducting low level "peace keeping" operations in Solomans and Timor. We are conducting "engineering" operations in Afghanistan, with Infantry and Cavalry peforming only security tasks for the "Ginger Beers" and in Iraq we have infantry/Cavalry performing security and training functions. None of the forces is actively engaged with an enemy force. Any contacts that occur are merely self defence.

This may be war to some, but it's a bit less than that to me. What America IS doing is war. Low level, perhaps but still "war". We are not.

We also have not deployed MBT's in ANY theatre since Vietnam. By this rationale obviously MBT's have no place IN our force structure, since we should only be creating formations that are likely to deploy on operations, based on current scenarios. If that were the case, we could leave artillery and armed recon helicopters out too...



Yes, but I'm asking how realistic this is?
In 2000 the US DoD was postulating having a capability to fight TWO Major Theatre Wars simoltaneously. How realistic was that?
You know as well as I do that the ability to deploy a brigade in one theatre and a battalionsized taskforce in another would strain ADF to the last man. If this scenario happened, we would be in a WW2-type environment (Japanese in Port Moresby), and not current deployments.
Hmm.

Interfet was a brigade sized force we deployed less than 8 years ago (is it THAT long already, sheesh :shudder) and NO elements of 6RAR OR 1RAR deployed during Interfet. Neither did ANY of 4RAR (Cmdo) except for a few CPP staff. Whilst it was a BIG deployment and stripped us of most of our assets, 3x battalions remained un-deployed, 1 Armoured Regt remained undeployed a sqn of 2 Cav Regt remained undeployed, a squadron of Blackhawks, SAS, ALL the Chinooks etc, etc remained un-deployed. It would have been difficult, but we COULD have deployed a battalion elsewhere even then. We'd have probably needed help to support them (we needed help in INTERFET as well though) but we had the manpower to do it. Things are better now, for 1 thing ALL regular infantry battalions are at "high readiness" now. With the arrival of our C-17's and Kanimbla and Manoora our lift capacity now is much greater than it was then (or will be in 12 months or so) and our support capacity has been bolstered.

The additional battalions will only improve this capability.

A brigade sized force and a battalion group in the Australian context means 4 battalions, max deployed at any one time. We have nothing like this many deployed at present and while I agree Interfet massively strained our support capabilities and "equipment levels", it opened the "eyes" of the ADF and Government (to a degree) and many of the problems we had then, would not be so large today.

Apart from capability deficiences (which are ADF wide) I am not aware of any of the currently deployed forces "stripping" other units of capability. ASLAV's and Bushmasters have been enhanced, other capabilities (Javelin, "Scan Eagle" Mk 11 sniper rifles etc) have been acquired rapidly and soldiers have been moved around, but that is a issue with manning and funding levels, not a force structure issue, in of itself....
 
A

Aussie Digger

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Specialised units (squadrons, battalions, troops) are broken up or form detachments to support core combat force usually based on infantry battalion.
No they don't. They deploy as fully formed sub-units with the appropiate levels of command for the size of the formation.

You may be interested to know that 1 of the goals of HNA is to form 9 "deployable" battlegroups along with 9 "battlegroup" command elements.

The command elements will reside in ALL on-line units, irregardless of Corps. Command of the battlegroup will go to whichever Corps is taking the lead role for the deployment.

Just as the Cav based battlegroup in Iraq is lead by a Cav Commander, the Engineering based taskforce in Afghanistan is commanded by a Gingerbeers commander, and the infantry based forces in Timor and Solomans are led by, you guessed it, infantry...

There's even a possibility that "Aviation Corps" could command a battlegroup one day, unlikely though it may seem. Theoretically under HNA however they could.
 

rickshaw

Defense Professional
Verified Defense Pro
So do the math.
I did. More armies appeared to be adopting wheeled vehicles "AT THE TIME" than abandoning them in favour of tracks. FT.

Specialised units (squadrons, battalions, troops) are broken up or form detachments to support core combat force usually based on infantry battalion.
Sometimes yes, sometimes no. Depends upon the situation. More often than not, "penny-packetism" is not a good idea, particularly WRT to Armour, while with Aviation, it prevents the best use of resources.

Yes, that's what they have administrative staff for (attached to taskforce HQ)
The more you dilute units, the more admin staff you require.

If you have excess aggression I suggest going for a run or maybe signing on as a contractor in Iraq to work it off.
Your view that I am aggressive is very subjective, FT. ;)

Here I think even if you don;t agree with somone, and do think they are subjective, and maube even haven't got a brain at all in your opinion, you need the skill to say so in a civil way.
I have been. I could have called you a bloody fool but I've refrained from doing so because, as I said once before, you amuse me, FT. I see a lot of youthful enthusiasm, some knowledge but little commonsense or experience.

Then again I am neither a moderator, not your parent, so you can disregard whatever I say altogether, and trust me, it won't bother me a bit.
Oh, I find it interesting.

:flame is probably going to be taken care of by moderators anyway, who are usually :sniper :D
Sure.
 

FutureTank

Banned Member
Taskforce literally means a force deployed to conduct a particular task. The command element is irrelevant. DJFHQ controls ALL operations OS, whether they be a platoon or brigade level formation. The "core" component will be whatever is considered sufficient to achieve the task at hand. A battalion as the "set" standard is a poor option, if a platoon is sufficient (ie: Tonga recently).

Where a battalion is required to deploy most often it is a single battalion group from the "same" battalion that is deployed. The only time it's NOT AFAIK, is in a situation where (due to our low numbers of battalions) soldiers from a particular battalion are required to deploy to more than 1 theatre (ie: 6RAR is currently deployed to Timor AND Afghanistan).

As to your "Joint training can only be done with a specific unit training area" I'm sorry but this is straight out wrong. What sort of training are you referring to? I've done a platoon level attack on the main oval at Gallipoli barracks Enoggera with a combined arms team formed from 2/14LHR and 25/49RQR!!! Corps specific training CAN be done almost anywhere IMHO (obviously with some limitations on the TYPE of training, ie: live firing etc), not the other way around. Simon9 can probably tell you about Charlie Coy 9RQR and the "Corps" specific training it conducts (or at least used to) in the back streets of Loganlea on the Southside of Brisbane!!! The "Joint training", you refer to is similar except perhaps when it's conducted on a large scale. Most "joint training" occurs during CPX's anyway.

They sent a particular force for a particular threat level and one designed to achieve a certain level of capability. Are you trying to suggest 1 Armd would have been more effective in Vietnam if it had been embedded with battalions all along? There is such a thing required as "concentration of force" in military operations you know...

"We are at war". I'd argue against that proposition merely because we are not ACTUALLY conducting combat operations. We are conducting low level "peace keeping" operations in Solomans and Timor. We are conducting "engineering" operations in Afghanistan, with Infantry and Cavalry peforming only security tasks for the "Ginger Beers" and in Iraq we have infantry/Cavalry performing security and training functions. None of the forces is actively engaged with an enemy force. Any contacts that occur are merely self defence.

This may be war to some, but it's a bit less than that to me. What America IS doing is war. Low level, perhaps but still "war". We are not.

We also have not deployed MBT's in ANY theatre since Vietnam. By this rationale obviously MBT's have no place IN our force structure, since we should only be creating formations that are likely to deploy on operations, based on current scenarios. If that were the case, we could leave artillery and armed recon helicopters out too...

Interfet was a brigade sized force we deployed less than 8 years ago (is it THAT long already, sheesh :shudder) and NO elements of 6RAR OR 1RAR deployed during Interfet. Neither did ANY of 4RAR (Cmdo) except for a few CPP staff. Whilst it was a BIG deployment and stripped us of most of our assets, 3x battalions remained un-deployed, 1 Armoured Regt remained undeployed a sqn of 2 Cav Regt remained undeployed, a squadron of Blackhawks, SAS, ALL the Chinooks etc, etc remained un-deployed. It would have been difficult, but we COULD have deployed a battalion elsewhere even then. We'd have probably needed help to support them (we needed help in INTERFET as well though) but we had the manpower to do it. Things are better now, for 1 thing ALL regular infantry battalions are at "high readiness" now. With the arrival of our C-17's and Kanimbla and Manoora our lift capacity now is much greater than it was then (or will be in 12 months or so) and our support capacity has been bolstered.

The additional battalions will only improve this capability.

A brigade sized force and a battalion group in the Australian context means 4 battalions, max deployed at any one time. We have nothing like this many deployed at present and while I agree Interfet massively strained our support capabilities and "equipment levels", it opened the "eyes" of the ADF and Government (to a degree) and many of the problems we had then, would not be so large today.

Apart from capability deficiences (which are ADF wide) I am not aware of any of the currently deployed forces "stripping" other units of capability. ASLAV's and Bushmasters have been enhanced, other capabilities (Javelin, "Scan Eagle" Mk 11 sniper rifles etc) have been acquired rapidly and soldiers have been moved around, but that is a issue with manning and funding levels, not a force structure issue, in of itself....
Ok, one can't really cal it a 'war' when the only 'action' Australian troops have seen is manning security in green zone and escorting civilians around.
However I would suggest that after US withdraws from Iraq, and they will, Australia's association will be remembered.

And this brings us back to East Timor.
What if the Indonesians decided to fight? All the units you listed were Australia's strategic reserve.

So what do Australian Army units train for? Of course training IS carried out at all different levels. However outside of the Pacific islands, anywhere ADF goes it would have to be a battalion based taskforce (even if incomplete). Quite frankly I don't understand why companies from different battalions would be used in same operation unless it is to get operation credits for the unit (which has always been the battalion in ADF and not the company).

Probably because funding has been better during Liberal government, and because ADF has not seen operations that called for actual combat (other then for SAS), it has not become apparent how low readiness the Army is. Speaking to Vietnam veterans I found out that all manner of equipment was gathered from all over the place to equip the first taskforce that went to Vietnam. Individuals were pulled out of their units and transfered to those being deployed for any number of reasons (fitness, admin, discharge, etc.)

If East Timor was an 'expereince', then I hope we won't have another like it.
Current Australian deployments are what I call 'friendly support' rather then active participation such as in Vietnam.

Its interesting how Australian commitment to opposing forces that would endanger our way of life has declined over time.
In WW1, only a decade after Federation, we sent six divisions with all the support to Europe.
In WW2 only three divisions were available, and these had to return to defend Australia against the Japanese.
In Korea a brigade was sent (eventually).
Malaysian deployment had somewhat more then a battalion, but somewhat less then a brigade.
We only deployed a reinforced battalion to Vietnam (with overlaps) with a swag of 'units', platoons and detachments.
Since then it had been companies (single companies) with the exception of East Timor (for obvious reasons).
The World may be becoming more peacefull which is why less Australians have been going to war, but then again, we maybe in for a shock.
 

FutureTank

Banned Member
I did. More armies appeared to be adopting wheeled vehicles "AT THE TIME" than abandoning them in favour of tracks. FT.
By the time Australia adopted the LAV, it had been a late adoption of a US vehicle, itself a late adoption of the European 1970s initiative.
As it happens, it coincided witht he post-Cold War adoption of new wheeled designs largely as an illustration that with a conflrontation with ex-USSR over, budgets could be cut, and the way they were cut with respect to AFVs was to put them on wheels.
Let's face it. Im major equipment purchases Australian Army has been consistently a generation behind for much of the late 20th century.

Sometimes yes, sometimes no. Depends upon the situation. More often than not, "penny-packetism" is not a good idea, particularly WRT to Armour, while with Aviation, it prevents the best use of resources.
Yes, but look at the OOB for Vietnam (only because it is more readily available). A plethora of platoons, 'units' and detachments for what was for most of the time a single infantry battalion.

The more you dilute units, the more admin staff you require.
Yes you do. So we agree on something.

I have been. I could have called you a bloody fool but I've refrained from doing so because, as I said once before, you amuse me, FT. I see a lot of youthful enthusiasm, some knowledge but little commonsense or experience.
Well, some people who feel insecure choose to become aggressive and abusive rather then identify their source of insecurity, and you display this even if you don't see it (an indication of the behaviour).
If you believe in something, enthusiasm is the way to show you are passionate on the subject, nothing wrong there.
True, I may lack in expereince, which is why I usually ask those that have, and always prepared to listen (and have been proven wrong before).

Do you mind telling me when I displayed a lack of common sense?
 

Whiskyjack

Honorary Moderator / Defense Professional / Analys
Verified Defense Pro
If East Timor was an 'expereince', then I hope we won't have another like it.
Current Australian deployments are what I call 'friendly support' rather then active participation such as in Vietnam.

Its interesting how Australian commitment to opposing forces that would endanger our way of life has declined over time.
In WW1, only a decade after Federation, we sent six divisions with all the support to Europe.
In WW2 only three divisions were available, and these had to return to defend Australia against the Japanese.
In Korea a brigade was sent (eventually).
Malaysian deployment had somewhat more then a battalion, but somewhat less then a brigade.
We only deployed a reinforced battalion to Vietnam (with overlaps) with a swag of 'units', platoons and detachments.
Since then it had been companies (single companies) with the exception of East Timor (for obvious reasons).
The World may be becoming more peacefull which is why less Australians have been going to war, but then again, we maybe in for a shock.
By the end of WWII the Australian Army had 6 Divisions in the Field. Also My understanding was that the Australian Army had a brigade deployed, which included some NZ elements.

Also I would make the following statement regarding Australia's recent deployments. They have been in support of Multinational/Coalition operations. At no stage has Australia faced a situation that is reminiscent to what it faced in 1942, with a hostile conventional force on it's doorstep.

The current stage is IMHO set more around politics than national survival. There is an enemy to be fought, and while it has the ability to hurt Australia, in terms of terrorism, it does not warrant a massive build up either.
 
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