This is a topic which good men can disagree strongly.
First. I hate the 313-ship plan. I think it puts money into the wrong priorities, it's focus is driven by the surface fleet in neglect of the needs of today, I think it is a plan that is bad for shipbuilders, and I think it is generally a strategic blunder designed for the war of tomorrow in an age when technology is moving so quickly that tomorrow's warship design might of been obsolete yesterday and no one would know better until the day of launch.
It focuses way too much of the shipbuilding funding on traditional firepower, lacks true innovation, accepts and disregards new concepts without evaluation, and restricts funding for future innovation. It ignores the war of today in an excuse to plan for the war of tomorrow, making assumptions with very little historical precedence.
Quite bluntly, I see the 313-ship plan as a cold war era upgrade using technologies first utilized in the Gulf War designed by Vietnam era sailors looking to relive the glory of Midway. It does virtually nothing to take advantage of the large lead in naval competition the US Navy currently enjoys, and does even less to sustain it.
The first problem with the 313-ship plan is the requirement for 7 DDG-1000s. I find the boasts that a 14,000 ton land attack destroyer will be a littoral stealth weapon able to operate in contested access areas containing robust, redundant, and survivable naval anti-access/area-denial networks not only unlikely, the suggestion barely passes the common sense test without just sounding stupid.
The second problem with the 313-ship fleet are the assumptions made. There are assumptions made the LCS is the best ship for deploying unmanned systems, that the LCS does not need to be well armed, that the LCS has a high requirement for speed, that the LCS has a high requirement for shallow draft, and the LCS will not require much armor.
Another assumption is the SSGN will not need to be replaced when the first 4 Ohio's are retired, nor will more SSGNs need to be converted from SSBNs, and this can be done while lowering the over all number of SSNs while additionally building SSNs without under ice requirements that was a staple of the cold war.
There is an assumption made regarding Marine Corp deployment from sea, that L-class ships are best replaced with unarmed or lightly armed, civilian manned commercial ships with no armor and large open cargo decks.
The final assumption is that every logistical ship will always be available, that tenders no longer matter, and that somehow there will be enough tankers to both supply MEBs operating at tremendous rates of speed off civilian ships and the fleet required to protect it.
This plan is stated to be achievable by taking funding from the naval aircraft budget, the same budget that would address the aging naval aircraft problem commonly discussed today, and that the money is better used by building bigger, more capable surface warships despite, for the first time in history, the average age of the surface fleet being younger by 4 years than the average age of US Naval aircraft.
Good men can disagree, but the 313-ship plan appears designed by competitors who hope for the US Navy to lose its substantial lead in naval capability.
What would I do different? I would do what the Royal Navy did after Lord Nelson established the Royal Navy as the most superior fleet in the world, and allowed the Royal Navy to rule the sea for almost a century. Following the Battle of Trafalgar, the Royal Navy was in the same position the US Navy is in today, well ahead of any future competitor in technological superiority and a numerical advantage. The Royal Navy responded to these events with wisdom.
First, they built several 1 ship classes to test new designs and technologies. Additionally, the ship classes that were built were not substantial upgrades to previous designs, and the total number of ships built per class was smaller, performed in steady production runs designed to sustain work for shipbuilders without breaking the budget. Smaller, faster ships were built and deployed, mostly to run down slave traders and deal with lingering piracy issues in remote colonies. I think the GWOT, substantial lead in blue water naval supremacy, the need for expeditionary forces, and the modern aircraft carrier fleets can be adapted to this model.
Build the DD(X), 2 of them, each of a different class. These two ships would follow a more recent tradition within the US Navy, specifically the USS Long Beach and USS Bainbridge, both 1 ship classes designed to test new technologies. While most people know the USS Long Beach was the first nuclear powered surface ship, most people may not remember the Long Beach was also the first warship designed to fire missiles as the main weapon. The Long Beach and Bainbridge were technology demonstrators for shipbuilding, propulsion systems, electronics, and weapons, and both were commissioned into the fleet to evaluate these technologies for future classes. The DD(X) has the opportunity to perform the same role for the modern Navy. The goal of the DD(X) 2 ship project would be to work towards a CG(X) deployable in the 2020s and a DDG(X) deployable in the 2030s, replacing the current CGs and DDGs respectfully.
While I would build the first 16 LCS ships, I would stop after 16 for a few years to evaluate the entire LCS, rather the littoral ship "Naval Truck" concept. I would additionally build 2 larger ~20,000 ton designs centered around 64 improved VLS cells but with focus on a well deck and a hanger. I would insure both ships have an expeditionary capability, but also the ability to develop the potential of a mother ship idea for littoral operations centered on a blue water warship.
I would also build 2, each of a unique class, SSGN submarines, while maintaining a build rate of 1 SSN a year until 2012, then increasing to 2. With the knowledge that the SSBN will need replacing in the next decade, and that underwater vehicles have arrived as a main element to a submarine arsenal, I would be a bit flexible with the shipbuilders and attempt to pay for half of each new SSGN with ONR funding. The SSGN(X) design competition would be to come up with an underwater superiority network that included options for the roles of current SSGNs, SSBNs, and SSNs., but focuesed on offboard systems and the ability to dominate area, detect and destroy littoral submarines at range.
The current fleet would be maintained to their full hull life when possible with the CGs and DDGs through modernization, to be replaced by lessons learned of the 4 technology demonstrators and 16 LCS demonstrators. The current Sea Base idea would be scrapped, replaced with variants of the LPD-17 that would serve both for ESGs and the Global Fleet Station concept, and variants would include an AGS variant or other shore bombardment variant.
The idea is to take advantage of the substantial lead the US Navy has over the near to mid term by building up the logistics forces, LPD-17s, and submarines for dealing with today's war while building technology demonstrators for future replacement classes of ships that would fight tomorrows war. If war was to break out before the CG(X) and DDG(X) are built, no one can argue the current CG and DDG fleet wouldn't be suitable, after all, it is the largest, most modern fleet in existance and unless something changes dramatically, will be for the duration of their service lives.
1 CVN would be built every 4.5 years to maintain a constant fleet of 11 CVNs, and additionally 4 LHAs then 8 LHDs would be build at a rate of 1 every 3.33 years. These two schedules would allow shipbuilders to plan ahead, knowing what is coming, and maintain naval and marine aviation carrier forces at a constant rate, but more importantly, to keep stability in the shipbuilding industry in an effort to curb or even lower costs.
Sorry this is so long.
