The more immediate solution lies in the network of allies, where local allieds are in a much better position to exercise control. The plus side for the smaller nations is the enormeous clout the US Navy has - in case the milder means doesn't convince.
Ths,
I think you nailed it right there, except as an immediate solution it also becomes the long term solution as well. One of the least discussed, but perhaps most important and most effective US Navy operations in the last few years is the work of the USS Emory S. Land in the Gulf of Guinea region off West Africa.
Using the sub tender as a mobile repair and refurbishing platform, the US Navy was able to repair several dozen OPVs for several nations, develop a working relationship with local Navies, develop a better understanding of the regional state and non state actors, develop an information sharing process, develop both a military and civilian relationship with local governments, and develop understanding of customs and politics in local ports; all of which boosted the US Navy domain awareness in the region without deploying a major warship.
It just so happens the increase awareness made deploying major warships to the region more important, see the USS Albany for details, but that is another topic...
If you read through the link I put on page 1 of this thread, the Naval Operations Concept for 2006 White Paper, it gives a scenario about the Global Fleet Station. In the example an Austin class LPD is deployed to a region for a multi-year tour to provide regional services to build relationships over a local area. I find the concept very clever, because it addresses a key strategic goal for the United States, but additionally a key tactical goal for the US Navy.
The key strategic goal for the US is that a Global Fleet Station provides a medium to build a "Unified Action" contingency before a crisis, as opposed to after one. Whether it is NGOs, other government agencies, or other military branches a platform with the capabilities of a LPD can balance a number of requirements quickly, and perform any number of tasks, both political and militarily, simultaneously to insure cooperation, improve relations, and sustain information networks for security as a commerce enabler.
But on the tactical level, it allows the Navy to leverage relatively small amounts of resources and funds for enormous gains through sustaining local OPVs, which as we know, after sustained training and utilization leads to eventual improvement requirements, thus eventually a major purchase for new equipment by the new partners. Those equipment improvements for smaller 3rd world countries will almost certainly be in the FAC or Corvette class.
I think it is a very smart approach in the "Sea Basing" concept, because it puts a good mix of tools in volatile places before problems hit critical mass, and uses common interest through local improvement to leverage local assistance to regional stability issues.
From an industry perspective, I think the concept develops a market that builds even greater incentive for the industry to develop smaller, low cost, unmanned sensor systems that are deployable on the FAC or Corvette level, which leverages the space on a 300-1200 ton vessel not for large, expensive weapons like SAMs or SSMs, rather lower cost deployable systems that tailor better to most present day littoral security situations.
