There seems no slow down to the Hellenic Airforce’s (Greece) arms build-up, with many significant aircraft/missile orders being made. In fact, Greek air assets appear out of proportion to the country’s size and international standing (sorry to any proud Greeks BTW). The procurement pattern appears to imply an offensive bias rather than defensive, with ever longer ranged aircraft, and enhanced strike equipment.
Bog standard paper analysis: Combat aircraft and related systems
The mainstay is the F-16C/D, about140* of which are in service/on order (at least 100 in service now). They are equipped with AMRAAM and Sidewinder, with 350 IRIS-T advanced missiles to be delivered from 2006 for the latest Block 52+ aircraft. The IRIS-T is an advanced short-range AAM analogous with the AIM-9X, ASRAAM etc. The fact that only 65 corresponding helmet-mounted cueing systems have been order suggests that these missiles won’t be employed on the earlier block30/50 aircraft. The block 52+ aircraft have the conformal tanks, giving them excellent range, and leading to press references about their strike tasking -contradictorily, having IRIS-T suggests an air-air role.
Of the older F-16s, one squadron of F-16 block 50s is equipped with LANTIRN pods for all weather precision strike and the other with HARM anti-radiation missiles for SEAD work. These two squadrons are less likely to be deployed in conventional air-air roles unless pressed. The other Block 30 F-16s remain credible although the gap between them and their newer cousins is widening, though Lightning II targeting pods are on order for them (15 pods, to be shared with the F-4 fleet), implying a shift from air-air to air-ground tasking for the older F-16s.
However, as if this latest order of F-16s isn’t enough, in July 2005 the Greek government confirmed the purchase of 30 Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft. This came as a bit of a surprise, as previous deals for between 60-90 Eurofighters had floundered and it was generally suspected that the block 52+ F-16 order replaced it. I would speculate that the Eurofighter will be employed primarily for air superiority, where it outclasses everything in the TAF fleet, until any future introduction of F35. The Eurofighter is likely to be equipped with an AMRAAM/IRIS-T weapons fit and possibly Meteor BVR missiles when they become available.
We should not forget the Mirage 2000, which has seen good service in HAF. The original EG/BG models are to be concerntrated in a single squadron equipped with Exocet anti-ship missiles (At least 39 ordered in late 90’s), although they should keep their respectable air-air capabilities (now way short of the later F-16 fleet). They are supplemented by 15 new Mirage 2000-5 aircraft, plus several airframe conversions, equipped with MICA AAMs (100 Radar-guided and 100 IR-guided). The purchase of MICA somewhat duplicates the IRIS-T/AMRAAM purchases, giving the HAF a broader threat profile –which is inherently expensive relative to force rationalization popular in other European airforces;bthe disadvantage of logistics being more than made up for by less reliance on single systems, especially those such as AMRAAM and AIM-9 which the TAF has first hand knowledge of.
Finally for the fast jets, the F-4 fleet is soldiering on in the strike role, whilst the A-7 is all but retired.
The Greek army deploys a squadron of AH-64 gunships and a few Hind (notionally in Cypriot colours). These are likely to be augmented with further attack helicopter purchases, probably more Ah-64s (idle speculation on airframe choices).
The last factor is SAM systems. The Greeks deploy an unusually wide range of SAM systems for a European nation. The older Hawk medium range systems have been augmented with Russian designed SA-8 Gecko as well as the much more advanced SA-15 Gauntlet system. And then some later generation Crotale systems, themselves highly regarded.
The Cypriots have some S-300 (SA-12) which are essentially under Greek control and represent a very formidably long range threat to TAF.
As if the S-300 wasn’t enough, the Greeks also have Patriot SAM. Again, a layered approach implying that they expect combat sooner rather than later (i.e. cost considerations which lead to fleet rationalization being put aside).
The question is, can the Turks compete -anyone know the Turkish situation?
*Not sure of attrition figures
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