







Something that I have been talk in this thread and Russia thread from begining of this war. Hydrocarbon is finite commodities, and market will find whatever supply they want in the end. Taking out Russian Hydrocarbon supply from Global market (through sanction and geopolitic coercion) is only for delusional people minded. Even if Euro land somehow manage to get rid of Russian hydrocarbon, they are going to pay higher prices for the alternatives sources and Russian hydrocarbon will find others that will take them.You cannot sanction any set of oil companies because “other” companies will appear to sell the exact same oil. The sanctions must be implemented on the source rather than distribution - that is, secondary sanctions - in order for them to be effective as intended, but that is not going to happen.
You’re right that oil is a global commodity and that supply reroutes when only part of the market imposes restrictions. But the conclusion that “sanctions don’t matter” doesn’t follow from that. Russian oil still finds buyers, shortages are avoided, but Russia pays an economic penalty for this rerouting. The Urals discount versus Brent widened, and profits in the hydrocarbon sector fell accordingly.Something that I have been talk in this thread and Russia thread from begining of this war. Hydrocarbon is finite commodities, and market will find whatever supply they want in the end. Taking out Russian Hydrocarbon supply from Global market (through sanction and geopolitic coercion) is only for delusional people minded. Even if Euro land somehow manage to get rid of Russian hydrocarbon, they are going to pay higher prices for the alternatives sources and Russian hydrocarbon will find others that will take them.
So no matter EU say, it does not matter. Because EU can not control Global Market, no matter how some delusional politicians in Brussels think so.
It is true that details are important.You’re right that oil is a global commodity and that supply reroutes when only part of the market imposes restrictions. But the conclusion that “sanctions don’t matter” doesn’t follow from that. Russian oil still finds buyers, shortages are avoided, but Russia pays an economic penalty for this rerouting. The Urals discount versus Brent widened, and profits in the hydrocarbon sector fell accordingly.
If the goal was to “remove Russian hydrocarbons from the market,” then sanctions obviously didn’t achieve that. If the goal was to reduce Russia’s income, they were at least partially effective, because Russia now sells much of its oil at lower net prices.
It’s also worth noting that grouping oil and gas together as “hydrocarbons” in this context is misleading. Gas is not nearly as fungible as oil. Unlike oil, most of the pipeline gas Russia previously sold to Europe could not be rerouted elsewhere.
www.mundiario.com
The goal, presumably, was to stop Russia's war efforts. In this regard the sanctions have failed. They certainly have done economic damage to Russia, though the extent of the damage isn't completely clear, and the extent of the damage hasn't been enough to shake the resolve of Russian leadership.You’re right that oil is a global commodity and that supply reroutes when only part of the market imposes restrictions. But the conclusion that “sanctions don’t matter” doesn’t follow from that. Russian oil still finds buyers, shortages are avoided, but Russia pays an economic penalty for this rerouting. The Urals discount versus Brent widened, and profits in the hydrocarbon sector fell accordingly.
If the goal was to “remove Russian hydrocarbons from the market,” then sanctions obviously didn’t achieve that. If the goal was to reduce Russia’s income, they were at least partially effective, because Russia now sells much of its oil at lower net prices.
It’s also worth noting that grouping oil and gas together as “hydrocarbons” in this context is misleading. Gas is not nearly as fungible as oil. Unlike oil, most of the pipeline gas Russia previously sold to Europe could not be rerouted elsewhere.
If the benchmark is “end the war,” then yes, sanctions haven’t achieved that. If the benchmark is “raise the cost of the war and degrade Russia’s long-term economic and military capacity,” then there is a good argument to be made that they’ve been at least partially effective.The goal, presumably, was to stop Russia's war efforts. In this regard the sanctions have failed. They certainly have done economic damage to Russia, though the extent of the damage isn't completely clear, and the extent of the damage hasn't been enough to shake the resolve of Russian leadership.
I imagine that they will probably encourage ethnic Russian's (from Russia itself) into the areas to strengthen their hold/claims, isn't that how so many ethnic Russians ended up in the various states neighboring Russia whilst they were all part of the USSR?The goal, presumably, was to stop Russia's war efforts. In this regard the sanctions have failed. They certainly have done economic damage to Russia, though the extent of the damage isn't completely clear, and the extent of the damage hasn't been enough to shake the resolve of Russian leadership.
EDIT: An interesting video from a Russian film crew documenting reconstruction efforts of Russian workers from Kaluga region working in Lugansk region, specifically the Pervomaysk (Sokologorsk), Gorskoe, and Zolotoe area. Zolotoe was one of the spots where Russia was attempting to encircle a Ukrainian element during the fighting around Lisichansk. The video is from February of 2024, which is ~1.5 years after the fighting ended in that area. Yet parts of the towns are still empty and it took until that month to start heating the school. Note while the director of the school interviewed appears to be a local, the doctors interviewed in the later part are Russian doctors working here. Plenty of the buildings are still damaged or even destroyed, even as some buildings are rebuilt. Unlike Mariupol', this isn't a PR priority for the Russian government. I think what we have in this video, despite being nearly 2 years old, is probably a better representation of the state of Russian reconstruction efforts in captured areas. I also suspect that ~30kms from the line, which is where this is, is about as close as Russian reconstruction efforts are going to get. Also, please note this area was only fought over for weeks, in some cases several months. Places where the fighting lasted years at or near the immediate vicinity will be much worse.
VK.com | VK
vk.com
EDIT2: And another interesting piece of news also about Pervomayskoe/Sokologorsk. The city administration website is publishing lists of apartments that are currently deemed abandoned with a 30 notice to appear of anyone considering themselves an owner. Presumably if they don't appear, the apartments will be seized and sold or used as some sort of state-sponsored housing. It's noteworthy that the owners are instructed to appear with a Russian passport*, or legal documents certifying a legal entity owns the apartment (like a company). They're also instructed to bring documentation that proves ownership in any way (presumably Ukrainian ownership documents will do) and proof that utilities debts for the apartments have been paid. Presumably utility debts is how they're tracking abandoned housing. It's not clear what happens if you show up with everything but no Russian passport, only a Ukrainian one. I was fairly confident that something like this would take place in annexed areas at some point but I'm surprised to see this is already happening. This is an area Russia took back in 2022, so at this point it's been ~3.5 years and people have had quite a bit of time to adapt. But I'm sure there are still many internally displaced persons from this area that haven't returned, but may like to at some point. All the apartments are in just two buildings but a quick search indicates many other such notices going back to August 2024. It will be interesting to see how Russia handles the eventual return of people whose residences fell under these rules and were seized. It's also not clear what Russia can do with large numbers of empty apartments, and presumably even single family homes. Even with the fighting, many areas will have far more housing than population.
*They mean internal passport, Russia's national ID system inherited from the Soviet days and used in many post-Soviet states to this day.
I suspect we will see some movement of population but I don't think it will be on a particularly large scale. I'm not aware of a deliberate Soviet policy of moving ethnic Russians into areas as part of a colonization effort (Crimea excepted), but I do know that plenty of movement of peoples did take place in the USSR. The USSR however also had a positive population growth. Russia does not. They can "colonize" relatively small areas, but the large territories they've declared annexed are probably a bridge too far. I think Russia will face demographic challenges in the newly annexed areas and this makes me think Russia will be willing to accommodate the return of internally displaced persons, provided they accept Russian citizenship. In fact I wouldn't be surprised if they seize the apartments, place them into a real estate reserve, and then hand them out to returning populations as a way to entice people back into the area. One of the problem Russia faces right now is that in a building with say ~100 apartments, there are let's say 50 actually occupied. But the rest are accumulating debts in terms of utilities, HOA fees, and property taxes. And they're often in bad shape, sometimes damaged by the fighting, causing problems for the entire building. If you seize them, you can repair them, and either list them for sale or use them as state housing. The same applies to private residences. If you look at Volnovakha for example, that town fell very early in the war. And it's been mostly rebuilt after the fighting. But here and there you see destroyed houses in the private sector right next to shiny new houses. The destroyed ones belong to people who either died in the fighting and no heirs have come forward, or people who fled and did not return. Leaving them as permanent ruins is obviously a bad idea, and this war is starting to drag on to the point where municipal, county (район) and regional authorities need to address the issue. Russian federal authorities don't always understand this, but the local ones do quite well. It's why Lugansk regional administration almost immediately stated that after the heavy fighting there would be no point in rebuilding Popasnaya, for example. And today I believe it's still mostly ruins and UXO with only some cleanup for main roads.I imagine that they will probably encourage ethnic Russian's (from Russia itself) into the areas to strengthen their hold/claims, isn't that how so many ethnic Russians ended up in the various states neighboring Russia whilst they were all part of the USSR?
That looks a lot like: We (~Europe) will fight to the last Ukrainian soldier.If the benchmark is “end the war,” then yes, sanctions haven’t achieved that. If the benchmark is “raise the cost of the war and degrade Russia’s long-term economic and military capacity,” then there is a good argument to be made that they’ve been at least partially effective.
According to the EC (bolding is theirs):If the benchmark is “end the war,” then yes, sanctions haven’t achieved that. If the benchmark is “raise the cost of the war and degrade Russia’s long-term economic and military capacity,” then there is a good argument to be made that they’ve been at least partially effective.




It's a minor point perhaps but the UK imported virtually 0 gas from Russia, any knock on impact to the UK is because of international price increases.According to the EC (bolding is theirs):
The measures are designed to achieve the EU policy objective of ending Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, through maximising pressure on Russia and using all tools available to diminish Russia’s ability to wage its illegal war of aggression.
Sanctions are effective and cost Russia, there is no question about that. Are they effective relative to the stated goal? That is debatable. If the benchmark rests where you put it, then the answer is probably yes. There is, however, the other side of the coin, of course.
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They keep signing this song about independence and rainbows. While it is understandably not kosher (or is it?) buying gas from Russia while it is waging war against Ukraine and used its gas as leverage against Europe, the supplies have been steady for decades before 2022 (disputes with Ukraine aside, which was more due to Ukraine being an unreliable transit provider). The current suppliers?
Qatar threatened to cut EU LNG supplies over sustainability law, letter shows
EU plans changes to sustainability law as US, Qatar increase pressure
Didn’t take very long to use the leverage. There was one other instance Qatar threatened to cut supplies to the EU last year as well, whatever the reason was, I do not remember. I don’t even want to talk about the Americans: imagine being dependent on the same source for energy, weapons, etc. Especially in the current environment and provided the latest national security strategy of the supplier (koxinga provided some excerpts and commentary in the US defence thread).
Furthermore, while I had previously talked about hundreds of billions of dollars (trillions by now) in subsidies Europe had to shell out due to high energy prices, are there any other costs to this new era of independence? Well, efficiency, they say, provided for reasonable gas prices. This is the efficiency they are talking about:
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These are real consequences of independence from relatively cheap pipe gas from and trade with the Russian Federation. Government spending is booming though! Another graphic:
View attachment 53979
Note the cost of Crimea annexation that is clearly visible on the RU line. I provided a much better graphic for this in the Russia thread a long while ago.
So yes, things are debatable and there are good arguments. In the meantime…
Russian MIC is still growing and so is its production (you fellas are going to have to use some type of translate from Russian here though):
The biggest, alleged, advantage that Ukraine had in drone superiority over Russia is gone and this is still work in-progress for the Russians and evolving:
Russia has centralized what began as a patchwork of volunteer drone groups into a state-backed system that is training pilots, ramping up production, and specializes in hunting Ukrainian drone operators and the networks that support them. Ukrainian soldiers and experts say that shift is rapidly eroding Ukraine’s early edge in drone warfare and poses a growing threat to its ability to hold the line.
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Deadly, elite, and scaling — inside Russia’s Rubikon front-line drone system
Russia has centralized volunteer drone units like Rubikon into a professional system that is eroding Ukraine’s early edge in UAV warfare and threatening its front lines.kyivindependent.com
Ukrainian troops in Myrnohrad appear to be actually encircled for the first time since the… about beginning. Appears to be a negotiation tactic for Ukraine when more or less real negotiations take place. They talked about their ability rotating (one-way) troops in, literally last week:
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NATO says Myrnohrad is "largely surrounded" and Russians control over 95% of Pokrovsk
A senior NATO official has said that Ukrainian defence forces in Myrnohrad have been "largely surrounded" and are reliant on drones for supplies, and has stated that Russian troops control more than 95% of the city of Pokrovsk.www.pravda.com.ua
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As Russia takes Pokrovsk, sister city Myrnohrad stares down encirclement
Ukraine's great fortress city of Pokrovsk has officially fallen — as far as Moscow is concerned. More than five weeks after Russian troops first started to swarm into the southern outskirts of the Donetsk Oblast city, Pokrovsk has been decisively overrun, although Kyiv still claims a presence...kyivindependent.com
Russian fleet of armoured vehicles is potentially larger today than it was in 2022:
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Analysis: Russian Armored Vehicle Fleet, 2022–2025
A production level geared for endurancesubstack.com
Russia is now arming Shaheds with air-to-air missiles:
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Russia is trying to hit Ukrainian helicopters and other aircraft midair with Shahed drones, deputy defense chief says
Lt. Col. Yurii Myronenko told Business Insider that Russia is testing new deep-strike weapons, including modified Shaheds and new models.www.businessinsider.com
The Shaheds are also now (confirmed) controllable (speculation long debated) and hit, for instance, Ukrainian mobile air-defense units. I lost the link, sorry, but Feanor will probably include it in his next update (or I can look it up if necessary).
Ukrainska Pravda posts articles about how Ukrainian lies and propaganda are going to cost the country the war (have to use translate of some kind):
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"Ложь нас медленно сжирает". Как правда становится жертвой войны
"Украинская правда" решила разобраться, из чего состоит пазл большой и малой лжи во время российско-украинской войны.www.pravda.com.ua
Reuters keeps posting Russian propaganda articles, now about Russian spare refining capacity to offset the damage from the UA strikes:
And about the dire situation in Ukrainian demographics. They call it population collapse (which I talked about on numerous occasions for years here):
Belgians (for a good reason) and Americans (for not a good reason) are set on keeping the Russian assets frozen and unavailable to Ukraine:
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How Belgium became Russia’s most valuable asset
Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever is unmoved in his opposition to a raid on Moscow’s funds held in a Brussels bank to support a loan to Ukraine.www.politico.eu
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US Urged Europeans to Oppose EU Plan for Loan to Support Ukraine
The US lobbied several countries in the European Union in an effort to block EU plans to use frozen Russian central bank assets to back a massive loan to Ukraine, according to European diplomats familiar with the matter.www.bloomberg.com
And
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And
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Ukrainian grain (and other) exports taking the sea route are likely to suffer greatly due to the actions of Ukrainians themselves:
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Thread by @exit266 on Thread Reader App
@exit266: War Risk Insurance It’s been a minute, let’s talk about it.⬇️ Ships sailing through conflict zones are required to carry War Risk Insurance. For a while when the Ukrainian Corridor started it was so expensi...…threadreaderapp.com
Italy says there should be no purchases of weapons for Ukraine while negotiations are ongoing (an indication of what is going to happen once some peace is agreed to):
Rutte says that one 2/3 of NATO members contributed about $1B per month for purchases of weapons since August and the pace is to continue (tragicomedy):
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Macron asked Xi to at least back moratorium on Russian strikes against UA critical infrastructure for the winter (with the currently ongoing bombardment Xi either has no say or was not very excited about the idea):
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Stubb called on Finns to prepare for an unfair peace in Ukraine:
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And so on. And I mean it because this is just two or three (incomplete, because I have much more) days worth of news that only I saw.
So what’s working and what’s not is up for debate and time will tell. Some things are pretty clear, but are either overlooked for a reason or the widespread delusion strikes once again.






I am just glad abomination junior is gone. He was and still is a walking, talking, sack of excrement.