Royal Canadian Navy Discussions and updates

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
It's pretty widely accepted that speed of delivery is one of the top selection criteria. The Vics, though recently upgraded, will start aging out in 2035. The RCN has a stated requirement that a new boat must be in the water and at least at initial operating capability by 2035. Hanwha has stated they can deliver 4 by that date (the first in 2029), whereas TKMS is only committing to one. In this respect, Hanwha has a clear advantage.

With regards to which is better, either one will be a vast improvement over the current fleet of boats. Between the Type 212 CD and the KSS-III, I favour the KSS-III because it has more volume for "stuff". However, there is some speculation on a Canadian defence forum that the boat TKMS has proposed is the Type 212 CD E (expeditionary), which would be roughly equivalent to the KSS-III in size. This was offered to the Dutch (and lost out to the NG proposal), but was at a very advanced level of design, so certainly a possibility. From what I can gather, it's essentially a 212 CD with a hull stretch, sharing all the same systems as the 212 CD, but with a substantially improved range and endurance.

The Type 212 CD (E)...advanced state of design...probably like NG's SSK derivative of their SSN....didn't exactly work out for Australia. Our Cyclone acquisition should have been, if it isn't flying, do not buy it. Same for subs, if it isn't diving, do not buy it. As you mentioned, delivery is paramount. Forget the "E".
 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
I suspect this decision will be driven by two factors: How quickly the first boat can be delivered, and strategic considerations related to trade and offsets. As Canada has signed on the the ReArm Europe initiative, purchasing a European boat might buy us considerable good will, and lead to reciprocal purchases of Canadian goods.
Delivery should trump trade offsets which is why I favour Hanwha. We have huge army requirements which both SKorea and Germany can accommodate. The loser should e have an advantage for the army kit. Global Eye should be our choice over the E-7, so some more Euro kit.
 
TKMS (but they could also outsource some work to their ally Fincantieri and/or to local companies, if the canadian gov agrees) can build SSKs with VLS.
The point is: does the RCN have a need for such systems? Are they ready to choose a VLS design and a missile?
Those kind of weapon systems are not cheap, even when we are talking about submarines (very expensive themselves) so Canada should really think carefully if they want to go with vertical launch or the more classical path of turpedo-tubes launched missiles.

The israeli INS-Drakon was built in Europe by TKMS and is believed to have a VLS in the sail.
There is a distinct difference between some limited sail based VLS and what the South Koreans are offering, which is a set of 10 hull mounted and large diameter VLS cells. It seems very unlikely TKMS will outsource work, as this has never been stated and Fincantieri is busy building submarines for the Italian Navy. The RFI released for this program specifically mentioned anti-ship and land attack missiles, alongside the sourcing of Tomahawk missiles for the River class, it seems the RCN is very interested in this capability. VLS allows you to offload missiles out of the torpedo magazine, leaving additional slots open there for the aforementioned systems alongside whatever other unmanned systems come in the future. These launchers are already integrated into the base design being offered to Canada, so removing them would likely be a hassle and fly against the MOTS mindset of the program.

I'm urprised NG wasn't downselected.

Maybe I'm seeing this with an Australian lense but with those three patrol oceans your politicians keep referencing, any boat selected ideally would need to be big enough to sustain prolonged operations involving long transits across each domain?

Is it the case that the TKMS Type 212CD or the Hanwha KS-III are the best available options from a series of bad to average options?

I'm not having a go at either design, but both likely excel in the Baltic or Sea of Japan, drifting at a few knots for extended peiods both close to their respective home port as well as their AOR. That clearly affects the type of submarine you would design and you can get away with a much smaller AND cheaper boat.

I'm not saying NG Barracuda is better than both designs, but the larger sized sub does help on many levels.

I assume NG after taking the Dutch order don't have the yard or industrial capacity to commit to the requested timeframes? From what I've heard one of the major fears was losing crew, knowledge and capability if RCN has a multi-year gap of no submarines, so the timeframes are a big issue (see RAN et al) forcing their hand at what is available in a relatively short timeframe.

There is of course the issue of operating submerged under sea ice for a prolonged period which usually is speciality of an SSN, but let's not go there shall we. Operating from Victoria then heading north past the Barents into the northern iced approaches sounds like a bloody long and difficult patrol, at slow speeds and not long on station when you finally get there. Doing it in a sub designed for small transit doesn't seem logical to me, albeit I of course may be wrong (from a person so far and not used to the region, nor only can access open source etc), but it may be the case like we've had over here, that if you had your time all over again you clearly would have acted sooner and more decisively to ensure the right capability is build/ deployed rather than this spilt milk merry-go-round we endure frustrated because ultimately 'we get what we get and we don't get upset' ...

Again just my 2 cents from far far away land.

Assume Hanwha would be the early favourite, but only just.
It very much seems that NG has their hands full with their current order book, between domestic and foreign buys at the moment. Taking on an order of 12 submarines on such an aggressive timeline is difficult, and perhaps the French have learned their lesson from Australia about biting off more than they can chew. Both designs have survived the down selecting process and are the obvious picks, they seem to meet all requirements and either would be a very capable option for Canada. The Koreans have a much faster delivery schedule and a yard that isn't totally crammed with other orders, so I am leaning towards them at this point.
 

Sender

Active Member
@CorvetteCrunch Agree SK is the likely winner albeit Japan thought they going to beat NG with OZ's first go around. WRT to Tomahawk, are torpedo launched versions still available for subs?
According to this, the submarine-launched Tomahawk is no longer produced, but work is underway on a sub-launched version of the NSM.

 

Sender

Active Member
The Type 212 CD (E)...advanced state of design...probably like NG's SSK derivative of their SSN....didn't exactly work out for Australia. Our Cyclone acquisition should have been, if it isn't flying, do not buy it. Same for subs, if it isn't diving, do not buy it. As you mentioned, delivery is paramount. Forget the "E".
I would point out that neither of these subs (KSS-III batch 2, or Type 212 CD) is actually in the water, "diving". The first Batch 2 isn't due for delivery until next year, and the first CD not until 2029. If we stuck to that restriction, the only subs of the original 5 options that are actually in the water would be the Spanish S-80 (barely) and Japanese Taigei Class. Had the Japanese government not decided to pull out, I still think those subs would have been strong contenders.
 

BostonMartin

New Member
Still not sure if the Germans will offer VLS cells, I assume not but I could be wrong. Receiving 4 KSS-III by 2035 would literally replace the current fleet and that is very attractive. But what about the stealth and AIP capabilities of the Type 212CD/E? How heavy should that count in the balance? 41 vs 21 days is a big difference... (if those numbers are accurate)
 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
Still not sure if the Germans will offer VLS cells, I assume not but I could be wrong. Receiving 4 KSS-III by 2035 would literally replace the current fleet and that is very attractive. But what about the stealth and AIP capabilities of the Type 212CD/E? How heavy should that count in the balance? 41 vs 21 days is a big difference... (if those numbers are accurate)
Not sure about the AIP or stealth differences but the RCN will have to evaluate this classified stuff. Delivery is paramount and SKorea can deliver, even more so now that India is likely going to commit the Type 212. The VLS system that KSS-III offers is another plus.
 

StingrayOZ

Super Moderator
Staff member
Is there any particular reason why Canada is seeking VLS/Tomahawk launched strike capability?
Canada has never seemed particularly interested in long range strike from aircraft or surface ships. Canada has not acquired LRASM or TLAM, and could easily do so. Canada also doesn't seem to have other types of long range munitions like JASSM o r JASSM-ER. Is there any reason why they haven't?

What are they intending to use it against? Where do they expect their subs to operate?
 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
Is there any particular reason why Canada is seeking VLS/Tomahawk launched strike capability?
Canada has never seemed particularly interested in long range strike from aircraft or surface ships. Canada has not acquired LRASM or TLAM, and could easily do so. Canada also doesn't seem to have other types of long range munitions like JASSM o r JASSM-ER. Is there any reason why they haven't?

What are they intending to use it against? Where do they expect their subs to operate?
A lack of long range strike weapons....Liberal kumbaya pollies, especially former PM junior! As for the future, who knows but having a VLS capability in the current geopolitical environment is useful if and when a decision is made to acquire long range missiles. Once the P-8s arrive, they will be another platform. I would expect most of the subs will be patrolling our coasts but Canada wants to expand Asian trade so some subs will be working with Asian navies.
 

BostonMartin

New Member
CCG will move from the Department of Fisheries and Oceans to DND. A better fit IMHO.

But they have no plan to arm the personnel nor the ships. Mainly to increase the defence budget on paper to satisfy NATO promises IMHO.
 
Still not sure if the Germans will offer VLS cells, I assume not but I could be wrong. Receiving 4 KSS-III by 2035 would literally replace the current fleet and that is very attractive. But what about the stealth and AIP capabilities of the Type 212CD/E? How heavy should that count in the balance? 41 vs 21 days is a big difference... (if those numbers are accurate)
Endurance figures are a bit useless as comparisons to each other without accompanying information to specify it. Endurance at what speed, with how many crew, on what type of power, etc. I have seen the Type 212CD listed as everything from 14 days up to 41 days, so I find any claims either way regarding the Germans and Koreans to be suspect. Ultimately it is for the RCN to decide and short listing both designs seems to indicate that both designs have more than acceptable endurance. One would suspect that the KSS-III is not that far behind in endurance, especially when it is a substantially larger vessel.

Is there any particular reason why Canada is seeking VLS/Tomahawk launched strike capability?
Canada has never seemed particularly interested in long range strike from aircraft or surface ships. Canada has not acquired LRASM or TLAM, and could easily do so. Canada also doesn't seem to have other types of long range munitions like JASSM o r JASSM-ER. Is there any reason why they haven't?

What are they intending to use it against? Where do they expect their subs to operate?
Our F-35 procurement includes $2.5B in associated weapons alongside the aircraft themselves, although it is to be seen if this includes stand off capability or anti-shipping munitions as described. Our lacklustre defence procurement and budgeting for many decades has precluded even basic capabilities, let alone excess capabilities like stand off attack munitions. Canada is interested in these sorts of long range strike capabilities due to the deterrence value and strategic options they provide to both the Military and Government at large. The RCN has been interested in the Tomahawk aboard the River class destroyers for quite sometime, there is rumored to be a purchase of HIMARS sometime soon alongside substantial munitions (GMLRS, GMLRS-ER & even PrSM) and the RFI for the Canadian Patrol Submarine Program specifically asks about the designs capability to field land attack and anti-shipping missiles.

With more money and effort going into procurement and planning, there is a want to have the strike capability that these systems offer. It allows Canada to make decisions of its own volition, and not have to beg its allies to undertake these missions on our behalf. It is also a valuable capability Canada can extend to our allies in NATO and worldwide as a whole. The world is becoming increasingly dangerous with Russia and China taking up antagonistic roles against Canada and her allies, having methods to strike back at these forces to support our own operations at home and abroad alongside those of our allies will be vital.

As far as how our submarines will operate, Arctic operations primarily around nautical chokepoints and near the ice sheets seem to be the plan. There will be the capability to do short duration under ice operations, but these are inherently dangerous for a conventional submarine and won't likely be done often. The same substantial endurance required to operate throughout the Arctic archipelago will also be used to deploy these same submarines abroad to Asia and Europe, to support our partners in their respective theatres. Stealthy platforms able to launch massed cruise missile or anti-shipping strikes against our adversaries is a potent deterrent factor against our adversaries.

CCG will move from the Department of Fisheries and Oceans to DND. A better fit IMHO.

It will be up for debate if this is a good change or not, as the Department of Fisheries and Oceans worked incredibly closely with the CCG and will be negatively affected by having their most important sister organization ripped away from them. The CCG acted as the primary transport service for DFO and their Fishery Officers, while the Fisheries Officers alongside RCMP, provided organic law enforcement capabilities that the CCG inherently lacks. DFO merged many of their own vessels into the CCG fleet when both organizations came together in the mid 1990's, so it seems questionable if the CCG will actually give DFO back their vessels, or be forced to work closely with an organization that is now under DND's mandate.

But they have no plan to arm the personnel nor the ships. Mainly to increase the defence budget on paper to satisfy NATO promises IMHO.
From what I've gathered, the Canadian Government cannot count the Canadian Coast Guard towards defence expenditure at this point due to the strict NATO guidelines as to what they consider "defence expenditure." The CCG has historically been a civilian organization and remains so, alongside being heavily unionized. Many within their ranks do not want to join the military or become militarized, so there will be substantial internal issues if that is ever forced upon them. I'd expect a very messy strike action/mass flight of personnel at the least.

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49198.htm

Defence expenditure is defined by NATO as payments made by a national government (excluding regional, local and municipal authorities) specifically to meet the needs of its armed forces, those of Allies or of the Alliance. For the purposes of this definition, the needs of the Alliance are considered to consist of NATO common funding and NATO-managed trust funds. The list of eligible NATO trust funds is approved by all Allies.

A major component of defence expenditure is payments for Armed Forces financed from within the Ministry of Defence budget. Armed Forces include land, maritime and air forces as well as joint formations, such as Administration and Command, Special Operations Forces, Medical Service, Logistic Command, Space Command, Cyber Command. They might also include parts of other forces such as Ministry of Interior troops, national police forces, coast guards etc. In such cases, expenditure is included only in proportion to the forces that are trained in military tactics, are equipped as a military force, can operate under direct military authority in deployed operations, and can, realistically, be deployed outside national territory in support of a military force. Expenditure on other forces financed through the budgets of ministries other than the Ministry of Defence is also included in defence expenditure.

Retirement pensions made directly by the government to retired military and civilian employees of military departments and for active personnel is included in the NATO defence expenditure definition.

Expenditures for stockpiling of war reserves of finished military equipment or supplies for use directly by the armed forces are included.
 

BostonMartin

New Member
Endurance figures are a bit useless as comparisons to each other without accompanying information to specify it. Endurance at what speed, with how many crew, on what type of power, etc. I have seen the Type 212CD listed as everything from 14 days up to 41 days, so I find any claims either way regarding the Germans and Koreans to be suspect. Ultimately it is for the RCN to decide and short listing both designs seems to indicate that both designs have more than acceptable endurance. One would suspect that the KSS-III is not that far behind in endurance, especially when it is a substantially larger vessel.
It's true that endurance figures depends on many factors, like an EV battery. Both subs would be an immense improvement and I just hope they really buy 12. It's easier to find/train personnel in the future than realise down the line that 4 extra subs would have been useful.

I suppose the RCN/CAF will have to decide where they want to put the focus on. My opinion is that the Type 212CD is superior in itself and better suited to patrol the arctic. "The Type 212CD integrates air-independent propulsion for extended submerged endurance, enhanced stealth signatures, and design adaptations for Arctic operations..." but the advantages of the KSS-III offered by the Koreans are substantial as well, the VLS cells and fast delivery could possibly be of critical importance in the near future.

Whatever they pick, I hope they listen to Topshee and decide by year end.
 
It's true that endurance figures depends on many factors, like an EV battery. Both subs would be an immense improvement and I just hope they really buy 12. It's easier to find/train personnel in the future than realise down the line that 4 extra subs would have been useful.

I suppose the RCN/CAF will have to decide where they want to put the focus on. My opinion is that the Type 212CD is superior in itself and better suited to patrol the arctic. "The Type 212CD integrates air-independent propulsion for extended submerged endurance, enhanced stealth signatures, and design adaptations for Arctic operations..." but the advantages of the KSS-III offered by the Koreans are substantial as well, the VLS cells and fast delivery could possibly be of critical importance in the near future.

Whatever they pick, I hope they listen to Topshee and decide by year end.
I think the Type 212CD is likely the more advanced submarine across the board, especially involving stealth with its new angular hull structure and regarding its advanced AIP/sensor suite. With that being said, the Korean's are apparently world leaders in lithium battery technology and may have an advantage in their battery technology over the Germans, while they can also offer a worse but seemingly still competitive AIP/sensor suite. It seems much of the sensor package is either domestically sourced or squired from Europe, and is fairly top of the line itself. The Germans can say their boat is adapted to Arctic operations, although I'd be curious to what degree it actually is and how much of that translates over to the Canadian Arctic.

With identical delivery timelines, I think I would lean more heavily towards the German offering. The Korean VLS is very appealing, but a NATO interoperable submarine out of the gate is a nice package. That being said, the current German delivery timeline looks to make their entire bid uncompetitive considering the pace that which the RCN is moving and the poor quality of our current submarines. With the current timeline, assuming the Korean boat can largely compare to its German counterpart and the VLS, I think the Korean's likely have this contest wrapped up unless political considerations come down to tipping the scale towards the Germans. Carney seems to have a substantial European slant, so that may be the case at the end of the day.
 
As people may have missed it, Chantier Davie released a video a few days ago showing off the work they are doing on a Polar Icebreaker for the Canadian Coast Guard, but also showed off what looks to be their offerings for the Continental Defence Corvette program. They deleted the video shortly after, but not before some people took screenshots. I thought these might interest folks, so I am sharing them here.

There seems to be two designs, one labeled 105 and the other 120. I would assume these refer to their overall length in metres, but I'm unsure. The smaller corvettes look relatively modern and stealthy, with perhaps some considerations put forward for northern operations. It features a 57mm Bofors, 16 VLS cells of some kind, likely 4-8 NSM amidships, RAS capable, torpedo tubes, a flight deck, boat/small mission bay, fixed panel array mast, gun control director, helipad of some kind and some section under the helipad available for payloads? The bigger design is a bit more unique, it looks to have both a mast top rotating array alongside fixed array panels on the mast. A 76mm gun is present with potentially some VLS behind it, a Millennium gun is mounted aft, I see what looks like NSM canisters amidships, there are more substantial boat/mission bays amidships, a clearly larger helipad, a stepped open stern for cargo and most prominently, a bow seemingly designed for some not insubstantial icebreaking capability.

Very curious that they deleted the video, perhaps somebody shared this before they were supposed to?

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Corvette 23rwqasda.png
 

swerve

Super Moderator
From what I've gathered, the Canadian Government cannot count the Canadian Coast Guard towards defence expenditure at this point due to the strict NATO guidelines as to what they consider "defence expenditure." The CCG has historically been a civilian organization and remains so, alongside being heavily unionized. Many within their ranks do not want to join the military or become militarized, so there will be substantial internal issues if that is ever forced upon them. I'd expect a very messy strike action/mass flight of personnel at the least.

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49198.htm

Defence expenditure is defined by NATO as payments made by a national government (excluding regional, local and municipal authorities) specifically to meet the needs of its armed forces, those of Allies or of the Alliance. For the purposes of this definition, the needs of the Alliance are considered to consist of NATO common funding and NATO-managed trust funds. The list of eligible NATO trust funds is approved by all Allies.
Indeed. Defence expenditure declared to NATO is often different from the national defence budget, e.g. Italy has been known to use money from non-defence budgets to help fund naval ships. NATO has still counted it as defence spending.

I think Japan's recent defence spending increases (not NATO, of course) are partly real, but partly reclassification of some spending as defence that was previously under other budgets, which both brings it more in line with how other "western" countries define defence spending, & makes it look as if Japan's extra spending is rather impressive. It's still significant, mind you. Japan's changed from trying to understate spending to squeeze it under the 1% limit, to trying to show allies how big a contribution they're making.
 
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