We completely agree on this. However, I lack context on how this is relevant to the sub-point about Putin not fearing NATO. it would appear that the reply feature is only saving 1 tier of responses which is unusual for this software.
You were arguing that Russian demands on Ukraine were evidence that Putin doesn't fear NATO...
It goes back to one of my points - what do you hope to achieve ? NATO invading Kaliningrad doesnt achieve anything. You mentioned NATO possibly invading to take nuclear weapons. That would require a massive ground invasion to even consider, given the size and dispersement of RU nuclear weapons.
There is no point in "nibbling" Russia. It solves nothing, it wont incite surrender, and it will only galvanize the RU people against an invader. And then ou are involved in a land war in Asia, which is something none of the western nations want to be part of.
You keep assuming present-day conditions, a unified Russia under effective central leadership, with a solid vertical of power. This is not a given. In fact it's almost certain that any NATO military action against Russia proper would come at a time when Russia is dealing with major internal problems that change the calculus of such an action.
All the NATO actions such as AG, Libya, etc were _small_ problems against nations that had no effective response. RU is not in the same category, nor will it ever be, not even counting the RU nuclear weapons.
Emphasis mine. I think it's entirely possible it will be at some point unable to provide an effective military response. Again I point to a fairly recent time when the entire VVS didn't have a single modern AAM.
Sure it is, all it would take in 15 minutes to review the available NATO forces before you realize - there simply arent the forces available to invade RU, while retaining any sort of meaningful goal.
If you cant propose a reasonable scenario given my points I posted before, then there is no rational fear.
Again you keep taking current conditions for granted. A limited intervention within Russia is possible if Russia's ability for a central response is limited.
A few bases in nearby places are not able to sustain a concerted effort into the heart of RU. How are you going to sustain multiple divisions into a hostile populace over long distances ? Air ? Nope. Ship ? Nope ? Long overland distances ? You think NATO as a whole has the tonnage capability for this ? I seriously doubt it given the state of EU forces.
I gave two possible hot spots within Russia, Tatarstan and the Caucuses. Neither is in the heart of Russia, both are accessible from an outside border, and neither require multiple divisions. Nor is a hostile populace guaranteed if the NATO forces pick one side over another in an ethnic spat. But as for sustaining multiple divisions into a hostile populace over distance, Iraq and Afghanistan come to mind. You've also seemingly taken it for granted that the USA is not in the picture.
You must be joking. A concerted effort by an outside entity into RU proper, is somehow going to create regime change ?
You keep ignoring the hypothetical example as a whole, taking a single piece of it and pretending it's happening in today's context. Consider Prigozhin's march on Moscow, but instead of it happening as is, something similar is happening in a far more divided Russia. The outside entity isn't creating the regime change. It's backing the party it wants within an already unstable internal environment. You don't have to outfight the entire VVS, you just have to keep them off the back of the rebel forces while they do most of the ground fighting. Maybe you insert some limited elements, advisers, SOF, etc. Maybe you provide logistics and weapons to the rebels. Maybe a limited ground element is inserted along side the rebels.
Why ? Why would NATO, the US or the EU care ? The distances are so vast and the payoff is nonexistant. Why would anyone care if the Tajiks or other group want ? What do we get out of it that outweighs the possible nuclear exchange ?
Why did anyone care what the Bosnians wanted?
Such action would have to take place in a context where the nuclear threat can be managed. Again there are a variety of factors. Look at the size of the Russian bomber fleet. It's already a fraction of what the USSR had. They're expensive to maintain, and they're old. They're also very possible to intercept. Submarines also can be intercepted and given the ASW capabilities of actors like the USA and Japan, Russian nuclear subs aren't exactly all that safe even currently. But we're talking about a scenario where Russia is weakened and having internal problems. There will also be undoubtedly some lateral contacts between Russian military personnel and western actors. You can get promises from ICBM unit commanders not to get involved unless it's a clear western nuclear strike or large scale invasion. But border fighting in the Caucuses, with an unpopular and unstable government in Moscow worth risking MAD over? Even at the level of governmental decision makers it's unclear they would be willing to do it. But even if they are, will the units follow those orders? And let's not forget with the improvements in technology it's possible that you can know a certain part of Russia's nuclear arsenal isn't in working order, and the rest can be dealt with if a launch is attempted.
Now you ask what the US or EU would get out of it. They could get out of it a Russia whose nuclear capabilities are disabled or severely reduced. They could get out of it a Russia that fractured and no longer poses a unified threat. They could even get out of it more reliable access to resources from an independent Yakutistan, or Arctic Republic, that bypasses Moscow with it's pseudo-imperial ambitions. It all depends on what happens within Russia. But we've seen two major collapses of states in one century, first the fall of the Russian Empire, and then the fall of the USSR. In the first case direct western intervention within Russia took place by multiple actors in multiple areas. US and Japanese in the Far East, British and French in the north, and in the south. The second saw no such intervention. There's an argument to be made that this was partyle because west of Russia was a fat buffer of independent states that were not aligned with the west. Intervening in Russia's Chechen Wars was not a viable option, no matter how much someone wanted to. Sure, nuclear deterrance, and the spectre of the Soviet Union had something to do with this as well. Many still perceived Russia as a fallen super power, rather than the new state that had emerged from the ruins, and were concerned with that. But I suspect the chances of Yeltsin nuking a western contingent in a confrontation over Chechnya were minimal. But of course no such insertion was possible. South of Chechnya is Georgia, at the time full of Russian bases and just coming out of their own civil war. But if Georgia is a NATO member, suddenly the relatively minor Pankisi Gorge incident can turn into NATO training fighters for the Chechens, and potentially declaring a no-fly zone over Chechnya.
Well, give us a concrete example of a realistic scenario. Otherwise its just paranoid fantasy.
See above.
Well, it sure works to prevent the EU from escalating weapons deliveries to UKR. No Taurus missiles and all that.
I don't think this is true. The west has supplied Ukraine with all kinds of weapons. I suspect the political considerations are the real reason, as well as limitations on numbers of arms that can be provided. I would be very surprised if anyone in EU leadership genuinely thought Russia would nuke the EU over missile deliveries to Ukraine.
Without RU nukes, the EU countries probably would of flooded UKR with better tier weapons and laughed all the way home.
This is fantasy. The EU countries don't have the weapons to flood Ukraine with.
You forget the psychological elements to being on the receiving end of 20KT of Tac-Nuke, or the considerable clean-up required afterwords.
I'm not forgetting, I'm pointing out that that's what it is, a psychological element.
How exactly are you going to destroy a RU nuke on the ground without triggering MAD ? You did notice in the UKR airfield raids, they didnt hit any Tu-160, right ? There was a good reason for that.
MAD requires a fully functioning state apparatus, a reliable nuclear triad, and the political will to use it. Again you're assuming present day Russia with it's current situation.
Exactly. Like the "in his '70s ex KGB strongman who will die in office" Putin. What happens after he's gone?
Small problems. Big problems. I cant forsee any reason why any western nation would want to participate in a civil war of a nuclear armed power.
There is no payoff worth the risk. The overriding sentiment would be "let Russians kill Russians". I think China would be far more likely to take over border zones in this case.
China would certainly be a problem. But there is a solid chance of intervention by NATO/EU countries if they can see a tangible goal and think they can get away with it. And of course if they have the capability.
