A better analogy is we are getting 30mm cannons into service on our new Boxers so we no longer need 5.56 Austeyer for the soldiers.
They are a completely different level of capability to each other. Both would be extremely useful to the ADF.
The RBS-70 should not have been scrapped/donated. It should have been stored so that it would be available in any future conflict.
The RBS-70 is still a highly capable system being purchased new, today, by nations.
The Ukraine war has taught us that even very old equipment (air defence systems for example) can be extremely valuable.
In war you need everything you can get.
I don't understand why the Australian Government seems to think it has to bury/sell/scrap most equipment as soon as new equipment is bought.
One simple example:
In a war with China we put small teams on remote islands, each say operating an anti-ship missile launcher or a HIMARS launcher.
A single RBS-70 launcher would give the team a basic, easily hidden, capability to deal with enemy forces approaching by helicopter for example.
That is not replaced by buying NASAMs. Especially when Australia is only getting TWO batteries.
And I was accused of strawman arguments?
A service rifle versus a vehicle mounted auto cannon?
Seriously guys this is ridiculous, while you can pack some gear in grease and sit it on a warehouse shelf for decades, other types of equipment have support requirements that require very substantial overheads in maintenance and training. This is not to use it, it is just to ensure it doesn't deteriorate and remains usable.
Even simple old gear such as the M-113A1 had ongoing maintenance needs that just about broke many reserve units. They required money, spares and personnel that just weren't available.
The biggest factor with the MRH-90 was the maintenance overheads. It literally became unsustainable. The Seaking helicopter was retired because it was an aging platform that could not be economically and safely supported with so many new capabilities entering service.
RBS-70 is still useful but what is the opportunity cost of retaining it?
One of the things, perhaps the single biggest thing, that the average person never considers is the support system and sustainment costs of a capability. If you can't afford to do it properly you don't actually have a capability at all.
It's not about the Digger in the trigger, it's the dozens of boffins and specialist loggies we need for other things that would needed to support it. Speed the capability out among Infantry Battalions and you quadruple, quintuple the number of technical and sustainment personnel required.
These are the same trades we need for all the new, highly complex systems entering service. Not just NASAMS, but Boxer, Redback, HIMARS, Hawkei, Huntsman, whatever strike missile we end up with. The radars, command communication and control systems, EW, drones, UAVs of all sizes, various UGVs.
Throw in local manufacture of multiple systems, sustaining and life extending aging and obsolescent systems we can't yet get replacements for.
And the big whammy, we have spent decades dumbing down or workforce, we are bribing, blackmailing and manipulating people to stay on in jobs so they can train and mentor the new generation. The small cadre of technically competent people are having to learn multiple new systems, on the run, so they can keep stuff working, introduce new stuff, all while coaching the next generation.
I suspect one of the reasons the Redback was cut back was no-one could workout where the maintainers for the planned three battalions were going to come from.
