A big part of RAN’s problem with Collins Class subs have been their own design choices and the modifications they have chosen to make since their introduction to service. It is those sorts of issues broadly across ADF acquisitions that have led to the current strategic imperative of “minimum viable capability”Not really. Australia has struggled to manage and sustain a force of six subs, with a significantly larger defence budget as well as potential pool of personnel to draw from. In order for the RNZN to manage to have a single sub either available for or on a deployment somewhere, then NZ would likely need a minimum of three and IMO more likely four subs in order to manage that. The RNZN would also likely have problems managing to sustain an adequate number of personnel to actually crew that few boats (a problem the RAN has encountered trying to sustain ops for six boats).
If essentially all the NZDF resources were directed to subs, then NZ might be able to manage it, but such a force structure distortion would play havoc with everything else that the NZDF needs or might need to do.
Subs are great ISR and anti-shipping assets and depending on design and armament configuration can also be great platforms to launch strikes. However they are useless at protecting surface shipping from aerial threats and likely would not even be aware of when merchant shipping might be threatened by many of the potential dangers to shipping. They also cannot replicate any of the capabilities provided by elements of the RNZAF or NZ Army.
If (big IF) Vote Defence does get sustained funding increases in real terms, there are a number of areas where more and sustained funding could be put to use. Unfort establishing a Kiwi sub force is not such an area because there are too many other areas which would need coverage first.
Let’s please be mindful as to where New Zealand’s Navy is today.The current Associate Minister for Defence is Chris Penk - former RNZN officer who pursued his dream and transferred to the RAN’s Submarine Service.
The capabilities of these amazing platforms won’t be lost on him - so I’d hope they’ll get a fair trial, rather than just from us internet heroes.
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The problems I was referring to had, to my understanding, nothing to do with the platforms themselves.A big part of RAN’s problem with Collins Class subs have been their own design choices and the modifications they have chosen to make since their introduction to service. It is those sorts of issues broadly across ADF acquisitions that have led to the current strategic imperative of “minimum viable capability”
A less bespoke design such as a Scorpene class (chosen purely as an example) in an off the shelf configuration” (as far as you can get in a submarine) seem to be beset by far fewer problems than the Collins Class have had to endure and thus require far fewer resources (and yes, budget) to operate.
RNZN will never be allocated the resources to operate any manned submarine squadron however so it is a pointless exercise.
Unmanned submarines however, may well be a different story…
Depends what you mean by the “platform”. The entire Rockwell Int combat system for one had to be junked, which was a major issue for the class for many years, the Haedamora diesel engines another and so on…The problems I was referring to had, to my understanding, nothing to do with the platforms themselves.
Also since this is the RNZN thread I do not wish to really take things too OT but if one looks back to the mid-1980's when tenders for what became the Collins-class SSG were requested or submitted, there really were not many OTS sub options, and even fewer that are of comparable size to the Collins-class. Even less than that are the designs which would be used similar to how the RAN appears to utilize their subs.
The three closest I have been able find are the Dutch Walrus-class, and the Japanese Harushio-class subs, or the ex-RN Upholder-class.