The agents were still huddled around him and the counter assault teams had already shown centre stage before he was let up and they were basically moving him to safety when he went for a photo-op.
Secret Service agents rushing former President Donald Trump off stage after gunshots sounding bangs were heard during a rally in Pennsylvania.
- Thread starter Sandhi Yudha
- Start date
The agents were still huddled around him and the counter assault teams had already shown centre stage before he was let up and they were basically moving him to safety when he went for a photo-op.
Too soon to talk about firearm's control the democrats were unsuccessful in getting the ar15 banned
www.nbcnews.com
What makes the AR-15 so beloved and so reviled
A rifle with military origins has become one of the country's most divisive consumer products.
Another loser that needs to grow up !!
Terran
Well-Known Member
I have been sitting on the periphery of this. Waiting to see what comes out.
Task and purpose did a video summary of the hearings on this incident.
in summery
So first up… The now former Director of the USSS I was giving benefit of the doubt to but she clearly was out of her depth. Her responses or lack there in if anything probably inspired more conspiracy theories than quieting. This woman is gave a master class in how not to go on the stand or talk to your supervisors.
Kimberly Cheatle’s testimony was remarkable in that it was bipartisan in its disappointment. The woman was an absolute failure, And the assessment from one of the committee members that she should be guarding Doritos was absolutely on point. (And comedy gold!) rather than her resignation she should have been fired and be applying to work as a mall security guard rather than taking a cushy Government pension
Next we have Director Wray of the FBI. Other than not understanding how a collapsing stock works. He was informative and concise (for a government Bureaucrat)... The same for Penn state police Col. Paris.
Col. Paris and Director Wray give us alot of information including potential ideas where the failures on the ground were (aside from the obvious lack of leadership from the top)
The Would Be assassin had scouted the event site in advance and before his attempt by drone this allowed him to identify the roof and easy access of it by large HVAC system on the ground connected to the building in question.
The building did have security coverage on the roof (we even have leaked chest cam footage proving this) however that coverage left its position (possibly to look for the very would be assassin who out take that position.)
It seems like failures of communications were involved. As the Secret Service and local police departments don’t seem to be able to talk to each other.
We also have a clear case of what Astronaut Frank Borman coined as a “Failure of imagination”.
It is 2024 and the US Secret Service has apparently not yet realized that Drones are a threat and for the life of me I cannot fathom how they could possibly be so dense. 6 years ago one was used in an attempt on the Venezuelan dictator.
That the Pennsylvania Event wasn’t Geolocked (software denial via FAA to prohibit access by commercial drones); that Event security seemed to not have Drone detection and counter drone equipment is a bad sign.
Consider we are watching a war on CNN every day where two sides are throwing modified hobby drones at each other loaded with explosives able to damage heavy armor and kill personnel. It should be clear that that is a potential means of attack.
Seriously there’s a movie where a whole sequence is Drones are used to attack the POTUS!! I used to dismiss that sequence as some writer’s imagination because surely the USSS has a counter measure for it… guess not.
Well on that subject. The assailant was able to employ such a drone but the Security lacked a drone is also a W.T.F.. there should have been some kind of overwatch looking for just this situation.
Outside of testimony on Capitol Hill we also know that People on the scene were living up “See Something Say something” telling authorities “hey there is a yahoo on that roof with a rifle”.
Yet The assailant was not just able to take up position but in sight of the Counter sniper team.
Col Paris claims that the assailant was on the roof for 3 minutes.
It’s likely as they (good Samaritans) were reporting to the local uniformed police about the would be assassin. They were telling each other but not able to tell the USSS as it wasn’t getting across the difference in command.
The Counter Sniper team as such were looking for a Shooter in the tree line and not right in front of them.
It seems oblivious but when looking through magnified optics you get tunnel vision. Had there been better communications or an eye in the sky…
How is it that the National Security Council could in 2011 watch half the world away The SEALs deliver 72 grains of retribution in Islamabad from overhead even getting a play by play, but the Security of a Presidental candidate in Rural Pennsylvania in broad daylight was limited to what could be seen on the ground in 2024? Beyond me. But still it happened.
—
I have until this point not used the names Donald Trump or Tomas Crooks.
That is because in reality on this I don’t give a rats ass about that in regards to this failure. This makes the U.S. Secret Service look like Keystone cops.
If you can’t see past Trump take a moment and imagine that it was Joe Biden or Kamala Harris or Obama. Because they are also people who do events like this. It could have been one of them on that stage and the degree of difference between the death and survival of the person standing at that podium is so thin that it could be measured in fractions of a percentage. Thomas Crooks didn’t miss. He just didn’t hit. Donald Trump literally dodged a bullet by a hair’s length.
www.nytimes.com
This photo by the NYT is of a bullet in travel having passed through the thin tissues of a human ear it maintains enough velocity that the shutter speed of the camera isn’t fast enough to capture it in a single moment but instead finds it as a motion blur.
The MOA of Crook’s DPMS AR 15 rifle and the movement of Donald Trump made the difference between a bullet passing through Trump’s ear lobe and a bullet severing his brain stem ending the Former President’s life graphically on National television.
Though Thomas Crooks failed to Assassinate Candidate/ Former President Donald J. Trump he did assassinate an innocent bystander. Corey Comperatore Fire Chief and family man. He almost ended the lines of others.
Thomas Crooks fired 8 shots according to testimony. Only one came close to hitting Trump and all his shots went into the crowd of innocent people. Crooks should not be viewed as a martyr. He was a terrorist. His actions were to take and disrupt the American political system by force of arms and dousing of blood. He had no concern of the families and innocent people in his line of fire.
If you can’t see that then there is something wrong with your moral compass.
Task and purpose did a video summary of the hearings on this incident.
in summery
So first up… The now former Director of the USSS I was giving benefit of the doubt to but she clearly was out of her depth. Her responses or lack there in if anything probably inspired more conspiracy theories than quieting. This woman is gave a master class in how not to go on the stand or talk to your supervisors.
Kimberly Cheatle’s testimony was remarkable in that it was bipartisan in its disappointment. The woman was an absolute failure, And the assessment from one of the committee members that she should be guarding Doritos was absolutely on point. (And comedy gold!) rather than her resignation she should have been fired and be applying to work as a mall security guard rather than taking a cushy Government pension
Next we have Director Wray of the FBI. Other than not understanding how a collapsing stock works. He was informative and concise (for a government Bureaucrat)... The same for Penn state police Col. Paris.
Col. Paris and Director Wray give us alot of information including potential ideas where the failures on the ground were (aside from the obvious lack of leadership from the top)
The Would Be assassin had scouted the event site in advance and before his attempt by drone this allowed him to identify the roof and easy access of it by large HVAC system on the ground connected to the building in question.
The building did have security coverage on the roof (we even have leaked chest cam footage proving this) however that coverage left its position (possibly to look for the very would be assassin who out take that position.)
It seems like failures of communications were involved. As the Secret Service and local police departments don’t seem to be able to talk to each other.
We also have a clear case of what Astronaut Frank Borman coined as a “Failure of imagination”.
It is 2024 and the US Secret Service has apparently not yet realized that Drones are a threat and for the life of me I cannot fathom how they could possibly be so dense. 6 years ago one was used in an attempt on the Venezuelan dictator.
That the Pennsylvania Event wasn’t Geolocked (software denial via FAA to prohibit access by commercial drones); that Event security seemed to not have Drone detection and counter drone equipment is a bad sign.
Consider we are watching a war on CNN every day where two sides are throwing modified hobby drones at each other loaded with explosives able to damage heavy armor and kill personnel. It should be clear that that is a potential means of attack.
Seriously there’s a movie where a whole sequence is Drones are used to attack the POTUS!! I used to dismiss that sequence as some writer’s imagination because surely the USSS has a counter measure for it… guess not.
Well on that subject. The assailant was able to employ such a drone but the Security lacked a drone is also a W.T.F.. there should have been some kind of overwatch looking for just this situation.
Outside of testimony on Capitol Hill we also know that People on the scene were living up “See Something Say something” telling authorities “hey there is a yahoo on that roof with a rifle”.
Yet The assailant was not just able to take up position but in sight of the Counter sniper team.
Col Paris claims that the assailant was on the roof for 3 minutes.
It’s likely as they (good Samaritans) were reporting to the local uniformed police about the would be assassin. They were telling each other but not able to tell the USSS as it wasn’t getting across the difference in command.
The Counter Sniper team as such were looking for a Shooter in the tree line and not right in front of them.
It seems oblivious but when looking through magnified optics you get tunnel vision. Had there been better communications or an eye in the sky…
How is it that the National Security Council could in 2011 watch half the world away The SEALs deliver 72 grains of retribution in Islamabad from overhead even getting a play by play, but the Security of a Presidental candidate in Rural Pennsylvania in broad daylight was limited to what could be seen on the ground in 2024? Beyond me. But still it happened.
—
I have until this point not used the names Donald Trump or Tomas Crooks.
That is because in reality on this I don’t give a rats ass about that in regards to this failure. This makes the U.S. Secret Service look like Keystone cops.
If you can’t see past Trump take a moment and imagine that it was Joe Biden or Kamala Harris or Obama. Because they are also people who do events like this. It could have been one of them on that stage and the degree of difference between the death and survival of the person standing at that podium is so thin that it could be measured in fractions of a percentage. Thomas Crooks didn’t miss. He just didn’t hit. Donald Trump literally dodged a bullet by a hair’s length.
Video: Our Photographer on Capturing the Bullet Streaking Past Trump
Doug Mills, a veteran photographer for The New York Times, was only a few feet away from former President Donald J. Trump at the rally in Butler, Pa., when the shooting started. Mr. Mills kept his finger on the shutter button, photographing as the scene unfolded. It was only afterward, while...
This photo by the NYT is of a bullet in travel having passed through the thin tissues of a human ear it maintains enough velocity that the shutter speed of the camera isn’t fast enough to capture it in a single moment but instead finds it as a motion blur.
The MOA of Crook’s DPMS AR 15 rifle and the movement of Donald Trump made the difference between a bullet passing through Trump’s ear lobe and a bullet severing his brain stem ending the Former President’s life graphically on National television.
Though Thomas Crooks failed to Assassinate Candidate/ Former President Donald J. Trump he did assassinate an innocent bystander. Corey Comperatore Fire Chief and family man. He almost ended the lines of others.
Thomas Crooks fired 8 shots according to testimony. Only one came close to hitting Trump and all his shots went into the crowd of innocent people. Crooks should not be viewed as a martyr. He was a terrorist. His actions were to take and disrupt the American political system by force of arms and dousing of blood. He had no concern of the families and innocent people in his line of fire.
If you can’t see that then there is something wrong with your moral compass.
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The world might remember Trump's triumphant fist in the air and urging on his supporters but he was nowhere near as tough as Teddy Roosevelt. Roosevelt was shot while campaigning for the presidency in 1912. An assassin's bullet actually lodged in his chest but he still went on to finish his speech, even working in the fact he was wounded into that speech. The bullet was never removed and he carried it for the rest of his life.
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
When I get a chance, I will watch the T&P clip in detail, but just a couple of seconds into the clip (right when it raised anti-drone capabilities) something occurred to me. It does seem that people forgot that at the time of the incident at the political rally, Trump was a former POTUS with a Secret Service protection detail and had not yet won the nomination to run for President. IMO this is an important detail that was/is overlooked because that difference changes some of the roles and concerns of personnel and agencies. Case in point, when Trump, as POTUS, would fly into areas in the US for rallies, at least some of those areas had temp flight restrictions imposed closing the areas for a 25 mile radius to all aerial traffic, including drone operation. AFAIK a former POTUS would not normally warrant such airspace restrictions because they can become very onerous absent a specific threat. Now as a major party candidate for the office of POTUS again, such restrictions might start getting imposed as a security precaution.I have been sitting on the periphery of this. Waiting to see what comes out.
Task and purpose did a video summary of the hearings on this incident.
in summery
So first up… The now former Director of the USSS I was giving benefit of the doubt to but she clearly was out of her depth. Her responses or lack there in if anything probably inspired more conspiracy theories than quieting. This woman is gave a master class in how not to go on the stand or talk to your supervisors.
Kimberly Cheatle’s testimony was remarkable in that it was bipartisan in its disappointment. The woman was an absolute failure, And the assessment from one of the committee members that she should be guarding Doritos was absolutely on point. (And comedy gold!) rather than her resignation she should have been fired and be applying to work as a mall security guard rather than taking a cushy Government pension
Next we have Director Wray of the FBI. Other than not understanding how a collapsing stock works. He was infinitive and concise. The same for Penn state police Col. Paris.
Col. Paris and Director Wray give us alot of information including potential ideas where the failures on the ground were (aside from the obvious lack of leadership from the top)
The Would Be assassin had scouted the event site in advance and before his attempt by drone this allowed him to identify the roof and easy access of it by larger HVAC system on the ground.
The building did have coverage however that coverage left its position (possibly to look for the very would be assassin.)
It seems like failures of communications were involved.
We also have a clear case of what Astronaut Frank Borman coined as a “Failure of imagination”. It is 2024 and the US Secret Service has apparently not yet realized that Drones are a threat and for the life of me I cannot fathom how they could possibly be so dense. 6 years ago one was used in an attempt on the Venezuelan dictator.
That the Event wasn’t Geolocked and the Event security seemed to not have Drone detection and counter drone equipment is a bad sign. We are watching a war on CNN every day where two sides are throwing modified hobby drones at each other loaded with explosives able to damage heavy armor and kill personnel. Seriously there’s a movie where a whole sequence is Drones are used to attack the POTUS!!
I used to dismiss that sequence as some writer’s imagination because surely the USSS has a counter measure for it…
Well on that subject that The assailant was able to employ such a drone but the Security lacked such a drone is also a W.T.F.. there should have been some kind of overwatch looking for just this kind of thing.
Outside of testimony on Capitol Hill we also know that People on the scene were living up “See Something Say something”. Yet The assailant was not just able to take up position but in sight of the Counter sniper team. Col Paris claims that the assailant was on the roof for 3 minutes.
Likely as they were reporting to the local uniformed police who were telling each other but not able to tell the USSS as it wasn’t getting across the difference in command.
The Counter Sniper team as such were looking for a Shooter in the tree line and not right in front of them.
It seems oblivious but when looking through magnified optics you get tunnel vision. Had there been better communications or an eye in the sky… How is it that the National Security Council could in 2011 watch half the world away The SEALs deliver 72 grains of retribution in Islamabad from overhead even getting a play by play, but the Security of a Presidental candidate in Rural Pennsylvania in broad daylight was limited to what could be seen on the ground in 2024.
I have until this point not used the names Donald Trump or Tomas Crooks.
That is because in reality on this I don’t give a rats ass about that in regards to this.
If you do take a moment and imagine that it was Joe Biden or Kamala Harris or Obama. Because they are also people who do events like this. It could have been one of them on that stage and the degree of difference between the death and survival of the person standing at that podium is so thin that it could be measured in fractions of a percentage. Thomas Crooks didn’t miss he just didn’t hit. Donald Trump literally dodged a bullet by a hair’s length.
Video: Our Photographer on Capturing the Bullet Streaking Past Trump
Doug Mills, a veteran photographer for The New York Times, was only a few feet away from former President Donald J. Trump at the rally in Butler, Pa., when the shooting started. Mr. Mills kept his finger on the shutter button, photographing as the scene unfolded. It was only afterward, while...
This photo by the NYT is of a bullet in travel having passed through the thin tissues of a human ear it maintains enough velocity that the shutter speed of the camera isn’t fast enough to capture it in a single moment but instead finds it as a motion blur.
The MOA of Crook’s DPMS AR 15 rifle and the movement of Donald Trump made the difference between a bullet passing through Trump’s ear lobe and a bullet severing his brain stem ending the Former President’s life graphically on National television.
Though Thomas Crooks failed to Assassinate Candidate/ Former President Donald J. Trump he fid assassinate an innocent bystander. Corey Comperatore. Thomas Crooks fired 8 shots according to testimony. Only one came close to hitting Trump and all his shots went into the crowd of innocent people. Crooks should not be viewed as a martyr. He was a terrorist. His actions were to take and disrupt the American political system by force of arms and dousing of blood. He had no concern of the families and innocent people in his line of fire.
If you can’t see that then there is something wrong with your moral compass.
The other thing which struck me, and keep in mind this is also based upon experience in emergency services, is that communications issues always happen, and particularly when the incident or event is a multi-agency response. As unfortunate as it is, this is just the nature of how things work (or do not) in part due to the limitations of technology and also in part due to the practical limits on effective span of control. If there had been some sort of unified command centre setup prior to the start of the really, then some of the comms problems might have been either avoided or at least somewhat mitigated, but I am not sure that the work required to setup such a command structure would normally make sense for a comparatively small event only lasting for a few hours.
Terran
Well-Known Member
True the former president doesn’t have the same level of protection that the active government does however. In Trump’s case a few additional things come into play. First he pissed off the Ayatollah. There has basically been a price on his head since Trump signed off on the order to send General Qasem Soleimani to meet his maker. The Iranians love drones.
Second although not yet made (at that point) Republican nominee. He was more or less the defacto. After the even Robert F. Kennedy jr the third party candidate was also given a Secret Service detail.
Third Geolock on drones doesn’t mean it’s fully restricted airspace. It’s just to keep low level drones out it removes the lowest common denominator.
A few thousand people were expected at the event and it was one of the last events before the Republican convention. So calling it small seems a little…
Paris says they were in communications with the USSS and Butler County Emergency Services Unit. The later had communications with the Penn state police via text.
They did tell the Secret service but by then it seems it was too late. It was the Butler County Emergency Services Unit whom identified Crooks as a suspicious person and attempted to locate him before he opened fire. But as at this point it’s in that last minutes till Crooks opens fire. Time was lost looking for Crooks on the ground when he was on the rooftop.
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
Accurate though. Compare the number of attendees and personnel to that rally with the number of spectators, participants and personnel deployed for a major event like the Boston Marathon, with ~30k runners and over 500k spectators along the course. Personnel deployed included 10k volunteers, but I could not get the number on deployed, standby or posted fire/rescue, EMS, or local/state/federal LEO's but I would expect the number of emergency services personnel of all types to easily have numbered in the thousands. Looking back at the personnel deployed for the 2023 Boston Marathon (and 10th anniversary of the Boston Marathon Bombing), personnel from 46 different local police departments alone were involved ahead of the actual race itself.
When an incident or event has a large number of personnel involved, it complicates most communications due to the limits on what is an effective span of control. When there are many different involved agencies, that complicates communication even further, partially due to span of control issues but also because different agencies usually use different kit and protocols which individually suit the various agencies' service needs, but might (in my experience, usually) not be well suited to interagency ops.
By my count, at least five different agencies were involved in security for the rally ahead of time and there certainly could have been more. I would be very curious to find out more about the pre-planning done for the rally beyond the site walk thru that the Secret Service and other agencies did in the days before the event.
StevoJH
The Bunker Group
In the US is there any sort of standardisation in equipment between police departments? Or is every individual police department, county sheriff, state police force etc free to choose whatever equipment they want?
Specifically asking regarding communications equipment, since presumably you would want some sort of commonality between local, county and state level law enforcement since in many areas jurisdiction would overlap.
Specifically asking regarding communications equipment, since presumably you would want some sort of commonality between local, county and state level law enforcement since in many areas jurisdiction would overlap.
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
Easy question with a rather complicated and not very easy answer. Please keep in mind though that when answering this, I myself do not have experience with all the LEO comms kit or requirements, so my response is coming from what I have run into on the Fire/Rescue/EMS side of things, plus some basic knowledge of gov't procurement as well as various laws & regs regarding communications and comms devices.
The first thing to keep in mind is that in the US, the FCC (Federal Communications Commission) has oversight including regulatory authority over all communications devices and systems, including RF spectrum. If one is specifically talking about radio communications, this will include the need for an individual or organization to have a radio license or licenses in order to broadcast (excepting for certain radio services where licensure is not required like CB, FRS or MURS). For emergency services or law enforcement, such requirements can dictate which specific RF bands or possibly even individual frequencies the service can make use or, how much power can be used (Tx) and in what area they can operate in, as well as some other requirements on the types of transmission (narrow band or wide band, analog or digital, etc.)
For those not already familiar with RF communications, there are a number of different bands available for use in the US, and various bands have different properties which might have one system preferable to another, at least for some applications.
This means that when when various orgs (including gov't ones like police, fire/rescue, DOT, public works, etc.) they will attempt to get licenses which will provide them access to bands and freqs which they believe would be useful to meet their communication needs, that they can also afford. The affording part comes in because the various services when purchasing kit would need to do so from approved vendors who would be supplying approved types of kit from approved manufacturers. This stuff can easily get quite expensive. A digital trunked HT (handy-talky) that operates on 800 MHz can easily run USD$7,500 for just that specific handheld, never mind the rest of the infrastructure necessary to make it operate or be useful. Granted that is not the sort of system that an individual dept. would have, but that might be a statewide enterprise provided by a state gov't accessible by individual depart and services within that state, or by certain major cities like NYC.
Using the incident in Pennsylvania as an example, IMO it would be unlikely that the radio gear used by the state, county & local law enforcement would be able to communicate directly with the radio gear in use by the Secret Service. Depending on some of the systems in use in Pennsylvania, there might be some systems which could be accessed by the various state and local agencies to allow direct communications, if all the responders were also kitted out with compatible devices. OTOH Pennsylvania might not have established a statewide system, and/or county and especially local agencies might not have the budget to afford to purchase and maintain compatible devices.
However, even if everyone who was part of security for the July incident in Butler PA had a device which could 'talk' to all the other personnel at the event, there would still be comms problems simply because once a talkgroup starts getting much past about ten people, it can very rapidly become so cluttered with chatter, crosstalk and/or stepping on one another that it becomes useless. Hence my comments earlier about span of control.
It would be an issue of channels, and SOPs too. Who gets to step on whom in an emergency? I suspect the coordination would be the bigger problem rather then bare compatibility. It wouldn't surprise me if they had kit that can talk to each other, but much of it is set up on different channels.
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
Typically a channel is either set at a specific frequency, or for more complex digital trunked radio systems a division from a frequency with the digital trunking handling who 'hears' simultaneous transmissions on that frequency. I would expect the Secret Service to have their own RF allocation (via licenses) which apply nationwide, so it would be distinctly possible that any PA LEO-specific systems might not be able to access that band or those frequencies used. This also be before any programming access for things like device encryption etc.
It should be possible (from a technology standpoint, if not an actual, practical one) for some sort of crossband or cross system repeater to be setup, which could receive communications from a device that is part of one service's system, and then rebroadcast transmissions over a system in use by another service. In fact the State of Connecticut had actually gone ahead and established such an arrangement, to allow on scene tactical communications between different services. However that can still very quickly run into that span of control issue where there are too many participants trying to use a channel or frequency at the same time.
I did do a little further checking and it appears that the Secret Service uses a RoIP-based system for protective details and other assignments however I could not find out anything about which RF band or frequency range the system used. In Pennsylvania there is the PA-STARnet which is a statewide 800 MHz radio system which sounds similar to NC's VIPER and South Carolina's Palmetto 800, both of which are digital, trunked radio systems. Now if the RoIP system used by the Secret Service is not also an 800 MHz-based system, then there would be no way for the radio systems to 'talk' directly to each other. However, even if everyone had an 800 MHz system in use, there would likely be hardware and software requirements which would need to be programmed before the devices could 'talk' to one another. Based off prior experience, the type of programming needed would not be something which could be done in the field, and would likely need to be done either by the vendor or manufacturer.
I don't know the devices in question, but a simpler radio set up (the kind civilian private security firms use) can typically be programmed in the field, if you have a computer, the software, the cables to hook up the radios, and time. Lots of time. I wouldn't be surprised to hear that coordination of comms was minimal where it could simply be done by a straight-forward SOP adjustment.
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
I can overwhelm or shut down systems like that pretty easily. Heck, operators have even done so accidentally. Also, depending on the type of radio some can actually be programmed in the field directly through a keypad on the radio itself (and yes, I have done field programming of radios for SAR and HazMat teams as well as others).
More advanced systems like those which are trunked and/or include decent encryption are for good reason not directly programmable by users. Use of proprietary connectors, cabling and software (which itself is also not available for purchase by the public) and the costs for such systems impose restrictions on who and how changes in programming can be done.
One issue with SOP's though is that most individual agencies seem to have not only their own SOP's, but also often use their own code systems, despite DHS strongly advocating for communications using plain language. TBH this is a bit of a sore point for me, because I have run radio nets where suddenly responders starting 'talking' using their specific department's codes and I had NFI what they were talking about or asking for. Not a good situation to have a deployed team in the field suddenly calling something in that is meaningless to the person who can get additional resources to them.
I spent the earlier part of my uniformed career, working on digital trunked radio systems for public safety (European standards such as TETRA / TETRAPOL) as well as participating and planning the comms plans for large scaled multi-days operations and exercises. I don't work on US systems but APCO /P25 is commonly used among LEO there.
Regulatory authorities in developed countries have very roburst spectrum management rules, and specifically for a category known as PMR or professional/public mobile radio, which is typically used for public security. Common Public Safety - The RadioReference Wiki
Chances of a frequency collision is low if everyone plays by the book. Digital trunked systems are widely used since the late 80s, using either FDM (e.g TETRAPOL) / TDM (e.g TETRA) to maximise the limited spectrum (efficiency).
If there are really dissimilar radio frequencies, most forces should have identified and work out something call a radio patch plan. The comms plan should clearly map out the spectrums and channels or talkgroups (the PMR term), patching if required, way in advance.
At least, that was how I was trained.
edit: I forgot to add, pre-ops/deployment, there should be an on-site recce. Comms plans only the operations side of the ops. On-site, there are potential screw ups due to physical infrastructure that could affect transmission. The recce is to identify such obstructions/blindspots and if needed, we have to plant reblow or signal boosters to get around the problem. It gets tricky in urban environment or areas with high concentration of steel (e.g factories, refineries)
Regulatory authorities in developed countries have very roburst spectrum management rules, and specifically for a category known as PMR or professional/public mobile radio, which is typically used for public security. Common Public Safety - The RadioReference Wiki
Chances of a frequency collision is low if everyone plays by the book. Digital trunked systems are widely used since the late 80s, using either FDM (e.g TETRAPOL) / TDM (e.g TETRA) to maximise the limited spectrum (efficiency).
If there are really dissimilar radio frequencies, most forces should have identified and work out something call a radio patch plan. The comms plan should clearly map out the spectrums and channels or talkgroups (the PMR term), patching if required, way in advance.
At least, that was how I was trained.
edit: I forgot to add, pre-ops/deployment, there should be an on-site recce. Comms plans only the operations side of the ops. On-site, there are potential screw ups due to physical infrastructure that could affect transmission. The recce is to identify such obstructions/blindspots and if needed, we have to plant reblow or signal boosters to get around the problem. It gets tricky in urban environment or areas with high concentration of steel (e.g factories, refineries)
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StevoJH
The Bunker Group
Presumably you don't put everyone in the same talk group/channel.
Each agency might have its own discrete channel, but I would assume that all it takes to co-ordinate from that point is for one person from each net to be in the same room/van/tent as whoever the co-ordinating authority is (presumably the secret service) to pass messages?
At least for an ad-hoc solution that only needs to work for an hour or two.
Each agency might have its own discrete channel, but I would assume that all it takes to co-ordinate from that point is for one person from each net to be in the same room/van/tent as whoever the co-ordinating authority is (presumably the secret service) to pass messages?
At least for an ad-hoc solution that only needs to work for an hour or two.
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
If you are talking about directed nets (i.e. one with a net control) then having a comms facility (room, van, tent, trailer, whatever) then having the respective net controls col-located and appropriately kitted could have that kind of coordination potentially. However, it also depends a bit on the infrastructure and architecture of the radio system(s) being used. Most US emergency services will be used to operating in directed nets, whether they realize that is what they are doing or not, simply because when the responders are making radio calls, they are almost always calling into a system to connect to some sort of dispatcher who is effectively the net control. Depending on the responders, their radios and radio systems might be connecting to an area radio tower which is monitored by dispatcher in an E-911 centre, EOC, or a police or fire dispatch centre who would be well offsite.
Since we still do not know whether or not the Butler Township, Beaver County and Butler County had access to the PA-STARnet (and again, they might not have due to equipment costs), it becomes rather difficult to figure out what potential options were available for any comm plan. Ideally, all PA personnel (local, county and state) would have had access to PA-STARnet and could then have been grouped together into talkgroups of 3-7 personnel, with the ability to have all the personnel receive emergency broadcasts from their net regardless of which talkgroup they were in.
However it is also possible that due to limitations imposed by the radio systems the different agencies used, the talkgroups had to be broken up by agency, with each talkgroup needing their own net control, some of whom might not have been able to be onsite or nearby. Unfortunately this is not an uncommon occurrence and is one of the areas where problems and delays in communications and relaying information often occur. A hypothetical example which could occurred in the Butler PA incident would go something like this. A Butler Township LEO spots someone/something suspicious and calls into his dispatch to advise before going to investigate. Said dispatcher would likely be offsite (and possibly shared with the Butler County law enforcement (which appear to answer to the DA, not Sheriff), as E911 services for the township and county are handled by the county 911 system) and then the dispatcher might be able to make a radio call over PA-STARnet to alert other agencies, or might have to then make phone calls to advise outside agencies of what their personnel are doing. Side note, I looked at the Butler Township Muni building which also houses their police department and I did not spot any obvious radio antennae or tower, so there might be a dispatch centre housed within but connected to offsite towers via a hardline, or the township commo facility might be somewhere else entirely.
However, this also starts to get into what I was referring to when I mentioned possible span of control issues and how this could be a problem for an event this small. With the potential need for five (or more) distinct radio nets which might each need a net control, would the organizers of the rally bothered to coordinate with the Secret Service and all first responder stakeholder agencies to develop the kind of comms plan needed, as well as arranging the numbers of personnel and kit?
Given that this was held at an outdoor site, I tend to think the answer was, "no."
Given that SS needs to run their ops on a regular basis, they should have already a standard comms plan for their own deployment purpose. That means admin nets/talkgroups, ops net/talkgroup, linked to their own C&C.
This should be independent of any local comms for opsec as well as ease of deployment. As for local forces, the simple way is just to embed a SS cell within the local LEO's C&C and this guy/cell will hold the SS comms devices and function as a bridge. This will avoid messing around with local comms, patching and so on.
This should be independent of any local comms for opsec as well as ease of deployment. As for local forces, the simple way is just to embed a SS cell within the local LEO's C&C and this guy/cell will hold the SS comms devices and function as a bridge. This will avoid messing around with local comms, patching and so on.
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
It would make sense for the Secret Service to have their own standardized comms plans, particularly for protective details which deploy away from protected sites. It would also make sense for the Secret Service to have comms personnel embedded with 'local' agencies to avoid some of the issues which can arise when attempting to interface with external radio systems.
Not entirely sure though that such efforts were thought of or put into action though. Reporting on recent security breaches and failures by the Secret Service over the last ~15 years give or take suggest that there are and certainly have been some issues. Apparently during one of the breaches during one of Obama's terms in office, there was an intruder who was observed entering the Whitehouse grounds but that report did not get relayed because someone apparently was holding the PTT down when the Secret Service personnel making the observation attempted to transmit the warning.