Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0

[Joe Black]

I don't understand why we constantly look past a "Son of Collins" build as an interim. Instead of doing LOTE, just build a couple of new Collins with all the improvment designated as part of the LOTE. Leverage Kockum's expertise in things like the plug-in sections for additional capabilities, etc.

It would take the focus away from AUKUS SSN, in fact, it makes more sense than trying to keep the existing afloat - pun intended, as long as possible into the 2040s.

 

[Armchair]

If the main objective was to maintain USN Virginias in Australia, we should have sought to build or buy Virginias. I don't understand why this could not have been done similar to the F35 program, with Australian firms contributing components to US Virginia production, perhaps building modules at ASC for final assembly in the USA, then getting some of the resulting SSNs. Setting out to learn all about Virginias, then switching to building the product of a different industry, seems risky and wasteful to me. Now that we know the USA is continuing with Virginia Block VI construction well into the 2040s, I don't see a reason we could not do the same. The design risk would be eliminated.

i think the main objective was to have a sovereign submarine capability and industry.
As I understand it, it is against US law for USN vessels to be built outside the US, I suspect that would prevent building modules in Australia. In any case we don’t know that the US is, or would be willing, to have Virginias built in Australia (even for use by Australia). The British pathway (and possibly a French one) was on the table.

I also question why we need 8 SSNs? That seemed to be part of the original Morrison announcement without any Navy analysis to back it up. UK and France only have 7 and 6 SSNs respectively. There is provision for Australia to first get 3 to 5 Virginias under AUKUS. If the RAN ended up with "just" 6 Virginias, I suspect that would be perfectly adequate, allowing a squadron of 3 on each coast. That force would easily be equivalent in capability to the previously proposed 12 Attack Class SSKs, with far greater range and additional capabilities via VLS tubes.

Another excellent question but of course none of us know/ can reveal the actual force structure requirements of the RAN but I don’t see why the force structure of two powers in the 2020s should tell us much about Australian requirements in the 2040s. In broad terms the number of platforms is about delivering a capability to achieve effects. Nuclear powers with aircraft carriers have other ways to achieve those that the ADF does not.

Edit added. Also we don’t know that the capability of the 12 Attack class was adequate so it may not be an appropriate baseline.

 

[hauritz]

I don't understand why we constantly look past a "Son of Collins" build as an interim. Instead of doing LOTE, just build a couple of new Collins with all the improvment designated as part of the LOTE. Leverage Kockum's expertise in things like the plug-in sections for additional capabilities, etc.

It would take the focus away from AUKUS SSN, in fact, it makes more sense than trying to keep the existing afloat - pun intended, as long as possible into the 2040s.

With a Trump presidency looking like almost a certainty at this stage we will likely find out in the next 12 months or so what the future of the AUKUS SSN will be. Might yet have a few more twists in the tale.

As far as the Colins LOTE is concerned recent reports of the higher than expected levels of corossion has ANZAC TRANSCAP vibes about it.

 

[Stampede]

Purely a personal view, I have had reservations myself about the AUKUS "optimal pathway" since it was announced in March 2023. From a cost and risk perspective it does not look optimal. It is very complicated, and places huge loads on the future RAN if any step fails, while assuming future governments will continue to fund it heavily. I support the idea of the RAN getting SSNs, but I perceive we are doing it in a slow and risky way.

My first concern is that we are getting both Virginia and SSN AUKUS SSNs, requiring the RAN to maintain two different classes of SSN, built by different supply chains. This is a huge challenge. It means different spare parts, equipment, maintenance procedures, safety protocols, crew training, maintenance staff training, training facilities (e.g. simulators). We should have picked one and stuck to it.

If the main objective was to maintain USN Virginias in Australia, we should have sought to build or buy Virginias. I don't understand why this could not have been done similar to the F35 program, with Australian firms contributing components to US Virginia production, perhaps building modules at ASC for final assembly in the USA, then getting some of the resulting SSNs. Setting out to learn all about Virginias, then switching to building the product of a different industry, seems risky and wasteful to me. Now that we know the USA is continuing with Virginia Block VI construction well into the 2040s, I don't see a reason we could not do the same. The design risk would be eliminated.

My second concern is with the design of SSN AUKUS in UK. In an operational sense, it is not clear to me that the RN and RAN's operational requirements will be the same. I doubt we need an ice -strengthened fin for example. We need something designed to operate optimally in warmer waters. It is much larger and probably more expensive, to accomodate the PWR 3 reactor. I question whether the RAN has internal technical experts that can meaningfully contribute to the design process. Few countries do.

I also question why we need 8 SSNs? That seemed to be part of the original Morrison announcement without any Navy analysis to back it up. UK and France only have 7 and 6 SSNs respectively. There is provision for Australia to first get 3 to 5 Virginias under AUKUS. If the RAN ended up with "just" 6 Virginias, I suspect that would be perfectly adequate, allowing a squadron of 3 on each coast. That force would easily be equivalent in capability to the previously proposed 12 Attack Class SSKs, with far greater range and additional capabilities via VLS tubes.

The SSN thing certainly has its merits,but its not without some concerns.
It’s more than a military platform, it’s a political handshake like no other.
A bold commitment.


Sub numbers going forward could be anything with the time lines involved.
What are we looking at….. maybe 6 SSN by the late 2040’s if we follow the current script which of course we won’t.
History tells us things change

As for Virginia’s and SSN AUKUS ,it does look a bit clunky.

Would not be surprised if we get 4 to 6
Virginias,no AUKUS sub and that’s it

Army and Air Force will need some capital investment within that time frame and that will need to come from somewhere.

Cheers S

 

[Scott Elaurant]

Would not be surprised if we get 4 to 6
Virginias,no AUKUS sub and that’s it

If we ended up with that, combined with the ability to reliably crew, maintain and operate them, I'd be fine with that. So would most navies.

 

[Scott Elaurant]

i think the main objective was to have a sovereign submarine capability and industry.
As I understand it, it is against US law for USN vessels to be built outside the US, I suspect that would prevent building modules in Australia. In any case we don’t know that the US is, or would be willing, to have Virginias built in Australia (even for use by Australia). The British pathway (and possibly a French one) was on the table.

Fair point, although I though various US laws were being changed to permit RAN Virginias under AUKUS. If no Australian content going into USN vessels was permitted, ASC building Virginia Blk IV or VI modules with final assembly in USA would still seem to be possible. The critical Virginia reactor modules would have to be built in USA, but the rest of the boat, including HS100 high strength steel hulls, could reliably be built in Australia.

 

[iambuzzard]

i think the main objective was to have a sovereign submarine capability and industry.
As I understand it, it is against US law for USN vessels to be built outside the US, I suspect that would prevent building modules in Australia. In any case we don’t know that the US is, or would be willing, to have Virginias built in Australia (even for use by Australia). The British pathway (and possibly a French one) was on the table.


Another excellent question but of course none of us know/ can reveal the actual force structure requirements of the RAN but I don’t see why the force structure of two powers in the 2020s should tell us much about Australian requirements in the 2040s. In broad terms the number of platforms is about delivering a capability to achieve effects. Nuclear powers with aircraft carriers have other ways to achieve those that the ADF does not.

Edit added. Also we don’t know that the capability of the 12 Attack class was adequate so it may not be an appropriate baseline.

I understand the US laws but how did we build two OHP frigates here under that?

 

[Todjaeger]

I understand the US laws but how did we build two OHP frigates here under that?

The Adelaide-class FFG's (Australianized Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates) were/are conventionally powered, no need for HEU reactors. At present Australia lacks a nuclear industry apart from some research and nuclear medicine reactors AFAIK. This in turn means that Australia really has no way of building a nuclear powerplant for a sub domestically.

The need to source reactors from overseas, and realistically only the US or the UK could potentially provide for Australian SSN reactor needs, complicates things from a number of angles.

 

[iambuzzard]

The Adelaide-class FFG's (Australianized Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates) were/are conventionally powered, no need for HEU reactors. At present Australia lacks a nuclear industry apart from some research and nuclear medicine reactors AFAIK. This in turn means that Australia really has no way of building a nuclear powerplant for a sub domestically.

The need to source reactors from overseas, and realistically only the US or the UK could potentially provide for Australian SSN reactor needs, complicates things from a number of angles.

I understand the requirement for reactors, etc in the US, but do the laws preclude building conventionally powered US designed warships for overseas navies or does it restrict US Navy warships only to be built in the US for security reasons?

 

[Armchair]

I understand the US laws but how did we build two OHP frigates here under that?

I am not sure if this is what you were asking. But the Australian OHPs were not built in Australia for the US armed forces. They were built for the RAN.

 

[Armchair]

I understand the requirement for reactors, etc in the US, but do the laws preclude building conventionally powered US designed warships for overseas navies or does it restrict US Navy warships only to be built in the US for security reasons?

there are US laws restricting technology transfer that are relevant to Australia and everywhere else Including conventional warships.
The security rationale for the restrictions on foreign built ships is mainly about the security of the US defence industry (but we are moving outside RAN matters).

 

[Todjaeger]

I understand the requirement for reactors, etc in the US, but do the laws preclude building conventionally powered US designed warships for overseas navies or does it restrict US Navy warships only to be built in the US for security reasons?

There might be several questions that you are asking about, not entirely sure about this. There are US laws which impact foreign builds of US designed military and naval kit, including warships. US laws are applicable in this case because the designs are US IP and I believe in even can extend to derivative designs in some cases. ITARS can be a confusing thing.

Theoretically, it would be possible for Australia or an Australian shipyard to have a US designed warship (or a warship designed by another nation but including US IP) in production which could then be exported from Australia to a third nation like NZ for instance. The inclusion of the US IP would most likely trigger a need for US State Dept. approval prior to any sale or transfer, which in turn could lead to the US potentially vetoing sales or exports, if the US had an issue with the potential buyer.

Now, warships produced for the USN do not absolutely have to be produced in the US, as there is a caveat in US law that enables the POTUS to grant a waiver for the importation of a foreign built warship into US service. As a practical matter, US law does effectively work out to requiring all US warships be built in US yards. This can help protect the integrity of US warship production (security of the designs and builds) as well as helping to maintain the US defence industry.

Now if the idea is to have Australian production of warship modules or components, which are then included in finished warships completed in the US, that might or might not conflict with existing US laws, that might be a question for someone who specializes in US defence laws. Additionally, I do not know enough about the US naval yards, how they operate, and where there are workforce and/or production shortfalls to know whether Australian module production would be helpful or viable.

Going back to the joint ANZAC-class frigate build, ship modules were built in Australia and New Zealand and then consolidated in Williamstown. With the Hobart-class destroyer build, IIRC modules were 'farmed out' and produced at several different facilities in Australia, before being shipped to Osborne for consolidation at ASC. However, if the US does not produce and consolidate modules in a similar fashion (I have no idea one way or another, something for me to see if I can look into) then having an Australian module source might be of no real help. Similarly, if the US does build modules and then consolidate them, but if the modules that the US needs help producing are ones which would be difficult and/or not viable for Australia to produce, then Australia as a part source would again be of little or no help.

 

[Redlands18]

There might be several questions that you are asking about, not entirely sure about this. There are US laws which impact foreign builds of US designed military and naval kit, including warships. US laws are applicable in this case because the designs are US IP and I believe in even can extend to derivative designs in some cases. ITARS can be a confusing thing.

Theoretically, it would be possible for Australia or an Australian shipyard to have a US designed warship (or a warship designed by another nation but including US IP) in production which could then be exported from Australia to a third nation like NZ for instance. The inclusion of the US IP would most likely trigger a need for US State Dept. approval prior to any sale or transfer, which in turn could lead to the US potentially vetoing sales or exports, if the US had an issue with the potential buyer.

Now, warships produced for the USN do not absolutely have to be produced in the US, as there is a caveat in US law that enables the POTUS to grant a waiver for the importation of a foreign built warship into US service. As a practical matter, US law does effectively work out to requiring all US warships be built in US yards. This can help protect the integrity of US warship production (security of the designs and builds) as well as helping to maintain the US defence industry.

Considering the amount of US systems on the Hobart's, it would have been impossible to build them without clearances.

 

[Todjaeger]

Considering the amount of US systems on the Hobart's, it would have been impossible to build them without clearances.

Certainly, FMS is like that. However it is my understanding that FMS would not necessarily be directly involved in sales of kit subject to US oversight and approval built by Country A for export to Country B. For the Spanish-Norwegian Fridtjof Nansen-class frigates, I believe Norway purchased the SPY-1F radar arrays and Aegis CMS direct from the US gov't. This was for installation during the build in Spain with the FMS being placed between Norway and the US, rather than between the US and Spain, and then another round of approvals so Spain could on-sell the SPY arrays and CMS from Spain to Norway.

 

[Bob53]

Some clarity
15% of all Virginias RAN crewed short term while we learn or as a future construct.
Ie these SSNs will be joint crewed going forward

cheers S

I’m don’t understand how that 15% of all crews is possible?

30 boats
Crew of 132
30 x 132 = 3960 crew.
3960 x .15 = 594 crew.

Has the RAN got that many submariners? And assuming we do how many does that leave to crew the remaining Collins?
it is this meaning if you join the RAN over the next 10 years as a submariner your probably heading to USN boat?

 

[Bob53]

Purely a personal view, I have had reservations myself about the AUKUS "optimal pathway" since it was announced in March 2023. From a cost and risk perspective it does not look optimal. It is very complicated, and places huge loads on the future RAN if any step fails, while assuming future governments will continue to fund it heavily. I support the idea of the RAN getting SSNs, but I perceive we are doing it in a slow and risky way.

My first concern is that we are getting both Virginia and SSN AUKUS SSNs, requiring the RAN to maintain two different classes of SSN, built by different supply chains. This is a huge challenge. It means different spare parts, equipment, maintenance procedures, safety protocols, crew training, maintenance staff training, training facilities (e.g. simulators). We should have picked one and stuck to it.

If the main objective was to maintain USN Virginias in Australia, we should have sought to build or buy Virginias. I don't understand why this could not have been done similar to the F35 program, with Australian firms contributing components to US Virginia production, perhaps building modules at ASC for final assembly in the USA, then getting some of the resulting SSNs. Setting out to learn all about Virginias, then switching to building the product of a different industry, seems risky and wasteful to me. Now that we know the USA is continuing with Virginia Block VI construction well into the 2040s, I don't see a reason we could not do the same. The design risk would be eliminated.

My second concern is with the design of SSN AUKUS in UK. In an operational sense, it is not clear to me that the RN and RAN's operational requirements will be the same. I doubt we need an ice -strengthened fin for example. We need something designed to operate optimally in warmer waters. It is much larger and probably more expensive, to accomodate the PWR 3 reactor. I question whether the RAN has internal technical experts that can meaningfully contribute to the design process. Few countries do.

I also question why we need 8 SSNs? That seemed to be part of the original Morrison announcement without any Navy analysis to back it up. UK and France only have 7 and 6 SSNs respectively. There is provision for Australia to first get 3 to 5 Virginias under AUKUS. If the RAN ended up with "just" 6 Virginias, I suspect that would be perfectly adequate, allowing a squadron of 3 on each coast. That force would easily be equivalent in capability to the previously proposed 12 Attack Class SSKs, with far greater range and additional capabilities via VLS tubes.

I think it’s because the US was the third spoke in the wheel and the discussion with the UK was initially about joining their program and developing an Australian sub construction capability…on the long held decision, position, assumption, view …the vibe …that the US would never sell Virginias. Those words were mentioned here quite a few times along with the US laws preventing any part of construction of a USN vessel being done anywhere other than in the USA. Which in hindsight turned out to have changed to a degree due to the strategic environment….. it works for everyone involved to let Australia have Virginias and that may turn into a maintenance facility and some inclusion in construction.. I wouldn’t be surprised if the AUKUS subs ( looks like a left leaning Gov about to enter the fray in the UK) do not eventuate in in the 25 years and in 20250 the RAN is still using and ordering more Virginias. on the other hand another change of Gov is also imminent… it would seem in the USA so who knows what grenades will come over that fence.
personally I agree with you Scott. If possible to be included in the construction then purchasing Virginias v, vI seems to make sense. They are not going to be inferior but I do seem to recall there was some issue about the 2 different reactor types?

 

[Scott Elaurant]

If possible to be included in the construction then purchasing Virginias v, vI seems to make sense. They are not going to be inferior but I do seem to recall there was some issue about the 2 different reactor types?

Bob I’m not sure what you mean by two reactor types? All the US SSNs from Seawolfs on use the S9G reactor. There is no other? Australia must learn how to maintain that reactor to both assist maintaining USN Virginias hosted in Perth and RAN Virginias bought from USA or hopefully made in ASC.

The problem of two reactor types only emerges if the RAN operates both US built Virginias (S9G reactor) and ASC built SSN AUKUS (RR PWR3 reactors). It is precisely that scenario I am advocating against, because that is a lot of work - spare parts, training and maintenance facilities for two different reactors. Hence as with the Adelaide (OH Perry) class frigates, I am wondering if we can build a US (submersible) warship design again in Australia?

Tthis would make AUKUS delivery much simpler, and probably allow a much earlier start To construction.
I’m sure some quid pro quo could be sorted out with BAE over extending the hunter frigates with an Air warfare destroyer build.

 

[John Fedup]

Isn’t the PWR3 basically a British clone of the S9G or is it significantly different?

 

[Redlands18]

Bob I’m not sure what you mean by two reactor types? All the US SSNs from Seawolfs on use the S9G reactor. There is no other? Australia must learn how to maintain that reactor to both assist maintaining USN Virginias hosted in Perth and RAN Virginias bought from USA or hopefully made in ASC.

The problem of two reactor types only emerges if the RAN operates both US built Virginias (S9G reactor) and ASC built SSN AUKUS (RR PWR3 reactors). It is precisely that scenario I am advocating against, because that is a lot of work - spare parts, training and maintenance facilities for two different reactors. Hence as with the Adelaide (OH Perry) class frigates, I am wondering if we can build a US (submersible) warship design again in Australia?

Tthis would make AUKUS delivery much simpler, and probably allow a much earlier start To construction.
I’m sure some quid pro quo could be sorted out with BAE over extending the hunter frigates with an Air warfare destroyer build.

This is what happens when you get 10 years behind with your Submarine replacement program and then after 7 years decide to go in a completely different direction with extremely limited choices, so you have to go begging to friends to help you out. It means other people end up making the choices for you. Building Virginia's or SSN(X) at Osborn may never have been on the table, and there is still a huge amount of work building the facilities and training the workforce at Osborn.

There is a saying "Beggars can't be choosy", think it fits very well here.

 

[iambuzzard]

There might be several questions that you are asking about, not entirely sure about this. There are US laws which impact foreign builds of US designed military and naval kit, including warships. US laws are applicable in this case because the designs are US IP and I believe in even can extend to derivative designs in some cases. ITARS can be a confusing thing.

Theoretically, it would be possible for Australia or an Australian shipyard to have a US designed warship (or a warship designed by another nation but including US IP) in production which could then be exported from Australia to a third nation like NZ for instance. The inclusion of the US IP would most likely trigger a need for US State Dept. approval prior to any sale or transfer, which in turn could lead to the US potentially vetoing sales or exports, if the US had an issue with the potential buyer.

Now, warships produced for the USN do not absolutely have to be produced in the US, as there is a caveat in US law that enables the POTUS to grant a waiver for the importation of a foreign built warship into US service. As a practical matter, US law does effectively work out to requiring all US warships be built in US yards. This can help protect the integrity of US warship production (security of the designs and builds) as well as helping to maintain the US defence industry.

Now if the idea is to have Australian production of warship modules or components, which are then included in finished warships completed in the US, that might or might not conflict with existing US laws, that might be a question for someone who specializes in US defence laws. Additionally, I do not know enough about the US naval yards, how they operate, and where there are workforce and/or production shortfalls to know whether Australian module production would be helpful or viable.

Going back to the joint ANZAC-class frigate build, ship modules were built in Australia and New Zealand and then consolidated in Williamstown. With the Hobart-class destroyer build, IIRC modules were 'farmed out' and produced at several different facilities in Australia, before being shipped to Osborne for consolidation at ASC. However, if the US does not produce and consolidate modules in a similar fashion (I have no idea one way or another, something for me to see if I can look into) then having an Australian module source might be of no real help. Similarly, if the US does build modules and then consolidate them, but if the modules that the US needs help producing are ones which would be difficult and/or not viable for Australia to produce, then Australia as a part source would again be of little or no help.

Thanks Todjaeger, that pretty much answers my questions.