Western Unity and Security

Big_Zucchini

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Do you think the underlying issues are untrue?
I don't understand the rationale behind these issues. And I wouldn't call them issues to begin with. I don't know whether it's unorthodox for the government to provide subsidies to companies. They surely give preferential treatment to defense companies when it comes to contracts, especially by promising them periodic contracts and some safety nets. But other than that, it seems the US is really just taking an issue with Israel's entire gov't-industry ecosystem which would make it incredibly difficult to change. So I am not sure what really is the issue here. The article itself also doesn't give us much details.

Or do you think they are true and the US has allowed it to go on for some time but has now decided to crack down?
I think that regardless of whether or not it's true, the US could have done something prior to the war, or waited until it ended. But this timing is horrible. Especially with the sanctions on civilians. I agree that those were justified, but it's not the time for that. Israel isn't running decades old wars, these things can wait a bit. Wartime is when you show solidarity.
 

KipPotapych

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I don't understand the rationale behind these issues. And I wouldn't call them issues to begin with.
I read the article and quickly looked for more info on the web and couldn’t find anything beyond a couple of Israeli sources and a couple more that copied/cited them, but no more substance. Honestly, there is no sufficient information provided in the article to get a grip of what the real issue is even. More clarity is needed to comment.

I think that regardless of whether or not it's true, the US could have done something prior to the war, or waited until it ended. But this timing is horrible. Especially with the sanctions on civilians. I agree that those were justified, but it's not the time for that. Israel isn't running decades old wars, these things can wait a bit. Wartime is when you show solidarity.
I don’t think there is anything wrong with the timing of the sanctions or the sudden change in the “narrative”, such as this (from last week):

The Biden administration on Friday said Israel's expansion of settlements in the occupied West Bank is inconsistent with international law, signaling a return to long-standing U.S. policy on the issue that had been reversed by the previous administration of Donald Trump.

Speaking at a news conference during a trip to Buenos Aires, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said the United States was "disappointed" in Israel's announcement of plans for building new housing in the occupied West Bank, saying they were counterproductive to reaching an enduring peace.

"They're also inconsistent with international law. Our administration maintains a firm opposition to settlement expansion, and in our judgment this only weakens, doesn't strengthen, Israel's security," Blinken said.



It is also long overdue, in my opinion. But in regard to timing, there is nothing wrong with it from the American perspective, provided the elections and the votes that Biden admin is most concerned about. Moreover, however, and, perhaps, more importantly, what I mentioned in the other thread (sorry, I didn’t look at it since, yet), the US losing credibility pretty quickly on the world stage, among allies inclusive (but maybe just as or more importantly, among others as well), so these moves (sanctions against civilians and the latest announcement) are pretty self-explanatory, no?

Kirby was asked why the administration waited three years to make this change. "We thought that at this moment, it was particularly important to reaffirm our commitment to a two-state solution," he responded. "And at this moment, we felt it was particularly important to reaffirm again our view of the inconsistency with international law that the settlements present."

This position, he added, is one that has been consistent over a range of Republican and Democratic administrations, and if there was an administration that was inconsistent on the issue, it was the previous one.


In fact, I am convinced none of this would have happened at all if hamas didn’t attack Israel on October 7 and Israel hasn’t done what it had and is doing now, with the US providing the means, which they still do, and it is also very important in this context. So yeah, I do not see how this can be viewed as bad timing from the perspective of the United States. It’s not ideal (should have been done sooner, really), but it isn’t necessarily bad timing. This is likely the best they can do in the circumstances.
 

Big_Zucchini

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I read the article and quickly looked for more info on the web and couldn’t find anything beyond a couple of Israeli sources and a couple more that copied/cited them, but no more substance. Honestly, there is no sufficient information provided in the article to get a grip of what the real issue is even. More clarity is needed to comment.
I saw a comment somewhere claiming it to be related to the US combating price dumping and involves multiple nations and not just Israel. JPost's legal reporting is generally low quality.

It is also long overdue, in my opinion. But in regard to timing, there is nothing wrong with it from the American perspective, provided the elections and the votes that Biden admin is most concerned about. Moreover, however, and, perhaps, more importantly, what I mentioned in the other thread (sorry, I didn’t look at it since, yet), the US losing credibility pretty quickly on the world stage, among allies inclusive (but maybe just as or more importantly, among others as well), so these moves (sanctions against civilians and the latest announcement) are pretty self-explanatory, no?
I understand the reasons. That doesn't make it right though. Rather, it just means there's a problem with US policy-making process that needs to be fixed.

In fact, I am convinced none of this would have happened at all if hamas didn’t attack Israel on October 7 and Israel hasn’t done what it had and is doing now, with the US providing the means, which they still do, and it is also very important in this context. So yeah, I do not see how this can be viewed as bad timing from the perspective of the United States. It’s not ideal (should have been done sooner, really), but it isn’t necessarily bad timing. This is likely the best they can do in the circumstances.
I believe that in times of war, allies must show solidarity and avoid hostilities. I find it difficult to understand your opinion that the opposite should occur.
 

KipPotapych

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I believe that in times of war, allies must show solidarity and avoid hostilities. I find it difficult to understand your opinion that the opposite should occur.
I am not saying what should or shouldn’t occur. In short, the unity only goes as far as the interests permit. National interests of any rational player will always supersede any intentional perceived or otherwise unity, regardless whether we agree with those interests or not.

In this case, the United States attempts to save some of the reputation, while likely not entirely productive because it is viewed for what it is and otherwise inconsistent actions on their part. They cannot stop facilitating the course of actions chosen by Israel (this refers to the unity discussed here), but they also cannot “muscle” Israel into what they think those actions should be (as has been observed over the past couple of months). So they implement this policy change/reversal due to the pressure from the international community, including the allies (which again refers to the unity). Hence, the best (likely the least) they can do under the circumstances, acting in their own interest (that we may or may not agree with).

Consider another example. United States said in very straight terms that they would go to war with China over Taiwan. The French, German, and other Euros said in terms that were just as unambiguous that they would not if that were to actually happen.

What about the French, Lithuanian, and Estonian officials suggesting that it may be a good idea to send troops to Ukraine, whatever that means, while most other allies said it would never happen?

What about Hungary and most of the rest of the EU? Turkey and Hungary in NATO? Poles talking about temporary closing the Ukrainian border? And then there comes internal politics, such as the security aid bill in the US, etc.

There is only unity as long as the perceived national interests of every party align (provided some party(ies) cannot exert (undue) influence on others). More realistically, there are likely various degrees of unity on certain issues, including security. Of course, the main assumption here is that every party acts rationally, which is often further limited by the irrational constituents of the said parties.
 

Big_Zucchini

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I am not saying what should or shouldn’t occur. In short, the unity only goes as far as the interests permit. National interests of any rational player will always supersede any intentional perceived or otherwise unity, regardless whether we agree with those interests or not.

In this case, the United States attempts to save some of the reputation, while likely not entirely productive because it is viewed for what it is and otherwise inconsistent actions on their part. They cannot stop facilitating the course of actions chosen by Israel (this refers to the unity discussed here), but they also cannot “muscle” Israel into what they think those actions should be (as has been observed over the past couple of months). So they implement this policy change/reversal due to the pressure from the international community, including the allies (which again refers to the unity). Hence, the best (likely the least) they can do under the circumstances, acting in their own interest (that we may or may not agree with).

Consider another example. United States said in very straight terms that they would go to war with China over Taiwan. The French, German, and other Euros said in terms that were just as unambiguous that they would not if that were to actually happen.

What about the French, Lithuanian, and Estonian officials suggesting that it may be a good idea to send troops to Ukraine, whatever that means, while most other allies said it would never happen?

What about Hungary and most of the rest of the EU? Turkey and Hungary in NATO? Poles talking about temporary closing the Ukrainian border? And then there comes internal politics, such as the security aid bill in the US, etc.

There is only unity as long as the perceived national interests of every party align (provided some party(ies) cannot exert (undue) influence on others). More realistically, there are likely various degrees of unity on certain issues, including security. Of course, the main assumption here is that every party acts rationally, which is often further limited by the irrational constituents of the said parties.
Agreed to an extent. Those are things that can be either solved or at least improved, even with unilateral steps.
 

Big_Zucchini

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Schumer's speech regarding the need for elections in Israel was seen by many as an expression of a conflict between Biden and Netanyahu, and perhaps a policy of supporting re-elections in Israel.
Yet since the beginning of the US's elections season, Biden's administration has done everything to stregthen Netanyahu and improve his popularity.
I understand why. Throwing allies under the bus, e.g. Ukraine, is a recurring theme during elections. But then the massive promotion of Netanyahu and Schumer's speech seem entirely contradictory. I don't know entirely what to make of this.
 

Big_Zucchini

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If true, this is a very worrying trend. I warned earlier that the western restrictions on Israeli war planning in Gaza will have repercussions for other allies and it is materializing again.
Such requests to pull one's punches end up alienating the local population and government, hurt the general war effort, and damage the cohesion of existing alliances.
Ideally, if such requests are already made, they should be coupled with incentives like economical or war stock relief that would at least offset the damage done by surrendering on that issue.
For example if Russia makes additional profit from refined oil sales, the US should offset that by providing Ukraine with weaponry equal in effect to what Russia could buy with its added revenue.
The US's previous requests to avoid using its weaponry on Russian soil were somewhat reasonable (not so much for me), leading Ukraine to develop its own weaponry to bypass this restriction - an effort highly likely significantly aided by the west. So now it makes little sense to request Ukraine to impose limits on its own weaponry.

Ultimately, past decisions by major arms providers to appease oil producers have backfired and led to those nations losing influence.
 

Big_Zucchini

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Norway, Ireland, and Spain jointly announce recognition of Palestine as a state. I assume for now the statement seen in the video is the full story, I haven't heard the Norwegian and Spanish statements.
This roster was expected, after all it does partially match their political alignment.


There are several comments I'd like to make on the issue:

1. Which Palestine?

Palestine is an ambiguous term. Some refer only to the J&S area ruled by the PA. Some refer to it and Gaza ruled by Hamas. And some can refer to both but recognize the PA as the rightful rulers of Gaza.
While it is true that currently Hamas does not de facto rule Gaza, and therefore there is currently only 1 Palestinian "state", the steady state is 2 separate Palestinian governments in J&S and Gaza, and therefore it is safe to assume they refer to a situation in which there are de facto 2 Palestinian states.
What they mean in their statement matters a lot. This ambiguity serves none.


2. Meaning for themselves, allies, and like-minded nations.

Recognition of a Palestinian state, in any form, as a direct consequence of October 7th, is effectively and undeniably a reward for terrorism. A statement to the Palestinians that any future attacks on a magnitude similar to October 7th will be answered with improved standing with the west. Unfortunately for Norway, Spain, and Ireland, they are not immune to the same threat.
Arabs constitute over 20% of Israel's population. In contrast, the muslim population in Norway, Spain, and Ireland is 3.3%, 5%, and 1.6% respectively. Notable for its immigrant population is the UK with over 6.5% muslims (as of 2021). yet crime levels resulting from immigration are overall much greater in Europe than they are in Israel. One key factor is assimilation time. While there is yet a long way to go, majority of Arabs identify as Israelis and integrate well, attending institutes of higher education and work in the tech and public sectors. Still, this is the culmination of almost 80 years of often tense coexistence under one state.
Taking in immigrants without carefully deradicalizing and assimilating them, especially at the high rate it happens right now, could well lead to an explosion of violence and eventually an internal cultural war.
And when terrorist organizations like Hamas say that Europe and the US are next - believe them. There have already been terror attacks in Europe and the US. This could grow substantially.
How is that a problem? Well, countries that are intentionally careless, tend to receive less support from allies, and could thus be more easily overwhelmed.
Furthermore, in cases of internal violence, allies have lower capacity to help as compared to purely military or purely economical issues.


3. Meaning for NATO and in context of Russia-Ukraine and future conflicts

Norway and Spain are NATO members. Ireland isn't, but its defense is de-facto built around NATO protection. All 3 are some of the lowest spenders on defense in Europe. In fact, 10 years into the Russian-Ukrainian war - they are still well below the bare minimum 2% requirement.
Since the end of the cold war, vast majority of NATO members have adopted new strategies based on 2 main principles:
  1. Defense capacity is the collective, rather than own individual capacity.
  2. Individual capabilities can therefore be reduced significantly.
But this ignores the reality that if every member lacks capacity for independent self defense, then they will inevitably also lack capacity to extend capabilities to defend allies (and themselves simultaneously).
Before a nation decides on armament or disarmament, it must first formulate a defense concept centered around the notion of the primary threats and their nature.
It can be argued that against the west, are operating a bloc of like-minded nations separated by individual ambitions but aligned via the west being a common enemy, and the notion that any weakening of the west - advances their own interests. This bloc includes Russia, Iran, China, Palestine, Syria, North Korea, and various state-level and sub-state-level proxies and allies.

For a western nation to perceive one or more of these as an enemy, but another as friendly, could make sense on some level, for example economically, but security-wise it is incoherent. And since for all 3 countries, Palestine is a money sink and not an economical partner, it remains solely an entity with political benefit.
And so if their entire interest in Palestine is purely political - in the immediate term this means indifference toward Ukraine.
As nations situated in Europe, they have the responsibility for themselves and their allies to contribute to collective European security, which in turn means supporting Ukraine.
In the longer term, unless they undergo a political change, this could mean relative unwillingness by the mentioned countries, to aid allies within and without the scope of NATO.
Furthermore, allies must not only actively aid each other, but also secure themselves, for example against the use of their own territory and assets for the advantage of an adversary.
Hence, it puts into question their viability as members within the grand NATO framework.
 

SolarisKenzo

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It's just politics, you overestimate the effects.
Not a single politician in Europe cares about Palestine.
In 14 days we vote in the EU, almost 400 million voters will have to tick on someone's name.

Those guys are just looking for a +0.0xx in the polls.
 

Big_Zucchini

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It's just politics, you overestimate the effects.
Not a single politician in Europe cares about Palestine.
In 14 days we vote in the EU, almost 400 million voters will have to tick on someone's name.

Those guys are just looking for a +0.0xx in the polls.
Political moves to score electoral points rarely work like that. Appeasing 2 sides of a conflict usually only ends up drawing the ire of supporters of both camps. Support for the "other" camp is always given more attention than support for "your" camp. But if they wish to appease only one side - Palestine, then all the points I raised above are valid.
 

KipPotapych

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1. Which Palestine?

Palestine is an ambiguous term. Some refer only to the J&S area ruled by the PA. Some refer to it and Gaza ruled by Hamas. And some can refer to both but recognize the PA as the rightful rulers of Gaza.
While it is true that currently Hamas does not de facto rule Gaza, and therefore there is currently only 1 Palestinian "state", the steady state is 2 separate Palestinian governments in J&S and Gaza, and therefore it is safe to assume they refer to a situation in which there are de facto 2 Palestinian states.
What they mean in their statement matters a lot. This ambiguity serves none.
Don’t think there is much ambiguity. If I had to bet, I would bet more states will follow suit.

But he stressed that Ireland hoped to see resumed diplomacy between Israel and the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank[…]

“It is now critical for the international community and especially the EU — which has extensive diplomatic and economic links to both Palestine and Israel — to recognize a Palestinian state, based on 1967 borders, if we are to have a chance at peace and the two-state solution,” Andrews said.[…]

Norway’s Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre and Foreign Minister Espen Barth Eide announced at a press conference Wednesday morning that their country will also recognize Palestine as a state from May 28, with the territorial demarcation between Palestine and Israel to be based on the borders from before June 4, 1967, when Israel captured the Gaza Strip from Egypt and the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan during the Six Day War.


 

Big_Zucchini

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Don’t think there is much ambiguity. If I had to bet, I would bet more states will follow suit.

But he stressed that Ireland hoped to see resumed diplomacy between Israel and the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank[…]

“It is now critical for the international community and especially the EU — which has extensive diplomatic and economic links to both Palestine and Israel — to recognize a Palestinian state, based on 1967 borders, if we are to have a chance at peace and the two-state solution,” Andrews said.[…]

Norway’s Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre and Foreign Minister Espen Barth Eide announced at a press conference Wednesday morning that their country will also recognize Palestine as a state from May 28, with the territorial demarcation between Palestine and Israel to be based on the borders from before June 4, 1967, when Israel captured the Gaza Strip from Egypt and the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan during the Six Day War.


"Pre-1967" or "1967" is code for "we don't care", which means they're probably ending their policy at recognition and won't pursue any other engagement.
 

Big_Zucchini

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TLDR:
The US policy items of banning the use of its weapons on Russian territory, and pressuring Israel to delay/avoid a Rafah operation, have proven unsubstantiated and detrimental. More Ukrainians, Israelis, and Palestinians are dying as a result. Regarding both Israel and Ukraine, the US can still reverse its decisions. Regarding Taiwan, I really hope they're taking note of this and preparing accordingly.

Right now regarding both Ukraine and Israel we're seeing 2 simultaneous processes of the breakdown of the recent US policy of de-escalation, or rather the wide realization that it in fact, it is not de-escalatory at all.
To that end, the US has vetoed Ukrainian use of American-made weapons on recognized Russian territory (e.g. ok for Crimea, not ok for Belgorod), which in turn has likely greatly contributed to Russia's new move to amass forces close to Kharkiv, whose potential loss to Russia could be incredibly painful.
Meanwhile other contributors like the UK have said they are ok with Ukraine using their weapons liberally, however the current logistical equation does not permit that. European allies provide more exquisite weapons but are limited in number and thus more suitable for hunting very high value targets, typically expensive and hard to replace equipment, while the US is able to provide large capacity as well, which in turn permits operations like counter-battery and targeting troop concentrations.
Not only has US policy been unsubstantiated, it has proven to in itself be escalatory, as Russia seeks to use these limitations to escalate.

Simultaneously, we now also see the refutation of the US's narrative regarding Rafah. With now close to a million civilians successfully evacuated from Rafah, it is evident that the narrative about excessive endangerement of civilians was simply detached from reality. For a military operation to be minimally harmful to whose whom we wish to protect (own troops and enemy civilians), it must fulfill several criteria - one of which is speed. The US's long time objection to a Rafah operation has therefore caused significant harm, as any effort to properly rebuild Gaza in terms of infrastructure and housing, as well as government, must be pushed back by an amount of time at least equal to that the IDF had to wait to initiate an operation in Rafah. Some of the waiting was due to negotiations, but it is known that the US pressured Israel to postpone or even outright cancel the operation.
 

Big_Zucchini

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Just read it now but never really thought of it. We may be headed toward a 3rd major confrontation between US allies, i.e. the 3 major frontiers (Ukraine, Israel, Taiwan), and their respective aggressors.

On the Israel front, Biden managed to de-escalate tensions with Iran. Long term perhaps not a wise decision, but nonetheless I recognize it is a clear political interest particularly during election season.
But on the Ukraine front, we're seeing new fronts created around northern Ukraine, thus perhaps offsetting the pressure. It is plausible that Russia recognizes the threat of a ramping up Ukrainian and western arms industry and hopes to utilize its current fleeting advantage for a push.
On the Taiwan front, we have not only emboldened Chinese forces, but also what is reportedly a ramped up propaganda effort to prepare the population for war.
 
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