Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0

[Todjaeger]

The tier 2 vessels are replacements for the Arafuras and instead of the proposed corvettes.

This is so much better than I expected. The ships will be superior in every way to the upgraded ANZACs, which were I should add, actually intended to be replaced by the Hunters. The Hunters are now, by default, becoming replacements for the FFGs and a timely replacement for the Hobart's is now pencilled in.

Best of all, not an Arafura class "battleship" or Cape class "missile cruiser" insight!

I still am of the opinion that how they (gov't) seem to be approaching the Tier 2 vessel build seem to be going about it in what I consider to be the wrong fashion.

If the objective is a combat-capable patrol vessel, have a vessel designed as such. If there is concern about getting at least some units into RAN service ASAP then fine, seek out a design which an overseas yard can rapidly get into production whilst an Australian yard or yards get configured to build to such a design. However, trying to quickly find an essentially MOTS design which is rapidly available from an overseas yard and then can be built in an Australian yard is IMO asking for trouble. By going with whatever might be available from overseas ASAP, one is trading possibly rapid availability for future/ongoing issues with operations, support and sustainability.

I suspect it would be better for a small overseas build of 3-4 vessels of whatever design is available that most closely resembles what is needed, while a design (not necessarily the same design) is Australianized for production in Australia.

I do recognize the political want/need to have shipbuilding in WA, still not convinced that doing so advantageous for Australia.

 

[GregorZ]

I would hardly say the GP frigates are more akin to the Constellation-class than the Knox-class. If this were to be the case then there's hardly a reason to not be building more Hunters as they are equivalent in role and capability. If the USN apparently considers the minimum capability for that sort of ship to be the Constellation-class then either we're looking for ships of a different type or we should be building more Hunters. The Constellation-class may well be the USN's way of increasing fleet mass at a cheaper cost but at risk of stating the obvious, the RAN is not the USN, we cannot afford to pursue the same solutions as they do. There is valid precedent for the use of smaller ASW escorts by the USN to good effect in providing persistent presence operations and increasing the threat to enemy submarines. I would say the Knox-class is a more relevant example of this for the RAN than the Constellation-class though.

Yes the USN minimum capability for a ship and the RANs are different. The USN way of doing things is generally bigger and more expensive, eg Burke vs Hobart. In saying that, that’s where I come with conclusion that the Constellation is akin or essentially similar to the GP frigates. Both navies are using theirs to the same effect, more ships in the water quickly and cheaper, and to take pressure off the MFUs. The Hunter is not the answer for this, building more Hunters does not help this specific requirement. The Knox have been OOS since the 90s? They were built for a specific role as ASW escorts. Neither the Constellation or the GP frigate have ASW as a specific requirement solely, they are both essentially GP FFGs. Perhaps more akin to the Perry class?

 

[GregorZ]

The tier 2 vessels are replacements for the Arafuras and instead of the proposed corvettes.

This is so much better than I expected. The ships will be superior in every way to the upgraded ANZACs, which were I should add, actually intended to be replaced by the Hunters. The Hunters are now, by default, becoming replacements for the FFGs and a timely replacement for the Hobart's is now pencilled in.

Best of all, not an Arafura class "battleship" or Cape class "missile cruiser" insight!

Interseting! Has me thinking we are heading back to the old RAN with Perth’s, Adelaide’s and ANZACs now to be Hobarts, Hunters, and GP FFGs, back to the future it is!

 

[iambuzzard]

The tier 2 vessels are replacements for the Arafuras and instead of the proposed corvettes.

This is so much better than I expected. The ships will be superior in every way to the upgraded ANZACs, which were I should add, actually intended to be replaced by the Hunters. The Hunters are now, by default, becoming replacements for the FFGs and a timely replacement for the Hobart's is now pencilled in.

Best of all, not an Arafura class "battleship" or Cape class "missile cruiser" insight!

Volks,
I love your summation of this. Imagine the conversations we could have if we met in person.

 

[iambuzzard]

Interseting! Has me thinking we are heading back to the old RAN with Perth’s, Adelaide’s and ANZACs now to be Hobarts, Hunters, and GP FFGs, back to the future it is!

Keep an eye out for Doc Brown and his DeLorean.

 

[Scott Elaurant]

I believe mid life upgrades need to be a thing of the past, as do 30 year life cycles.

They are a false economy that provides diminishing returns and poor value for money.

Agreed. I have thought the same for years. Japan seems to be gaining definite benefits from turning over its sub force every 20 years, even though they are clearly built to last longer.

I am not expert on the capability but in terms of the economics of construction and maintenance it makes no sense. A ship might have an amount equal to its entire construction cost spent on maintenance through its life. More than half of this might come in the last ten years. Avoid that and you can build a lot of new ships. With subs it is even worse, since the proportionate maintenance cost is higher still, >150% of the sub build cost. So why indeed not build new subs or frigates or AWDs instead? As crews get smaller and at sea maintenance less, these ratios are going up over time, not down.

Aside from the dubious economics, warships and subs with too long an economic life probably has a negative impact on design and construction skills too. Designs don’t get updated as often, and deep maintenance of an old hull is not the same skill as building a new ship. Less practice means less skill retention.

From this, it follows that LOTE type projects to drag out ships and subs to 40 years life must be the height of inefficiency. They are virtually an admission that you failed to fund a replacement class in sufficient time.

In the commercial world, lots of ships are scrapped after 20 years. They know its time to buy a new ship.

This is not a criticism of any class or prograM. I am just detailing the principles why Volkodav is correct.

 

[Armchair]

Agreed. I have thought the same for years. Japan seems to be gaining definite benefits from turning over its sub force every 20 years, even though they are clearly built to last longer.

With a 20 year service life from 2030-2050 for the first GP frigate that implies selection and design for the GP frigate replacement needs to begin no later than 2040 (while Hunters are still being built and before DDG replacement construction).

Contrast that with decision making and build for ANZAC replacement. First ship commissioned 1996, first replacement program envisioned in 2009 second in 2024, ships selected in 2018 and 2025 (?), replacements now anticipated to be delivered in 2030 (GP frigate) and 2034 (Hunter)

 

[Stampede]

It certainly merits close attention (and more than it is receiving in general and specialist media in Australia).
What, however, are the less risky alternatives to augment strike capability for the RAN any time soon?
Modify Hunter to add strike cells? Hunters are not appearing, in the anticipated ASW form, before 2034. Modifications would add time and risk (to a program that is $45bn with a purported $20bn budget gap) and would (presumably) apply to ship 4+, so not appearing any time soon.
Build something else ( e.g. Arrowhead 140 or FREMM or new build Hobart) presumably with Aegis? Where would they be built? At what cost?
Buy second hand Ticonderogas?
Cancel Hunter and build Burkes?

Programs, including USN programs, fail but what other program, that could be started now, could successfully deliver the required capability?

Sure there are different arguments that RAN does not require the capability but those are not about the risk that the LOCSV program fails.

It's a conundrum.

The review has concluded the best way to get capability quickly is a Tier 2 frigate with the first to be built overseas.
I guess we have to assume they have crunched the numbers and all the options.
Still puzzled as to why the OPVs were cut.
The main dollars would of been spent setting up this program and the initial hulls.

The last six of an order of twelve would not have been that big a cost and would of all been in service most likely before the first Tier 2 frigate arrives.
Not comparing an OPV to a frigate, but rather the Fleets composition for the remainder of the decade.
If the OPVs survive the politics, I'm confident they will provide excellent service.
Certainly fast track a replacement UAV for both the OPVs and the MFUs.
That would be my first change.

The other , add to any existing vessel within space and weight any missing opertunity.
A PAIR of CIWS on each large vessel but for the ANZACs. ..........a must have!
Additionally navy need to look at complimenting their fleet with a SHORAM system. Asap.
These are light weight flexible systems that offer capability to both air and surface threats.
A realativly quick to service addition in response to the range of threats we are seeing today.
Not everything needs or warrants a ESSM.

Swapout the 25mm bushmaster with a 30mm ASAP.
Greater range and choice of rounds.
A no brainer
Prioritise recruitment and retention.
Don't have the answer, but needs to happen.
We want to grow the fleet so personal numbers must start growing asap.
The Navy reserve appears relatively small.
Maybe an opertunity in this space.

Suggest the RAAF is the main short term opertunity for enhanced capability this decade.
Again disappointed that their were no new additions to existing fleet numbers.
Most peculiar!

Something about rhetoric and action. Action appears to have been kicked down the road.

Maybe alot is happening behind the scenes that we don't know about.
Trust that is the case.

Just some thoughts.


Cheers S

 

[StevoJH]

This fleet will consist of DDGs and DDHs. AORs and large amphibious ships will also be built at the new Adelaide yard to support a continuous build.

I've always liked the concept of the Invincible Class and Hyuga class, even if possibly at a smaller scale. And with no fixed wing aircraft.

If large portions of the fleet become made up of unmanned vessels, it probably becomes more viable.

Large flat deck with a large hanger for Helicopters and UAV's. enough displacement to get a big radar up really high. And if you want to, plenty of space to fit lots of VLS around the periphery. Supported with GP frigates and/or optionally manned vessels there would be the potential to generate a significant force with limited crew requirements and at a (relatively) economical cost for the capability generated.

While you do put a lot of egg's in one basket, you also increase the efficiency of aircraft maintenance crew requirements and increase your sea level radar coverage.

 

[Armchair]

Still puzzled as to why the OPVs were cut.
The main dollars would of been spent setting up this program and the initial hulls.

The last six of an order of twelve would not have been that big a cost and would of all been in service most likely before the first Tier 2 frigate arrives.

The analysis concluded the OPV could not perform minor warfighting tasks. Essentially those vessels would need to be escorted by other ships in threatening environments so they would not add to capability but actually subtract from (limited) capability. Crewing and sustaining 12 ships (over at least 20 years) is much more expensive than 6 ships so there is the saving (we also don’t know what the contract costs for the cancellation are). Those 240 sailors who would be crewing the last six ships are notionally available elsewhere.

They also concluded they were not suited/ necessary for constabulary duties. I find that one harder to understand.

 

[GregorZ]

Keep an eye out for Doc Brown and his DeLorean.

Don’t mention HMAS Me… not saying it, not going there

 

[SammyC]

The analysis concluded the OPV could not perform minor warfighting tasks. Essentially those vessels would need to be escorted by other ships in threatening environments so they would not add to capability but actually subtract from (limited) capability. Crewing and sustaining 12 ships (over at least 20 years) is much more expensive than 6 ships so there is the saving (we also don’t know what the contract costs for the cancellation are). Those 240 sailors who would be crewing the last six ships are notionally available elsewhere.

They also concluded they were not suited/ necessary for constabulary duties. I find that one harder to understand.

I think the report stated they were inefficient for constabulary duties, rather than were not suited. This related to the larger crew size of an Arafura over a cape class patrol boat to do effectively (in their view) the same function.

I'm not sure I agree with that assessment but there we have it.

 

[devo99]

Yes the USN minimum capability for a ship and the RANs are different. The USN way of doing things is generally bigger and more expensive, eg Burke vs Hobart. In saying that, that’s where I come with conclusion that the Constellation is akin or essentially similar to the GP frigates. Both navies are using theirs to the same effect, more ships in the water quickly and cheaper, and to take pressure off the MFUs. The Hunter is not the answer for this, building more Hunters does not help this specific requirement. The Knox have been OOS since the 90s? They were built for a specific role as ASW escorts. Neither the Constellation or the GP frigate have ASW as a specific requirement solely, they are both essentially GP FFGs. Perhaps more akin to the Perry class?

The description given for the intended GP frigate so far is, to paraphrase, frigates with a focus on ASW capability and some land attack and self defence capabilities as well. Sounds much more like the Knox-class than Constellation-class. I think our government may define "GP frigate" a bit differently to the USN.

 

[Bluey 006]

I've always liked the concept of the Invincible Class and Hyuga class, even if possibly at a smaller scale. And with no fixed-wing aircraft. Large flat deck with a large hanger for Helicopters and UAVs. enough displacement to get a big radar up high.

Interesting! Yet a little over a week ago when the prospect of the UK possibly looking to offload the Prince of Wales (the next step up beyond the Invincible Class) was brought up. You jumped on the bandwagon to refute it. Unable to see its potential to be repurposed beyond the current role.


The PoW just happens to be a large flat deck with hangers, space for large numbers of UAVs, a big radar and comprehensive C4I infrastructure. Which well-places it to be a capital ship for a fleet of smaller manned and unmanned systems, communication nodes, anti-submarine helicopters, and strike platforms.

What is the use case for a *single* carrier operated by the RAN in our region? A single carrier is not a capability, or at least not an enduring one. Its why the RN bought two. Just look at how much time the MN and Russians have no carrier available as an example.

Power projection, sea control, airspace control during distributed maritime operations, sustained CAP beyond the range of land-based fighters, a mobile forward operating base for distributed aviation across islands we are trying to hold as part of our A2AD strategy, ability to provide a small force of strike fighters that could provide a limited level of air support for expeditionary joint taskforces (if you are using as a carrier), a command-and-control centre for undersea control with for anti-submarine helicopters, a platform for launch and recovery of unmanned systems etc

For the most part, it would not be a single carrier operated by the RAN. It would be an Australian contribution to collective security as part of larger allied task forces supported by the US Pacific fleet (200 ships, 160,000 sailors and 1,500 aircraft) and supporting assets from other allies and partners.

Moot point anyway.UK came out and said they don't want to sell it, for now....................

 

[GregorZ]

The description given for the intended GP frigate so far is, to paraphrase, frigates with a focus on ASW capability and some land attack and self defence capabilities as well. Sounds much more like the Knox-class than Constellation-class. I think our government may define "GP frigate" a bit differently to the USN.

From ’The Enhanced Lethality Surface Fleet’ publication from the Government lays out that the Tier 2 GP frigate should:

‘• operate a Maritime Combat Helicopter • provide undersea warfare through a depressed active/passive towed array sonar and have the ability to store, handle and employ lightweight torpedoes • provide air defence through a limited number of point and self-defence systems • provide maritime and land strike • provide force protection.’

Sounds more like a Perry or Constellation to me, than a specialised Knox.

 

[ADMk2]

I would agree with your point that the Australian built tier 2s are more likely to be modified for our requirements than the first three, simply because there will be more time to do so (these wont start until around 2030). It's possible that the first three may be updated later on as part of say a mid life refit or extended maintence period, or we just accept them as they are. Low cost will always be a factor with the GPs, both in build and through life.

If we went with the Mogami for example, it may be we buy it exactly as is (perhaps with English manuals and our own power points) for the initial three, but look for the FFM fitted with our gear for the subsequent seven. Just for information, I never served on a ship that had an Australian power point. I had to bring plug adaptors for for my shaver and phone charger every where I went.

As a side note I don't actually see much difference between the base Mogami and the revised spec FMM, other than it is bigger and has additional VLS. There's probably a bunch of small ergonomic changes, reliability improvements or equipment new models, but otherwise it is a fairly small update reflecting in-service learnings. For instance it runs much the same propulsion and machinery as its earlier sister, and by the looks of things the layout is much the same. Its far less of a change than say going from a MEKO 200 to a 210.

To your point on expanded use of LOCSVs, I agree. With the virtual Aegis/CEC recently released, it is very compact and can be retrofitted on ships never considered before. It's not a stretch of the imagination to see these vessels acting as future escorts in their own right. Their one limitation however, is that they need to share the mothership sensors, so the LHD, AOR or other will need to provide this.

I'm not so sure on the V concept. Perhaps 64, but larger than that it becomes in my view a liability. If for instance it had 128 VLS fitted fully with ESSM at $2M a pop (for the sake of the argument), then that is a $billion, and a lot to loose if it goes down. I would suggest it is better to allocate the same number of VLS over a couple of smaller vessels such that there are fewer eggs in one basket.

If the LOCSV concept works (and I understand that there is a lot to go before this is achieved) then I see substantially more than six in the fleet. Given that our next ship build design won't be until the mid 40's, it is possible that the Hunters and GP frigates may well be the last staffed warships that we construct.

I agree, if the concept works, I see a future where we buy a lot more than 6x LOCSV’s. I am considering it the same as MQ-28A Ghostbat. We just ordered a mere handful of Block 2 examples, but I doubt anyone seriously expects the program to stop there if it keeps progressing well…

 

[Volkodav]

Agreed. I have thought the same for years. Japan seems to be gaining definite benefits from turning over its sub force every 20 years, even though they are clearly built to last longer.

I am not expert on the capability but in terms of the economics of construction and maintenance it makes no sense. A ship might have an amount equal to its entire construction cost spent on maintenance through its life. More than half of this might come in the last ten years. Avoid that and you can build a lot of new ships. With subs it is even worse, since the proportionate maintenance cost is higher still, >150% of the sub build cost. So why indeed not build new subs or frigates or AWDs instead? As crews get smaller and at sea maintenance less, these ratios are going up over time, not down.

Aside from the dubious economics, warships and subs with too long an economic life probably has a negative impact on design and construction skills too. Designs don’t get updated as often, and deep maintenance of an old hull is not the same skill as building a new ship. Less practice means less skill retention.

From this, it follows that LOTE type projects to drag out ships and subs to 40 years life must be the height of inefficiency. They are virtually an admission that you failed to fund a replacement class in sufficient time.

In the commercial world, lots of ships are scrapped after 20 years. They know its time to buy a new ship.

This is not a criticism of any class or prograM. I am just detailing the principles why Volkodav is correct.

As you are probably aware from your industry experience, Brownfield projects can be more complex and more difficult than Greenfield ones.

Spiral upgrades of systems are complex enough, but major upgrades including life extension, and remedial structural and systems work, fall very much within the definition of "wicked problems".

 

[SammyC]

Agreed. I have thought the same for years. Japan seems to be gaining definite benefits from turning over its sub force every 20 years, even though they are clearly built to last longer.

I am not expert on the capability but in terms of the economics of construction and maintenance it makes no sense. A ship might have an amount equal to its entire construction cost spent on maintenance through its life. More than half of this might come in the last ten years. Avoid that and you can build a lot of new ships. With subs it is even worse, since the proportionate maintenance cost is higher still, >150% of the sub build cost. So why indeed not build new subs or frigates or AWDs instead? As crews get smaller and at sea maintenance less, these ratios are going up over time, not down.

Aside from the dubious economics, warships and subs with too long an economic life probably has a negative impact on design and construction skills too. Designs don’t get updated as often, and deep maintenance of an old hull is not the same skill as building a new ship. Less practice means less skill retention.

From this, it follows that LOTE type projects to drag out ships and subs to 40 years life must be the height of inefficiency. They are virtually an admission that you failed to fund a replacement class in sufficient time.

In the commercial world, lots of ships are scrapped after 20 years. They know its time to buy a new ship.

This is not a criticism of any class or prograM. I am just detailing the principles why Volkodav is correct.

I think this is the only way that continuous ship building is sustained.

WA for instance, has a model based on 7 GPFs, 6 LOCSVs, 18/6 landing craft and in the order of 25/22 patrol boats (cape and guardian) to project over the next 20 years. Two capes and the landing craft are the plan through to about 2030, thereafter the GPFs and LOCSVs to about 2040, followed by the next batch of patrol boats through to about 2045. Then the cycle will need to start again or we will have another valley of death. Life extensions will result in this outcome.

For Osborne, its the same thing just based on Hunters and subs.

There is enough work in the above programs to continuously sustain two shipyards on a 20-25 year cycle.

In and around all that we need to select where the next series of big ships (LHD, LPD and AOR) will all be built. At the moment these can only be constructed offshore as we don't have the large facilities in Australia. I'm interested to see if this comes up in the next round of shore facility upgrades.

Last point on Austal. I have noted a few people questioning why the commitment to them. In my view it came down to a pivotal moment where the Government had a choice to let yet another ship builder close, like Williamstown, or to step in and provide a sustainable workload.

Austal receives in the order of 75% of its workload through its US yard, and all its commercial ferries are made either in Vietnam or the Philippines. The Henderson facility is now only a Government contractor, producing either coast guard, border force or defence ships. It does however house their global design team, and outside of Obsborne, I would suggest (tell me if I'm wrong) this is the last organisation in Australia capable of designing and building warships of any type.

They are going through an ownership change at the moment, likely to be private equity. They made a loss on the US business last year (mainly on the salvage ship contract) and the Australiasian business is not doing much more than keeping its head above water. I would suspect the new owners to close divisions that do not have a pathway to acceptable profitability and have an ongoing order book. It is very much stump up or close up time.

Yes they have had their problems, but as far as endangered capabilities go this is at the forefront. Once it has gone it would be near to unrecoverable to remake it, as Cockatoo Island and Williamstown demonstrate.

 

[hauritz]

I still am of the opinion that how they (gov't) seem to be approaching the Tier 2 vessel build seem to be going about it in what I consider to be the wrong fashion.

If the objective is a combat-capable patrol vessel, have a vessel designed as such. If there is concern about getting at least some units into RAN service ASAP then fine, seek out a design which an overseas yard can rapidly get into production whilst an Australian yard or yards get configured to build to such a design. However, trying to quickly find an essentially MOTS design which is rapidly available from an overseas yard and then can be built in an Australian yard is IMO asking for trouble. By going with whatever might be available from overseas ASAP, one is trading possibly rapid availability for future/ongoing issues with operations, support and sustainability.

I suspect it would be better for a small overseas build of 3-4 vessels of whatever design is available that most closely resembles what is needed, while a design (not necessarily the same design) is Australianized for production in Australia.

I do recognize the political want/need to have shipbuilding in WA, still not convinced that doing so advantageous for Australia.

The most obvious candidate for a MOTS build is the Hobart. We could have three of them built urgently in Spain, rather than the current plan to build three non-existant warship designs in a yet to be determined foreign yard. The other part of the plan would be to accelerate the production of the Hunter class. I think an aim to have at least three in service by the mid thirties should be quite achievable,

This would give us some breathing space for the tier two warship which would need some fairly extensive design work before it is ready for production.

By the mid thirties that variation of the plan would see a surface fleet of 6 X Hobarts and 3 X Hunters. If all goes well we might even see the first of the Tier two ships entering service at around that time.

 

[SammyC]

Yea Hauritz, I would have liked to have seen more Hobarts, and they were my forecast for the recently released Naval review (on which I was horribly wrong). Short of some miracle I can't see that now happening.

In regards to accelerating the Hunters, I am perplexed about this as I thought there would have been some flexibility to increase the tempo. I suspect it came down to cost (would have exacerbated the near term (10 year) expenditure profile) above what could be managed, and would have complicated the Osborne continuous ship building program (would have created a valley of death later on).

I would also view the Government must have received guidance on conflict likelihood over the next 5-15 years (of which we will never see), and have considered that the ship building program adequately prepares for the higher risk periods. I can only assume they see conflict as more towards the back end of the window when the fleet is reasonably well modernised.

There is an awful lot of faith and blind trust with this last statement.