Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
This article about the lack of LCS deployed to the Red Sea, asks the question “If the LCS can’t fight the Houthis, who can they fight? The likely answer is: no one.” It has parallels to the discussion about upgrading the Arafura’s armament where you could spend a lot of money but still have a ship that is too vulnerable to deploy to any hotspots.

Better off spending the money on more capable frigates.
It's not just vulnerability, it's the effects they can deliver.

If they are incapable of defending nearby vessels from even drone attack, they are useless in this scenario. Absolute minimum is a large magazine with at least a longer range point defence missile.

Interestingly back in the 1960s the Light Destroyer (DDL) evolved from a gun and Seacat armed corrvette to a Tartar/SM-1MR FFG because of a similar change in the strategic situation. At the same time the USN moved from DEs/FFs to FFGs (FFG-7).

There really should be three tiers in terms of air defence, tier 1 being SM-3 / ABM, tier 2 SM-6, tier 3 ESSM. All should be GP in nature with NSM, and ASW capabilities, with some tier 2 having high end ASW.
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
I recall reading previously, but can't find the reference, that the prototype blocks were so good that they would go into one (or more?) of the ships.
This speaks highly of the design process and quality control.
MB
My understanding is the initial prototype blocks were to prove process, facilities, and personnel prior to actual blocks and as such the blocks were built to the RN baseline design not the RAN, which were still being worked on.

Later prototype blocks will be to the RAN design and, although not scheduled to be used, can be if they are good enough.

The reason for prototyping is a number of blocks, in particular the keel blocks, on the Hobart program were substandard and required extensive rework. Ironically the yard they came from went on to consistently produce the highest quality work on cost and schedule.
 

Reptilia

Well-Known Member
My understanding is the initial prototype blocks were to prove process, facilities, and personnel prior to actual blocks and as such the blocks were built to the RN baseline design not the RAN, which were still being worked on.

Later prototype blocks will be to the RAN design and, although not scheduled to be used, can be if they are good enough.

The reason for prototyping is a number of blocks, in particular the keel blocks, on the Hobart program were substandard and required extensive rework. Ironically the yard they came from went on to consistently produce the highest quality work on cost and schedule.
These 3 blocks I think are the real deal for the first Hunter.


If Blocks on average take about 2 months, Hunter would be launched sometime in 2027. Going off the U.K build, +5-6 years for fit out, testing and delivery(Dec 2022- 2027 or 2028). Australia should be able shave some time off by learning from the u.ks first 2-3 type 26 builds.
 
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Flexson

Active Member
Sorry if theres confusion

By deployment, i mean operations of high risk.
Trips to Singapore and Thailand carry a medical risk and not a risk to life.

Yes we can keep up flag waving and training with foreign navies, but no ones going to MEAO anytime soon
And those RPD's, IPE's and RIMPAC's carrying less risk than ever before! On a recent RPD I completed the Port Liberty Plan had placed Recreational Scuba Diving on the banned activities list as it was deemed too "High Risk". So we send members to some of the most beautiful places in the world but we don't allow them to experience anything.
 

south

Well-Known Member
Fantasy fleets are far more interesting…

If only we could move back to the “my destroyer is bigger than yours’
 

ADMk2

Just a bloke
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
I don't think you understand opsec if you are posting official information from the DRN.
It should be posted on a public forum. I will be reporting this post as security breach.

Remove the post now.
Not all that secret, mate…


Good day folks.

Information in the public domain should not present a security risk. If any party considers a post contravenes any legal requirement, then they must advise relevant authorities and advise the Mods. This discussion should not take place in open forum.

However, if a poster can point to relevant publically available information then this can be posted. If there are concerns about this information, then this needs to be directed to the appropriate authorities and those considering it a breach should report it. It should not become a bun fight on this platform. I would hope that information published by the government should not be in breach of relevant legislation.

Alexsa
 
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Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Fantasy fleets are far more interesting…

If only we could move back to the “my destroyer is bigger than yours’
My target is bigger than your target ;).

I'm surprised anyone outside of defence can work anything out with all the absolute desulional excrement being sold as fact by alleged experts at the moment.

Opsec seems to be working quite well because the occasional accurate information is drowned out completely by misinformation, misrepresentation and outright lies.
 

Aardvark144

Active Member
It doesn't have to be 'Secret'. Irrespective on what Classification it holds, information on the Defence Networks such as the FSC remain on a Need-To-Know-Basis until such detail is released by Defence on the Public Forum. Reading your link I can find no reference to the complete FSC that was mentioned in previous posts. Let's be careful shall we.
 

StoresBasher

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Fantasy fleets are far more interesting…

If only we could move back to the “my destroyer is bigger than yours’
I'd rather talk about anything else really, which is why I had a break of a few years from this forum.
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
I'd rather talk about anything else really, which is why I had a break of a few years from this forum.
The sad thing is with the current reviews and strategic situation it is the perfect time to dust off the proposed, never realised, structures of decades past.

The fantasy fleet circle jerks send to be very platform centric when what is needed is an analysis of what effect is required in where.

This is numbers, availability, survivability, and capability, not which shiny platform or widget various suppliers want to sell us, and especially not what people think looks cool.

There are multiple serious analysis going back over a hundred years that are still relevant because of geography alone. Patrol boats with missiles, just like notional fast attack craft and torpedo boats of the past are simply irrelevant in our strategic environment.

Let's take the Bathurst Class Corvette of WWII fame as an example of a bare minimum surface combatant. It's dual purpose armament, sensors and role would be equivalent to ANZACs updated systems on a new, more survivable hull. Not a PB, not an FAC, not an OPV based Corvette.

The sloops and later frigates would be equivalent to the Hunters and notional GP frigates. The Hobart's are very much akin to the fleet destroyers (Ns and Q's, not the Scrap Iron Flotilla, that's the ANZACs).

There is no functional equivalent to the cruisers we used to have. That sort of capability would be something like Burke's, Ticonderogas or even Japan's DDHs.

Every single asset we have is smaller, less capable, older and available in fewer numbers than what every single serious review has indicated we need. Yet we have continual discussions if more if the same but newer with extra bits added.
 

Stampede

Well-Known Member
The sad thing is with the current reviews and strategic situation it is the perfect time to dust off the proposed, never realised, structures of decades past.

The fantasy fleet circle jerks send to be very platform centric when what is needed is an analysis of what effect is required in where.

This is numbers, availability, survivability, and capability, not which shiny platform or widget various suppliers want to sell us, and especially not what people think looks cool.

There are multiple serious analysis going back over a hundred years that are still relevant because of geography alone. Patrol boats with missiles, just like notional fast attack craft and torpedo boats of the past are simply irrelevant in our strategic environment.

Let's take the Bathurst Class Corvette of WWII fame as an example of a bare minimum surface combatant. It's dual purpose armament, sensors and role would be equivalent to ANZACs updated systems on a new, more survivable hull. Not a PB, not an FAC, not an OPV based Corvette.

The sloops and later frigates would be equivalent to the Hunters and notional GP frigates. The Hobart's are very much akin to the fleet destroyers (Ns and Q's, not the Scrap Iron Flotilla, that's the ANZACs).

There is no functional equivalent to the cruisers we used to have. That sort of capability would be something like Burke's, Ticonderogas or even Japan's DDHs.

Every single asset we have is smaller, less capable, older and available in fewer numbers than what every single serious review has indicated we need. Yet we have continual discussions if more if the same but newer with extra bits added.
Volk I agree with you on so many levels but one.
The reality that long term plans inevitably change with the passage of time.
Sometimes a single build will stay the distance. 10 ANZACs (not 12) comes to mind.
But as you have often talked about re the history of the RAN and what we had planned for or better , had hoped for , for usually does not come to fruition.

ANZACS on their own are fine, but the intended fleet they were to sail with was altered substantially and therfore were forced to become something they were not designed for.

We await the Naval Review and I'd guess it will provide a road map for the RAN going forward and the type and numbers of vessels required to give government and Navy a maritime response to the challenges of the future.
Appropriate and all good stuff, if both the force mix is correct and equally important and this is the key point........... Implemented!
Take one item out of mx and the balance is lost with compromises having to be made.

It's almost like you have to plan your fantasy fleet around the fact that long term expectations will not be met.

All very negative on my behalf , but its an observation mirrored on the reality that we have today , versus the aspiration we aspired to over the decades.

It's why we talk about up gunning OPVs and bolting on bits to ANZACs when there's no weight margin left. Why we talk of more Hobart's and other options when what we should of done is ordered more in the first place.
Up gun the Cape class is met with comedy, buy if all had gone well the Evolved Cape series would not have been built and OPVs would be in service today doing their job.
Admirals tlold they were out of control wanting a third LHD, yet since the Canberra Class came into service what's the ADFs go to asset for some many activities etc etc.

Reluctantly fantasy fleets play a role due to expediancy.
I guess it's a form of reluctant adaptability.

I hope the Naval Review gets bipartisan support for decades to come.

Cheers S
 

Meriv90

Active Member
IMHO what we should be talking right now is the Shield vs Sword situation we are having with the Houtis.

We are seeing that even Burkes are failing, with missiles slipping through.

Australia is like Italy, we are sea countries, imagine if after Yemen the result will be that at this moment, thanks to technology, the Sword is way too strong than the Shield. If the only way to stop the Houtis is going to be boots on the ground it will mean that Sea Denial strategies are way too efficient and even the most modern fleets will have problems controlling the seas.

If the sword is that strong forget frigates and destroyers, the solution would be SSN (congratz on AUKUS) and B21...
 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
IMHO what we should be talking right now is the Shield vs Sword situation we are having with the Houtis.

We are seeing that even Burkes are failing, with missiles slipping through.

Australia is like Italy, we are sea countries, imagine if after Yemen the result will be that at this moment, thanks to technology, the Sword is way too strong than the Shield. If the only way to stop the Houtis is going to be boots on the ground it will mean that Sea Denial strategies are way too efficient and even the most modern fleets will have problems controlling the seas.

If the sword is that strong forget frigates and destroyers, the solution would be SSN (congratz on AUKUS) and B21...
I have always wondered about surface ship survival given the huge development of drone and missile technology. Layered defences within a CSG is one thing but a few surface combatants on their own….? Hopefully some of the exotic 40 mm ammo along with 40 mm guns addresses much of the threat along with laser advances. SSNs and long range strike jets, for Canada, a bridge too far, sadly.
 
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