Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0

[SammyC]

I don't disagree with you OldTex. I know it takes 3-4 years to develop a marine technician to be able to run an engine room, and the best part of a decade for that person to progress to becoming a senior sailor.

Some thoughts on staffing new ships. Resolving this is somewhat critical to any future capability, as many have stated.

Lets assume that any new ship strategy adopts a living within your means methodology. As such new ships need to be substantively crewed by existing personnel (give or take a bit). Lets also optimistically assume that the Navy can reach a point where existing sea based billets can be reliably filled (controversial, I know). I will also add that any new ships will not be available until about 2030, so there is some time to prepare.

There are two crew groups of interest to this assessment, being:

• the major fleet units (ANZAC/Hobart), being in the order of 1,800 positions at sea.
• the minor war vessels (patrol boats, hydros and mine hunters), being in the order of 600 positions at sea.

Lets assume that the Hunter build continues, or is substituted for an equivalent type of tier 1 ship (so 12 Hunters and AWDs combined, maybe it increases to 15). That means that the existing MFU crews need to be quarantined and allocated to this program, with none spare, and even then they will be stretched. Following this logic, then only the existing MWV crews are available for any tier 2 solution.

So, the eventual tier 2 strategy becomes less about taking crew from the ANZACs/Hobarts and more about transferring and transforming the Cape, Armadale, Leeuwin and Huon teams. It necessitates taking smaller 20-40 person crews and expanding them to be 80-100 person crews. This is not a simple task.

There are some restrictions with this, namely there is only enough people in this group for a limited number tier 2 vessels (6-10, not 15-20), and there are some specific skill sets that are not predominantly within this community (electronic technicians, warfare operators and engineers come to mind).

It would also indicate that there will be insufficient platforms to cover all responsibilities currently conducted (low end constabulary, mine hunting and hydro), and the new tier 2 expectations (high end constabulary, low end warfighting) concurrently. Some choices on function will need to be made, in particular some things need to be given up.

So, a reasonable conclusion from this is that we could have a sustainable warfighting tier 1 and 2 fleet of between 18-25 vessels with minimal additional people, on the basis that:

• the full coastal patrol function could be consolidated within Border Force (all Capes and Arafuras), releasing crew for tier 2 duties. It creates a resourcing shortfall for Border Force, but perhaps this is an easier problem to resolve.
• the hydro function could be contracted out to a civilian organisation, releasing further crew for tier 2 duties. It's not unreasonable that say TKMS could take on this role with their own ships and people.
• crew size becomes a priority over capability when selecting the tier 2 platform (the lower the better)
• the tier 2 propulsion, weapons and sensor fit needs to be relatively simple, aligning with a smaller, more junior crew. This further limits the capability of the platform.

I would be interested is others thoughts on this

 

[Morgo]

I don't disagree with you OldTex. I know it takes 3-4 years to develop a marine technician to be able to run an engine room, and the best part of a decade for that person to progress to becoming a senior sailor.

Some thoughts on staffing new ships. Resolving this is somewhat critical to any future capability, as many have stated.

Lets assume that any new ship strategy adopts a living within your means methodology. As such new ships need to be substantively crewed by existing personnel (give or take a bit). Lets also optimistically assume that the Navy can reach a point where existing sea based billets can be reliably filled (controversial, I know). I will also add that any new ships will not be available until about 2030, so there is some time to prepare.

There are two crew groups of interest to this assessment, being:

• the major fleet units (ANZAC/Hobart), being in the order of 1,800 positions at sea.
• the minor war vessels (patrol boats, hydros and mine hunters), being in the order of 600 positions at sea.

Lets assume that the Hunter build continues, or is substituted for an equivalent type of tier 1 ship (so 12 Hunters and AWDs combined, maybe it increases to 15). That means that the existing MFU crews need to be quarantined and allocated to this program, with none spare, and even then they will be stretched. Following this logic, then only the existing MWV crews are available for any tier 2 solution.

So, the eventual tier 2 strategy becomes less about taking crew from the ANZACs/Hobarts and more about transferring and transforming the Cape, Armadale, Leeuwin and Huon teams. It necessitates taking smaller 20-40 person crews and expanding them to be 80-100 person crews. This is not a simple task.

There are some restrictions with this, namely there is only enough people in this group for a limited number tier 2 vessels (6-10, not 15-20), and there are some specific skill sets that are not predominantly within this community (electronic technicians, warfare operators and engineers come to mind).

It would also indicate that there will be insufficient platforms to cover all responsibilities currently conducted (low end constabulary, mine hunting and hydro), and the new tier 2 expectations (high end constabulary, low end warfighting) concurrently. Some choices on function will need to be made, in particular some things need to be given up.

So, a reasonable conclusion from this is that we could have a sustainable warfighting tier 1 and 2 fleet of between 18-25 vessels with minimal additional people, on the basis that:

• the full coastal patrol function could be consolidated within Border Force (all Capes and Arafuras), releasing crew for tier 2 duties. It creates a resourcing shortfall for Border Force, but perhaps this is an easier problem to resolve.
• the hydro function could be contracted out to a civilian organisation, releasing further crew for tier 2 duties. It's not unreasonable that say TKMS could take on this role with their own ships and people.
• crew size becomes a priority over capability when selecting the tier 2 platform (the lower the better)
• the tier 2 propulsion, weapons and sensor fit needs to be relatively simple, aligning with a smaller, more junior crew. This further limits the capability of the platform.

I would be interested is others thoughts on this

Or we make recruiting and training an appropriately sized Navy a national priority.

 

[StevoJH]

How much of your ability to train future engineers and senior sailors would be given up by reducing or eliminating the fleet of minor vessels?

I really don't think this is the answer, if anything the answer is probably to have more of them (with an equivalent increase to RAN total personnel) to train the people to operate the major combatants, and possibly to give more options for more senior people who might be more likely to stay if they are offered a 'lifestyle posting' every now and then, the reduced logistics needs of the minor vessels also gives more options on basing.

Having just looked at the pay scales, it is actually quite good. So how much of the retention problem is pay, and how much is QoL and insufficient opportunities for advancement? If the problems are QoL and reduced chances for advancement, reducing the number of platforms will just make this worse.

 

[ASSAIL]

This short tour of ADV Peron has just been published on fb.
For us oldies from the patrol era 60s-80s these look pretty schmick and a vast improvement on the shoe box galley and 12man aft mess on an Attack boat!

https://fb.watch/pIgTGKZP3C/?

 

[Reptilia]

Update from NavalNews (YouTube, sorry cannot link it), reporting from Washington DC, Surface Navy Association-2024 re Adaptable Deck Launchers.

effectively a non-deck penetrating RELOADABLE angled VLS, in 2, 4 & 8 launch tube configurations.
whilst not ideally launching from the vertical, they would provide more reloadable redundancy to existing magazine capacities.
I don’t know what CMS integration would be required or whether smaller vessels could be data linked?

also mention of containerised vertical launch solutions, in I think 4 cell configuration?

this Potentially has not only for enhanced ship borne resilience, but perhaps also potential for rapid installations of point defence solutions for land based asset protection?

I found it very interesting, perhaps grounds for optimism, and food for thought.

On Naval News. The Adaptable deck launchers now on a larger NOMARS called the Dauntless, 4x4 cell launchers on a roughly 600 ton vessel, 24+knt speed.
The smaller NOMARS, the Defiant was on display at Indo-Pacific 2023 and can carry 2x4 cells, 15+knt speed. Demonstration expected late 2024/early 2025.

 

[iambuzzard]

This short tour of ADV Peron has just been published on fb.
For us oldies from the patrol era 60s-80s these look pretty schmick and a vast improvement on the shoe box galley and 12man aft mess on an Attack boat!

https://fb.watch/pIgTGKZP3C/?

They just need something more than two 12.7mm machine guns. a 25mm Typhoon wouldn't go astray.

 

[Bob53]

We are laying up ANZACs because we don't have enough engineers, technical sailors and combat systems operators, how would we crew and support these ships that have significant equipment, logistical and training differences to current RAN ships?

A lot of the issues we have now are due to the lack of understanding by decision makers in successive governments over what is involved in acquisition and sustainment of capability, in particular personnel and staff recruitment, training and retention.

They honestly seem to assume any idiot off the street can do this work. It's probably because they predominantly come from backgrounds where any idiot could do what they do, sales, marketing, hr, union officials, political staffers, management etc.

Jeez except for political staffer ( add in civil engineer and logistics) I’ve done all those roles…. Idiot off the street

 

[Maranoa]

How much of your ability to train future engineers and senior sailors would be given up by reducing or eliminating the fleet of minor vessels?

I really don't think this is the answer, if anything the answer is probably to have more of them (with an equivalent increase to RAN total personnel) to train the people to operate the major combatants, and possibly to give more options for more senior people who might be more likely to stay if they are offered a 'lifestyle posting' every now and then, the reduced logistics needs of the minor vessels also gives more options on basing.

Having just looked at the pay scales, it is actually quite good. So how much of the retention problem is pay, and how much is QoL and insufficient opportunities for advancement? If the problems are QoL and reduced chances for advancement, reducing the number of platforms will just make this worse.

As an infrequent sea rider on RAN warships I am sure the Quality of LIfe issue is a major contributor to departures of early to mid stream technical staff particularly partner and kids quality of life or this is what I've learned from chats with many pussers on the smoking deck. In many ways a long RAN patrol on a Main Fleet Unit is like being in prison, particularly for propulsion staff in those hell hot and noisy engine rooms, albiet with much better food and excellent company.

 

[SammyC]

How much of your ability to train future engineers and senior sailors would be given up by reducing or eliminating the fleet of minor vessels?

I really don't think this is the answer, if anything the answer is probably to have more of them (with an equivalent increase to RAN total personnel) to train the people to operate the major combatants, and possibly to give more options for more senior people who might be more likely to stay if they are offered a 'lifestyle posting' every now and then, the reduced logistics needs of the minor vessels also gives more options on basing.

Having just looked at the pay scales, it is actually quite good. So how much of the retention problem is pay, and how much is QoL and insufficient opportunities for advancement? If the problems are QoL and reduced chances for advancement, reducing the number of platforms will just make this worse.

Thanks Stevo, valid points. This was just an analysis considering what could be done in a people constrained environment.

For what it is worth, my view is the Navy needs to have in the order of 18 tier 1s (Hobarts and Hunters) plus some mix of about 20 Arafuras and tier 2s, plus the 22 Capes. In addition it needs another 2 AORs and 1 LHD. That's a 67 ship fleet, and I think I'm dreaming. To Volkodav's point, that comes at the cost of hospitals and schools, which I equally value.

Your comments on QoL, I think is important and I agree with it. I'm not sure I would call the engine rooms on modern ships prisons, however I left the Navy when long deployments and crash postings started to impact the mental health of my family. I loved my job, but I am comfortable with my choice.

Morgo, if we can grow the Navy, then the options become much more flexible and I would love to see this. I will note the Government has committed to a 30% uniformed staff increase by 2040, so if that can be achieved then perhaps that is an option.

Just a point on technical training, there are no engineering sea billets on the existing MWVs, so upsizing to a tier 2 (where there would be something), would likely improve the ability to train engineers. I would also suggest that technical sailor training would be more efficient in the larger teams on a tier 2 over a MWV, and would be conducted on systems more aligned with the tier 1s (for comparison a Tasman would have similar equipment to the Hobarts, and probably the AORs and LHDs). This would improve the ability for technical sailors to move between tier 2s and tier 1s, significantly enhancing personnel flexibility (transferring from a MWV to an MFU is currently not very easy). So my view is that a tier 2 platform (depending on what it is), could enhance fleet training, particularly to the benefit of tier 1s.

 

[StingrayOZ]

As an infrequent sea rider on RAN warships I am sure the Quality of LIfe issue is a major contributor to departures of early to mid stream technical staff particularly partner and kids quality of life or this is what I've learned from chats with many pussers on the smoking deck. In many ways a long RAN patrol on a Main Fleet Unit is like being in prison, particularly for propulsion staff in those hell hot and noisy engine rooms, albiet with much better food and excellent company.

Prisoners don't have to work very hard, most prisons are very modern.

Modern low crew ships, or even better, older ships, but with shortages in crew, mean some sailors are flat out doing two or more jobs at the same time.

A stagnant fleet of old ships also means terrible prospects for promotion. Older ships often mean poor reliability, poor amenities, people pissing in sinks because the ship predates female sailors, or just doesn't have a toilet at one end (engine room), no gyms, cramped, not made for younger, taller sailors, poor aircon/air quality, noise.

Sailors also need a career.. leaving aside the only 3 Hobart's, that leaves the Anzacs, which are between 20 and 30 years old. Who signing up to learn on an Anzac when we are already pulling them out of the water? Which leaves the new Hobarts, but there are only 3 of them, not much chance to move around or promotion. Heck we are pulling those out of the water too, for upgrades...

I hear the LHD are well liked due to accommodations, lots of travel and engagement with regionals, new, lots of space, great to bring new recruits as there is space and man power to train.

Having a true continuous build process isn't just good for industry, its good for sailors.

Are we surprised that breaking continuous builds that both our uniformed and non-uniform workforce disappears!? The solution of the crewing crisis isn't less ships.

 

[old faithful]

The only similarity of Prison life and service life, is being institutionalised, that's where it ends.
On another note, where would RAN be if they had of stuck with the Barracuda subs?
I doubt that steel would have even been cut yet anyway.
I have read some criticism about the choice of the Virginia class, but to be honest, I think it's the best move by the ADF since the F111s.

 

[hauritz]

Prisoners don't have to work very hard, most prisons are very modern.

Modern low crew ships, or even better, older ships, but with shortages in crew, mean some sailors are flat out doing two or more jobs at the same time.

A stagnant fleet of old ships also means terrible prospects for promotion. Older ships often mean poor reliability, poor amenities, people pissing in sinks because the ship predates female sailors, or just doesn't have a toilet at one end (engine room), no gyms, cramped, not made for younger, taller sailors, poor aircon/air quality, noise.

Sailors also need a career.. leaving aside the only 3 Hobart's, that leaves the Anzacs, which are between 20 and 30 years old. Who signing up to learn on an Anzac when we are already pulling them out of the water? Which leaves the new Hobarts, but there are only 3 of them, not much chance to move around or promotion. Heck we are pulling those out of the water too, for upgrades...

I hear the LHD are well liked due to accommodations, lots of travel and engagement with regionals, new, lots of space, great to bring new recruits as there is space and man power to train.

Having a true continuous build process isn't just good for industry, its good for sailors.

Are we surprised that breaking continuous builds that both our uniformed and non-uniform workforce disappears!? The solution of the crewing crisis isn't less ships.

Trying to attract sailors to serve on cramped old ANZACs might be a breeze compared to getting submariners for the aging Collins class in the 2030s and beyond. I imagine the Virginias and AUKUS boats might hold some attraction but convincing young people to base a career around a 35 to 40 year old diesel submarine in the age of nukes is going to be a tough sell.

 

[SammyC]

PM issues challenge, sets out vision for confronting decade of disruption, danger

folks

This would be the first time I have seen any senior government members discuss the future military plan (this was from an interview with the PM). This is from Defence Connect, but I think there is a longer article in the Australian (which I can't access behind the paywall).

A couple of interesting quotes are below.

..."stressing the importance of our nation’s defence and national resilience is key to Australia not only surviving this era of renewed great power competition, but also thriving and embracing the opportunities present".

“You can’t defend Australia with a press release, you need assets" (note this is my favourite quote for the year)

"We will make sure members of the Australian Defence Force have the capability they need to protect and defend our country, that’s a priority"

Promising commentary in my view leading into an announcement regarding the Naval review.

 

[Reptilia]

PM issues challenge, sets out vision for confronting decade of disruption, danger

folks

This would be the first time I have seen any senior government members discuss the future military plan (this was from an interview with the PM). This is from Defence Connect, but I think there is a longer article in the Australian (which I can't access behind the paywall).

A couple of interesting quotes are below.

..."stressing the importance of our nation’s defence and national resilience is key to Australia not only surviving this era of renewed great power competition, but also thriving and embracing the opportunities present".

“You can’t defend Australia with a press release, you need assets" (note this is my favourite quote for the year)

"We will make sure members of the Australian Defence Force have the capability they need to protect and defend our country, that’s a priority"

Promising commentary in my view leading into an announcement regarding the Naval review.

Here is the Article from the Australian.
Defence spending a priority in the upcoming budget.

Redirecting

 

[OldNavy63]

This short tour of ADV Peron has just been published on fb.
For us oldies from the patrol era 60s-80s these look pretty schmick and a vast improvement on the shoe box galley and 12man aft mess on an Attack boat!

https://fb.watch/pIgTGKZP3C/?

I’m wracking my remaining brain cells trying to remember exactly how many Foxtel and USB outlets we had in the J/R’s mess on HMAS Advance (P-83) in the mid-80s - umm - probably none. Many an exciting meal was had underway, tip-toeing across a wet upper deck with your scran in one hand and brew in the other, down the vertical hatch to the Junior Rates Mess aft. We were never troubled deciding which gym to spend our afternoon in. The incoming Fremantle class looked pretty big in comparison to the A-boats, but in the video ADV Cape Perron looks massive.

 

[Redlands18]

I’m wracking my remaining brain cells trying to remember exactly how many Foxtel and USB outlets we had in the J/R’s mess on HMAS Advance (P-83) in the mid-80s - umm - probably none. Many an exciting meal was had underway, tip-toeing across a wet upper deck with your scran in one hand and brew in the other, down the vertical hatch to the Junior Rates Mess aft. We were never troubled deciding which gym to spend our afternoon in. The incoming Fremantle class looked pretty big in comparison to the A-boats, but in the video ADV Cape Perron looks massive.

Probably get lost navigating your way around an Arafura

 

[Volkodav]

I’m wracking my remaining brain cells trying to remember exactly how many Foxtel and USB outlets we had in the J/R’s mess on HMAS Advance (P-83) in the mid-80s - umm - probably none. Many an exciting meal was had underway, tip-toeing across a wet upper deck with your scran in one hand and brew in the other, down the vertical hatch to the Junior Rates Mess aft. We were never troubled deciding which gym to spend our afternoon in. The incoming Fremantle class looked pretty big in comparison to the A-boats, but in the video ADV Cape Perron looks massive.

Back in the days when the crew would be battered and bruised long before the boat broke.

These days the crews are comfortable (with the exception of the poor souls in the Austere Accommodation who don't even get safe air to breath) but the frames are buckling and the hull is cracking.

 

[Scott Elaurant]

The only similarity of Prison life and service life, is being institutionalised, that's where it ends.
On another note, where would RAN be if they had of stuck with the Barracuda subs?
I doubt that steel would have even been cut yet anyway.
I have read some criticism about the choice of the Virginia class, but to be honest, I think it's the best move by the ADF since the F111s.

Opinions vary and we will have to disagree on Virginias. I think they are a great SSN but the cost is too high. Hence I think this is a bad decision.

I don't agree with your comment on Barracuda (Attack Class) not starting. The last stage of the functional review had just been completed when the Attack project was cancelled in 2021. It was ready to proceed to the next stage, which would have been detailed design with construction starting 2022/23. There was criticism of slow progress on Attack. Naval Group in 2020 changed their local manager and was catching up to schedule. Lockheed Martin had made good progress on the US combat system design integration. Contrary to some reporting it was also not over budget. Adm Greg Sammut reported that recent progress had been good just before cancellation. In my view the timing of Attack cancellation was chosen because any later and it would have meant abandoning a started D&C contract.

Top defence official was to report ‘good progress’ on French submarine project weeks before axing

Documents obtained under FoI show defence leadership given positive advice about Attack-class submarine progress

www.theguardian.com

If you check the last official update construction of the Attack Class was due to start 2022/23. Covid might have delayed that a few months but there is no suggestion construction would have started any later than 2023, with some non-official sources suggesting steel for the hull might be first cut in 2024. The Attack project was cancelled just as it was about to gear up and order pre-start components.

Research

Research

www.aph.gov.au

I admit to bias on this one because I live in Adelaide and have friends who lost their jobs when Attack was cancelled in 2021. I think that the manner and timing of the Attack Class cancellation was a loss for Adelaide shipbuilding and navy funding. Cancelling FSP (Attack) allowed the government to reduce budgeted funding for FSP construction of $2 billion per year from 2022 onwards. The subsequent May 2022 budget (the last Morrison budget) saw this money withdrawn, with no increase in other naval project funding. The army was given $4 billion in funding for new Abrams tanks. The Abrams project had not been identified as a funded project prior to 2021. So the cancelled sub funding became a financial windfall for an unscheduled army project.

The cost of AUKUS was at that time still unknown, and no funding was allocated except for the Task Force in Canberra. In my view the main winners from AUKUS were consultants in Canberra, not the navy or shipbuilding. The ASC shipyard upgrade in Adelaide was also cancelled with the AUKUS decision. That saw 700 jobs lost with Laing O'Rorke, in addition to the 400 jobs lost with Naval Group in Adelaide. A contract was recently signed to recommence the ASC shipyard upgrade construction. AUKUS effectively delayed that work 2 years.

Now AUKUS has been announced with a huge cost estimate ($260 - $368 billion). Australian sub construction has effectively been delayed ten years, with the start date announced as the "mid 2030s". Most people in Adelaide with any actual experience of sub construction from the Collins build will be retired by then. A new generation of builders will be trained, but the opportunity to transfer experience will have been lost.

I am not opposed to the decision to move to nuclear powered submarines (SSNs). Operationally it makes sense for the RAN given Australia's geography. It is a response to the naval arms race occuring in Asia. I also think that fears of nuclear safety by critics are overblown. Between the US, UK and French navies they have safely put to sea over 200 SSNs in the past 60 years, without a single external radiation leak. The safety record of western SSNs is far better than land based nuclear reactors.

From everything I have read the Virginia and SSN AUKUS will be excellent submarines. Yet I now question the choice. The cost and timing of construction is wrong for the RAN IMO. I think it was decided on political and not technical or security grounds. Shifting from the French Attack (Shortfin Barracuda SSK) to the French SSN (Barracuda) would have reduced delay on construction (detailed design already done), reduced crewing pressures and vastly reduced cost. I do not suggest that the Barracuda SSN is superior to the Virginia or SSN AUKUS. It is only 2/3 the size and half the firepower. Yet it is also half the cost, less risk and less delay. Barracuda SSNs would still be acoustically superior to Chinese and Russian SSNs.

There were some half truths told to justify cutting the French SSN out of the AUKUS choice. It is true that the French SSN needs to be refuelled every ten years. But that is a relatively automated process that can be done in weeks. The infrastructure for it could have been built at ASC for a fraction of the cost of AUKUS (perhaps $2-3 billion). Since the French SSNs run on Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) reactor cores could have been stored locally. The existing medical research reactor at Lucas Heights in Sydney runs on LEU, and is regularly refuelled here.

Whereas the "sealed unit" claims about the US and UK HEU reactors are false. They require very complex mainenance every ten years including replacement of critical safety and control components that degrade over time from being irradiated. The ten year maintenance cycles of US and UK SSNs take at least six months, sometimes years.

The Navy’s Submarine Maintenance Crisis Needs Ready, Affordable Solutions

The urgency of the Navy’s submarine maintenance crisis necessitates a bold and innovative response. More than one-third of the nation’s SSNs are in extended maintenance availabilities vice being at sea.

www.usni.org

By comparison the latest French SSN has been designed to reduce maintenance. This is an issue that has been given insufficient attention IMO.

France's new Submarine Suffren completes first operational deployment - Naval News

The French MoD announced that the French Navy' Suffren nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) and its blue crew completed their first operational deployment with the Charles de Gaulle carrier strike group on January 4, 2023.

www.navalnews.com

There have really been two shifts in AUKUS. First in 2021 we went from "regionally superior" SSK to SSN. Then in 2023 we went from "an SSN" to committing to the most expensive SSN choices possible. When AUKUS was first floated groups like ASPI suggested that going with the UK Astute class might double the whole of life costs of FSP from $90 billion to $130 to $170 billion. Now with a fleet of Virginias and SSN AUKUS (surely a maintenance nightmare to sustain both) the cost has doubled again to $260 to $368 billion. This will have major impacts on the ADF. If the Hunter Class budget is cut back, AUKUS will be why.

So I agree with the shift from SSK to SSN, but I think we have gone much to far in choosing a very challenging SSN to acquire and sustain.

Moderators if you are unhappy with this it can be stricken. I am not criticising people's efforts to deliver AUKUS. I am criticising the political decisions.

 

[Stampede]

Opinions vary and we will have to disagree on Virginias. I think they are a great SSN but the cost is too high. Hence I think this is a bad decision.

I don't agree with your comment on Barracuda (Attack Class) not starting. The last stage of the functional review had just been completed when the Attack project was cancelled in 2021. It was ready to proceed to the next stage, which would have been detailed design with construction starting 2022/23. There was criticism of slow progress on Attack. Naval Group in 2020 changed their local manager and was catching up to schedule. Lockheed Martin had made good progress on the US combat system design integration. Contrary to some reporting it was also not over budget. Adm Greg Sammut reported that recent progress had been good just before cancellation. In my view the timing of Attack cancellation was chosen because any later and it would have meant abandoning a started D&C contract.

Top defence official was to report ‘good progress’ on French submarine project weeks before axing

Documents obtained under FoI show defence leadership given positive advice about Attack-class submarine progress

www.theguardian.com

If you check the last official update construction of the Attack Class was due to start 2022/23. Covid might have delayed that a few months but there is no suggestion construction would have started any later than 2023, with some non-official sources suggesting steel for the hull might be first cut in 2024. The Attack project was cancelled just as it was about to gear up and order pre-start components.

Research

Research

www.aph.gov.au

I admit to bias on this one because I live in Adelaide and have friends who lost their jobs when Attack was cancelled in 2021. I think that the manner and timing of the Attack Class cancellation was a loss for Adelaide shipbuilding and navy funding. Cancelling FSP (Attack) allowed the government to reduce budgeted funding for FSP construction of $2 billion per year from 2022 onwards. The subsequent May 2022 budget (the last Morrison budget) saw this money withdrawn, with no increase in other naval project funding. The army was given $4 billion in funding for new Abrams tanks. The Abrams project had not been identified as a funded project prior to 2021. So the cancelled sub funding became a financial windfall for an unscheduled army project.

The cost of AUKUS was at that time still unknown, and no funding was allocated except for the Task Force in Canberra. In my view the main winners from AUKUS were consultants in Canberra, not the navy or shipbuilding. The ASC shipyard upgrade in Adelaide was also cancelled with the AUKUS decision. That saw 700 jobs lost with Laing O'Rorke, in addition to the 400 jobs lost with Naval Group in Adelaide. A contract was recently signed to recommence the ASC shipyard upgrade construction. AUKUS effectively delayed that work 2 years.

Now AUKUS has been announced with a huge cost estimate ($260 - $368 billion). Australian sub construction has effectively been delayed ten years, with the start date announced as the "mid 2030s". Most people in Adelaide with any actual experience of sub construction from the Collins build will be retired by then. A new generation of builders will be trained, but the opportunity to transfer experience will have been lost.

I am not opposed to the decision to move to nuclear powered submarines (SSNs). Operationally it makes sense for the RAN given Australia's geography. It is a response to the naval arms race occuring in Asia. I also think that fears of nuclear safety by critics are overblown. Between the US, UK and French navies they have safely put to sea over 200 SSNs in the past 60 years, without a single external radiation leak. The safety record of western SSNs is far better than land based nuclear reactors.

From everything I have read the Virginia and SSN AUKUS will be excellent submarines. Yet I now question the choice. The cost and timing of construction is wrong for the RAN IMO. I think it was decided on political and not technical or security grounds. Shifting from the French Attack (Shortfin Barracuda SSK) to the French SSN (Barracuda) would have reduced delay on construction (detailed design already done), reduced crewing pressures and vastly reduced cost. I do not suggest that the Barracuda SSN is superior to the Virginia or SSN AUKUS. It is only 2/3 the size and half the firepower. Yet it is also half the cost, less risk and less delay. Barracuda SSNs would still be acoustically superior to Chinese and Russian SSNs.

There were some half truths told to justify cutting the French SSN out of the AUKUS choice. It is true that the French SSN needs to be refuelled every ten years. But that is a relatively automated process that can be done in weeks. The infrastructure for it could have been built at ASC for a fraction of the cost of AUKUS (perhaps $2-3 billion). Since the French SSNs run on Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) reactor cores could have been stored locally. The existing medical research reactor at Lucas Heights in Sydney runs on LEU, and is regularly refuelled here.

Whereas the "sealed unit" claims about the US and UK HEU reactors are false. They require very complex mainenance every ten years including replacement of critical safety and control components that degrade over time from being irradiated. The ten year maintenance cycles of US and UK SSNs take at least six months, sometimes years.

The Navy’s Submarine Maintenance Crisis Needs Ready, Affordable Solutions

The urgency of the Navy’s submarine maintenance crisis necessitates a bold and innovative response. More than one-third of the nation’s SSNs are in extended maintenance availabilities vice being at sea.

www.usni.org

By comparison the latest French SSN has been designed to reduce maintenance. This is an issue that has been given insufficient attention IMO.

France's new Submarine Suffren completes first operational deployment - Naval News

The French MoD announced that the French Navy' Suffren nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) and its blue crew completed their first operational deployment with the Charles de Gaulle carrier strike group on January 4, 2023.

www.navalnews.com

There have really been two shifts in AUKUS. First in 2021 we went from "regionally superior" SSK to SSN. Then in 2023 we went from "an SSN" to committing to the most expensive SSN choices possible. When AUKUS was first floated groups like ASPI suggested that going with the UK Astute class might double the whole of life costs of FSP from $90 billion to $130 to $170 billion. Now with a fleet of Virginias and SSN AUKUS (surely a maintenance nightmare to sustain both) the cost has doubled again to $260 to $368 billion. This will have major impacts on the ADF. If the Hunter Class budget is cut back, AUKUS will be why.

So I agree with the shift from SSK to SSN, but I think we have gone much to far in choosing a very challenging SSN to acquire and sustain.

Moderators if you are unhappy with this it can be stricken. I am not criticising people's efforts to deliver AUKUS. I am criticising the political decisions.

I wish I could recall a recent article that talked about out submarine future, because it gave some details about the high projected cost of pursuing the conventional Attack Class. Seemed unusually high and based on economics made going with the Virginia's a logical choice.
I confess to some scepticism.
Like the Taipans it's a subject that divides and I confess to have given up on trying to discern fact from fantasy.
I want to like AUKUS, but for so many layers there are too many questions.

Hopefully it will meet and exceed expectations.


In hindsight I think it would of been preferable to continue on with the Attack program with reduced numbers with the view we did not do a major refit of the Collins Class
At the same time explore a SSN pathway either with what we are doing now with AUKUS or alternatively with the ATTACK Class.
It would of given some redundancy and future choices that the ageing Collins class does not.


Cheers S

 

[Armchair]

From everything I have read the Virginia and SSN AUKUS will be excellent submarines. Yet I now question the choice. The cost and timing of construction is wrong for the RAN IMO. I think it was decided on political and not technical or security grounds. Shifting from the French Attack (Shortfin Barracuda SSK) to the French SSN (Barracuda) would have reduced delay on construction (detailed design already done), reduced crewing pressures and vastly reduced cost. I do not suggest that the Barracuda SSN is superior to the Virginia or SSN AUKUS. It is only 2/3 the size and half the firepower. Yet it is also half the cost, less risk and less delay. Barracuda SSNs would still be acoustically superior to Chinese and Russian SSNs.

thanks for setting all that out, Scott. Many interesting points.
One thing we don’t know is whether your favoured alternative could deliver the required capability for the RAN in the time frame anticipated. We know that the USN believes Virginias will deliver relevant capability because they are accelerating production.