Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0

[MickB]

Outside of wartime conditions, how long do people think it would take the RAN to increase the number of available personnel to crew warships by 25% when some of the postings take 10-15 years to build the needed level of skill and experience?

I have no personal knowledge so I'm asking a legit question not trying to have a dig.
Given that a skill level requires 15 years to build, are there not people who have already served 3 or 5 or 10 years who can be brought up to this level if the positions were available?
I guess my question is , are the limited number of hulls a detriment to promotion and buy extension retention?

 

[iambuzzard]

Late in WWII the UK had so much new gear coming online they couldn't operate it without decomissioning existing capabilities. They tried to get Australia to crew two new fleet carriers and potentially a couple of cruisers, while we were disbanding army units to send warm bodies back home to bring in the harvest.

To my thinking, the only reserve that makes sense is an extra example or two of an in-service type. It is current config, and lays up prior to major maintenance or upgrade, with its crew going to its sister that is coming out of maintenance. If the proverbial hits the fan a crew can be formed and get the extra hull back in operation.

So, indeally, instead of three DDGs, there are five. Three in active service (including intermediate maintenance) for two always available, one in reserve, one in refit or upgrade.

As a new class enters service, the ship being replaced isn't disposed of until the new ship reaches FOC.

I think we're on the same page there, Volkodav. If the aim is to have a 12, 16 or 18 MFU fleet then that should mean that number in service with the extras in the reserve/maintenance cycle.
If a shooting war starts with so few ships in the water we could find ourselves in a whole mess of trouble if we lose a couple with no reserves.
In AFL and NRL, or any sport, you have players on the bench. We need to be smart.
A lot of people on here say why build extra ships if we can't crew them. I'm sure if things go pear shaped you will get a lot of recently retired crew rejoining the service. There are still a few dedicated people out there despite the current social media driven "me" generation.
It would be prudent to have a couple of hulls laid up in reserve for them to crew in an emergency.
Once the Anzacs are decommissioned they should be held in reserve for some years, not sold off immediately or sunk as fish farms.

 

[Meriv90]

In those 18 you count active or operational ships that can be immediately fielded?

Because to be able to immediately field 18 units, means you need way more ships than those 18. I forgot the progression but if i remember correctly at low numbers it is an operational ship every 3 of the class, the more you increase the ratio 1:3 decreases slowly but still to have 18 operational ships you need to at least double that number in built and crewed ships.

And on the reserves: what's the cost of having reserves?

Which country outside the US can sustain an attrition war?have reserves or shipyards fast enough?

Even Russia had to ask for North Korea munition, its only attrition capabilities are human waves.

China have personnel problems like the rest of us.

Report: PLA Navy Runs Into Crewing Difficulties for Growing Fleet

This without touching the matter that they don't have a sea war-faring tradition, thus we aren't event mentioning the quality of those crews (not as human capital but as institution capabilities).

I'm not saying "misery loves company", but i would discern from problems that only Australia has and thus can be solved versus problems that afflict all players and that unless Australia is an Unicorn wont be able to solve.

 

[hauritz]

In those 18 you count active or operational ships that can be immediately fielded?

Because to be able to immediately field 18 units, means you need way more ships than those 18. I forgot the progression but if i remember correctly at low numbers it is an operational ship every 3 of the class, the more you increase the ratio 1:3 decreases slowly but still to have 18 operational ships you need to at least double that number in built and crewed ships.

And on the reserves: what's the cost of having reserves?

Which country outside the US can sustain an attrition war?have reserves or shipyards fast enough?

Even Russia had to ask for North Korea munition, its only attrition capabilities are human waves.

China have personnel problems like the rest of us.

Report: PLA Navy Runs Into Crewing Difficulties for Growing Fleet

This without touching the matter that they don't have a sea war-faring tradition, thus we aren't event mentioning the quality of those crews (not as human capital but as institution capabilities).

I'm not saying "misery loves company", but i would discern from problems that only Australia has and thus can be solved versus problems that afflict all players and that unless Australia is an Unicorn wont be able to solve.

China is rapidly expanding its fleet and that creates a lot of challenges for them. The good thing for Australia and it’s allies is that this does give us a little breathing room. Of course assuming this could also bring about complacency. I think a lot of us are concerned by the lack of urgency in dealing with the growing Chinese threat but just think of how poor some of our decisions have been over the last few decades and how much time and money this has cost us.

In other words we have a delicate balancing act to perform over the next decade or so.We can’t afford any more rash, poorly thought out solutions. We need to carefully set out our priorities based around realistic timeframes and budgets.

 

[Meriv90]

I would start by agreeing on a priority list.

What's more important for RAN?
A)Ships in the water?(timing)
B)National industry?(sustainability)
C)Crewing cost (because as point one you can solve this by budget)
D)Budget constraints?
Etc.. etc...

Because what I'm seeing happening is that the conversation goes in circles because everyone has different priorities.

 

[Wombat000]

The implied message is “the threat of conflict of some degree is the highest it’s been for yonks, and the window of that occurring is within 10yrs”.

it either is as stated or it isn’t?

If it actually is, then the priority should be capability available, so A - Ships in the water!

However the natural extension to that is a sustainable and meaningful - B.
One is either serious or they’re not, if they are then deal with it via D, which will solve C.

 

[Meriv90]

While for example my perception of the priorities of the users that normally write are

B-C-A

Off-shore building is completely out of the window.

I never read increasing the pay drastically to attract international trained individual while training new crews

And I never read of budget constraints. Prices are never discussed. I think the first time it was how expensive is to fill 100+ vls.

Rarely the Chinese/or other possible threats gets mentioned, what capabilities they field and thus what countermeasures you should field.

 

[ASSAIL]

I’m unaware of current practice for manning of ships in refit. During my time many ships company remained posted to the ship and enjoyed some well earned shore time.
In times of manpower shortages this practice is quite wasteful.
During my exchange service with the RN I was posted to HMS Achilles which was approaching refit, we steamed to Gibraltar, decommissioned Achilles to HM Dockyard, moved our stores and recommissioned the just refit completed HMS Bacchante and departed for work up.
This struck me as being very manpower efficient.
Maybe we already do this with the Anzacs?

 

[Todjaeger]

I have no personal knowledge so I'm asking a legit question not trying to have a dig.
Given that a skill level requires 15 years to build, are there not people who have already served 3 or 5 or 10 years who can be brought up to this level if the positions were available?
I guess my question is , are the limited number of hulls a detriment to promotion and buy extension retention?

Lacking personal knowledge myself, I cannot really answer the question but there are certain things I can make guesses on.

One of the first things I would keep in mind is that Australia and the RAN already have existing training streams which take personnel and develop them so that they have the relevant skills and experience for the postings. This is how the RAN has been able to operate the surface warships which are already in service and why the RAN has over the decades and changes in classes in service been able to operate warships. It also means that people are already being brought up to the levels required, to crew the existing ships. I would therefore modify the question to ask whether or not more currently serving personnel could be developed to fill posts aboard new/additional vessels. The immediate answer I would have on this is I have no idea...

An area I would be concerned about and would likely need some reflection upon, is the question of what or how are these notional existing RAN personnel being developed currently, and what is the objective of their current professional development? There might be existing RAN personnel that would be ideal to develop to staff critical postings which would exist in the future if the RAN fleet were to expand, but it would not make sense to do so if taking them out of their current development were to then cause a critical shortage elsewhere in the RAN. That is sort of one of the problems with trying to cover a future need using existing personnel, as the existing personnel are already posted to positions so they would need replacements to takeover before training could begin.

I suspect the promotion and retention questions are indeed tied to the availability of ships, but the degree to which this is an issue is not known to me. If eligibility for promotion is (at least at times) dependent on sea time or especially sea time in certain postings, then I would certainly expect a limited number of ships to have an impact on RAN personnel and their ability to be promoted. Going further with this thought, I could certainly see how hindrances to promotion could negatively impact retention.

However, the availability (or lack thereof) of ships/ship postings can create a kind of chicken/egg paradox.

It is likely here were decisions and commitments need to be made by gov't to deliberately expand the number of personnel with critically useful skills for deployments, coupled with a future expansion of the fleet by nn date, so that the expanded numbers of personnel in such roles actually can get posted to sea, continue to expand their skills and experience, and provide valuable service to Defence.

 

[d-ron84]

From what a friend of mine, and ex-USN Dolphin has said, submariners categorize everything in the water as either hostile subs or targets. The point of having a 'quiet' hull for an ASW vessel is to reduce the amount of noise radiating from the ASW vessel which can interfere with the vessel's efforts to listen for possible sub activities. A decent sub with a decent crew is going to be able to detect a surface vessel fairly easily.

I know I'm a bit late to this discussion, but that is 100% correct

 

[devo99]

Arafuras are not combatants; they are not built to go in harms way.

I'd imagine the MHC role would at times result in them being in some form of harms way as they will need to be accompanying or preceding any amphibious force. Of course there will likely be other escorts screening for them but something a little more useful than the 25mm guns could come in handy, if perhaps a hard sell bearing in mind RAN efforts to decrease the number of different gun calibres in use.

 

[devo99]

I guess my question is , are the limited number of hulls a detriment to promotion and buy extension retention?

Generally people join the Navy to be on ships. The number of ships in the fleet directly corresponds with the number of ship postings to be filled. Less ships means less ship postings which means less officers and sailors needed and a tighter promotion pipeline since the number of possible ship postings generally goes down as rank goes up. This is one of the arguments for a balanced fleet of smaller and larger ships so that you don't get brand new COs getting a DDG as their first command but also so you don't get a whole batch of ex-patrol boat COs all competing for spots on three DDGs.

 

[Pusser01]

I’m unaware of current practice for manning of ships in refit. During my time many ships company remained posted to the ship and enjoyed some well earned shore time.
In times of manpower shortages this practice is quite wasteful.
During my exchange service with the RN I was posted to HMS Achilles which was approaching refit, we steamed to Gibraltar, decommissioned Achilles to HM Dockyard, moved our stores and recommissioned the just refit completed HMS Bacchante and departed for work up.
This struck me as being very manpower efficient.
Maybe we already do this with the Anzacs?

During ASMD, AMCAP & going forward to Transcap, there is no ship staff allocated to the ship. The crew is re-allocated a couple of months prior to undocking, generally from a ship that has just docked for its go. For in-water maintenance periods, the crew remains allocated to the ship for the 3-6 month period & use it for leave, training etc. Cheers.

 

[Bob53]

A bit of an apples to oranges comparison though. Australia does not have a domestic aerospace industry which is large enough to support and sustain jet aircraft production, never mind advanced fast jets. Any fighter aircraft Australia would order would either have to be built overseas, or a manufacturer would need to construct/purchase a facility in Australia to engage in production. If a company was foolish enough to actually setup domestic fighter production in Australia, that facility would only operate until the contracts to meet the Australian order were completed. There just is not enough domestic activity to sustain such a capability.

For naval shipbuilding, there can be enough activity to sustain the industrial base, provided things are properly planned for and managed.

Aknowledged …more the point was if we are short on time there is a precedent for public consumption.

 

[Bob53]

Plenty, but magic crew land fantasy fleets seem more popular.

Gets a bit ho hum at times. Like seeing the realities of the fantasies brought to light by the pros though.

 

[Bob53]

Late in WWII the UK had so much new gear coming online they couldn't operate it without decomissioning existing capabilities. They tried to get Australia to crew two new fleet carriers and potentially a couple of cruisers, while we were disbanding army units to send warm bodies back home to bring in the harvest.

To my thinking, the only reserve that makes sense is an extra example or two of an in-service type. It is current config, and lays up prior to major maintenance or upgrade, with its crew going to its sister that is coming out of maintenance. If the proverbial hits the fan a crew can be formed and get the extra hull back in operation.

So, indeally, instead of three DDGs, there are five. Three in active service (including intermediate maintenance) for two always available, one in reserve, one in refit or upgrade.

As a new class enters service, the ship being replaced isn't disposed of until the new ship reaches FOC.

Makes great sense and reduces the workload and increases availability and therefore potentially pro longs the life of the ship, meaning in.20 years there might not be as much urgency to replace or as discussed we have a reserve ship for training etc. so it won’t happen.

 

[Stampede]

Just curious , did Luerrsen have a stand at Indo / Pacific 23

I didn't see them on the exhibitors list.


Cheers S

 

[Reptilia]

First photos of the Taiwanese Light Frigate coming out, 2 ships expected in 2026.

from the website upmedia.mg, translated…
Link

蔡英文17日主持海軍輕型巡防艦開工典禮　艦體設計初稿圖疑曝光--上報

日前美國軍工集團Leidos的全資子公司Gibbs&Cox，在參加2023印太海事展時，公開澳洲皇家海軍推銷的輕型......

www-upmedia-mg.translate.goog

‘A few days ago, Gibbs & Cox, a wholly-owned subsidiary of the US military-industrial group Leidos, disclosed the light frigate configuration AUSLF promoted by the Royal Australian Navy when participating in the 2023 Indo-Pacific Maritime Exhibition, and revealed that "this design is based on the reference to another one expected to be launched next week." "The design of an allied navy that will cut steel plates and deliver two ships in 2026." It was pointed out that the Navy was very annoyed because the information about the start of steel plate cutting of the Navy's light frigate (air defense type) was revealed in advance, because the Ministry of National Defense has planned On the morning of the 17th, President Tsai Ing-wen went south to Kaohsiung CITIC Shipbuilding to preside over the steel plate cutting and groundbreaking ceremony for the Navy's light frigate (air defense type). She also displayed the overall design of the light frigate (air defense type), which also represented the official start of construction of the navy's light frigate. .

However, what is also causing headaches for the Navy is that 48 hours after the foreign reports, a "Navy Light Corvette" hull design appeared on the Internet. The drawing also marked "The Navy Light Corvette has a length of 115 meters and a width of 115 meters." 15 meters, with a full load of 3,000 tons", and the design clearly states all weapon configurations and future plans. It is pointed out that the dimensions in the design are indeed the ship's specifications, but the hull design is that of the Navy. The initial design draft of the light frigate hull was questioned. The navy had already leaked the design drawings of the navy's light frigate hull.

People familiar with the matter pointed out that the biggest difference between the configuration of the Australian corvette promoted by Gibbs & Cox and the configuration of the navy's corvette is that in addition to the different number of bow vertical launching systems and naval guns, our navy's corvette will be a rotary The 3D phase array radar is integrated with the Taikang antenna on the main mast, while the Australian light frigate uses a fixed 3D phase array radar.

As for the first version of the naval light frigate hull design that appeared on the Internet, it was pointed out that the dimensions and weapon information marked internally were completely finalized projects. "The ship is 115 meters long, 15 meters wide, with a full load of 3,000 tons, and weapons On the project, the Chinese Academy of Sciences Huayang Vertical Launch System (VLS) at the bow of the ship contains 32 Haijian-2 anti-aircraft missiles; the future planned air defense type will include 24 Haijian-2 anti-aircraft missiles plus 10 Haigong-3 anti-aircraft missiles, and The 32 anti-submarine Haijian-II anti-aircraft missiles plus 8 anti-submarine rockets; the total of 16 Yuu-er and Yu-san anti-ship missiles are all clearly explained.

It was pointed out that the navy's light frigate finalized the design for the first time. After internal discussions, it was believed that the Taikang antenna located in the middle of the hull and the 3D phase array radar should be integrated on the main mast. After further discussions with Gibbs & Cox, The final decision was made on the design drawing of the naval light frigate (air defense type) released on the 17th. Above the main mast of the bow is a rotating 3D phase array radar, and a Taikang antenna is installed behind the radar.

It is understood that the navy's light frigate is completing the contract design and immediately carries out and completes all ship model testing projects according to the design drawings. It has now entered the detailed design stage, and the construction drawing work has also begun. If everything goes well, it can be completed in accordance with the contract. Two naval light frigates will be delivered in 2026; however, due to the naval light frigate towed sonar procurement project sponsored by the Chinese Academy of Sciences, a total of three foreign manufacturers have passed the qualifications to enter the selection. The Guanghua Planning Office of the Chinese Academy of Sciences will work with various professional fields to make the selection. In the near future Only then will there be results. Therefore, Gibbs & Cox has not yet finalized the anti-submarine design. It remains to be seen whether there will be any changes.’

 

[iambuzzard]

Makes great sense and reduces the workload and increases availability and therefore potentially pro longs the life of the ship, meaning in.20 years there might not be as much urgency to replace or as discussed we have a reserve ship for training etc. so it won’t happen.

I believe it was Kim Beazley as Defence Minister who got the 15 F-111Gs which were fully mission capable for the RAAF to prolong the service life of the F-111Cs. Why can't the RAN take a similar approach?

 

[south]

I believe it was Kim Beazley as Defence Minister who got the 15 F-111Gs which were fully mission capable for the RAAF to prolong the service life of the F-111Cs. Why can't the RAN take a similar approach?

Capable airframes, but critically missing some things that the F-111C had (e.g Harpoon, AGM-142, pave tack for LGB delivery) - they weren’t directly mission capable and my understanding is the G was mostly used by 6SQN for training.

1. We cannot (currently) man the ships we have, yet let’s propose we get (even more) spare ships.
2. It’s well established that having a ship alongside provides respite to members (and their families), and allows for shore based training and leave etc (see @Pusser01 reply above). Would having a ship to swap crews into and sending them straight back out be beneficial for retention long term? Unlikely.
3. 15 surplus USAF F-111’s is a huge difference in cost to additional state of the art warship