Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0

[hauritz]

A positive article related to the U.S. sub production capabilities Which flows through to the ability of the USN to release Virginias. Interesting the number of additional staff hired in the past few years.…assuming some wastage probably in excess of 5000 new hires.

Rep. Joe Courtney: US undersea supremacy is only growing stronger - Breaking Defense

In a new op-ed, Rep. Joe Courtney, D-CT., makes the case for why America's submarine capabilities are still robust.

breakingdefense.com

The article does mention the $3 billion that Australia invested into the US submarine industrial base. Sounds like that might be in USD as well. I have never been able to find details about this.
Is it an investment as in buying shares?
Did that money come with any guarantee that submarines would absolutely be provided for Australia?

 

[iambuzzard]

The article does mention the $3 billion that Australia invested into the US submarine industrial base. Sounds like that might be in USD as well. I have never been able to find details about this.
Is it an investment as in buying shares?
Did that money come with any guarantee that submarines would absolutely be provided for Australia?

I think it goes towards increasing production.

 

[Bob53]

The article does mention the $3 billion that Australia invested into the US submarine industrial base. Sounds like that might be in USD as well. I have never been able to find details about this.
Is it an investment as in buying shares?
Did that money come with any guarantee that submarines would absolutely be provided for Australia?

I think we would be rightly peeved if we chipped in toincrease production and didn’t get the subs.

 

[AndyinOz]

I think it goes towards increasing production.

From what I recall reading on the subject when it was first announced, it was to be provided to the US in order to increase capacity but was not stated exactly what that would entail. Whether that would be directly increasing production from the two yards or whether it would be used to deal with the maintenance backlog, which as a result would in theory allow for faster production of new boats. That was to be left to the US how best to utilise the funding.

 

[Wombat000]

rant deleted.

 

[H_K]

On the question of timelines for a Tier 2 build, I thought I’d share a couple of examples to give an idea of what « best in class » looks like.

(ordered by speed)

Builder	Project	Client	Contract signing to sea trials
Naval Group	Gowind 2500	Egypt	2 yrs 9 mo
Hyundai	HDF 3000	Philippines	3 yrs 1 mo
Damen	Sigma 10513	Morocco	3 yrs 2 mo
Navantia	Alfa 3000	Saudi Arabia	3 yrs 2 mo
TKMS	Meko A200	Egypt	3 yrs 7 mo
Naval Group	Gowind 2500	UAE	3 yrs 11 mo
Fincantieri	FCX-30	Qatar	4 yrs 5 mo

Average of 3.5 years to build, once a contract is signed. Add 6 months for delivery (builders & acceptance trials, crew qualification and defect rectification), and another 6-12 months post-delivery for the crew to work up and declare IOC.

Most of these yards have the ability to deliver follow-on ships on a 6 month cadence. Add 12-18 months to stand-up local production for follow-on hulls.

The big question of course is the time it takes to run a procurement process, finalize contracts, and how much allowance there is to customize to RAN requirements… On the one hand, a crash « FMS style » procurement using off-the-shelf equipment could deliver 3-4 hulls in 2028-2029 (2-3 built abroad followed by local production). On the other hand a protracted procurement process leading to a completely custom, local-only build would be hard pressed to deliver 2 hulls by 2031-2032…

 

[Redlands18]

On the question of timelines for a Tier 2 build, I thought I’d share a couple of examples to give an idea of what « best in class » looks like.

(ordered by speed)

Builder	Project	Client	Contract signing to sea trials
Naval Group	Gowind 2500	Egypt	2 yrs 9 mo
Hyundai	HDF 3000	Philippines	3 yrs 1 mo
Damen	Sigma 10513	Morocco	3 yrs 2 mo
Navantia	Alfa 3000	Saudi Arabia	3 yrs 2 mo
TKMS	Meko A200	Egypt	3 yrs 7 mo
Naval Group	Gowind 2500	UAE	3 yrs 11 mo
Fincantieri	FCX-30	Qatar	4 yrs 5 mo

Average of 3.5 years to build, once a contract is signed. Add 6 months for delivery (builders & acceptance trials, crew qualification and defect rectification), and another 6-12 months post-delivery for the crew to work up and declare IOC.

Most of these yards have the ability to deliver follow-on ships on a 6 month cadence. Add 12-18 months to stand-up local production for follow-on hulls.

The big question of course is the time it takes to run a procurement process, finalize contracts, and how much allowance there is to customize to RAN requirements… On the one hand, a crash « FMS style » procurement using off-the-shelf equipment could deliver 3-4 hulls in 2028-2029 (2-3 built abroad followed by local production). On the other hand a protracted procurement process leading to a completely custom, local-only build would be hard pressed to deliver 2 hulls by 2031-2032…

And what do we have come 2028-29?
A vessel with poor range and endurance (A200 excepted), around 4000nm @ 15kt.
A vessel with completely different combat systems to that of the Hobarts, Anzacs and Hunters, most of these are with French systems and weapons.
A vessel with very little compatibility to the rest of the RAN.
A requirement for unique trg and logistics.
Order any of these off the production line as are and you are getting a vessel designed for completely different strategic circumstances to Australia.

 

[Meriv90]

-Only if you go for FMS for the first hulls.
Being a Tier 2 the french have experience with long range patrols. Even if we are taking it slowly (as in the article below from yesterday) the French are moving from their Floreal class to the new EPC, in the french version a long range oceanic patrol.

Launching of the first phase of the European Patrol Corvette project - Naval News

Launching of the first phase of the European Patrol Corvette projectwith signature of Modular and Multirole Patrol Corvette contract

www.navalnews.com

And the Spanish also are going to adopt the same long range version or at least a more weaponized model, and they have experience with your systems. The French version should have 10k range I would say more than exceeding RAN needs.
I bet that we could cut the planning phase significantly, and probably you could use both French and Spanish shipyards if not more, to put in the water several hulls. Remember for us it is still economies of scale because after yours on the same shipyards would arrive the national version of the same family.

Another positive side could be the export possibilities. You would have a local version of a 30-40 hull strong class. Why an ASEAN would buy an European version (that effectively by now outside Korea are the only exporters) when you can buy a local version from the Australians? Why buying Korean version of a ship that has just a portion of the hulls in the water than the European family? And with the possibility of exports you could avoid a future valley of death.

Resuming
-You loose the benefits of a local produced ship
+You benefit by economies of scale cost reductions of a way bigger class, and use the cheaper labor of EU shipyards.
-You have increased risk for a paper design
+You diversificate the risk by having the possibility of multiple EU shipyards.
+Bigger export possibilities, I know that it sounds exactly as the MEKO 200 and Anzac class, but back then what were the ASEAN requirements?
+You get several hulls in the water in time and for your needs.

 

[Stampede]

And what do we have come 2028-29?
A vessel with poor range and endurance (A200 excepted), around 4000nm @ 15kt.
A vessel with completely different combat systems to that of the Hobarts, Anzacs and Hunters, most of these are with French systems and weapons.
A vessel with very little compatibility to the rest of the RAN.
A requirement for unique trg and logistics.
Order any of these off the production line as are and you are getting a vessel designed for completely different strategic circumstances to Australia.

Fair call.

Still begs the question, what does our fleet look like this side of 2029?

Is there any scope to add increased military capacity to the RAN in the next six years?

Cheers S

 

[iambuzzard]

This is a question for the members on here with a naval engineering background.
What would be required to up gun the Type 31 or Constellation class frigate to a 127mm gun as this now seems to be the main gun of choice for our MFUs (see, this layman is picking up your lingo! Lol). I realise there would be ballast issues and I am not sure how top heavy the current designs are.
Are a lot of the systems compatible to what the RAN is currently using?
The European designs (not British) seem to be unsuitable due to various systems and weapons and although the ships might be capable the time taken to modify them to suit our needs would be too long as we need hulls in the water quickly. Range is always a high priority in our region.
The above two designs to me seem to be the most suitable for our needs for a light patrol frigate. I don't see corvettes as being of any use outside our immediate waters due to their lack of range, heavy armament, and space for upgrading .
I look forward to your thoughts on this.
Cheers,
Buzzard.

 

[iambuzzard]

Fair call.

Still begs the question, what does our fleet look like this side of 2029?

Is there any scope to add increased military capacity to the RAN in the next six years?

Cheers S

You asked the question I was about to ask. How soon?

 

[Volkodav]

I'm being very cheeky here, but, if the surface fleet review indicates we need proper DDGs, doesn't that, by default make the Hobart's and Hunters Tier 2?

A lot of the issue we have at the moment stems from the original tiers proposed under the 87 defence white paper. Grouping FFGs and DDGs together allowed future cabinets to conflate the two types as equivalent and interchangeable.

The truth is the DDG equivalent of the FFG-07 was the Ticonderoga class AEGIS cruiser (originally a DDG). The designed replacement for the Adams Class DDGs in the USN, were the Arleigh Burke Class DDG 51 class.

Compared to these the FFGs were very much second tier, while the ANZACs were little better than USCG High Endurance Cutters. (I am being a little liberal here, the ANZACs did have a CMS and a PDMS).

By grouping DDGs with FFGs the GotD was able to retire the DDGs without replacement, shrink the class of six to four, then replace them with only three new ships.

At the same time, ANZACs were upgraded to become GP (as opposed to Patrol) frigates and then became defacto replacements for the FFGs, which had become replacements for the DDGs.

Paul Dibb probably had a point when he said the MEKO 200 ANZ was too large and too capable. I know at the time many thought he was talking out his backside but in hindsight he was right. A smaller ship could never have been sold as an FFG replacement, meaning the tier 1 contraction would have been obvious enough to become a political issue.

 

[hauritz]

I'm being very cheeky here, but, if the surface fleet review indicates we need proper DDGs, doesn't that, by default make the Hobart's and Hunters Tier 2?

A lot of the issue we have at the moment stems from the original tiers proposed under the 87 defence white paper. Grouping FFGs and DDGs together allowed future cabinets to conflate the two types as equivalent and interchangeable.

The truth is the DDG equivalent of the FFG-07 was the Ticonderoga class AEGIS cruiser (originally a DDG). The designed replacement for the Adams Class DDGs in the USN, were the Arleigh Burke Class DDG 51 class.

Compared to these the FFGs were very much second tier, while the ANZACs were little better than USCG High Endurance Cutters. (I am being a little liberal here, the ANZACs did have a CMS and a PDMS).

By grouping DDGs with FFGs the GotD was able to retire the DDGs without replacement, shrink the class of six to four, then replace them with only three new ships.

At the same time, ANZACs were upgraded to become GP (as opposed to Patrol) frigates and then became defacto replacements for the FFGs, which had become replacements for the DDGs.

Paul Dibb probably had a point when he said the MEKO 200 ANZ was too large and too capable. I know at the time many though he was talking out his backside but in hindsight he was right. A smaller ship could never have been sold as an FFG replacement, meaning the tier 1 contraction would have been obvious enough to become a political issue.

Actually I don’t think suggesting the Hobart and Hunter are future Tier 2 ships is cheeky at all. Even now both those ships are looking decidedly baseline compared to a number of ship designs on the drawing board or actually in production for the 2030s and beyond.

Both the Hobart and Hunter classes have been criticised for their lack of armament and that certainly won’t be addressed with smaller and less capable warships.

If Australia does go for a corvette sized ship which is basically just intended for constabulary and grey zone conflicts then I can live with that. But let’s not pretend that these are warfighting ships. In fact as Dibb suggested it is probably best to go with a ship that can absolutely not be considered as a future frontline warship.

If you want proper combat vessels for the 2030s and beyond then the Hunter class is your new baseline.

 

[Armchair]

In addition, Japan's security situation is a lot more focused. Not as much as, say, Israel or India, but they really only have one threat and one theatre.

One(ish) theatre but two real threats, surely (leaving aside territorial disputes with Russia)

Japan could deter North Korea on their own probably (using the methods mentioned by Todjaeger and in home waters) but it is cheaper and more effective to attempt to deter China in a coalition led by the US (and probably in the JMSDF case using their vessels in greater strategic depth than provided by their home waters).

Despite their very different circumstances Australia and Japan, in my view, share the same mid term macro strategic goal - prevent the US from military disengagement from east Asia.

If the (officially classified but obvious to the PRC) capability required by Aus govt is “make a credible contribution to coalition efforts at deterring an invasion of Taiwan” then the previous ADF (secret but obvious) answer probably was something based around the idea “commit a Collins somewhere near” (obviously much more behind that).

If the core of the RAN part of the answer has changed (perhaps temporarily) to “commit a Hobart to a coalition fleet” then the large purchase (even with Tomahawk limitations) for a conflict, that might last months, might be less baffling. Maybe the acquisition says more about anticipated low Collins availability, higher anticipated PLAN ASW capability, filling the known gap to Virginia arrival, and doubts about SM-3 and SM-6.

In any case it is worth debating all the limitations etc (some, in some circumstances, apply to USN, RN and JMSDF too) but in the scenario in the previous para though the thread-relevant limitations are more about Hobart availability (and survivability in a coalition context) rather than Tomahawk age, observability, sovereign targeting, or inevitable obsolescence.

Or it could just be a mistake, I am open to that. Tomahawk has been mentioned or implied in Australian defence plans for decades. Patient advocates may have finally got their choice.

 

[Redlands18]

Actually I don’t think suggesting the Hobart and Hunter are future Tier 2 ships is cheeky at all. Even now both those ships are looking decidedly baseline compared to a number of ship designs on the drawing board or actually in production for the 2030s and beyond.

Both the Hobart and Hunter classes have been criticised for their lack of armament and that certainly won’t be addressed with smaller and less capable warships.

If Australia does go for a corvette sized ship which is basically just intended for constabulary and grey zone conflicts then I can live with that. But let’s not pretend that these are warfighting ships. In fact as Dibb suggested it is probably best to go with a ship that can absolutely not be considered as a future frontline warship.

If you want proper combat vessels for the 2030s and beyond then the Hunter class is your new baseline.

The way I see it, the Hobarts are Tier 2 Destroyers, the Hunters Tier 1 Frigates and the Anzacs Tier 2 Frigates. Why are we comparing the Hunter to a Burke? the Hunter will be a superior ASW ship to a Burke but inferior in, AAW, ASuW and Land Attack.

 

[H_K]

And what do we have come 2028-29?
A vessel with poor range and endurance (A200 excepted), around 4000nm @ 15kt.
A vessel with completely different combat systems to that of the Hobarts, Anzacs and Hunters, most of these are with French systems and weapons.
A vessel with very little compatibility to the rest of the RAN.
A requirement for unique trg and logistics.
Order any of these off the production line as are and you are getting a vessel designed for completely different strategic circumstances to Australia.

This is where configuration vs. customization comes into play. The RAN will need to specify what systems are must-haves to give it the mix of AAW, ASW and ASuW capabilities it wants and to maximize commonality with existing systems (e.g. 9LV CMS, ESSM, NSM, CAPTAS sonar, range/endurance thresholds) and let the market offer configurations around those requirements.

The good news is several vendors like Damen, Navantia, and probably TKMS will have no problem offering a combat suite built around 9LV (based on past experience), including many sensors & weapons already in use in the RAN, without requiring a lot of custom work. Saab offers some out-of-the-box configurations built around 9LV that could make sense and simplify integration (e.g. Sea Giraffe 4A radar, CEROS fire control etc). Adding range/endurance is also possible on many designs (as was done to go from Meko 200 to Anzac).

The bad news is that some custom options may be off the table, especially if they are not widely adopted elsewhere (CEAFAR) or if they have a big of a ship impact which would disqualify many off-the-shelf designs (e.g. 127mm gun or strike length Mk-41 VLS). At the end of the day it wouldn’t be surprising if (for example) Fincantieri and Naval Group were disqualified early on and the competition became a 3 horse race between say Damen (Sigma), BMT (Arrowhead 140), and TKMS (Meko A200). That would be a pretty good range of options.

 

[hauritz]

On the question of timelines for a Tier 2 build, I thought I’d share a couple of examples to give an idea of what « best in class » looks like.

(ordered by speed)

Builder	Project	Client	Contract signing to sea trials
Naval Group	Gowind 2500	Egypt	2 yrs 9 mo
Hyundai	HDF 3000	Philippines	3 yrs 1 mo
Damen	Sigma 10513	Morocco	3 yrs 2 mo
Navantia	Alfa 3000	Saudi Arabia	3 yrs 2 mo
TKMS	Meko A200	Egypt	3 yrs 7 mo
Naval Group	Gowind 2500	UAE	3 yrs 11 mo
Fincantieri	FCX-30	Qatar	4 yrs 5 mo

Average of 3.5 years to build, once a contract is signed. Add 6 months for delivery (builders & acceptance trials, crew qualification and defect rectification), and another 6-12 months post-delivery for the crew to work up and declare IOC.

Most of these yards have the ability to deliver follow-on ships on a 6 month cadence. Add 12-18 months to stand-up local production for follow-on hulls.

The big question of course is the time it takes to run a procurement process, finalize contracts, and how much allowance there is to customize to RAN requirements… On the one hand, a crash « FMS style » procurement using off-the-shelf equipment could deliver 3-4 hulls in 2028-2029 (2-3 built abroad followed by local production). On the other hand a protracted procurement process leading to a completely custom, local-only build would be hard pressed to deliver 2 hulls by 2031-2032…

It isn’t just constructing a new ship that is the time consuming part. It is all the work leading up to it.

Take the Hobart class for example. Planning began in the year 2000, a design was selected in 2007, the contract was issued in 2009, issues with design pushed production back to 2012.

Once construction started it only took 4 or 5 years to build the ship but it took 12 years to get to that point.

At this stage we haven’t even got to the planning stage of any new warship yet. That might happen next year. Even with a captain’s choice I find it hard to believe anything is likely to be delivered before the end of the decade.

If there is something that is likely to be be delivered before the end of the decade it would be something like the C-90 which barely qualifies as a warship in my opinion.

There really aren’t that many options left for Australia now. We ran the clock down. If a war occurs before the end of the decade we will be fighting it with whatever we have now.

 

[Redlands18]

This is where configuration vs. customization comes into play. The RAN will need to specify what systems are must-haves to give it the mix of AAW, ASW and ASuW capabilities it wants and to maximize commonality with existing systems (e.g. 9LV CMS, ESSM, NSM, CAPTAS sonar, range/endurance thresholds) and let the market offer configurations around those requirements.

The good news is several vendors like Damen, Navantia, and probably TKMS will have no problem offering a combat suite built around 9LV (based on past experience), including many sensors & weapons already in use in the RAN, without requiring a lot of custom work. Saab offers some out-of-the-box configurations built around 9LV that could make sense and simplify integration (e.g. Sea Giraffe 4A radar, CEROS fire control etc). Adding range/endurance is also possible on many designs (as was done to go from Meko 200 to Anzac).

The bad news is that some custom options may be off the table, especially if they are not widely adopted elsewhere (CEAFAR) or if they have a big of a ship impact which would disqualify many off-the-shelf designs (e.g. 127mm gun or strike length Mk-41 VLS). At the end of the day it wouldn’t be surprising if (for example) Fincantieri and Naval Group were disqualified early on and the competition became a 3 horse race between say Damen (Sigma), BMT (Arrowhead 140), and TKMS (Meko A200). That would be a pretty good range of options.

Naval Group would very much depend on how badly the bridges were burnt with the Subs as well as how much appetite there is right now for French equipment (Thales being the exception). If you are going to run a competition though, you will need to add a couple of years. I would have real doubts you are going to get all that into a Sigma 10514, even an A200 would be a tight fit as we have found out with the Anzacs.

 

[Anthony_B_78]

It isn’t just constructing a new ship that is the time consuming part. It is all the work leading up to it.

Take the Hobart class for example. Planning began in the year 2000, a design was selected in 2007, the contract was issued in 2009, issues with design pushed production back to 2012.

Once construction started it only took 4 or 5 years to build the ship but it took 12 years to get to that point.

At this stage we haven’t even got to the planning stage of any new warship yet. That might happen next year. Even with a captain’s choice I find it hard to believe anything is likely to be delivered before the end of the decade.

If there is something that is likely to be be delivered before the end of the decade it would be something like the C-90 which barely qualifies as a warship in my opinion.

There really aren’t that many options left for Australia now. We ran the clock down. If a war occurs before the end of the decade we will be fighting it with whatever we have now.

The seven years for planning stage is surely a good example of deliberately stretching something out to avoid having to pay for it. There's no good reason for seven years of planning; that's just bureaucratic inertia likely driven by the fact that it was a low budget priority until it was able to be pushed forward.

I do agree though that acquiring new ships would absolutely take time, and it may well be a case of gaining the capabilities we might need after the next war, rather than for that conflict - whatever and wherever it is.

 

[Todjaeger]

This is where configuration vs. customization comes into play. The RAN will need to specify what systems are must-haves to give it the mix of AAW, ASW and ASuW capabilities it wants and to maximize commonality with existing systems (e.g. 9LV CMS, ESSM, NSM, CAPTAS sonar, range/endurance thresholds) and let the market offer configurations around those requirements.

The good news is several vendors like Damen, Navantia, and probably TKMS will have no problem offering a combat suite built around 9LV (based on past experience), including many sensors & weapons already in use in the RAN, without requiring a lot of custom work. Saab offers some out-of-the-box configurations built around 9LV that could make sense and simplify integration (e.g. Sea Giraffe 4A radar, CEROS fire control etc). Adding range/endurance is also possible on many designs (as was done to go from Meko 200 to Anzac).

The bad news is that some custom options may be off the table, especially if they are not widely adopted elsewhere (CEAFAR) or if they have a big of a ship impact which would disqualify many off-the-shelf designs (e.g. 127mm gun or strike length Mk-41 VLS). At the end of the day it wouldn’t be surprising if (for example) Fincantieri and Naval Group were disqualified early on and the competition became a 3 horse race between say Damen (Sigma), BMT (Arrowhead 140), and TKMS (Meko A200). That would be a pretty good range of options.

TBH I do not really see a point in Australia ordered a design to be built to Australian specs, by a European shipyard. Firstly Australia would need to decide what it wants, what is needs, what a design absolutely has to have etc. It would then need to select which design best meets Australian requirements and there would need to be negotiations over the terms of the contract. This is something which would essentially have to happen, no matter where RAN warships were to be built. All of this would require time, which would also come before contracts could be signed and orders placed.

Pretty much the only possible exceptions were if Australia were to select a MOTS build, from a shipyard with an already established and active build programme, but there are two (or rather, at least two) important caveats with that. Australia would still have to negotiate the terms of any contract, and Australia would have to accept the ship fitout 'as is' which could mean a RAN vessel fitted with systems the RAN is unfamiliar with, and without any established training, support, maintenance or operational experience with.

Also, for any RAN order other than a MOTS order, detailed design work would need to be done, in order to fit the systems the RAN specifies. Again, this takes time.

As I and others have mentioned, repeatedly, there are reasons why a number of us consider the RAN getting new warships in service quickly as something which cannot happen. There are either a couple of years of work required before any contracts could be signed and then new warships built, or Australia would have to accept ships designed and built to the requirements of other navies (MOTS), fitted with kit the RAN is unfamiliar with. If the RAN did decide on the MOTS option, even with a 'Captains pick' and therefore not a competition between designers/builders, several years would be needed for the RAN to get personnel trained to operate the new kit, get a pool of maintainers trained and experienced to keep the kit operational, as well as time to establish the supply chains needed to keep everything in good working nick.

It is unfortunate, but there really is no way to shorten the process and still have an effective and useable warship brought into service.