Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0

[ASSAIL]

Reading the carbinet papers relating to the carrier replacement are an eye opener. Others (Spoz & Assail) may be able to add further insight, but basically the deputy chief scientist, department of primeminister and cabinet, and the RAAF representative provided advice to government, in 1982, that killed the carrier replacement program.

The government of the day didn't make a decision at the time as an election was approaching, but the overwhelming advice and sentiment, was not to replace Melbourne, especially as Invincible was nolonger available.

The key elements were:
1. The Harrier was useless, inferior to the F-5 Tiger etc. because it wasn't supersonic.
2. Helicopters were inferior to fixed wing ASW aircraft because dipping sonar was inferior to the "Barra" sonar buoy.
3. The only carrier worth getting, therefore, was one that could operate supersonic fighters and fixed wing ASW aircraft.
4. A conventionally powered CTOL version of a French design (that became CdeG) was the only viable solution, but too expensive.
5. In the current economic environment Australia couldn't afford to acquire such a ship, especially as acquiring an additional 10 P-3C aircraft ( which in their opinion were far superior at ASW than the RAN as a whole) was a much higher priority and Australia couldn't afford both.

Further to this:
1. Without supersonic fighter cover, even guided missile destroyers were too vulnerable to operate.
2. Being inferior to land based MPA aircraft, naval ASW helicopters weren't worth operating.
3. The RAN would have to become a coastal force, operating within Australian waters, under RAAF air cover.
4. This was a price worth paying to have a modern, effective air force.

Today these arguments would be ripped apart by a twelve year old using Google but back then they were the authoritive opinions of the experts on airpower, backed by the preeminent defence scientist. This was also following the preliminary information from the Falklands conflict.

Just as many unsubstantiated claims are being made about the future of warfare based on events in Ukraine, the Falklands some how was twisted to indicate that surface ships were unsurvivable and airpower was king.

The replacement carrier was gone, the ability to take effective ASW helicopters to sea was gone. The ability to triangulate to effectively use Ikara at longer range was gone.

Surface combatants were seen as incapable of defending themselves, therefore a waste of resources.

A follow on of losing the carrier, was losing justification for additional FFGs, there were initially meant to be ten (six instead of only two Australian built ships), plus the three DDGs and four US built FFGs. Also, initial plans to supplement the patrol boats with missile armed FACs died at the same time.

If memory serves, it was actually proposed to build a pair of Dutch M Class frigates instead of the last two FFGs. This was because the air power mafia had "proven" guided missile ships were a waste of resources.

The sad fact is, the Dibb report and the following white paper, actually improved things for the RAN from where they were heading. The RAN had done a very good job if convincing the political classes that a navy without a carrier, wasn't a navy. When the choice was made, based on advice not to replace the carrier, the navy, by its own statements, had become irrelevant.

All of which is why I spat the dummy and resigned from the RAN!
These decisions seemed to have had the support of the people during the Bob Hawke love in period so ……if they didn’t care.,.
Being an ASW specialist was a dead end in these circumstances.

 

[south]

Reading the carbinet papers relating to the carrier replacement are an eye opener. Others (Spoz & Assail) may be able to add further insight, but basically the deputy chief scientist, department of primeminister and cabinet, and the RAAF representative provided advice to government, in 1982, that killed the carrier replacement program.

We must be reading different papers from the National Archives... What I took was that the DFDC (Secretary, CDF and 3x service chiefs) agreeing that the Carrier would compromise the rest of defence, in a budget constrained environment. In fact, the cost of the HMS INVINCIBLE program was increasing - when significant savings were desired. Acquisition of the carrier would run the risk of compromise to the remainder of the Defence Program of record.

View Digital Image

recordsearch.naa.gov.au

Page 128 and 129

Even without HMS INVINCIBLE, the defence budget is under great strain from recent wage increases for both civilians and servicemen, price increases in existing procure- ment programs and increasing operating costs. Substantial funds, additional to Budget provisions, will almost certainly be required this financial year. Acquisition of HMS INVINCIBLE would lead to very substantial strain on the 1982/83 and subsequent budgets, when the full-year effects of the recent wage increases wili also be being felt. Although it would seem possible to accommodate the carrier by radical reprogramming, to do so would lead to highly visible cuts in the program. The submission does not analyse what these cuts might be, but it would be reasonable to expect that there would be a serious impact on;

- the acquisition of the P3Cs
- the Hunt Class Mine Counter-Measure Vessels
- the patrol boat program
- helicopters
- mortar locating radar
- medium guns for the Army
- munitions for the Army
- capital works programs (airfield development, Garden Island, ADFA)
- manpower

The key elements were:
1. The Harrier was useless, inferior to the F-5 Tiger etc. because it wasn't supersonic.
2. Helicopters were inferior to fixed wing ASW aircraft because dipping sonar was inferior to the "Barra" sonar buoy.
3. The only carrier worth getting, therefore, was one that could operate supersonic fighters and fixed wing ASW aircraft.
4. A conventionally powered CTOL version of a French design (that became CdeG) was the only viable solution, but too expensive.
5. In the current economic environment Australia couldn't afford to acquire such a ship, especially as acquiring an additional 10 P-3C aircraft ( which in their opinion were far superior at ASW than the RAN as a whole) was a much higher priority and Australia couldn't afford both.

2. Again - must be reading a different set of papers. It's constantly highlighted that LRMP aircraft, along with ASW Helos/FFG upgrades are essential, where as the central platform (carrier) was desirable. Note the medium ASW helo wasn't originally in the program, and budget space became available with retirement of Melbourne (Page 43/44). The only reference to Barra being 'superior' is on Page 84, where they comment 'Passive sonarbouys, such as Barra, would be preferred against current nuclear submarines'. In contrast - the value of ASW helo's is highlighted continually.
3. Does not correlate with the discussions on Page 16-18.
4. On Navy advice, page 109

Further to this:
1. Without supersonic fighter cover, even guided missile destroyers were too vulnerable to operate.
2. Being inferior to land based MPA aircraft, naval ASW helicopters weren't worth operating.
3. The RAN would have to become a coastal force, operating within Australian waters, under RAAF air cover.
4. This was a price worth paying to have a modern, effective air force.

Can't find a reference to any of these, can you provide a page number? Regarding 4 - there's talk about benefits of not acquiring being increased requirement for the RAAF/RAN to operate as a joint force, as well as a broader range of capabilities across both...

 

[south]

For those with time on their hands who want to review a 41 year old decision... I've taken the liberty of putting some point outs below.

p16-18: HMS Invincible no longer available due RN retention, follow on options
p43-44 and again 70-71: recommendation not to acquire, discussion around P3C/FFG/ASW helo suitability, costings...
p77-87: ASW Study
p93-98: ASW Capability discussions
p104-126: Aircraft carrier/STOVL/land based air capability discussions

View Digital Image

recordsearch.naa.gov.au

 

[Volkodav]

For those with time on their hands who want to review a 41 year old decision... I've taken the liberty of putting some point outs below.

p16-18: HMS Invincible no longer available due RN retention, follow on options
p43-44 and again 70-71: recommendation not to acquire, discussion around P3C/FFG/ASW helo suitability, costings...
p77-87: ASW Study
p93-98: ASW Capability discussions
p104-126: Aircraft carrier/STOVL/land based air capability discussions

View Digital Image

recordsearch.naa.gov.au

Did you read the submissions made by the deputy chief scientist? Or did you leave them out because they didn't fit your beliefs?

The RAAF submission was actually far more factual and even handed than that by the deputy chief scientist.

I read these papers a few years back and recalled them at about three in the morning after being woken up by a vomiting cat and thought I would share my recollection.

 

[StingrayOZ]

For those with time on their hands who want to review a 41 year old decision... I've taken the liberty of putting some point outs below.

p16-18: HMS Invincible no longer available due RN retention, follow on options
p43-44 and again 70-71: recommendation not to acquire, discussion around P3C/FFG/ASW helo suitability, costings...
p77-87: ASW Study
p93-98: ASW Capability discussions
p104-126: Aircraft carrier/STOVL/land based air capability discussions

View Digital Image

recordsearch.naa.gov.au

I laughed, Bob Katter was the chairman..

Also mentioned Hermes, but at 2,100 crew, nearly twice Melbournes.

 

[Volkodav]

I laughed, Bob Katter was the chairman..

Also mentioned Hermes, but at 2,100 crew, nearly twice Melbournes.

That was the second time Hermes was offered to the RAN, the first time was during the mid 60s when she was still in her CTOL configuration and had seen less than 10 years service.

She would have easily operated the Skyhawks, Trackers and Sea Kings procured for Melbourne and could likely also have flown Tracers. The RN apparently did a study looking at her flying a homogenous airgroup of Skyhawks instead of her actual small group of Sea Vixen and Buccaneer.

Abe posted here or on another site several years back, that Hermes could have been inexpensively converted back to CTOL and flown Melbourne's airgroup at a quite reasonable cost.

 

[spoz]

Reading the carbinet papers relating to the carrier replacement are an eye opener. Others (Spoz & Assail) may be able to add further insight, but basically the deputy chief scientist, department of primeminister and cabinet, and the RAAF representative provided advice to government, in 1982, that killed the carrier replacement program.

The government of the day didn't make a decision at the time as an election was approaching, but the overwhelming advice and sentiment, was not to replace Melbourne, especially as Invincible was nolonger available.

The key elements were:
1. The Harrier was useless, inferior to the F-5 Tiger etc. because it wasn't supersonic.
2. Helicopters were inferior to fixed wing ASW aircraft because dipping sonar was inferior to the "Barra" sonar buoy.
3. The only carrier worth getting, therefore, was one that could operate supersonic fighters and fixed wing ASW aircraft.
4. A conventionally powered CTOL version of a French design (that became CdeG) was the only viable solution, but too expensive.
5. In the current economic environment Australia couldn't afford to acquire such a ship, especially as acquiring an additional 10 P-3C aircraft ( which in their opinion were far superior at ASW than the RAN as a whole) was a much higher priority and Australia couldn't afford both.

Further to this:
1. Without supersonic fighter cover, even guided missile destroyers were too vulnerable to operate.
2. Being inferior to land based MPA aircraft, naval ASW helicopters weren't worth operating.
3. The RAN would have to become a coastal force, operating within Australian waters, under RAAF air cover.
4. This was a price worth paying to have a modern, effective air force.

Today these arguments would be ripped apart by a twelve year old using Google but back then they were the authoritive opinions of the experts on airpower, backed by the preeminent defence scientist. This was also following the preliminary information from the Falklands conflict.

Just as many unsubstantiated claims are being made about the future of warfare based on events in Ukraine, the Falklands some how was twisted to indicate that surface ships were unsurvivable and airpower was king.

The replacement carrier was gone, the ability to take effective ASW helicopters to sea was gone. The ability to triangulate to effectively use Ikara at longer range was gone.

Surface combatants were seen as incapable of defending themselves, therefore a waste of resources.

A follow on of losing the carrier, was losing justification for additional FFGs, there were initially meant to be ten (six instead of only two Australian built ships), plus the three DDGs and four US built FFGs. Also, initial plans to supplement the patrol boats with missile armed FACs died at the same time.

If memory serves, it was actually proposed to build a pair of Dutch M Class frigates instead of the last two FFGs. This was because the air power mafia had "proven" guided missile ships were a waste of resources.

The sad fact is, the Dibb report and the following white paper, actually improved things for the RAN from where they were heading. The RAN had done a very good job if convincing the political classes that a navy without a carrier, wasn't a navy. When the choice was made, based on advice not to replace the carrier, the navy, by its own statements, had become irrelevant.

All those arguments about the carrier are BS but they carried the day at the time. It’ll be a long time before those Navy people involved forgive what they saw, and see, as deliberate misrepresentation. In the higher circles of Defence decisions are often made for reasons other than those which appear in Committee minutes, the hard discussions having occurred between the VSOs, usually one, or maybe two, on one, before the meetings were convened.

On Hermes, you didn’t need 2100 people to operate her; we could have done it with considerably less. Many of that 2100 were air group; the total RAN FAA at the time would have been lucky to make the nearly 1000 you could embark in her. She would probably have needed another 100 or so stokers above Melbourne’s ship’s company, but not much more than that.

And, as Volk says, I am entitled to feel bitter about the 4th DDG; I put a lot of effort into trying to get it. The arguments used against that were BS, too; but at least came from outside Defence.

 

[Volkodav]

All those arguments about the carrier are BS but they carried the day at the time. It’ll be a long time before those Navy people involve forgive what they saw, and see, as deliberate misrepresentation.

And, as Volk says, I am entitled to feel bitter about the 4th DDG; I put a lot of effort into trying to get it. The arguments used against that were BS, too; but at least came from outside Defence.

The message I got reading between the lines was the issue in 82 was PM&C, more to the point the deputy chief scientist. He was a guided missile guy who did a lot of work supporting various UK programs in the 50s. Reading between the lines he was very much in the camp of shiny new capabilities making old ones obsolete.

The RAAF narrative wasn't so much deliberate misinformation, they honestly believed fast was better and if we couldn't afford a carrier that flew fast jets it would be a waste of money.

Generally speaking Australia has never been cursed with the inter service rivalry / politics the UK have encountered. The US bomber mafia and later fighter mafia do my head in, the RAF has its share of delusional psychopaths, but even the RN had admirals, who while the BPF was doing its thing off Japan, they were pushing for new battleships at the expense of carriers, which they saw as a passing fad.

 

[Morgo]

A couple of LLCs going for a nice harbour cruise this morning. Good day for it.

Not sure what the side by side docking was about though.

 

[StingrayOZ]

That was the second time Hermes was offered to the RAN, the first time was during the mid 60s when she was still in her CTOL configuration and had seen less than 10 years service.

She would have easily operated the Skyhawks, Trackers and Sea Kings procured for Melbourne and could likely also have flown Tracers. The RN apparently did a study looking at her flying a homogenous airgroup of Skyhawks instead of her actual small group of Sea Vixen and Buccaneer.

Abe posted here or on another site several years back, that Hermes could have been inexpensively converted back to CTOL and flown Melbourne's airgroup at a quite reasonable cost.

Hermes might have been the go looking back on it. She was a big ship, and no doubt been more suitable for CTOL ops in the later jet age. I believe the phantom was trialled on her but the concern that she wouldn't be able to have a big enough airwing for UK ambitions. A4 skyhawks would be more suitable, and less of an issue for Australia.

Again, our problem was probably buying the smaller ship, then trying to refit her and run out of growth potential. Losing a radar and plane to rough seas.

On Hermes, you didn’t need 2100 people to operate her; we could have done it with considerably less. Many of that 2100 were air group; the total RAN FAA at the time would have been lucky to make the nearly 1000 you could embark in her. She would probably have needed another 100 or so stokers above Melbourne’s ship’s company, but not much more than that.

I see as Viraat they quote her crew as 1,207 + air crew. So yeh, probably ~200 more, probably mostly stokers.

If we had Hermes operating, I would have imagined various Coups in the pacific during the 70's-80's and East Timor could have probably been adverted conflict/bloodshed.

I wonder how much money was saved going with Melbourne + refits over Hermes.

 

[Stampede]

Hermes might have been the go looking back on it. She was a big ship, and no doubt been more suitable for CTOL ops in the later jet age. I believe the phantom was trialled on her but the concern that she wouldn't be able to have a big enough airwing for UK ambitions. A4 skyhawks would be more suitable, and less of an issue for Australia.

Again, our problem was probably buying the smaller ship, then trying to refit her and run out of growth potential. Losing a radar and plane to rough seas.

I see as Viraat they quote her crew as 1,207 + air crew. So yeh, probably ~200 more, probably mostly stokers.

If we had Hermes operating, I would have imagined various Coups in the pacific during the 70's-80's and East Timor could have probably been adverted conflict/bloodshed.

I wonder how much money was saved going with Melbourne + refits over Hermes.

Something to consider is the availability provided by a single ship.
Aviation has a place at sea.

We ended up getting not one, but two LHD's .

We now talk of a navy of threes.

Dollars, energy and priorities.



Cheers S

 

[hauritz]

There were a few options for replacing the Melbourne tossed around after the Invincible deal fell through. The most interesting one in my opinion was the Iwo Jima class. I think that was the option preferred by the navy at that time.

Perhaps the navy realised that the best chance of getting a new flattop was to opt for an amphibious vessel, Thirty years on we ended up with the Canberra class.

 

[Volkodav]

Something to consider is the availability provided by a single ship.
Aviation has a place at sea.

We ended up getting not one, but two LHD's .

We now talk of a navy of threes.

Dollars, energy and priorities.



Cheers S

Into the early 70s HMAS Sydney was available as a fast troop transport, and potentially a helicopter carrier. Her replacement was HMAS Tobruk.

Potentially Hermes, if acquired in the 1960s, could have been supplemented with Centaur. Centaur, had been modernised with a shallow angled deck and steam catapults, not dissimilar to Melbourne's configuration, but was a larger ship.

Centaur could have covered Hermes for her availabilities, operating Skyhawks and Trackers, but otherwise being deployed as a training ship / transport.

Bulwark and Albion, used as Commando Carriers by the RN, could also have been acquired and canabalised.

Fantasy over.

 

[Redlands18]

There were a few options for replacing the Melbourne tossed around after the Invincible deal fell through. The most interesting one in my opinion was the Iwo Jima class. I think that was the option preferred by the navy at that time.

Perhaps the navy realised that the best chance of getting a new flattop was to opt for an amphibious vessel, Thirty years on we ended up with the Canberra class.

The RAN actually ran a competition in 80-81 to replace the Melbourne, between the Garibaldi and 2 US designs, Iwo Jima and SCS, the latter being the baseline design for the Spanish de Asturis, interestingly the Invincible design didn't make the short list. Won by the Iwo Jima, This plan went out the door when Invincible become available.

 

[spoz]

Seen as too expensive if a new build; and with incompatible systems. When she became available at what was effectively a knock down price it became a different story; refitting her with the then current RAN systems (LWO2, SPN 35 and NCDS) could be done over a period for a reasonable cost and we would have lived with the Olympuses and Paxmans.

Might have meant that instead of ANZACs we would have ended up with T23s.

I had a posting to join her standby crew in my hand ……. Bloody Falklands.

 

[Volkodav]

Seen as too expensive if a new build; and with incompatible systems. When she became available at what was effectively a knock down price it became a different story; refitting her with the then current RAN systems (LWO2, SPN 35 and NCDS) could be done over a period for a reasonable cost and we would have lived with the Olympuses and Paxmans.

Might have meant that instead of ANZACs we would have ended up with T23s.

I had a posting to join her standby crew in my hand ……. Bloody Falklands.

The Invincibles were literally designed as cruisers with applicable combat systems command and control etc.

There originally meant to be eight of them, the helicopters were there because they were big enough to carry a useful number, each helo on station being seen as equivalent to an ASW frigate in the screen.

Harriers were almost an afterthought.

They would have been an awesome acquisition and not just for their aviation capability.

 

[swerve]

I doubt very much that eight Invincible class were ever planned. Perhaps eight of one of the early ideas which eventually became the Invincibles was considered for a while. AFAIK they got the command & control when other classes were cancelled, & the flat deck was chosen over a Jeanne d'Arc/Vittorio Veneto big rear deck to maximise ASW capability. To the best of my knowledge Harriers were definitely an afterthought.

 

[Volkodav]

I doubt very much that eight Invincible class were ever planned. Perhaps eight of one of the early ideas which eventually became the Invincibles was considered for a while. AFAIK they got the command & control when other classes were cancelled, & the flat deck was chosen over a Jeanne d'Arc/Vittorio Veneto big rear deck to maximise ASW capability. To the best of my knowledge Harriers were definitely an afterthought.

Not the Invincibles persay but the through deck cruisers and preceding designs of the late 60s. The smallest concept being a Type 82 with Seadart forward and a large hangar and flight deck aft, but most being through deck designs.

They were all cruisers first and helicopter / harrier carriers second. They were task group leaders and the numbers were required to cover NATO commitments. This is where my recall is shaky, but I think it was to support one group each in home waters, North Atlantic, and Med.

I need to pull out my Friedman and Brown books and reread those sections.

 

[Bob53]

I found this article interesting particularly when the chat here at time has talked about having ships with a hundred or more VLS. These numbers are in $USD so multiply roughly by 1.5 for Aussie Dollars.

Even a 8 X cell MK41 VLS quad packed with ESSM is getting close to $100m worth of missiles

A Hobart with 48 cells spread across ESSM, SM2 and SM3 and whatever Anti Ship missiles, the numbers certainly add up very fast

Here Is What Each Of The Navy's Ship-Launched Missiles Actually Costs

Arming America's fleet of fighting ships is an extremely expensive endeavor.

www.thedrive.com

 

[John Fedup]

I found this article interesting particularly when the chat here at time has talked about having ships with a hundred or more VLS. These numbers are in $USD so multiply roughly by 1.5 for Aussie Dollars.

Even a 8 X cell MK41 VLS quad packed with ESSM is getting close to $100m worth of missiles

A Hobart with 48 cells spread across ESSM, SM2 and SM3 and whatever Anti Ship missiles, the numbers certainly add up very fast

Here Is What Each Of The Navy's Ship-Launched Missiles Actually Costs

Arming America's fleet of fighting ships is an extremely expensive endeavor.

www.thedrive.com

Significant coin for these missiles. Still think an extra 8 cells for the CSC would be worth the investment. One hundred million extra dollars to protect a 2 billion plus ship, not out of line IMHO.