ADF General discussion thread

swerve

Super Moderator
Not so hard when you put a 2000lb bomb through the roof, true - but how many 2000lb bombs can be dropped, compared to weapons capable of destroying an aircraft in the open? What if there's a threat from small drones launched locally?

I can see advantages to all sorts of different protective measures, & no one size fits all solution.
 

south

Well-Known Member
Not so hard when you put a 2000lb bomb through the roof, true - but how many 2000lb bombs can be dropped, compared to weapons capable of destroying an aircraft in the open? What if there's a threat from small drones launched locally?

I can see advantages to all sorts of different protective measures, & no one size fits all solution.
What the good General is talking about is passive defence. And back in the day of visually aimed dumb bombs, where people were limited to a max of 1x target per pass, pouring concrete over everything provided a pretty good way of making it harder to attack (and often pushed it to 1x target/formation). For starters to get through concrete now the bad guys need to not only deliver a well aimed weapon, but it has to arrive with the correct fusing and impact parameters to be able to slice through the hard shell and go bang inside, which at the very least changes your delivery profile.

In the stress of combat, delivering that precisely aimed dumb weapon against a small, hardened target; that’s no easy feat; ask the guys who went after targets in Route pack VI in vietnam (e.g Thanh Hoa Bridge) or airfields in GW1.

Now, with current PGMs every fighters can kill multiple targets per pass. And it’s not limited to 2000lb class; even weapons like SDB-1 can go through a lot of concrete… As an example a 4-ship of most fighters full with SDB-1 coukd
destroy 32-64 similar shelters, as I’m sure General Wisbech was aware. My guess is he was talking figuratively, rather than literally.

What’s the takeaway? Fixed, hard installations no longer provide the measure of defence they used to. Dispersal, agility, resilience through multiple pathways (e.g fuel installations) provide better methods of passive defence.
 

south

Well-Known Member
I think you missed my point.
Not really.

sure, shelters are useful. They keep the sun off. And maybe they’ll keep a UAV out. Maybe. But they’re expensive, fixed installations that even a small warhead, of which a fighter can deliver multiple, will go through them.

dispersal, resilience and CCD are better VFM.
 

swerve

Super Moderator
I think you missed the bit about fighters (or even bombers) not being the only threat.

Of course, local conditions differ, which is why I said "no one size fits all solution." There are cases where dispersal could increase the risk to aircraft & conditions where it could be very useful
 

jeffb

Member
Have we almost gone full circle though? Platforms will need to be centralised to a degree around air defense systems.

With true modern precision weapons it doesn't really matter how far you disperse, the target will be engaged. Making sure you can cover as many of your systems and facilities with air defense and harden them to a level able to resist the unguided remnants of guided munitions is where we are at now.
 

Redlands18

Well-Known Member
I think you missed the bit about fighters (or even bombers) not being the only threat.

Of course, local conditions differ, which is why I said "no one size fits all solution." There are cases where dispersal could increase the risk to aircraft & conditions where it could be very useful
Pearl Harbour was the perfect example of this, the Americans feared sabotage attacks by Japanese Agents on the ground, so grouped all their planes together to be better protected by ground forces. Of course, this made them perfect targets for Japanese aircraft.
 

south

Well-Known Member
Have we almost gone full circle though? Platforms will need to be centralised to a degree around air defense systems.

With true modern precision weapons it doesn't really matter how far you disperse, the target will be engaged. Making sure you can cover as many of your systems and facilities with air defense and harden them to a level able to resist the unguided remnants of guided munitions is where we are at now.
Not strictly true. You know there is an aeroplane on an airbase… but where?

So for the cost of a full Hardened shelter (which we have established is fixed, thus easily targetable, and can penetrate with a relatively small weapon, I can build maybe 5 or even 10 revetments with blast walls to prevent sympathetic damage; the engineering is after all far simpler. Maybe even a colourbond roof to keep the sun and rain, and as importantly pesky overhead observation off. So instead of building 15 HAS, I could build say.. 70 shelters with blast walls and roofs.

Maybe I just build 45 though, so I have some extra surge capability, allowing operators to play the shell game.

Now I have use the spare $$$ for EW and point defence to counter UAVs/blind sensors and engage PGMs etc. And high end decoys to complicate and confuse targeting.

I’d suggest that’s a far more survivable effect than trying to bundle everything in concrete.
 
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Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Wouldn't money be better spent on something like AEGIS Ashore backed up by Iron Dome for our fixed facilities?

Logically a layered defence with adequate early warning is going to be be more useful than than hardened shelters.

As for protection from sabateurs / special forces, a motorised infantry company supported by CAV and maybe SPG heavy mortars would ruin their day.
 

ADMk2

Just a bloke
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Not strictly true. You know there is an aeroplane on an airbase… but where?

So for the cost of a full Hardened shelter (which we have established is fixed, thus easily targetable, and can penetrate with a relatively small weapon, I can build maybe 5 or even 10 revetments with blast walls to prevent sympathetic damage; the engineering is after all far simpler. Maybe even a colourbond roof to keep the sun and rain, and as importantly pesky overhead observation off. So instead of building 15 HAS, I could build say.. 70 shelters with blast walls and roofs.

Maybe I just build 45 though, so I have some extra surge capability, allowing operators to play the shell game.

Now I have use the spare $$$ for EW and point defence to counter UAVs/blind sensors and engage PGMs etc. And high end decoys to complicate and confuse targeting.

I’d suggest that’s a far more survivable effect than trying to bundle everything in concrete.
Such shelters are terribly vulnerable to the USAF when they have complete air superiority over the top of them, few range and time on station issues, can bring virtually any weapon and as many aircraft as they like to do so and can spend as long as they like and hit it as many times as they like to ensure they kill it.

Which is a very different scenario than we face. If any enemy has such freedom of action over our bases, it will not matter what we try and do to them, just as it didn’t in Iraq.

Given vastly different range, environmental and (hopefully) military capacity issues, one might suspect a rather different operational environment that is more akin to long range missile strike. As we saw in 2017, when 59x 1000lbs warhead class missiles were operationally employed against a single airbase from range, hardened shelters provided substantial defensive resilience…

No-one measure is going to prove totally effective. A mix I rather think is required. Defensive fortifications however retain a place on most battlefields, according to most nations around the world.IMG_0089.jpeg
 

spoz

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
I do wonder what the threat is that these measures might be aimed at; and, if worried about it, why not move the aircraft to Alice or Learmonth or somewhere. Australia’s geography would make air attack on the level of Desert a Storm or some such rather difficult; and who, except the US has or in the reasonable future will have the capability to mount such an op, and where would they mount it from?
 

Julian 82

Active Member
I do wonder what the threat is that these measures might be aimed at; and, if worried about it, why not move the aircraft to Alice or Learmonth or somewhere. Australia’s geography would make air attack on the level of Desert a Storm or some such rather difficult; and who, except the US has or in the reasonable future will have the capability to mount such an op, and where would they mount it from?
I think the threat to be concerned about is bombardment by conventional ballistic missiles and cruise missiles of which China has many.

A surprise attack on fighter aircraft parked on an apron can be effected using cluster submunitions (of which one cruise missile or ballistic missile can carry dozens). Think an SSN launching cruise missiles off the coast of Exmouth.

Conversely, if each fighter aircraft is hidden away in it’s own disbursed hardened aircraft shelter (preferably there are more shelters than aircraft), you would need to hit each shelter with one or more missiles in order to guarantee the destruction of the fighter force on that base. These missiles are not cheap so it makes such an attack a more complex and costly exercise. For all they know, they could be hitting empty hardened aircraft shelters.
 

south

Well-Known Member
Such shelters are terribly vulnerable to the USAF when they have complete air superiority over the top of them, few range and time on station issues, can bring virtually any weapon and as many aircraft as they like to do so and can spend as long as they like and hit it as many times as they like to ensure they kill it.

Which is a very different scenario than we face. If any enemy has such freedom of action over our bases, it will not matter what we try and do to them, just as it didn’t in Iraq.

Given vastly different range, environmental and (hopefully) military capacity issues, one might suspect a rather different operational environment that is more akin to long range missile strike. As we saw in 2017, when 59x 1000lbs warhead class missiles were operationally employed against a single airbase from range, hardened shelters provided substantial defensive resilience…

No-one measure is going to prove totally effective. A mix I rather think is required. Defensive fortifications however retain a place on most battlefields, according to most nations around the world.View attachment 50491
G’day AD. I’d be happy to have evidence the US were after the HAS on that strike. One could make an argument that they didn’t go after the HAS because the Tomahawk wouldn’t get through the roof. Which may be valid until you remember that someone forgot the door. I genuinely don’t believe they were trying to hit the HAS (or many of them anyway) or the runway….
 
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Vivendi

Well-Known Member
Things hardly goes according to plan in a war, and it's always great to have options and complementary measures. Thus it seems to me that the best idea is to combine HAS with a plan for dispersal.

For instance if a surprise attack is launched before one has been able to implement any dispersal plans, HAS may come in handy... one thing about surprise attacks is that to be successful they have to be a complete surprise, and that puts some limitations on how the attack can be performed, the size of the attack, and with what equipment/munitions etc.
 

ADMk2

Just a bloke
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
G’day AD. I’d be happy to have evidence the US were after the HAS on that strike. One could make an argument that they didn’t go after the HAS because the Tomahawk wouldn’t get through the roof. Which may be valid until you remember that someone forgot the door. I genuinely don’t believe they were trying to hit the HAS (or many of them anyway) or the runway….
There are reports to that effect, some were hit, some were missed. The point being, ruling them out completely due to being vulnerable under particular circumstances to one threat (extremely expensive, air-launched weapons) is the same basic argument people are trying to use against tanks and has IMHO the same logical flaws.

I get the opportunity cost argument, if we spend on “that” can we spend on “this”? But HAS clearly have a capability to protect extremely valuable and rare assets from a range of threats, up to and including 1000lbs class long range stand off weapons, the best the West has, at present under certain scenarios.

To me it’s not an and / or argument, it has to be an ‘all’ argument…

This argument (if it exists in ADF circles) feels very familiar to the argument that Army made for a long time against buying automatic grenade launchers.

They compared the capability of AGL’s against then in-service direct fire support options, specifically 12.7mm heavy machine guns and the Carl Gustav 84mm anti-armour weapon.

The 12.7mm has much better range you see and the 84mm hits far harder… So why would we want 40mm AGL?

The fact that the 40mm AGL is a completely different weapon for a completely different role didn’t enter the discussion in the professional circles. Until the specific benefits of that particular system were of course belatedly realised (which is why everyone else uses them…) and we had to get them too. Now of course, much later we use all 3 systems (and others besides).

HAS isn’t a sole solution for the reasons you’ve outlined perfectly well. There are other options. Which against that threat may work even better. But it has a capability nonetheless and for the same reason all our allies employ such capabilities in appropriate places as part of a suite of defensive capability, so should we… IMHO.
 
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Morgo

Well-Known Member
https://www.finance.gov.au/sites/default/files/2023-05/Audit of Employment - Report_1.pdf

Some absolutely outrageous findings for Defence coming out of this Audit Office review.

Defence makes up $15.7bn of the total $20.8bn (75.4%) of the external labour spend across the Federal Government. That equates to 34,926 FTEs. That’s the equivalent of $450,000 per FTE!

This is a national disgrace. I get that there are a small number of people who might be worth this sort of money but this is profiteering bordering on fraud by the providers, and negligence of the highest order by Defence.

Defence has all the money it needs to procure a couple of armoured brigades, every fantasy fleet discussed on the RAN thread and a bloody CVN if we wanted to. All we’d need to do is end this disgusting debacle, and cut this spend in half. Imagine what could be done with an extra $7.5bn per year!

Disgraceful.

Now I have vented I would love to know from those who work in Defence and the ADF - what the possible justifications for this situation are?
 

DDG38

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
https://www.finance.gov.au/sites/default/files/2023-05/Audit of Employment - Report_1.pdf
Now I have vented I would love to know from those who work in Defence and the ADF - what the possible justifications for this situation are?
I've worked in the APS for the past 15 years, and I can say 2 things were major contributors to this situation - 1, government ideology that the private sector do things better than government, and 2, the big 4 consultancy firms doing a good job convincing APS executives that they can do things that public servants can't. In my experience that's complete BS, but it became mantra in the APS that if you had to start a new project then the first thing you did was hire consultants to implement it. And here we are.
 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
I've worked in the APS for the past 15 years, and I can say 2 things were major contributors to this situation - 1, government ideology that the private sector do things better than government, and 2, the big 4 consultancy firms doing a good job convincing APS executives that they can do things that public servants can't. In my experience that's complete BS, but it became mantra in the APS that if you had to start a new project then the first thing you did was hire consultants to implement it. And here we are.
Canadian governments are no exception to this consultative BS. Probably similar in other countries as well. Typical pollie behaviour, lining the pockets of their political donors. As to our current government, as Francis Uquart was so fond of saying, “ I could not possibly comment”!
 

spoz

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
As somebody who was in Defence for more than 50 years, I second DDG 38. Until the 90s and a number of rationalist economics reviews we had the power in uniform and the APS to make our own judgements and do the work ourselves. Since then the “contractors are better “ mantra, patently BS (you get the same, or less experienced people but have to pay for profit) has gutted us - but somebody still has to do the things we used to do. I am, however, sceptical of the figure, particularly if it is not given a time boundary. ANAO has its own issues and agenda.

And don’t get me started about the downskilling of the total Australian workforce as contractors bleed experienced staff from the APS and Defence, but don’t have appropriate training programs to generate more, so we end up importing Poms and Yanks and Philippinos et al…
 
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Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
I've worked in the APS for the past 15 years, and I can say 2 things were major contributors to this situation - 1, government ideology that the private sector do things better than government, and 2, the big 4 consultancy firms doing a good job convincing APS executives that they can do things that public servants can't. In my experience that's complete BS, but it became mantra in the APS that if you had to start a new project then the first thing you did was hire consultants to implement it. And here we are.
Add in the idiotic way defence does retention and you have the trifecta.

There is a widely advertised recruitment and retention bonus for some but not all APS, it is literally 10% on top of your base salary. It is paid by job family framework, not the project worked on or role being filled. This means an overall shortage of project managers means all project managers get the payment, while a dearth of deadwood, past retirement age techos (that industry doesn't want), hidden in dark corners, means the irriplacible techo on a critical project doesn't get it.

Industry reaches out to the competent techo, offers $50-60k more than defence pays, they are stupid not to take it. Defence then can't recruit or transfer a replacement in a critical role so gets a contractor in on three times what they paid the APS person. Sometimes it's the same person, different polo shirt.

Another core problem is career path. Many, if not most of the defence contractors are engineers and techos. Engineers have a career path, techos don't. A competent techo is an APS 5 (max $83000pa) or APS 6 (much rarer max $97000pa), EL 1 (max $120000) are almost unheard of. Industry pays APS 5 equivalent techos $130-180000).

An admin person or PM gets the same pay for the same level. The admin or PM doesn't need to be qualified, they get appointed, trained, promoted, trained, promoted again. An admin person can go from APS 3 (trainee) to EL1 in less than a decade. A PM gets appointed at APS 5 and is a 6 in 12 to 18 months, EL 1 in less than five years. The techo stays at APS 5 until they get pissed off and leave as there is no career path.
 
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