Russia - General Discussion.

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
I have just read a very interesting article in Foreign Affairs Blundering on the Brink but unfortunately its paywalled.

Recently released declassified Soviet Union documents from the CPSU archives and the Military archives have given an unhitherto view of the USSR decision making and reasoning for their placement of nuclear missiles in Cuba in 1962. According to the documents Khrushchev had devised a cunning plan to place the missiles there, because he believed that when discovered, Kennedy wouldn't do anything due to the US Jupiter nuclear missiles based in Turkiye. "Khrushchev expected the United States to simply put up with Soviet deterrence, just as he had put up with U.S. deterrence." Khrushchev's driving reason for this ill-fated plan was his "... resentment of U.S. assertiveness in Europe and his fear that Kennedy would order an invasion of Cuba, overthrowing Castro and humiliating Moscow in the process." It was a humongous gamble that backfired.

Khrushchev sent an envoy, Sergei Biryuzov, the commander of the Soviet Strategic Missile Forces, to broach the idea with Fidel Castro in Havana. Castro was absolutely enthralled with the proposal and he saw it as protection from a further US invasion after the US sponsored Bay of Pigs debacle. Unfortunately for Khrushchev, Biryuzov was an artilleryman not a missile SME (Subject Matter Expert), and this incompetence would have drastic repercussions. Biryuzov was tasked to scout the island and identify sites for the missile batteries. When he returned to Moscow he said that the palm trees would hide the missiles. However when General Igor Statsenko, the commander of the Cuban Missile Group arrived in Cuba and visited each site, he quickly identified that whilst there were indeed palm trees, they were to far apart for camouflage purposes. The gaps in-between were completely open to the sky with the palms only covering 1/16th of the required area. The Cuban vegetation wasn't as described by Biryuzov who had "... told Khrushchev that the missiles could be safely hidden under the foliage of the island’s plentiful palm trees." When Statsenko reported back to Moscow that the sites were untenable, the STAVKA withheld that information from Khrushchev. What is not known is whether or not Khrushchev would've have continued with the plan if he had been aware of the Statsenko report.

"According to the proposal, the Soviet army would send to Cuba the 51st Missile Division, consisting of five regiments: all of the group’s officers and soldiers, about 8,000 men, would leave their base in western Ukraine and be permanently stationed in Cuba. They would bring with them 60 ballistic missiles: 36 medium-range R-12s and 24 intermediate-range R-14s. The R-14s were a particular challenge: at 80 feet long and 86 metric tons, the missiles required a host of construction engineers and technicians, as well as dozens of tracks, cranes, bulldozers, excavators, and cement mixers to install them on launching pads in Cuba. The troops of the missile division would be joined by many other soldiers and equipment in Cuba: two antiaircraft divisions, one regiment of IL-28 bombers, one air force squadron of MiG fighters, three regiments with helicopters and cruise missiles, four infantry regiments with tanks, and support and logistics troops. The list of these units filled five pages of the proposal on May 24: 44,000 men in uniform, plus 1,800 construction and engineering specialists."​

It was definitely a very large group and many of the soldiers were transported in cargo ships, living in the holds with their equipment. Not the most pleasant of experiences for a voyage from the Black Sea to Cuba. When they did arrive and got down to work, they found that the required construction equipment and materials hadn't arrived in time, important parts for the missiles were absent, their equipment wasn't at all suitable for Cuban conditions with the hot air temperatures and high humidity. Worst of all the construction of the missile emplacements, and assembly of the missiles was during the hurricane season.

The whole exercise was a gamble based on luck and the military planners hadn't adequately researched the Cuban environmental, political, military, and geographic conditions. When faults and mistakes in the plan were reported back, they were generally ignored because the planners and Moscow based staff hid their mistakes from their superiors, who in turn didn't want to annoy Khrushchev. This was a hypercentralisation of control where people avoided responsibility, especially when things turn to custard. Because a plan had been approved no one was willing to deviate from it. Their logistics was also a problem because they had never deployed such a large contingent so far before, especially by sea. So Soviet personnel were deployed on a mission that required lack of detection by the US and under strict secrecy. It was a failure before the ships sailed because of the hypercentralisation and secrecy. In the end it was the lack of adequate preparation and inflexibility within the Soviet C2 structure that caused Soviet personnel to be deployed to Cuba without being told of the real reasons, and that it could cause conflict with the US. The rest, as they say, is history.

Khrushchev had a fall back position; an escape clause so to speak. Khrushchev knew when he had to back down and fully understood the dangers, especially of nuclear war. He succeeded in that he gained a promise from Kennedy never to invade Cuba, and the removal of the US Jupiter missiles from Turkiye. He was also aware that a massive embarrassment and failure on his part would severely reduce the reputation and image of the USSR within international communist circles and the third world. But most importantly of all he understood that if such a thing did occur the CPSU & USSR would lose its leadership of international communism, handing it over to the CCP & PRC which the CPSU definitely didn't want to concede.

The 1962 Cuban Crisis was much studied both in the west and within the USSR, but sometimes the more things change the more they stay the same. In the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine we see exactly the same mistakes occur with poor logistics, planning, and the misleading of Russian troops about what they are doing. Some troops were told that they were going on extended exercises and many weren't even told that they were invading a neighbour country. The Russian political and military belief was that they would be welcomed by the Ukrainians, however the truth on 24/2/22 was far different and the invasion galvanised and united the Ukrainian population, with differences between ethnic Ukrainians ethnic Russian citizens of Ukraine being set aside.

Putin has been rattling the nuclear sabre off and on over the last year and unlike Khrushchev he doesn't have a fall back position. He doesn't know when to back down or retreat in order to preserve the long term vision and national aims. He has wrecked the reputation of Russia and shown his military to definitely not be the feared and unbeatable force it once was. He has reduced Russia to almost the vassal state of the PRC and the damage that he is inflicting on the Russian polity, people, and economy will take long to repair. Putin doesn't have the political nous or skills of Khrushchev or Stalin. Whilst Khrushchev was removed from his position as General Secretary of the CPSU in 1964 and sent into retirement, Putin's more than likely to die in office, either from natural causes or by other means.

I do not believe that Russia will collapse; it's not impossible but improbable. Russia will survive Putin, but the Kremlin is another story. Putin isn't Stalin and Stalin was many things, but stupid he wasn't. Stalin was a good planner and knew what he had to do in the running of his Russian empire, and generally how he was going to do it. He was a control freak and very ruthless in achieving his aims. He used the NKVD as his tool for controlling those around him and the wider population. Large purges were not uncommon and ordering the death of millions wasn't an issue for him. He had an innate sense of survival and never left his enemies or opponents any opening to move against him. Putin, despite all of his blustering and bellicose, doesn't have those skills of Stalin and he's leaving opportunities for his enemies within the Kremlin to conspire and work against him. That may be his downfall in the end.

Whilst we say that the Russian military are poorly performing, it would both be very remiss and dangerous for us to assume that this is the status quo. They can still be a formidable enemy and underestimating them, or any enemy for that matter, is both foolish and dangerous. The longer this war goes on the more the Russian military will both learn and understand. The poor leaders in the field will be killed or replaced, enabling those leaders who have succeeded in learning the hard lessons taught in combat, to come forward and move up the command chain. Natural selection is the term. However the overall concern must be whether, or not, the Russian military as an institution, can change for the better and undertake a thorough, honest, truthful, reappraisal of itself. Time will tell.
 
Last edited:

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
I have just read a very interesting article in Foreign Affairs Blundering on the Brink but unfortunately its paywalled.

Recently released declassified Soviet Union documents from the CPSU archives and the Military archives have given an unhitherto view of the USSR decision making and reasoning for their placement of nuclear missiles in Cuba in 1962. According to the documents Khrushchev had devised a cunning plan to place the missiles there, because he believed that when discovered, Kennedy wouldn't do anything due to the US Jupiter nuclear missiles based in Turkiye. "Khrushchev expected the United States to simply put up with Soviet deterrence, just as he had put up with U.S. deterrence." Khrushchev's driving reason for this ill-fated plan was his "... resentment of U.S. assertiveness in Europe and his fear that Kennedy would order an invasion of Cuba, overthrowing Castro and humiliating Moscow in the process." It was a humongous gamble that backfired.

Khrushchev sent an envoy, Sergei Biryuzov, the commander of the Soviet Strategic Missile Forces, to broach the idea with Fidel Castro in Havana. Castro was absolutely enthralled with the proposal and he saw it as protection from a further US invasion after the US sponsored Bay of Pigs debacle. Unfortunately for Khrushchev, Biryuzov was an artilleryman not a missile SME (Subject Matter Expert), and this incompetence would have drastic repercussions. Biryuzov was tasked to scout the island and identify sites for the missile batteries. When he returned to Moscow he said that the palm trees would hide the missiles. However when General Igor Statsenko, the commander of the Cuban Missile Group arrived in Cuba and visited each site, he quickly identified that whilst there were indeed palm trees, they were to far apart for camouflage purposes. The gaps in-between were completely open to the sky with the palms only covering 1/16th of the required area. The Cuban vegetation wasn't as described by Biryuzov who had "... told Khrushchev that the missiles could be safely hidden under the foliage of the island’s plentiful palm trees." When Statsenko reported back to Moscow that the sites were untenable, the STAVKA withheld that information from Khrushchev. What is not known is whether or not Khrushchev would've have continued with the plan if he had been aware of the Statsenko report.

"According to the proposal, the Soviet army would send to Cuba the 51st Missile Division, consisting of five regiments: all of the group’s officers and soldiers, about 8,000 men, would leave their base in western Ukraine and be permanently stationed in Cuba. They would bring with them 60 ballistic missiles: 36 medium-range R-12s and 24 intermediate-range R-14s. The R-14s were a particular challenge: at 80 feet long and 86 metric tons, the missiles required a host of construction engineers and technicians, as well as dozens of tracks, cranes, bulldozers, excavators, and cement mixers to install them on launching pads in Cuba. The troops of the missile division would be joined by many other soldiers and equipment in Cuba: two antiaircraft divisions, one regiment of IL-28 bombers, one air force squadron of MiG fighters, three regiments with helicopters and cruise missiles, four infantry regiments with tanks, and support and logistics troops. The list of these units filled five pages of the proposal on May 24: 44,000 men in uniform, plus 1,800 construction and engineering specialists."​

It was definitely a very large group and many of the soldiers were transported in cargo ships, living in the holds with their equipment. Not the most pleasant of experiences for a voyage from the Black Sea to Cuba. When they did arrive and got down to work, they found that the required construction equipment and materials hadn't arrived in time, important parts for the missiles were absent, their equipment wasn't at all suitable for Cuban conditions with the hot air temperatures and high humidity. Worst of all the construction of the missile emplacements, and assembly of the missiles was during the hurricane season.

The whole exercise was a gamble based on luck and the military planners hadn't adequately researched the Cuban environmental, political, military, and geographic conditions. When faults and mistakes in the plan were reported back, they were generally ignored because the planners and Moscow based staff hid their mistakes from their superiors, who in turn didn't want to annoy Khrushchev. This was a hypercentralisation of control where people avoided responsibility, especially when things turn to custard. Because a plan had been approved no one was willing to deviate from it. Their logistics was also a problem because they had never deployed such a large contingent so far before, especially by sea. So Soviet personnel were deployed on a mission that required lack of detection by the US and under strict secrecy. It was a failure before the ships sailed because of the hypercentralisation and secrecy. In the end it was the lack of adequate preparation and inflexibility within the Soviet C2 structure that caused Soviet personnel to be deployed to Cuba without being told of the real reasons, and that it could cause conflict with the US. The rest, as they say, is history.

Khrushchev had a fall back position; an escape clause so to speak. Khrushchev knew when he had to back down and fully understood the dangers, especially of nuclear war. He succeeded in that he gained a promise from Kennedy never to invade Cuba, and the removal of the US Jupiter missiles from Turkiye. He was also aware that a massive embarrassment and failure on his part would severely reduce the reputation and image of the USSR within international communist circles and the third world. But most importantly of all he understood that if such a thing did occur the CPSU & USSR would lose its leadership of international communism, handing it over to the CCP & PRC which the CPSU definitely didn't want to concede.

The 1962 Cuban Crisis was much studied both in the west and within the USSR, but sometimes the more things change the more they stay the same. In the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine we see exactly the same mistakes occur with poor logistics, planning, and the misleading of Russian troops about what they are doing. Some troops were told that they were going on extended exercises and many weren't even told that they were invading a neighbour country. The Russian political and military belief was that they would be welcomed by the Ukrainians, however the truth on 24/2/22 was far different and the invasion galvanised and united the Ukrainian population, with differences between ethnic Ukrainians ethnic Russian citizens of Ukraine being set aside.

Putin has been rattling the nuclear sabre off and on over the last year and unlike Khrushchev he doesn't have a fall back position. He doesn't know when to back down or retreat in order to preserve the long term vision and national aims. He has wrecked the reputation of Russia and shown his military to definitely not be the feared and unbeatable force it once was. He has reduced Russia to almost the vassal state of the PRC and the damage that he is inflicting on the Russian polity, people, and economy will take long to repair. Putin doesn't have the political nous or skills of Khrushchev or Stalin. Whilst Khrushchev was removed from his position as General Secretary of the CPSU in 1964 and sent into retirement, Putin's more than likely to die in office, either from natural causes or by other means.

I do not believe that Russia will collapse; it's not impossible but improbable. Russia will survive Putin, but the Kremlin is another story. Putin isn't Stalin and Stalin was many things, but stupid he wasn't. Stalin was a good planner and knew what he had to do in the running of his Russian empire, and generally how he was going to do it. He was a control freak and very ruthless in achieving his aims. He used the NKVD as his tool for controlling those around him and the wider population. Large purges were not uncommon and ordering the death of millions wasn't an issue for him. He had an innate sense of survival and never left his enemies or opponents any opening to move against him. Putin, despite all of his blustering and bellicose, doesn't have those skills of Stalin and he's leaving opportunities for his enemies within the Kremlin to conspire and work against him. That may be his downfall in the end.

Whilst we say that the Russian military are poorly performing, it would both be very remiss and dangerous for us to assume that this is the status quo. They can still be a formidable enemy and underestimating them, or any enemy for that matter, is both foolish and dangerous. The longer this war goes on the more the Russian military will both learn and understand. The poor leaders in the field will be killed or replaced, enabling those leaders who have succeeded in learning the hard lessons taught in combat, to come forward and move up the command chain. Natural selection is the term. However the overall concern must be whether, or not, the Russian military as an institution, can change for the better and undertake a thorough, honest, truthful, reappraisal of itself. Time will tell.
Interesting read and yes, Cuba and Ukraine are similar C-Fs but as you point out old Nikita at least had a fall back position. As for improvements for the Russian military, solving the corruption issues won't exactly be a priority for the criminals running Russia at the moment, a group where Putin's likely replacement will come from (assuming no mega purge occurs).
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
A correction, the Russo Ukrainian War started in 2014 when Putin illegally annexed Crimea. He sent his "little green men" in and at same time stirred up the Donetsk and Luhansk separatist movements. Hells teeth two of the separatist leaders were Russian FSB operatives posing as Ukrainian ethnic Russian citizens.
If you want to draw the line there for analytical purposes, you can. But I again point you to the significance of measuring the timeline of the conflict. This comes from a comparison with the Taliban outlasting NATO in Afghanistan. Russia hasn't had to make a major war effort since '14 continuously. In the '14 and '15 campaigns Russia launched limited interventions, and interfered through proxies and intelligence service operatives. This is hardly a major war effort likely to sap Russia's strength and determination.

The Russians may give reasons to negotiate but even if they have a break, they will return to undermining and eventually having another attempt to invade and subjugate Ukraine. Putin's made it into a national crusade and with the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) fully supporting it, the war becomes a religious war. The Russian Orthodox Church is grinding its teeth and gnawing its entrails because the independent (from Russia) Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) was approved by the Greek Patriarch who is first amongst equals. The ROC had control of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) and the OCU has upset that apple cart. Scuffles at Kyiv monastery as Church accused of Russia ties resists eviction

The UOC have been accused of supporting the Russian invasion and long suspected of harbouring Russian sympathies. That's why the UKR govt didn't extend the UOC lease of the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra monastery, and in the process of evicting them. Church accused of Russia ties resists Kyiv monastery eviction. The UKR Govt considers the UOC a nest of vipers and a security threat. In wartime you take such threats seriously. The UKR Govt must have hit a nerve in Moscow because:

"Russia condemned Kyiv’s push against the UOC as an outrage and a crime. 'Such actions are increasingly plunging Ukraine into the Middle Ages in the very worst sense of the word,' foreign ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova wrote on the Telegram app." Source: ibid.​

For the Russian Govt to respond in such a way indicates that the UKR is correct in regarding the UOC as a nest of vipers.
I don't see what this has to do with the discussion around negotiations. The ROC is mostly a sad joke domestically, often called out for corruption, and is defacto a barely functional ideological branch of the government that few actually listen to, at least in my experience. If you think the ROC is going to dictate Russia's willingness to negotiate, you are mistaken. They will provide generalized ideological support for literally whatever the government tries to do. If it's war, it will be a holy war to defeat evil. If it's peace, it's because we are a peace-loving people and god loves peace too. Or some other plausible line.
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
If you want to draw the line there for analytical purposes, you can. But I again point you to the significance of measuring the timeline of the conflict. This comes from a comparison with the Taliban outlasting NATO in Afghanistan. Russia hasn't had to make a major war effort since '14 continuously. In the '14 and '15 campaigns Russia launched limited interventions, and interfered through proxies and intelligence service operatives. This is hardly a major war effort likely to sap Russia's strength and determination.
The Russian operation since 2014 isn't an accurate contrast to the Taliban defeat of NATO forces. In this case Russia had the national resources and ability to provide the required support for its Ukrainian operation prior to Feb 2022. The Taliban didn't have the resources of a nation state to back them so they were having to improvise, which they did.
I don't see what this has to do with the discussion around negotiations. The ROC is mostly a sad joke domestically, often called out for corruption, and is defacto a barely functional ideological branch of the government that few actually listen to, at least in my experience. If you think the ROC is going to dictate Russia's willingness to negotiate, you are mistaken. They will provide generalized ideological support for literally whatever the government tries to do. If it's war, it will be a holy war to defeat evil. If it's peace, it's because we are a peace-loving people and god loves peace too. Or some other plausible line.
Actually it has quite a bit to do with negotiations. Putins' and his regimes' survival depends upon achievements gained, but since Sep 2022 he has achieved nothing, losing control of the major centres of Kharkiv and Kherson, as well as no substantial gains on the battlefield. He's using religion to his ends, and the ROC spreads his line to their congregations, who as a rule generally accept what the priests say as being kosher; they probably trust the priests more than the govt. That helps keep the great hairy unwashed from becoming overly excited and having thoughts of revolution. It's that support which helps keep his oligarch pets in line, but only to a point. Putin can't give away anything because he will likely be defenestrated or similar, and he's rather attached to his own skin. In fact it's been claimed that he's "... pathologically afraid for his life." Putin is 'pathologically afraid for his life' says former security officer. Don't underestimate the great hair unwashed at your peril. Tsar Nicholas II did in his arrogance and that resulted in his downfall and the execution of him and his family in the basement of a house in Yekaterinburg.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
The Russian operation since 2014 isn't an accurate contrast to the Taliban defeat of NATO forces. In this case Russia had the national resources and ability to provide the required support for its Ukrainian operation prior to Feb 2022. The Taliban didn't have the resources of a nation state to back them so they were having to improvise, which they did.
Ok let's rewind. This tagent started with a discussion of negotiations. The example of the Taliban and NATO was provided. The context of that example was two decades of protracted military efforts. Russian involvement in Ukraine '14-'22 doesn't come anywhere near what NATO has had to do in Afghanistan. Therefore this isn't a relevant comparison. The question isn't whether Ukraine today is a bigger challenge then the Taliban but whether to consider Russian involvement in Ukraine before the 02-22 invasion as comparable to the military effort required and therefore the staying power depleted. Does this make sense?

Actually it has quite a bit to do with negotiations. Putins' and his regimes' survival depends upon achievements gained, but since Sep 2022 he has achieved nothing, losing control of the major centres of Kharkiv and Kherson, as well as no substantial gains on the battlefield.
He never controlled Kharkov. The city wasn't even enveloped. But in general your point is correct. It hasn't been a great ~8 months.

He's using religion to his ends, and the ROC spreads his line to their congregations, who as a rule generally accept what the priests say as being kosher; they probably trust the priests more than the govt.
I don't think this is true. I think the ROC has very little credibility with the Russian public.

That helps keep the great hairy unwashed from becoming overly excited and having thoughts of revolution. It's that support which helps keep his oligarch pets in line, but only to a point.
Again I don't think this is true. I think what keeps people in line is a combination of several factors. Emigration is a big one. The most unhappy ones can just leave. The legal measures taken against them that come short of repressions, but are quite unpleasant (minor criminal cases or administrative detentions) make it difficult for someone to be both a political opposition activist and successful in Russia. But they can always leave. The general comparison to pre-Putin, mainly in the form of referring to the '90s, a truly terrible time. The systematic shutting down of opposition options is also a big one. If there are no viable alternatives to Putin many will support Putin. If you eliminate viable opposition but leave the nonviable kind, people think they're "choosing" Putin. None of this has anything to do with the ROC whose influence (again in my experience) is very limited.

Putin can't give away anything because he will likely be defenestrated or similar, and he's rather attached to his own skin. In fact it's been claimed that he's "... pathologically afraid for his life." Putin is 'pathologically afraid for his life' says former security officer.
If he is tossed out a window, it won't be the unwashed that cause it. They might be the tool but it will be his own "grey cardinals" that would allow for it. And the church again does nothing about this. At the end of the day Putin is old. Heart conditions develop and accidents happen. You don't need a window or a unwashed crowd.

Don't underestimate the great hair unwashed at your peril. Tsar Nicholas II did in his arrogance and that resulted in his downfall and the execution of him and his family in the basement of a house in Yekaterinburg.
The sociological condition within Russian society in 1913 is very different from today. Tsarist Russia was mass-murdering peasants, and putting down peasant uprising left and right for decades before that point came, and before you had 1917 you had 1905. Modern day Russia isn't in that same position, not even close. There isn't an ossified economic system ready to die and be replaced (feudalism). Quite the opposite, what Russia needs today is a relatively stable period of economic development. The longer, the better. It's what makes this war so stupid. Modern day Russia isn't teeming with well organized revolutionary parties, and the economy of Russia isn't being held back by its own superstructure. There isn't a revolutionary situation within Russia. There is room for regime change, sure, but not revolution. And Nicholas the 2nd was less arrogant and more clueless. He didn't ignore the unwashed masses because he thought they didn't matter, he was blissfully unaware of the country he ruled.
 

swerve

Super Moderator
Some aspects of the Russian economy were doing well in 1913. Commercial agriculture was flourishing, exporting lots of grain. Heavy industry was booming, & other modern industries were doing well in some areas. Education was expanding fast: the supply of literate workers & well-educated technical staff was growing rapidly.

AFAIK the chief economic problems were the bureaucracy & the idiot at the very top.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Some aspects of the Russian economy were doing well in 1913. Commercial agriculture was flourishing, exporting lots of grain. Heavy industry was booming, & other modern industries were doing well in some areas. Education was expanding fast: the supply of literate workers & well-educated technical staff was growing rapidly.

AFAIK the chief economic problems were the bureaucracy & the idiot at the very top.
I.e. the super-structure holding back the economic base. The tsarist elites were done. They were useless parasites that contributed next to nothing. The middle class had no interest in them, and the peasants were ready to string up anyone, as the old feudal land holdings made it impossible for the peasants to consistently feed themselves. Famines were occurring with unpleasant regularities, and some villages were almost permanently on the brink of starvation. And the working class lived in the early-industrial era conditions, which certainly didn't help. Nicholas II was a non-entity as a ruler, basically useless. What was needed was a strong reformer. What was available was a typical representative of the old aristocracy that had no idea what he was doing. Modern day Russia doesn't really have this problem. Russia doesn't need a revolutionary shift in property relations (from feudal to capitalist). Russia just needed to not have started this war. A war that is in no way necessary, a war that can't even be advantageous for Russia (even the best case scenario would have been bad), and a war that has put Russia in arguably the worst possible position for the major geopolitical shifts yet to come.
 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
Clinton regrets the removal of Soviet nukes from Ukraine. I guess if Ukraine had technical and financial assistance to support the nukes, the present situation may have never occurred but that assistance wasn’t considered and even if it was, many countries have the West would have been uneasy and technically I don’t know how realistic that would have been.

 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
^ That would have been a disaster waiting to happen, imo. UA sold everything they could find buyers for back in the 90-00’s. Would have never worked.

Also, my understanding is that, while they had the nukes, they were never in the position to launch or have access to if they wanted to do so.

And, at the end of the day, everyone was well aware of the current problem way back when over 30 years ago. For example:

[…]The President: Another question. Ed Hewett is just back from Ukraine. Is Yeltsin spending a lot of time on relations with the states of the former Soviet Union? I'm particularly interested in Ukraine. There are a lot of Ukrainian-Americans. We must handle them properly, with great respect. There is the nuclear question.

The last time I talked to Kravchuk, before Ed went, Kravchuk was optimistic for a speedy resolution in Ukraine's relationship with Russia. Is he right, or will it take a long time?

Mr. Gaydar: It will take a long time. The President spends a lot of time on republic problems. In some areas there is rapid progress in relations with Byelorus and Kazakhstan, for example.

There are problems with Ukraine. Of course we are not afraid of a Yugoslav-type case in Russian-Ukrainian relations. We'll need time to find new ways to establish close relations.

There is a very serious problem in Ukraine itself, for example in the tensions between West Ukraine and Kiev. Problems with Russian-language Ukraine. The economic situation is uneasy, and worse than ours. They're not moving fast enough on reforms. I hope they will speed up their reform program.

Ambassador Lukin: It is interesting. Sometimes people overestimate the nationality problem in Russia, and underestimate it in Ukraine. Russia is 83 percent Russian; Ukraine is 73 percent Ukrainian.

The President: 73 percent. Who are the rest?

Ambassador Lukin: Mostly Russian.

Mr. Gaydar: Mostly in Crimea.

The President: If we can help, we'd like to. Of course, this is better left to the countries involved.

Ambassador Lukin: It will be hard to do anything with Crimea. On May 5 the Crimean Supreme Soviet will meet to consider whether or not to have a referendum. They will almost certainly decide in favor of referendum on whether to be independent or stay in Ukraine. It would be best to put this aside, but it looks like a referendum will take place in August.

The President: How will the ballot read? Is the choice to be independent, stay in Ukraine, or go to Russia?

Ambassador Lukin: There is no Russia option. Either stay in Ukraine or join the Commonwealth as an independent state.

The President: Well, we wish you well. I know you've talked to others, but I wanted to say hello.

Please give my warm regards to President Yeltsin.[…]


This is from a memo of conversation between Bush Senior and other US officials and Russians back in 1992:


In other words, this was long time coming. It could have probably been resolved in other ways, but we have what we have.
 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
^ That would have been a disaster waiting to happen, imo. UA sold everything they could find buyers for back in the 90-00’s. Would have never worked.

Also, my understanding is that, while they had the nukes, they were never in the position to launch or have access to if they wanted to do so.

And, at the end of the day, everyone was well aware of the current problem way back when over 30 years ago. For example:

[…]The President: Another question. Ed Hewett is just back from Ukraine. Is Yeltsin spending a lot of time on relations with the states of the former Soviet Union? I'm particularly interested in Ukraine. There are a lot of Ukrainian-Americans. We must handle them properly, with great respect. There is the nuclear question.

The last time I talked to Kravchuk, before Ed went, Kravchuk was optimistic for a speedy resolution in Ukraine's relationship with Russia. Is he right, or will it take a long time?

Mr. Gaydar: It will take a long time. The President spends a lot of time on republic problems. In some areas there is rapid progress in relations with Byelorus and Kazakhstan, for example.

There are problems with Ukraine. Of course we are not afraid of a Yugoslav-type case in Russian-Ukrainian relations. We'll need time to find new ways to establish close relations.

There is a very serious problem in Ukraine itself, for example in the tensions between West Ukraine and Kiev. Problems with Russian-language Ukraine. The economic situation is uneasy, and worse than ours. They're not moving fast enough on reforms. I hope they will speed up their reform program.

Ambassador Lukin: It is interesting. Sometimes people overestimate the nationality problem in Russia, and underestimate it in Ukraine. Russia is 83 percent Russian; Ukraine is 73 percent Ukrainian.

The President: 73 percent. Who are the rest?

Ambassador Lukin: Mostly Russian.

Mr. Gaydar: Mostly in Crimea.

The President: If we can help, we'd like to. Of course, this is better left to the countries involved.

Ambassador Lukin: It will be hard to do anything with Crimea. On May 5 the Crimean Supreme Soviet will meet to consider whether or not to have a referendum. They will almost certainly decide in favor of referendum on whether to be independent or stay in Ukraine. It would be best to put this aside, but it looks like a referendum will take place in August.

The President: How will the ballot read? Is the choice to be independent, stay in Ukraine, or go to Russia?

Ambassador Lukin: There is no Russia option. Either stay in Ukraine or join the Commonwealth as an independent state.

The President: Well, we wish you well. I know you've talked to others, but I wanted to say hello.

Please give my warm regards to President Yeltsin.[…]


This is from a memo of conversation between Bush Senior and other US officials and Russians back in 1992:


In other words, this was long time coming. It could have probably been resolved in other ways, but we have what we have.
Yep, and it isn’t very good but I agree, the obstacles wrt a nuke capable Ukraine were unobtainable and likely undesirable.
 
If you talk on Neutral in this war, then I'm like most Asian Nations and Asian Publics (especially outside US close allies nations) as on the 'fence' in this War. We are acknowledge Russian fault on this War, but many Asian public and even politicians don't buy 'West' politicians and public opinion on this war as simple 'unprovoked' attack by Russia.
The fact that you are “on the fence” in this war shows that you are not neutral. When you have one country invading and bombing another, and you are “on the fence”, it shows that you would clearly support the invading country if the circumstances would have been in more equilibrium. The fact that you don’t support the victim and can remain “on the fence” after all that happened in the last year shows that you clearly support Russia against the West.

If the situation would have been in reverse and it would have been NATO invading Belarus, you would have been crying imperialism from day one.
 

Ananda

The Bunker Group
The fact that you don’t support the victim and can remain “on the fence” after all that happened in the last year shows that you clearly support Russia against the West.
Say what you believe, if that's make you happy. Not hide the fact that most countries in this world outside collective west is in the 'fence' on this War. They condemn Russia invading Ukraine, but stop and either not support or abstaining on other US and West sponsor for not engaging and blockade Russian trade.

Your comments is not surprising for a Western perspective that feel everyone in the World should touting Western possition.

Surprisingly to some in the west, other non western world, can think and make decision on their own. Your attitude is just the same with some in Washington Hill and Brussels, either with us or against us. Well the world now doesn't touting to what Washington and Brussels demands only. This is different world then in 70's.
 
Your attitude is just the same with some in Washington Hill and Brussels, either with us or against us. Well the world now doesn't touting to what Washington and Brussels demands only. This is different world then in 70's.
When it comes to an unprovoked war with the aim to annex territory, it’s true that the only options are you’re either with us or against us. The countries that don’t side with Ukraine are showing their true colors (I mean the colors of their leaders), and the West should take note and be more careful in the future when dealing with these countries.

The “collective West” has tolerated a lot from countries like China, India or Brazil who clearly don’t like the West. While Western countries are trying to reduce pollution and emissions despite the associated costs and the reduction in the standard of living, China and India are building coal power plants like there is no tomorrow, while Brazil is burning the Amazon in order to free land for agriculture. The West should demand everyone to play by the same rules, and if developing countries don’t want, then the West should stop bothering about emissions because it has no sense to make sacrifices while the largest part of the world doesn’t care and is not willing to make any effort.

The West should stop caring about others so much, because others certainly don’t care about the West at all.
 

Ananda

The Bunker Group
West should stop caring about others so much, because others certainly don’t care about the West at all.
Well that's what you believe, then it's your choice. However looking how Washington on both eisle keep coming to court India (champions of staying in the fence on this war), seems your believe not really follow but those in US administration.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Posts moved to appropriate thread.

When it comes to an unprovoked war with the aim to annex territory, it’s true that the only options are you’re either with us or against us. The countries that don’t side with Ukraine are showing their true colors (I mean the colors of their leaders), and the West should take note and be more careful in the future when dealing with these countries.

The “collective West” has tolerated a lot from countries like China, India or Brazil who clearly don’t like the West. While Western countries are trying to reduce pollution and emissions despite the associated costs and the reduction in the standard of living, China and India are building coal power plants like there is no tomorrow, while Brazil is burning the Amazon in order to free land for agriculture. The West should demand everyone to play by the same rules, and if developing countries don’t want, then the West should stop bothering about emissions because it has no sense to make sacrifices while the largest part of the world doesn’t care and is not willing to make any effort.

The West should stop caring about others so much, because others certainly don’t care about the West at all.
Several points. First and foremost, the you're with us or against us line is typically not particularly productive. Even at the heights of the Cold War you had the unaligned movement. The truth is that expecting all countries to tow an arbitrary line is unrealistic. They won't. You add some interesting qualifiers. Do you think that if an unprovoked war is launched without the goal to annex territory, this is different? What if the war is "provoked"? Russia certainly claims the latter. Granted they didn't accuse Ukraine of a WMD program (oh wait they did... ;) ).

The part about "tolerating" a lot from Brazil and India is particularly curious. Pollution is a problematic choice to put it mildly. If you look at pollution per person the 1st world leads by a hefty margin. And there is a strong correlation between CO2 emissions and quality of life. If the average American had to cut their CO2 emissions to those of the average Indian, what would that look like? Then there's the historic aspect. CO2 isn't just an annual number. There's also the amount of carbon already in the atmosphere. How much of it was put there by the industrializing of the current 1st world? How much did the 1st world profit from that? Now the third world has to not industrialize or do so much slower and more expensively even as the 1st world continues to out-pollute them on a per person basis? Curiouser and curiouser. I think your position here is either a neo-imperial one, the third world needs to do what's good for the first, or a profoundly ignorant one. If anything the third world has tolerated a lot from countries like the UK, France, the US.

As for playing by the same rules... invasion of Iraq? Oh sorry, that was provoked. By Saddam's WMD program clearly aimed at the US. Let me wave a vial around. :rolleyes: The third world quite rightly doesn't see much difference between the behavior of Russia in Ukraine and western countries in other imperialist adventures. This is why they're on the fence. They've seen talk of playing by the same rules but every time those rules hurt the interests of the powerful countries, they find an excuse to get out of following them. Which is why much of the third world doesn't believe the talk of rules and don't see any special reason to unite with the west in their sanctions against Russia. Mpst of the third world doesn't see themselves threatened by Russia in any meaningful way. There is nothing Russia can really do to India or Brazil. Even to intervene in Syria required the consent of the Syrian government, and would have been basically impossible without it. The US on the other hand maintains the capability to intervene in almost any country on earth, and could probably occupy and hold for quite a significant length of time almost any of them too. Russia is also a valuable trading partner, and one that often provides competition to deals offered by other players. So the third world at large, while not happy about Russian aggression, don't feel threatened, don't feel a burning need to respond, and don't want to face the economic problems of passing sanctions against a major player in the world economy. This has been explained repeatedly by others in this thread.
 
Well that's what you believe, then it's your choice. However looking how Washington on both eisle keep coming to court India (champions of staying in the fence on this war), seems your believe not really follow but those in US administration.
I don’t agree with how the US administration is handling this issue. I think the US should reward those who help Ukraine, not those who stay on the fence in order to extract benefits for themselves. I think the West has been very weak in dealing with the rest of the world lately, and that it is tolerating way more than it should.
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
@Feanor, way too much common sense for that one post above. I won’t even bother adding much more at this point, but just one bit.

Here is an interesting part of an interview with Mark Milley. I will highlight (in bold) the parts most relevant to this discussion.

MILLEY: Look, I spent a considerable amount of time in Iraq and Afghanistan, lost a lot of soldiers in both. I am deeply invested at the emotional level and the psychological level as well as a professional level. And in neither case have outcomes been exactly what we would have preferred. But I can tell you that every soldier, sailor, airman, and Marine who served in those conflicts did extraordinarily well. And they fought with tremendous skill. And they fought for the right reasons, which was to protect the United States of America.

Now, the second thing going into Iraq has to do with is to free the Iraqi people of the yoke of tyranny and dictatorship that Saddam Hussein was. And I don't think a lot of people quite fully understand, unless you were in Iraq or you have relations with the Iraqi people, how brutal that dictatorship was. Saddam Hussein was vicious. And what he was doing to the Iraqi people was incredible. And that's not—bad things happen all over the world. That in and of itself is not justification for an invasion of the sort that we did. It has to be defensive in nature, and we thought at the time that we were defending ourselves.


HANNAH: Though there was plenty of evidence that Saddam Hussein led a brutal and oppressive regime, no evidence ever emerged that he, in fact, possessed weapons of mass destruction. This fact allows many to chalk up the failure in Iraq to faulty intelligence, and the reckoning that's happening on the anniversary this week—to the extent there is one—fails to consider whether the possession of those weapons would have made the war more strategically sound or less, more just or not. America's war in Iraq and the muddied reasoning behind it has raised enduring questions about America's involvement and motivations in all kinds of international conflicts, Ukraine included. That's why we sat down with General Milley to get his take on America's interests in defending Ukraine against Russia, a conflict which, with no end in sight, risks becoming yet another forever war. So, I asked Chairman Milley what America's main goal is for its support, its ongoing support, and its generous support for Ukraine.

MILLEY: The fundamental purpose, the interest of the United States—the reason why, if you will—has to do with the rules-based international order that was put in place at the end of World War II in order to prevent great power war. And rule number one, if you will, was that you can't conduct wars of aggression, and large powers cannot attack smaller powers without some sort of justification that justifies the defense of themselves. So, wars of aggression are definitely opposed by this rules-based order. So, what Putin has done is a frontal assault on that rules-based order by conducting a very large, very coordinated attack on a much smaller country, a country that presented no material or military threat to Russia. Ukraine was never going to invade Russia. Ukraine wasn't going to attack Russia. And yet Russia went ahead and without provocation, conducted a very significant war of aggression.

HANNAH: And that Russian motivation matters, too..

MILLEY: My analysis says in Russia's case, their essential casus belli as laid out in an article—a 17-page article which was written by Putin in the summer of ’21. And in July of ’21, he lays out his reasons or his justification. They’re deep historical linkages, he argues, with Ukraine and Russia. He argues that Ukraine is actually historically part of Russia—ancient roots sort of thing. And he argues that when the wall came down, the NATO boundary shifted from the inter-German border all the way to the east. So, now you have Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and other countries as members of NATO, and in their mind—in Putin's mind and Russia's mind—Ukraine was attempting to become a member of NATO. And he perceived that to be a threat. Fear, pride, and interest are what Thucydides tells us are the fundamental causes of war. And I'd say that's still pretty much true after two-and-a-half millennia from when he wrote it.

So, in the case of Russia, They don't have large oceans on either side of them. They don't have massive mountain ranges. So, there's not obvious physical barriers to invasion from the West. So, fear plays a fundamental role, I think, to explain—not excuse, but explain—Russia's actions. And then there's obviously interest with not only national security interests, but there's financial interests, etcetera, of oil and gas and so on. And then pride, because when the wall came down, the Soviet Union was a great power. And in Putin's mind—he was Lieutenant Colonel Putin at the time, KGB officer in East Germany. Watches the wall come down. And that ripped apart at Russian pride. And he says that was the worst event that occurs in the last century.

So, those three things, I think—fear, interest, and pride—help explain. And again, they don't excuse. This is a war of aggression. It's Putin's war. It's a war of choice. But I think it does help explain why they're doing what they're doing.


And then the last paragraph, the “fear, interest, and pride” part… Something, eh? Explains, but does not excuse or justify.

The main difference between Ukraine and Iraq, among others, is that this happened to be “at the doorstep”, so to speak, a white European nation, invaded by a competitor/enemy/you pick. Justified? Hardly. But more so than Iraq ever was, as General Milley nicely outlined himself in the last paragraphed I highlighted in bold, no? If an American general can put it in a perspective, how else would you expect most of the world to see it?

This is the source for the interview, take a listen or read the transcript: Episode 14: How the War in Ukraine Ends — None Of The Above
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
I don’t agree with how the US administration is handling this issue. I think the US should reward those who help Ukraine, not those who stay on the fence in order to extract benefits for themselves. I think the West has been very weak in dealing with the rest of the world lately, and that it is tolerating way more than it should.
Frankly, I do not believe the west can do much more. I mean the US allowed oil to flow from Venezuela. They’d probably go to Iran too if the latter didn’t supply the drones and who knows what else.

I am in Canada, and, frankly, again, you are sitting on a horse that appears to be quite a bit high. “The west has been very weak dealing with the rest of the world lately”? “Tolerating”? Common, let’s be real. This is part of the reason why things are the way they are.
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
The NATO Gen Sec gave a press conference overnight NZ time, and one of the things he said came across as public acknowledgement that it's a case of not if Ukraine joins NATO but when. He also said that Sweden's membership should be approved shortly. This creates further problems for Putin because all of his western borders will be NATO borders. I have included Belarus as part of Russia, because for all intents and purposes it is now. So the war that he launched against Ukraine has achieved the opposite to what he wanted.

 

Vanquish

Member
In regards to fence sitting I often wonder if it's not just a product of which side the foreign aid and cheap weapons hand outs come from that determines which way to lean.
 
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