ADF General discussion thread

[seaspear]

Does this argument cover the firing of surface to surface missiles from submarines as mooted for the R.A.N submarines and other platforms a Tomahawk missile for instance has a capability to have conventional as well as nuclear payload
Australia to invest in long-range missile technology for naval fleet (smh.com.au)

 

[alexsa]

The issue many miss is that Australia are a signatory to the non-proliferation treaty. As such Australia cannot simply get nuclear weapons. This would be in breach of the treaty so a change would be needed or Australia would need to ignore the treaty. I cannot see the latter happening unless the world situation changes dramatically.

Let’s be honest, the US and Russia have enough warheads currently to make a real mess of the world. Conventional warheads are all we could field in the intermediate term as Australia would have to develop its own nuclear weapons if the country desired such a capability as the NPT does not permit the transfer to technology . That would put us in the same camp as Iran and North Korea as such a development would be in breach of the Non-Proliferation treaty. Not a good look.

 

[ddxx]

I agree, any sort of nuclear weapon would be fundamentally stupid for Australia to acquire for very obvious reasons which are in the collective national interest. Hugh White is also on that ridiculous bandwagon, among other bandwagons of near-equal stupidity.

I do however think the idea of conventional intermediate range ballistic missiles for long range strike and deterrence is an idea worthy of exploration.

This would be along the lines of those being developed by South Korea.

 

[Todjaeger]

I agree, any sort of nuclear weapon would be fundamentally stupid for Australia to acquire for very obvious reasons which are in the collective national interest. Hugh White is also on that ridiculous bandwagon, among other bandwagons of near-equal stupidity.

I do however think the idea of conventional intermediate range ballistic missiles for long range strike and deterrence is an idea worthy of exploration.

This would be along the lines of those being developed by South Korea.

There is an enormous, and enormously risky problem with attempting to field conventionally armed long-range ballistic missiles. At present, I am unaware of any way for a targeted nation to positively determine that an inbound ballistic missile has a conventional warhead instead of a nuclear warhead, prior to detonation.

As a result, targeted nations would essentially have to assume the worst case scenario, that they are the targets of a nuclear or some other WMD strike. This in turn would essentially compel a targeted nation to immediately launch a counterstrike (if able) prior to the arrival/detonation of inbound warheads. Such a counterstrike would need to be launched whilst the initial strike is still inbound, because if that initial strike is a nuclear one, then there is a good chance that a post-detonation counterstrike would not be possible.

The reality is that there is just too much risk for adversaries to be able to afford to treat inbound long-ranged ballistic missiles as anything other than a nuclear strike.

Now the situation with S. Korea is a bit different as I understand it. Firstly, I believe their ballistic missiles would all be classified as either SRBM or MRBM having ranges of ~800 km or less. Secondly, I believe the goal for such missile forces would be for S. Korea to attempt to achieve as much of a decapitating strike vs. N. Korean command and control facilities as possible, as quickly as possible. With those sorts of ranges, just about everywhere in N. Korea would be in range of a launch site from S. Korea, also the flight times would likely be quite short, which might be enough to prevent the launch of a counterstrike.

Australia launching vs. a hypothetical adversary that is a couple thousand km's away is a bit of a different story.

 

[Gooey]

Surface-Surface Missile systems, especially longer range ones, are single-use, inflexible, predictable, unless nuclear have limited payload, and expensive. On the other hand if you have air power knowledge, Very Long Range attack aircraft are multi-role, flexible, with large payloads, and expensive.

SSM weapon systems have their place in area denial but I am guessing that there is a Russell Prescient matrix somewhere looking at the trade-offs and best bang/buck b/w SSM and other systems.

 

[ddxx]

There is an enormous, and enormously risky problem with attempting to field conventionally armed long-range ballistic missiles. At present, I am unaware of any way for a targeted nation to positively determine that an inbound ballistic missile has a conventional warhead instead of a nuclear warhead, prior to detonation.

As a result, targeted nations would essentially have to assume the worst case scenario, that they are the targets of a nuclear or some other WMD strike. This in turn would essentially compel a targeted nation to immediately launch a counterstrike (if able) prior to the arrival/detonation of inbound warheads. Such a counterstrike would need to be launched whilst the initial strike is still inbound, because if that initial strike is a nuclear one, then there is a good chance that a post-detonation counterstrike would not be possible.

The reality is that there is just too much risk for adversaries to be able to afford to treat inbound long-ranged ballistic missiles as anything other than a nuclear strike.

Now the situation with S. Korea is a bit different as I understand it. Firstly, I believe their ballistic missiles would all be classified as either SRBM or MRBM having ranges of ~800 km or less. Secondly, I believe the goal for such missile forces would be for S. Korea to attempt to achieve as much of a decapitating strike vs. N. Korean command and control facilities as possible, as quickly as possible. With those sorts of ranges, just about everywhere in N. Korea would be in range of a launch site from S. Korea, also the flight times would likely be quite short, which might be enough to prevent the launch of a counterstrike.

Australia launching vs. a hypothetical adversary that is a couple thousand km's away is a bit of a different story.

Absolutely that's without a doubt a key area that needs to be considered in any exploration.

South Korea is working on a new variant of their Hyunmoo Ballistic Missile family which is expected to have a range of at least 3,000km. [Source]

 

[seaspear]

Is there an argument that Australia should be looking at a long range land based anti-ballistic system ,the article from the Strategist suggests longer range of detection systems needs to be developed but also seems to suggest Australia should look at interception of such threats
Why Australia needs a long-range air defence capability | The Strategist (aspistrategist.org.au)

 

[Redlands18]

Is there an argument that Australia should be looking at a long range land based anti-ballistic system ,the article from the Strategist suggests longer range of detection systems needs to be developed but also seems to suggest Australia should look at interception of such threats
Why Australia needs a long-range air defence capability | The Strategist (aspistrategist.org.au)

Does a system exist that could be positioned in Northern Australia to shoot down ballistic missiles armed at the major Southern cities?

 

[FoxtrotRomeo999]

Is there an argument that Australia should be looking at a long range land based anti-ballistic system ,the article from the Strategist suggests longer range of detection systems needs to be developed but also seems to suggest Australia should look at interception of such threats
Why Australia needs a long-range air defence capability | The Strategist (aspistrategist.org.au)

We risk going from a few missile types to every missile under the sun. However, let's look at the likely possible target - a hypersonic multi-warhead missile. The SM 6 missile (Block 1B) SM-6 Missile | Raytheon Missiles & Defense (raytheonmissilesanddefense.com) has been chosen by the USN and US Army Army Selects SM-6, Tomahawk For Ground Launchers | Missile Threat (csis.org) so a solution is already available "sorta-kinda" off the shelf and based on the existing RAN SM2 and planned SM6 solution:

1. The SM6 Block 1B variant "will reportedly reach hypersonic speeds, i.e. above Mach 5. " Army Picks Tomahawk & SM-6 For Mid-Range Missiles - Breaking Defense so it should be able intercept a hypersonic target and will evolve as the targets evolve.
2. The missile will be the same across US Navy and US Army. “The Army will not modify the Navy missiles,” Army Picks Tomahawk & SM-6 For Mid-Range Missiles - Breaking Defense This gives us a common solution though what else do we need to buy to get a workable land based solution - Aegis on a Bushie or does the US Army solution include "batteries"?
3. A Patriot solution is possible but would add another class of missile .... in what is looking like a very cluttered Australian missile environment.

 

[Todjaeger]

Absolutely that's without a doubt a key area that needs to be considered in any exploration.

South Korea is working on a new variant of their Hyunmoo Ballistic Missile family which is expected to have a range of at least 3,000km. [Source]

I believe you are referring to the Hyunmoo-3 which is a LACM, not a ballistic missile, with the -3C variant having a range of ~1,500 km and development of a -3D variant with a theorized range of ~3,000 km is believed to be underway. The S. Korean SRBM and LACM have different flight profiles and also rather different reported weights. The Hyunmoo-2B SRBM has a launch weight of ~5,400 kg vs. the Hyunmoo-3C LACM's launch weight of ~1,360 kg.

No, S. Korean does not help matters by using the same base name for both LACM and SRBM, differentiating which one is which by the model number and variant. And people have issues with some of the names and naming conventions the US uses (@Takao )...

 

[ddxx]

I believe you are referring to the Hyunmoo-3 which is a LACM, not a ballistic missile, with the -3C variant having a range of ~1,500 km and development of a -3D variant with a theorized range of ~3,000 km is believed to be underway. The S. Korean SRBM and LACM have different flight profiles and also rather different reported weights. The Hyunmoo-2B SRBM has a launch weight of ~5,400 kg vs. the Hyunmoo-3C LACM's launch weight of ~1,360 kg.

No, S. Korean does not help matters by using the same base name for both LACM and SRBM, differentiating which one is which by the model number and variant. And people have issues with some of the names and naming conventions the US uses (@Takao )...

Sorry, I got my missiles confused, the one I was referring to is the Hyunmoo-5 which is still under development.

It’s a ballistic missile, capable of carrying an 8-9 tonne conventional warhead with an expected range of at least 3,000 km.

 

[WaveWalker]

I think it would be pretty hard to justify to the public (that's assuming they are even this closely interested in Defence issues) why we are spending around a billion dollars on just 18 SPHs, of which only 12 will be in actual combat units.

Land 8116 phase 1 is quoted as being a contract for 30 K9’s and 15 K10 ammunition resupply vehicles for $700m.

@WaveWalker Source please. Sources are required.

Ngatimozart

 

[aussienscale]

Does a system exist that could be positioned in Northern Australia to shoot down ballistic missiles armed at the major Southern cities?

There is, but is it pretty expensive, AEGIS Ashore, combined with AEGIS BMD capability of ships. Can't see us getting a system TBH, not many up and running as it is.

https://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed-martin/rms/documents/aegis/APS_FactSheet_V2.pdf

 

[Redlands18]

There is, but is it pretty expensive, AEGIS Ashore, combined with AEGIS BMD capability of ships. Can't see us getting a system TBH, not many up and running as it is.

https://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed-martin/rms/documents/aegis/APS_FactSheet_V2.pdf

Very expensive, we would require one each for Canberra, Perth, Sydney, Brisbane, Melbourne, Darwin and Townsville.

 

[seaspear]

I don't suppose we could skip Canberra, but seriously could a small number just situated in Northern Australia detect and defend against North Korean ballistic missiles?

 

[spoz]

Very expensive, we would require one each for Canberra, Perth, Sydney, Brisbane, Melbourne, Darwin and Townsville.

Got a thing against Adelaide (and Cairns)? Hobart, well maybe not although I’d miss the scallop pies.

 

[buffy9]

I don't suppose we could skip Canberra, but seriously could a small number just situated in Northern Australia detect and defend against North Korean ballistic missiles?

What are we trying to protect? With the relatively limited number of strategic missiles North Korea likely has can it afford to be targetting North Australia, or even Australia proper? If an adversary with the capability really wants to use a ballistic missile, can we stop it?

I don't see North Australia as holding any strategic value (beyond a handful) to target - we simply don't present the same threat as countries in closer proximity or with more immediate presence.

I've seen descriptions of missile defence that describe it as a money sink. It makes sense, with no gurantee it will actually work and with a limit to the number of missiles it can counter. It can make sense to place defences around areas you are seeking to protect - but in Australia these aren't really concentrated close to one another, raising the costs to do this at scale. It also doesn't really help achieve deterrence or 'impactful projection.'

All the while there is a lot of things in Defence being fought over as is. I see AEGIS Ashore as being like the B-21 - a shiny diamond that doesn't really address the reality of the situation for Australia.

The focus at the moment appears to be focused on air and missile defence for the Joint Force (NASAMS, MRGBAD, the DDGs), and passively hardening/dispersing everything strategic to make sure a strike isn't crippling. The former (alongside allies) ensures we can manoeuvre relatively freely, and the latter ensures we can still manage a war if need be. Neither are easy or simple, but have more redundancy and reliability than AEGIS Ashore imho.

 

[ADMk2]

Very expensive, we would require one each for Canberra, Perth, Sydney, Brisbane, Melbourne, Darwin and Townsville.

Quite.

Then stepping up there is Ground based mid-course missile defence…

Lockheed Martin Marks First Next Generation Interceptor Flight Software Delivery

HUNTSVILLE, Ala., Oct. 25, 2022 – Lockheed Martin recently delivered the first flight software package for the nation’s next-generation intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) interceptor...

news.lockheedmartin.com

Which we couldn’t afford if we spent our entire defence budget on it, and literally on nothing else…

 

[seaspear]

What are we trying to protect? With the relatively limited number of strategic missiles North Korea likely has can it afford to be targetting North Australia, or even Australia proper? If an adversary with the capability really wants to use a ballistic missile, can we stop it?

I don't see North Australia as holding any strategic value (beyond a handful) to target - we simply don't present the same threat as countries in closer proximity or with more immediate presence.

I've seen descriptions of missile defence that describe it as a money sink. It makes sense, with no gurantee it will actually work and with a limit to the number of missiles it can counter. It can make sense to place defences around areas you are seeking to protect - but in Australia these aren't really concentrated close to one another, raising the costs to do this at scale. It also doesn't really help achieve deterrence or 'impactful projection.'

All the while there is a lot of things in Defence being fought over as is. I see AEGIS Ashore as being like the B-21 - a shiny diamond that doesn't really address the reality of the situation for Australia.

The focus at the moment appears to be focused on air and missile defence for the Joint Force (NASAMS, MRGBAD, the DDGs), and passively hardening/dispersing everything strategic to make sure a strike isn't crippling. The former (alongside allies) ensures we can manoeuvre relatively freely, and the latter ensures we can still manage a war if need be. Neither are easy or simple, but have more redundancy and reliability than AEGIS Ashore imho.

I don't believe we could defend against a large scale intercontinental nuclear missile attack but my query of the positioning of a anti-ballistic missile system in the north of the country to protect the rest of the country from a rogue nation up north , I understand the Hobarts may have some anti-ballistic missile capability so always having a ship stationed in a position of interception could also be difficult ,obviously I'm not an expert and it might be diferent to when Patriot missile systems were positioned in Europe because of the potential threats of a attack from Iran
Nato's missile defence shield 'up and running' - BBC News

 

[Redlands18]

Lockheed Martin hopes to deliver more F-35s to Australia (msn.com)
Ignore the F-35 bit, the important info is, from Marles today, the DSR will be released in April.