This post (putting aside the nuclear weapons lines that
@Redlands18 has much more politely responded to), this post demonstrates three things that are quite common, but mean one cannot actually contribute seriously to defence discussions.
The first is an ignorance about the role of the ADF. It fulfils missions that are given to it by Government, which includes the defence of Australian interests. Australian interests are not just geographically confined, but rather they are global in scope. This is clearly seen, even in the worst days of Defence of Australia, where the ADF has committed forces to Rwanda, Somalia, Timor Leste, PNG, Afghanistan, Iraq, Solomon Islands and others. We also have contributed elements to South Korea, NATO, Malaysia, Indonesia, Japan, the Philippines among others. That's in the last 30 years alone. The fact you refer to the South China Sea (why are we fighting there?) further highlights the hypocrisy of the DoA people - Australian interests do not stop at the 12 nm line.
To that end, the ADF needs to be capable across a broad area of remit. Yes, it is a limited pool of money. That's what makes force design harder than picking kit. But until you change the government's explicit tasking, you need a capable Air Force, Army and Navy. I would highly recommend reading any official histories about our intervention into Timor Leste in 1999 to see how close we came to failing - because of the decision to go Defence of Australia and restrict the Army to some ASLAVs and PMVs.
Secondly is ignorance about how an Army fights. We don't fight alone, we fight as combined arms teams. The simplest team is the infantry-armour team. Infantry is squishy, slow and poorly armed. It has no shock value and very limited in what it can carry. It does, however, excel at operating in complex terrain, getting into sneaky places, as well as dealing with occupied terrain, most notably people (civilian, neutral and enemy). Armour, on the other hand, is the opposite. Putting infantry and armour together covers each other's weaknesses. Just look at Russian armoured tactics at the start of 2022, where combined arms was ignored and kit died.
This means that, just like a football team where wingers strengths make up for front rower's weaknesses and vice versa, the team is only as strong as it's weakest link. Using the M113
is the same as using the Mirage III today. If you think it's feasible to take the Mirage III against a REDFOR threat in 2032 then I'll give up. But if you think an F-35 may be more suitable, you've answered why the M113 needs replacement. Yes, Boxer is used as an APC/IFV by some nations. But they face problems, most commonly in the direct fire/assault zone. There, the tanks and IFVs need common mobility so they can fight together.
Thirdly is the word deterrence. I belong to the school of though that argues the only two things that truly deter a potential enemy are mass (and by that I mean significant mass, a'la the Soviet Union in 1980s. Not 1 Bde being the toughest nut in the region in the 1980s) or nuclear weapons. Without those, we can't deter. Which means, the ADF cannot deter. But I'm happy to debate that - what people don't understand is what provides the best deterrence.
RAND has done a study on this, the best deterrence is heavily armoured, forward deployed Army units. Why? Two reasons. One, it's a bloody hard nut to crack and two, it's a sure sign of a nation's commitment. We say to ally 'we are here to help, have some PMV' and we say to ally 'we are here to help, where would you like our Bde?' are two very different discussions. Without a capable Army, your best chance at deterrence (assuming I am wrong about mass and nukes) has been deleted. In addition to the findings of RAND that mobile assets provide less deterrence, have a look at all of the deterrence the USAF and allies provided against the Taliban in 2021...
But, in a specific answer of how do IFVs fit into operations in the SCS? The answer to me seems quite clear, supporting the VPA in keeping their border secure and pressuring the CCP's southern flank. And for VPA, read any of the nations to the south of China that we are friendly with - Cambodia, Thailand, India, Pakistan (all of whom, by the way, send students to ADFA, RMC, Staff College and other training courses).
You are correct that there is limited money. Which is why people who have done the job criticise kit focused decisions. To give you a rough idea, FSP20 used weeks of wargaming, each wargame consisting of 50 - 150 people across the ADO and other Departments. And that's before the analysis before and after. It's why I am known to say, if you don't want IFV's that's cool. You don't argue LAND 400's selections. You argue the Government direction. Throwing out stuff like more ships, subs or aircraft is meaningless. Actually, as an aside, from memory the RAN and RAAF are prioritised in the first 10 years by FSP20; most of LAND 400's funding falls after 2030... So if the sky is falling and we need more RAN/RAAF,
we have already prioritised that.
