ADF General discussion thread

[StingrayOZ]

Any combatant needs to be able to defend itself from air, surface and undersea threats. If it can’t it needs to be escorted (a large high value fleet asset), or it’s a patrol vessel that is not expected to act as a combatant.

Self defence against air threats at a minimum means being able to intercept inbound missiles or aircraft at the radar horizon, which implies a range of 15-20nm. Currently for the RAN that means ESSM, which means the vessel needs space and weight for loaded VLS cells, a reasonable radar and combat system to launch and control the missiles, and enough electrical power and cooling to support all of that. On top of this their needs to be point defence systems for close range defence. If a combatant can’t defend itself from inbound modern anti-ship missiles, it’s a target.

I think there are some developments that can make a corvette more useful.

ESSMII has its own seeker and is a much more capable missile. It will have an engagement range of more than 50km. Having its own seeker, makes the ships radar not need to illuminate the target, it can be a lower power but more sensitive radar. CAMM and CAMMER also offer this capability. CAMM is a smaller lighter missile and can be cold launched making it more suitable for small ships and saving much weight.

NSM is a much lighter missile than harpoon. While 8 harpoons really need quite a large ship, 8 NSM is much lighter and further ranged. They don't have the same explosive power, but range and targeting is much improved.

Drones are much smaller than manned aircraft, Even a small ship could operate 3 largish drones with have sensors and could be armed. Where as previously a corvette probably wouldn't have any significant embarked helo capability.

I'm not really against looking at and even acquiring Corvettes. But not having any significant, reliable deployable large ship capability in the 2025-2030 period I think that should be a priority. There is no corvette currently inservice with the RAN (or the USN, or the RN). So there would need to be a project created, a selection process, crew training, industry specification and support etc. 10-15 year project. As opposed to new build hobarts.

 

[hauritz]

While I have reservations about corvette sized vessels there are a few of things to consider.
A corvette is preferable to an OPV.
Not every situation requires the presence of a top of the line warship.
They are cheaper to acquire and operate.
Also everything is networked these days.

One fear I have is that Austal could push its Independence class LCS onto us.

 

[Stampede]

Riiiigghttt!!!! So virtually unarmed, tactically useless, unsurvivable PBs and OPVs are perfectly adequate for our personnel to sail and fight in, but something that has equivalent combat power to an ANZAC or Type 31, but with a smaller hull is inadequate?
Basically the there is an assumption that if it's not a 6000 plus tonne frigate it isn't worth providing effective self protection or combat capability to.

Reality check, perfect is the mortal enemy of perfectly good enough, but having nothing at all, or something that is worse than nothing are actually not very sensible alternatives.

The Armidale class corvettes were far from perfect but we would have been screwed without them, the V&W class destroyers were hopelessly obsolete but were better than nothing.

As capability increases so does cost, but there is a balance where a platform is no longer disposable and needs to be able to fight and survive, which increases costs far more than just tacking on weapons. At the same time, if you need survivable presence in more locations than you have high end combatants to deploy, then you need to compromise.

The question is, should the compromise be survivability, capability, or having something you can deploy at all?

What is the level of threat
We get the need for the high end stuff.
Do we want to employ a destroyer for those contingencys just beyond the capability of a patrol vessels.
Suggest No.
It's over kill and realistically we just don't have the numbers.
Something has to fill this middle ground.

Cheers S

 

[Morgo]

What is the level of threat
We get the need for the high end stuff.
Do we want to employ a destroyer for those contingencys just beyond the capability of a patrol vessels.
Suggest No.
It's over kill and realistically we just don't have the numbers.
Something has to fill this middle ground.

Cheers S

What are these contingencies though? What situations would an OPV be insufficient for, but a Hunter / Hobart would be overkill?

I would argue that OPVs become overmatched once someone starts slinging missiles, and If someone starts slinging missiles I don’t think anyone will be upset about having AEGIS and 48 VLS.

 

[Volkodav]

What are these contingencies though? What situations would an OPV be insufficient for, but a Hunter / Hobart would be overkill?

I would argue that OPVs become overmatched once someone starts slinging missiles, and If someone starts slinging missiles I don’t think anyone will be upset about having AEGIS and 48 VLS.

How many extra destroyers can we buy instead of corvettes, or patrol frigates for that matter?

Reality check, we don't have enough destroyers to guarantee one is available to deploy once the upgrade program starts, we definately don't have enough to be using them for roles a Corvette or patrol frigate could do.

Why am I saying corvettes? Well they are what are being suggested and apparently officially considered. I would love a a patrol or gp frigate instead of corvettes, but corvettes are better than opvs, which are better than pbs.

Back before the F-100 was selected I speculated that if the F-100 was successful over the G&C design we should build eight of them as replacements for the FFGs and DDGs, maybe even twelve or fourteen if we replaced the Anzacs as well. It didn't happen but in light of where we are now it would have been smarter and more efficient to have done so.

The problem we have is there are no short term solutions to the capability gap we are facing in major combatants. Arming opvs won't cut it, corvettes may be a viable interim option.

 

[Stampede]

What are these contingencies though? What situations would an OPV be insufficient for, but a Hunter / Hobart would be overkill?

I would argue that OPVs become overmatched once someone starts slinging missiles, and If someone starts slinging missiles I don’t think anyone will be upset about having AEGIS and 48 VLS.

Fair question

I foresee a lot of "testing of the water" by smaller craft as a test of political will.

Call it micro gun place diplomacy or what ever, but it will be part of a bigger picture test or sovereignty.

You will want over match for the threat but not overkill for that in itself may play to the politics of the day.
It's a dance of response.
That dance may not be kinetic ,just the threat of a kinetic response.

As Volk also points out, its also about being realistic with funds and time.

I'm sure you know our frigate numbers and how many are in the water and also how immense our maritime domain is to secure.

A few dozen destroyers would be nice but it's just not going to happen.

Hence smaller less capable craft to facilitate numbers.

Don't get me wrong.

We don't want to go to gun fight with just a knife.

It's a awkward and unpredictable task that we seek to undertake.


Challenging times ahead


Cheers S

 

[Takao]

The striking fact from that article is the range, 3400nm@12kt. For comparison the same site gives the Anzacs 6000nm@18kt, no wonder people talk about how short legged they were. Another interesting point to, is how much ship design has changed, the Avante is actually 1m wider but 15m shorter on a similar displacement.

What particularly stands out to me is that is worse range than the V&W Class destroyers as delivered in 1916.

Exactly the ones that were found to be too short-legged for operations in war. Especially in the Atlantic (let alone the Pacific). I have no qualms about debating the use of smaller vessels; but let us stop being silly and thinking that something with that range offers any significance to the major fighting elements of the RAN.

It's even more galling to think that RAN units have, and will continue to do so by virtue of being a Navy, operational taskings almost every single week. The Navy is so much more active than the RAAF or ARA by virtue of their mission - and they need range. Supporting fisheries across the southern Indian? Rescuing yachtsmen in the Southern Ocean? Aiding HADR between us and NZ (arguable covering 1/4 of the southern hemisphere? All require range.

Again - history already offers lessons....

 

[Takao]

I certainly don't think there is a considerable amount of difference in terms of original capability between the two. The Hobarts will appear to be more tightly integrated with Spy + Aegis and a larger vls magazine, making them more suitable for Aegis fleet integration and possibly for SM-3, as well a larger missile load out enabling things like tomahawk. The the difference is mild out of the box, the Hunters have much more room for growth and will probably have a deeper radar horizon and would likely make better ships for individual work.

But I think people are missing what the current ADF and Australian defence discussion is.

It is more about Australia not having a navy at all. Its more like stop building Hunters, get rid of the Hobarts, push the SSN acquisition way, way into the future (shelved). Buy B21's. Perhaps build patrol boats.

It is not a continuum between new Hobarts and Hunters. Its effectively removing large area defence vessels from the RAN, the big ships. Removing both Hobarts and Hunters from the future (or curtailing their build at 3-6). Replacing them with aircraft. Building more Hobarts will be an argument for more Hunters, not the other way around. This would also include disposing of the LHD's and going with smaller amphibious ships that do not need escorts (or so the logic goes). Basically break the submarine arm as well, it turns out SSN's are hard and expensive. Hard to build, hard to operate, hard to dispose of. The USN isn't going to base 12 SSN's and 2 SSBN in Australia. They aren't going to pay for upgrades to FBE and FBW.

Osborne and henderson can then build small ships <2000t. These would then adopt the ASPI Patrol boat battleship concept of putting a NSM on them, maybe with a 40mm gun to deal with air threats. These ships would operate in Australian waters under the safe protection of the RAAF.

This then frees up lots of money for aircraft.

The argument goes that aircraft are more flexible, faster to respond, more survivable. Western doctrine generally has aircraft as the tool for anti-shipping, not ships, therefore, pointless to build large ships as in future wars they are too open to attack, and Australia needs to focus on sinking chinese naval assets. The US is basing B-52's here and will likely base B21's here. So Australia will defund its Navy to fund a much more capable airforce, based around long range bombers. Which will be based up north. The US has already funded upgrades to Tindal.

Also, it is argued it is too hard to staff and crew the Navy. Australians would prefer jobs in the air force. Therefore we should abandon these hard to staff platforms. Fund more upgrades to airbases and long range strike platforms.

I would be interested in how people see that proposal working. Particularly we would be basically be abandoning or winding up any existing ship acquisitions right now, and B21's might appear sometime mid/late 2030's. Perhaps.

I think there is more to defence of Australia than bombing mainland china with B21's. Which likely won't be survivable in Chinese airspace in 2030.
I am also not convinced that moving the Australian navy into a brown water force will solve our problems, nor will again abandoning local manufacturing of complicated things like ships and land platforms for a US off the shelf wonder weapon.

It isn't a viable solution for three fundamental reasons: persistence, economy, and mission.

Persistence.
Firstly, aircraft are not persistent. In a ground sense, it's why the ground elements of Army are essential - a combined arms team is the only force that can occupy the ground. If you don't occupy the ground you cede it to the threat for options. Aircraft cannot hold the ground, and you just have to look at the last weeks of Afghanistan when levels of airpower not seen since DESERT STORM were thrown at the Taliban - and nothing happened. At one stage every single serviceable AC-130 was operating...and they did nothing. And that's not a one off - look at the RAF/RAAF bombing of jungles in Malaya (achieved very little) and the multi-year campaign against North Vietnam (again, achieved little short of arguable LINEBACKER).

In the maritime environment it is subtly different (because you cannot hold ocean), but persistence is essential. Look at our own history with Emden and Kormoran and the impact their presence had on us. If you have a vessel, it's a threat all the time. The aircraft goes home after 2 hr. 6 h if it's a P-8. HMAS Brisbane goes home after 4 weeks (assuming no RAS or maintenance). That's 4 weeks where I have to consider a threat if I am REDFOR; and unless it's Sydney Harbour or maybe Port Moresby, let's not have any jokes about airpower maintaining a presence for 24/7 regardless of weather any further away. HMAS Brisbane can do it anywhere.

Economy.
We are a nation that requires imports. It sucks, but is understandable. Don't forget, the greatest industrial power on earth in 1914 required imports too. The only way those imports can come to us is via sea. The sheer quantity of oil alone can never be brought in by air, let alone the thousands of ISO containers that go through our ports each year. Australia's survival is tied to sea lanes. And in a time of war - who will protect the convoys/ships that sail them? Aircraft were vital to the Battle of the Atlantic in 1939-1945 yes; but it was the frigates, destroyers and corvettes that did the bulk of the work. Without them, Britain dies (see above about persistence). Australia is no different. Critically, those sea lanes start in the US or MEAO. What aircraft can reach that far?

Beyond that is the fact that Australian interests do not stop at the 12 nm line. Which means that we may have to put ground forces somewhere outside Australia again. In fact, that's almost a guarantee. So who protects the land forces going there? Who keeps their supply lines open? You cannot sustain a land force by air; you cannot move vital equipment by air in any meaningful numbers. The only option is by sea - and that requires escorts. There is a reason that GEN Leahy said the most important Army project in the 2000s was the AWD Project.

Mission.
Finally, we get to the mission. Unlike the other two services, the Navy has always had policing as a mission. We all have warfighting and diplomacy, but the Navy has the third one. To that end, how will aircraft take that on? How will aircraft tackle immigration, fishing, piracy or smuggling? No matter what your take is on individual topics, the RAN will be there aiding civil authorities. To say nothing of supporting one of the largest rescue zones in the world (~10% of the earth's surface is our responsibility!), and (because some of our neighbours simply don't have the capability), aiding other nations.

In addition, the diplomacy for the RAN is so much easier. Everytime they do a task, training, exercise or operational, they go somewhere foreign. The RAAF doesn't, the ARA doesn't. Even just moving from here to Japan to work in an exercises there will see opportunities to hit a dozen nations along the way. And when a warship rolls into a harbour, with a professional, well drilled and well dressed crew that sends a message - friend or possible foe alike. That Captain will have much more influence than an ARA or RAAF officer of equal rank would - just look throughout history where naval officers - especially RN - have been used as diplomats or helped shape national policy.

I'd highly suggest reading SPC-A Commercial Publications: The Navy and National Security: The Peacetime Dimension | Royal Australian Navy to get a better understanding.

Final thoughts
I have a good mate who has come up through the minehunters. Their stories about getting to Japan are horrible - the constraints of weather and range that MFUs do not have to deal with as much have, at times, seen real risk taken by these crews that they shouldn't have to do. Doing anything to minimise the blue water capability of our Navy will undermine the ADF almost more than anything else. And yes, I have put my money where my mouth is and as an Army officer suggested halving the RAAF and ARA budgets to boost the RAN. With the exception of the air mobility arm (really just 36 Sqn for the RAAF) and nuclear weapons, air power is an enabling arm of war. They cannot achieve operational or strategic aims by themselves. The other two can, and do. And while Australia remains an island the RAN and ARA must remain balanced.

 

[Morgo]

Fair question

I foresee a lot of "testing of the water" by smaller craft as a test of political will.

Call it micro gun place diplomacy or what ever, but it will be part of a bigger picture test or sovereignty.

You will want over match for the threat but not overkill for that in itself may play to the politics of the day.
It's a dance of response.
That dance may not be kinetic ,just the threat of a kinetic response.

As Volk also points out, its also about being realistic with funds and time.

I'm sure you know our frigate numbers and how many are in the water and also how immense our maritime domain is to secure.

A few dozen destroyers would be nice but it's just not going to happen.

Hence smaller less capable craft to facilitate numbers.

Don't get me wrong.

We don't want to go to gun fight with just a knife.

It's a awkward and unpredictable task that we seek to undertake.


Challenging times ahead


Cheers S

That’s a well reasoned response. I think my perspectives which may differ from yours are:

1) I get the point about grey zone conflicts but I do think that an OPV with a 40mm is suitably for most contingencies, with the threat of that OPV calling a friend (P8, Hunter, Hobart, SSN) being sufficient.

2) I agree with your point on the size of our EEZ, but to me this argues for more resources directed to long ranged, highly capable combatants able to operate alone - which corvettes aren’t.

3) Given the above I don’t think there’s any reason why we shouldn’t be working toward at least 12 frigates + 6 destroyers. Recent levels have been simply inadequate, which our current predicament is showing up. It will take time to get to this level (although perhaps a bit quicker given the first Navantia offer) and to enable this we should be directing every spare dollar we have into the Hunter program - not corvettes.

 

[Bob53]

Sat on the side mostly during the corvette discussion. It has shifted significantly from adding a 57mm gun, a RIM116 and a 4 pack of NSMs to something way bigger. At the time there was criticism of the folks who mentioned this …trying to turn the Arafura in to battleships I think was the refrain.

the fastest way for us the get this moving is to keep as much of the original design and bolt on capabilities where possible.

One thing I hope that comes out if this is a hangar for a SH 60. That alone changes the equation on the Arafuras.

 

[AndyinOz]

Sat on the side mostly during the corvette discussion. It has shifted significantly from adding a 57mm gun, a RIM116 and a 4 pack of NSMs to something way bigger. At the time there was criticism of the folks who mentioned this …trying to turn the Arafura in to battleships I think was the refrain.

the fastest way for us the get this moving is to keep as much of the original design and bolt on capabilities where possible.

One thing I hope that comes out if this is a hangar for a SH 60. That alone changes the equation on the Arafuras.

I could be wrong and I am perfectly willing to be corrected but wasn't the design deliberately changed to remove some of the deck strengthening to ensure that the vessels would not be capable of landing anything like a Seahawk or something of a similar size and weight? I had thought that the idea was for these sorts of constabulary platforms would have some sort of UAV capability but nothing more.

So even that might be beyond the scope of possibility unless of course the apparent inbuilt deficiency was rectified. But again that was not part of the original intended use of the class.

Though I will certainly concede that the geopolitical and security environment we find ourselves in is significantly different even to that which was observable when the patrol boat replacement was envisioned.

Does that mean as part of a revamp of our capabilities we need to rethink, perhaps but we might well be rapidly running out of time if not close to having done so already.

 

[Stampede]

That’s a well reasoned response. I think my perspectives which may differ from yours are:

1) I get the point about grey zone conflicts but I do think that an OPV with a 40mm is suitably for most contingencies, with the threat of that OPV calling a friend (P8, Hunter, Hobart, SSN) being sufficient.

2) I agree with your point on the size of our EEZ, but to me this argues for more resources directed to long ranged, highly capable combatants able to operate alone - which corvettes aren’t.

3) Given the above I don’t think there’s any reason why we shouldn’t be working toward at least 12 frigates + 6 destroyers. Recent levels have been simply inadequate, which our current predicament is showing up. It will take time to get to this level (although perhaps a bit quicker given the first Navantia offer) and to enable this we should be directing every spare dollar we have into the Hunter program - not corvettes.

Their is merit in your points.


Cheers S

 

[Volkodav]

That’s a well reasoned response. I think my perspectives which may differ from yours are:

1) I get the point about grey zone conflicts but I do think that an OPV with a 40mm is suitably for most contingencies, with the threat of that OPV calling a friend (P8, Hunter, Hobart, SSN) being sufficient.

2) I agree with your point on the size of our EEZ, but to me this argues for more resources directed to long ranged, highly capable combatants able to operate alone - which corvettes aren’t.

3) Given the above I don’t think there’s any reason why we shouldn’t be working toward at least 12 frigates + 6 destroyers. Recent levels have been simply inadequate, which our current predicament is showing up. It will take time to get to this level (although perhaps a bit quicker given the first Navantia offer) and to enable this we should be directing every spare dollar we have into the Hunter program - not corvettes.

You are missing the point of a second tier combatant, be it a Corvette, a patrol frigate, a gp frigate, a LCS, or a flexible support ship, i.e. a modern APD (destroyer transport) or something like the Danish Absalons, or proposed RN Type 32, is that it is survivable against low level threats on its own, but more importantly, can contribute complementary combat power to a taskforce consisting of more capable ships.

It is cheap enough to have enough of them to provide and maintain persistent presence where required. Durability, endurance, and survivability are also factors, which rules out PBs, OPVs and even FACs.

They are intended to operate under the umbrella of high end surveillance and strike capabilities, but have the capacity to fight when they have to. PBs and OPVs are so lacking in defensive capability that they are literally no better in terms of combat power than an auxillary or civilian ship taken up from trade and fitted with a couple of Typhoons. You could literally bolt RBS 70 and Javelin to the deck of a bulk carrier and give it more capability than a PB.

A Corvette (with RAM, SeaRAM, ESSM, Mica, Sea Ceptor etc.) can escort auxillary or civilian vessels in a higher threat environment, under the overwatch of high end capabilities, an OPV can't. An OPV would be pressed doing much more than counter piracy work and would provide no additional capability to a taskforce.

It's not even a case of buying more destroyers and using them. Any combatant operating on its own is less capable and less survivable than one operating with others. Even if we had the money to be able to afford thirty destroyers, so we could have fifteen doing fleet work (i.e. working with other ships) and fifteen doing constabulary and patrol work (i.e. working on their own) it just makes no sense as such a platform is too valuable to waste or risk on its own, while a corvette can do the work quite adequately where an OPV and pb couldn't.

The thinking of the three tier navy was tier one was guided missile ships suitable for high end taskforce operations, likely supporting allies. Tiers two and three were for EEZ patrol, and defence, holding choke points open, escort / defence of auxiliary and civilian vessels. Tier three would do local and near regional waters, tier two would provide the same combat power but with greater endurance.

There would have been no PBs, no OPVs, rather small and medium combatants capable of point defence of themselves and ships they were escorting, with anti surface and anti submarine capability provided predominantly by a deployed helicopter. They were to have space and weight preserved to upgrade shipborne weapons and sensors to improve their organic anti surface and ASW capability as the strategic situation evolved.

What we got instead was the planned corvettes were scraped, PBs, that were arguably less durable than the preceding PBs, acquired. The tier two patrol frigates where crammed full of everything that would fit in an attempt to turn them into tier one, major fleet units, while the real tier one was whittled down from nine, to six, to four and finally only three ships.

Think on that, the plan for the 2000s (following the post cold war peace dividend), was a dozen medium endurance, point defence missile armed, helicopter equipped small combatants, eight similarly equipped high endurance medium combatants, and eight to nine high end multi role guided missile frigates and destroyers. We are currently arguing that six corvettes, to support a dozen destroyers and frigates, during the most challenging and dangerous strategic environment since the 1930s, is over kill and unnecessary?

 

[Stampede]

You are missing the point of a second tier combatant, be it a Corvette, a patrol frigate, a gp frigate, a LCS, or a flexible support ship, i.e. a modern APD (destroyer transport) or something like the Danish Absalons, or proposed RN Type 32, is that it is survivable against low level threats on its own, but more importantly, can contribute complementary combat power to a taskforce consisting of more capable ships.

It is cheap enough to have enough of them to provide and maintain persistent presence where required. Durability, endurance, and survivability are also factors, which rules out PBs, OPVs and even FACs.

You could literally bolt RBS 70 and Javelin to the deck of a bulk carrier and give it more capability than a PB.

A Corvette (with RAM, SeaRAM, ESSM, Mica, Sea Ceptor etc.) can escort auxillary or civilian vessels in a higher threat environment, under the overwatch of high end capabilities, an OPV can't. An OPV would be pressed doing much more than counter piracy work and would provide no additional capability to a taskforce.

It's not even a case of buying more destroyers and using them. Any combatant operating on its own is less capable and less survivable than one operating with others. Even if we had the money to be able to afford thirty destroyers, so we could have fifteen doing fleet work (i.e. working with other ships) and fifteen doing constabulary and patrol work (i.e. working on their own) it just makes no sense as such a platform is too valuable to waste or risk on its own, while a corvette can do the work quite adequately where an OPV and pb couldn't.

The thinking of the three tier navy was tier one was guided missile ships suitable for high end taskforce operations, likely supporting allies. Tiers two and three were for EEZ patrol, and defence, holding choke points open, escort / defence of auxiliary and civilian vessels. Tier three would do local and near regional waters, tier two would provide the same combat power but with greater endurance.

There would have been no PBs, no OPVs, rather small and medium combatants capable of point defence of themselves and ships they were escorting, with anti surface and anti submarine capability provided predominantly by a deployed helicopter. They were to have space and weight preserved to upgrade shipborne weapons and sensors to improve their organic anti surface and ASW capability as the strategic situation evolved.

What we got instead was the planned corvettes were scraped, PBs, that were arguably less durable than the preceding PBs, acquired. The tier two patrol frigates where crammed full of everything that would fit in an attempt to turn them into tier one, major fleet units, while the real tier one was whittled down from nine, to six, to four and finally only three ships.

Think on that, the plan for the 2000s (following the post cold war peace dividend), was a dozen medium endurance, point defence missile armed, helicopter equipped small combatants, eight similarly equipped high endurance medium combatants, and eight to nine high end multi role guided missile frigates and destroyers. We are currently arguing that six corvettes, to support a dozen destroyers and frigates, during the most challenging and dangerous strategic environment since the 1930s, is over kill and unnecessary?

Their is some merit in Morgo's wish to have well defended ships, but the RAN you wish to create is more aligned to my way of thinking.
A good number of vessels within the available budget offering a range of capability's to deal with a range of contingency's.
Its about balance and having all ships painted grey having a level of warfighting capacity.
Something that has been a constant source of frustration for me re the OPV's.
A large some of money, building a lot of quite big ships of negligible military value.
For a modest amount of extra coin, a ship of similar size with a different design could do the constabulary stuff AND contribute militarily to the fleet.

Like your comment re the attributes of a Corvette


"They are intended to operate under the umbrella of high end surveillance and strike capabilities, but have the capacity to fight when they have to. PBs and OPVs are so lacking in defensive capability that they are literally no better in terms of combat power than an auxillary or civilian ship taken up from trade and fitted with a couple of Typhoons."

May need to" bolt RBS 70 and Javelin" onto the Arafura's!


Trust some good decisions come out of the review next years

Cheers S

 

[Redlands18]

"They are intended to operate under the umbrella of high end surveillance and strike capabilities, but have the capacity to fight when they have to. PBs and OPVs are so lacking in defensive capability that they are literally no better in terms of combat power than an auxillary or civilian ship taken up from trade and fitted with a couple of Typhoons."

May need to" bolt RBS 70 and Javelin" onto the Arafura's!


Trust some good decisions come out of the review next years

Cheers S

RBS 70 - Wikipedia
It has actually been done by the RAN and ARA, with 2 RBS-70 teams embarked on the HMAS Success for deployment to the first Gulf War in 1991

 

[Volkodav]

RBS 70 - Wikipedia
It has actually been done by the RAN and ARA, with 2 RBS-70 teams embarked on the HMAS Success for deployment to the first Gulf War in 1991

Still not ideal, besides, these days you have RAM, Sea Ceptor, Mica and ESSM, the Army is getting NASAMS.

When you have a base CMS such as 9LV an eight cell Mk-41 VLS provides 32 ESSM or with ExLS soft launch missiles such as Sea Ceptor and RAM Block II can be carried and used quite effectively. This makes for a well defended ship.

Now on the survivability side you have different levels of fire rating, firefighting zones, insulation etc. There's the type and capacity of the fire mains, is there a water mist system, CO2, water deluge, halon. The is ballistic protection, NBC.

Don't forget the basic structure of the ship, thickness and grade of steel used. Access to compartments, design facilitating damage control, materials used in compartments, for pipes, cable trays, ladders. Shock clearances, the shock resilience of not just equipment, but it's foundations, fittings and interfaces.

USS Stark survived two Exocet hits, Moskva, a much larger ship with Russia's equivalent of AEGIS, burnt to the waterline. A lot of it is crew training and doctrine, but ship design is a major factor, Look at Sheffield, without certain design compromises it is highly probable her crew would have saved her.

Once you install a certain level of capability on a ship it by default gains a level of importance and is no longer considered disposable and designing in a level of durability, survivability and fightability becomes a necessity. Also, and think on this, "considered disposable" i.e. some ships have so little capability that you expect to lose them and their crews if you deploy them in harm's way. A 40mm white phosphorus grenade would likely be the end of an Armidale, imagine what a Javalin or Korrenet would do.

 

[Redlands18]

Still not ideal, besides, these days you have RAM, Sea Ceptor, Mica and ESSM, the Army is getting NASAMS.

When you have a base CMS such as 9LV an eight cell Mk-41 VLS provides 32 ESSM or with ExLS soft launch missiles such as Sea Ceptor and RAM Block II can be carried and used quite effectively. This makes for a well defended ship.

Now on the survivability side you have different levels of fire rating, firefighting zones, insulation etc. There's the type and capacity of the fire mains, is there a water mist system, CO2, water deluge, halon. The is ballistic protection, NBC.

Don't forget the basic structure of the ship, thickness and grade of steel used. Access to compartments, design facilitating damage control, materials used in compartments, for pipes, cable trays, ladders. Shock clearances, the shock resilience of not just equipment, but it's foundations, fittings and interfaces.

USS Stark survived two Exocet hits, Moskva, a much larger ship with Russia's equivalent of AEGIS, burnt to the waterline. A lot of it is crew training and doctrine, but ship design is a major factor, Look at Sheffield, without certain design compromises it is highly probable her crew would have saved her.

Once you install a certain level of capability on a ship it by default gains a level of importance and is no longer considered disposable and designing in a level of durability, survivability and fightability becomes a necessity. Also, and think on this, "considered disposable" i.e. some ships have so little capability that you expect to lose them and their crews if you deploy them in harm's way. A 40mm white phosphorus grenade would likely be the end of an Armidale, imagine what a Javalin or Korrenet would do.

Armidale's just need a mistake during a routine refit. I don't think they ever worked out what happened with the Bundaberg.

 

[hauritz]

It isn't a viable solution for three fundamental reasons: persistence, economy, and mission.

Persistence.
Firstly, aircraft are not persistent. In a ground sense, it's why the ground elements of Army are essential - a combined arms team is the only force that can occupy the ground. If you don't occupy the ground you cede it to the threat for options. Aircraft cannot hold the ground, and you just have to look at the last weeks of Afghanistan when levels of airpower not seen since DESERT STORM were thrown at the Taliban - and nothing happened. At one stage every single serviceable AC-130 was operating...and they did nothing. And that's not a one off - look at the RAF/RAAF bombing of jungles in Malaya (achieved very little) and the multi-year campaign against North Vietnam (again, achieved little short of arguable LINEBACKER).

In the maritime environment it is subtly different (because you cannot hold ocean), but persistence is essential. Look at our own history with Emden and Kormoran and the impact their presence had on us. If you have a vessel, it's a threat all the time. The aircraft goes home after 2 hr. 6 h if it's a P-8. HMAS Brisbane goes home after 4 weeks (assuming no RAS or maintenance). That's 4 weeks where I have to consider a threat if I am REDFOR; and unless it's Sydney Harbour or maybe Port Moresby, let's not have any jokes about airpower maintaining a presence for 24/7 regardless of weather any further away. HMAS Brisbane can do it anywhere.

Economy.
We are a nation that requires imports. It sucks, but is understandable. Don't forget, the greatest industrial power on earth in 1914 required imports too. The only way those imports can come to us is via sea. The sheer quantity of oil alone can never be brought in by air, let alone the thousands of ISO containers that go through our ports each year. Australia's survival is tied to sea lanes. And in a time of war - who will protect the convoys/ships that sail them? Aircraft were vital to the Battle of the Atlantic in 1939-1945 yes; but it was the frigates, destroyers and corvettes that did the bulk of the work. Without them, Britain dies (see above about persistence). Australia is no different. Critically, those sea lanes start in the US or MEAO. What aircraft can reach that far?

Beyond that is the fact that Australian interests do not stop at the 12 nm line. Which means that we may have to put ground forces somewhere outside Australia again. In fact, that's almost a guarantee. So who protects the land forces going there? Who keeps their supply lines open? You cannot sustain a land force by air; you cannot move vital equipment by air in any meaningful numbers. The only option is by sea - and that requires escorts. There is a reason that GEN Leahy said the most important Army project in the 2000s was the AWD Project.

Mission.
Finally, we get to the mission. Unlike the other two services, the Navy has always had policing as a mission. We all have warfighting and diplomacy, but the Navy has the third one. To that end, how will aircraft take that on? How will aircraft tackle immigration, fishing, piracy or smuggling? No matter what your take is on individual topics, the RAN will be there aiding civil authorities. To say nothing of supporting one of the largest rescue zones in the world (~10% of the earth's surface is our responsibility!), and (because some of our neighbours simply don't have the capability), aiding other nations.

In addition, the diplomacy for the RAN is so much easier. Everytime they do a task, training, exercise or operational, they go somewhere foreign. The RAAF doesn't, the ARA doesn't. Even just moving from here to Japan to work in an exercises there will see opportunities to hit a dozen nations along the way. And when a warship rolls into a harbour, with a professional, well drilled and well dressed crew that sends a message - friend or possible foe alike. That Captain will have much more influence than an ARA or RAAF officer of equal rank would - just look throughout history where naval officers - especially RN - have been used as diplomats or helped shape national policy.

I'd highly suggest reading SPC-A Commercial Publications: The Navy and National Security: The Peacetime Dimension | Royal Australian Navy to get a better understanding.

Final thoughts
I have a good mate who has come up through the minehunters. Their stories about getting to Japan are horrible - the constraints of weather and range that MFUs do not have to deal with as much have, at times, seen real risk taken by these crews that they shouldn't have to do. Doing anything to minimise the blue water capability of our Navy will undermine the ADF almost more than anything else. And yes, I have put my money where my mouth is and as an Army officer suggested halving the RAAF and ARA budgets to boost the RAN. With the exception of the air mobility arm (really just 36 Sqn for the RAAF) and nuclear weapons, air power is an enabling arm of war. They cannot achieve operational or strategic aims by themselves. The other two can, and do. And while Australia remains an island the RAN and ARA must remain balanced.

I have often toyed with the idea of a navy centric defence force. Australia does not share any land borders with any other nation, unless you count Antarctica. Our main population centres are well to the south effectively out of range of any non-carrier based aircraft and maybe a few long ranged bombers. In fact one thing to take from the Russian experience with its air force over the Ukraine is that air operations over another country are extremely difficult. If you break down Australia's core military priorities it is to protect the mainland and its lines of trade and communication.

In that scenario you could pretty much just get rid of the air force and replace it with an air element in the navy. The army would be reduced to manning missile batteries and perhaps carrying out a few peace time HADR missions. The navy could even divest itself of most of its amphibious elements and instead concentrate on submarines, frigates, destroyers and perhaps even a couple of carriers.

Having powerful allies enables Australia to have well balanced forces but if you take these alliances out of the picture then all of a sudden you are really going to have to focus your resources.

 

[StingrayOZ]

USS Stark survived two Exocet hits, Moskva, a much larger ship with Russia's equivalent of AEGIS, burnt to the waterline. A lot of it is crew training and doctrine, but ship design is a major factor, Look at Sheffield, without certain design compromises it is highly probable her crew would have saved her.

I would be careful about comparing Moskva to an Aegis American destroyer. I just want to elaborate so people don't think Moskva = modern aegis ship equiv.

I know what you are saying here and you are right, the Moskva has basically no networked systems, mix of ancient soviet systems, and some Russian but still dated systems, poor tactics and conops, several systems appear to be non-working or were not able to be employed because interference with other systems. Its a great example on what happens when you just dump a lot of systems onto an old large platform and don't fund any integration. Russian ships of the later soviet period always played pretty fast and loose with survivability, because if it got hit, it was likely the end of the ship, because you have expended all munitions or they had something that was undefeatable.

May need to" bolt RBS 70 and Javelin" onto the Arafura's!

The OPV's would make poor platforms for basically any weapon system. We choose the least capable design for the OPV's, and then selected many equipment and modifications to further limit any combat capability. From power generation, engine, speed, Rhib placement, etc. On the spectrum of OPV's they are very much at the very basic end.

Again new new ship would be a 10+ year journey. The RAN Doesn't currently operate any corvettes, and WWII experiences aren't relevant anymore and all of those who operated them aren't just old, they have passed. So we would basically be at the very begining of selection suitable equipment for corvettes, many of the systems (SM-2/SM-6/ESSM, Aegis, MH60R, 5" etc) are in appropriate for a corvette. So unless your corvette is the size of an Anzac frigate you would be having to select, acquire, industry/logistically support, train, munitions, integrate all of those basic things, bearing in mind how smoothly the Arafura's 40mm implementation went.

For the effort to bring a small weapon system online say 57mm gun, you could be bringing a more capable weapon system online. Like 127mm advanced munitions, F-35B or LRASM. I now honestly wonder if we can bring a 40mm gun into service before 2027. Then we need to develop CONOPS, train, maintain, manufacture munitions, have a strategic store of parts, a plan for future upgrades. We could bring a very hollow capability very quickly, but how useful would that be.

We did this with the C27J.. The mini-herc concept. If the idea is the bring capability quicker, we are better off aiming for something either we already operate or almost already operate. It had commonality, and was from an existing supplier and had existing in service customers.

I would urge to consider what we can do with the existing platforms, systems and weapons of the ADF. We can increase their number, or perhaps acquire a weapon for those existing systems.

Money it costs to bring in extra Destroyers or Frigates is not that relevant in the bigger picture, and their capabilities are well known and fit in with existing planning and support. The discussion about crews is frequently bought up, but how are we going to crew a platform that is not in-service with any navy in a way we would configure it. Existing platforms, even new ones, have had people working on them for a decade before they were in-service and approaching a decade of service. Plus there are crews from overseas with two decades of service. Training and simulations are already inplace today and can be expanded, not just established.

 

[Volkodav]

I would be careful about comparing Moskva to an Aegis American destroyer. I just want to elaborate so people don't think Moskva = modern aegis ship equiv.

I know what you are saying here and you are right, the Moskva has basically no networked systems, mix of ancient soviet systems, and some Russian but still dated systems, poor tactics and conops, several systems appear to be non-working or were not able to be employed because interference with other systems. Its a great example on what happens when you just dump a lot of systems onto an old large platform and don't fund any integration. Russian ships of the later soviet period always played pretty fast and loose with survivability, because if it got hit, it was likely the end of the ship, because you have expended all munitions or they had something that was undefeatable.

The OPV's would make poor platforms for basically any weapon system. We choose the least capable design for the OPV's, and then selected many equipment and modifications to further limit any combat capability. From power generation, engine, speed, Rhib placement, etc. On the spectrum of OPV's they are very much at the very basic end.

Again new new ship would be a 10+ year journey. The RAN Doesn't currently operate any corvettes, and WWII experiences aren't relevant anymore and all of those who operated them aren't just old, they have passed. So we would basically be at the very begining of selection suitable equipment for corvettes, many of the systems (SM-2/SM-6/ESSM, Aegis, MH60R, 5" etc) are in appropriate for a corvette. So unless your corvette is the size of an Anzac frigate you would be having to select, acquire, industry/logistically support, train, munitions, integrate all of those basic things, bearing in mind how smoothly the Arafura's 40mm implementation went.

For the effort to bring a small weapon system online say 57mm gun, you could be bringing a more capable weapon system online. Like 127mm advanced munitions, F-35B or LRASM. I now honestly wonder if we can bring a 40mm gun into service before 2027. Then we need to develop CONOPS, train, maintain, manufacture munitions, have a strategic store of parts, a plan for future upgrades. We could bring a very hollow capability very quickly, but how useful would that be.

We did this with the C27J.. The mini-herc concept. If the idea is the bring capability quicker, we are better off aiming for something either we already operate or almost already operate. It had commonality, and was from an existing supplier and had existing in service customers.

I would urge to consider what we can do with the existing platforms, systems and weapons of the ADF. We can increase their number, or perhaps acquire a weapon for those existing systems.

Money it costs to bring in extra Destroyers or Frigates is not that relevant in the bigger picture, and their capabilities are well known and fit in with existing planning and support. The discussion about crews is frequently bought up, but how are we going to crew a platform that is not in-service with any navy in a way we would configure it. Existing platforms, even new ones, have had people working on them for a decade before they were in-service and approaching a decade of service. Plus there are crews from overseas with two decades of service. Training and simulations are already inplace today and can be expanded, not just established.

Spartan vs herk is a poor example, OPV vs Corvette is more King Air vs MV-22.

Just looking at the RAN spec for a Arafuras there would be 9LV, but being a Corvette probably an absolute minimum of RAM, a 57mm, facilities for a Romeo, irrespective of whether it normally operated a Camcopter, and likely NSM. Sensor suite would be more ANZAC than Arafura.