ADF General discussion thread

Redlands18

Well-Known Member
All this points to me to a material increase in defence spend, with the RAN, RAAF and RAA being the big winners. This doesn’t equate to swingeing cuts elsewhere (although some trimming looks inevitable, even if just for the optics).

As always, time will tell….
Just to clarify something that is bugging me, when you say RAA are you referring to, Regular Australian Army? because the term RAA is actually shorthand for the Royal Australian Artillery, the correct shorthand term for the Regular Army as a whole is ARA (Australian Regular Army)
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Here is Richard Marle's full speech and discussion transcript from the Submarine Institute of Australia conference.

It's well worth a read IMO and brings further insight and context to his perspective beyond the quotes which have circulated in the media.

I think your DEFMIN gets it about SSNs and not just at the pointy end.
"When we – when this meeting happened, the Strategic Conference, happened last time, two years ago it was a very different world. At that point in time, the successor to Collins was 12 Attack-class submarines, diesel-electric, that we were building with the French and at conferences like this when people like you were asking ministers like me about whether we would consider walking down a nuclear path, you would get very short dead bat answers to those questions which encouraged everyone to move on. And now here we are two years later, and the successor to Collins is a nuclear capability that we are working on with both the United States and the United Kingdom, with an announcement due on the optimal pathway in the first half of next year. ...
"When I first became shadow minister for defence, back in 2016, it was clear to me that submarines mattered. But if I'm being really honest, I didn't quite understand why they mattered. And now, I hope I do. But I really want to thank everyone in this room and this organisation for promoting discussion and debate around the single most important capability that we have within the Australian Defence Force which builds Australia's strategic space, and that's particularly the case in a world where our strategic circumstances are much more complex and much more precarious. So getting the debate right, and making the right decisions has been, is more important now, and the stakes are higher now than they have probably been at any point since the end of the Second World War. ...
"Perhaps the starting point is to answer it in a strategic context, which is that the opportunity fundamentally, in walking down the pathway of developing a nuclear powered submarine capability, is to have the capability to build Australia's strategic space in a much wider range of circumstances that are potentially there facing us in the future, than that what I really think (inaudible) since the end of the Second World War. And I put that in, it's kind of significant terms, meaning building strategic space and making sure that we have capability - defence capability in Australia, actually, I think goes to our ability to maintain the way of life that we’ve enjoyed into the middle of this century, in I think could be a much more precarious and potentially much more dangerous world. And so, the nuclear powered submarines, I think, are absolutely fundamental. Probably the most fundamental piece in that puzzle. And I think it is important to start by making that observation because as we walk down this path, often we think about, you know, the kind of defence industry dividend and the technological dividend for the economy. All really important, but we need to analyse this from the point of view of strategic purpose first. That’s the dog, and the rest is the tail. It’s really important that we have a clarity of thought going forward here, where tails don’t wag dogs. ...

"There is though a significant tail, and that is that in developing the ability to make a nuclear powered submarine in Australia, not the reactor but the rest of it, is a huge undertaking, we will do and from that is going to have an enormous benefit obviously in terms of jobs, but in terms of what that can do around the place of science and technology within our economy. And I think if we kind of go off strategic policy for a moment, one of the great challenges for us as a country, as important as primary industry is – and it’s really important - we need to develop the human component of our economy much more. We need to climb the technological ladder, we really need to change and enhance our cultural relationship with science and start infusing science and technology throughout our economy. Making our economy more complex. This is a really important endeavour, which will help that. So, I think on a whole range of levels there are great opportunities that come from walking down this path. ..."
He appears to understand that the tail is just as important as the pointy end and that without the full infrastructure and logistics the pointy end is going to fail. He also recognises that Australia is lacking in certain technologies, scientific and technological skills, and that it will have to start now to ensure that the required skills etc., will be available when required, but also will be ongoing. Plenty of STEM in primary, secondary, and tertiary education as well as industry and throughout the wider economy.

On timelines:
"Last week I received the first interim advice from Sir Angus Houston and Stephen Smith. We are in a position to hand out the Defence Strategic Review in the first quarter of next year. That's the same time as what we're trying to do with the assessment of where we go with submarines, in respect of that. ..."

On the nuclear pathway.
"The final point I’ll make is, we are walking down the nuclear pathway (inaudible) pretty easily, but the scale of what that means in terms of the national endeavour, is huge. It's meaning, for example, that a building, I guess in Adelaide that might have housed some components of the Attack-class submarine would have been rated to withstand a one-in-500 year seismic event in the context of a nuclear mindset, we need to be rating that building to a one-in-10 thousand year seismic event. Everything needs to be harder. Everything needs to be more robust. This is an example of the degree to which we need to go to make sure that we are able to be good nuclear stewards, from cradle to grave. And cradle this sense means the receiving of the reactor, not the building of it, but right through the process we need to be thinking about how we regulate and how we handle the nuclear material. We need to be doing that from the perspective of both the United States and the United Kingdom because they are not going to walk down this path unless they have a complete sense of confidence about our ability to be good nuclear stewards. We won't be able to do it from the perspective of the International Atomic Energy Agency, who will not give us the tick unless they have a sense of confidence that we will good nuclear stewards, and their tick will be the social licence for us walking down this path. So there is just a power work to be done in respect of all of that and again, I think people in this room have an enormous contribution to make there. ...
Then one final piece amongst all of this is that, I mentioned earlier that to get to where we need to, in terms of nuclear powered submarine capability, there is a human dimension to this. We need to grow our submariners and providing opportunities for them on essentially US and UK boats is going to be really important. So we've already announced something in relation to that in respect of the UK, we hope to find opportunities in the US as well. But that, I mean that happens well before we’ve got our own nuclear submarine in the water, but we will be kind of walking down a path very soon of actually growing Australian submariners who are nuclear submarine capable. ..."

On the Collins Class:
"In terms of Collins, yeah, I guess going back to the previous question you asked, whichever way you cut it, Collins is going to be doing the bulk of their submarine task for many years to come. Life of Type Extension of Collins, which is really now the replacement all six Collins, are going to be really important. And so, a lot of what we're going to be about in the immediate term, in terms of the way in which we are doing our submarine capability, is through Collins. So I can’t kind of emphasise enough how important Collins is, and the emphasis we need to place upon that, and particularly the Life of Type Extensions. ..."
Well we kinda figured that was going to happen because that was the only logical and feasible solution, despite what some may think. It comes down to both cost and practicality.

On subs being built in Australia:
"Before we say nuclear powered submarines, submarines are hugely complex machines, so the process that we have gone through as a country in terms of - as a defence industrial base, and working out what capabilities we have to build the Attack-class, as we were going to, is not wasted effort. That actually, that is still highly relevant to understand what capabilities we've got and what we can bring to bear in this. So I think before we talk about nuclear power, we are planning to build submarines in Australia still, and we're planning to walk down that path pretty soon, and pretty quickly. And so all the work that we had previously done in relation to getting people prepared to participate in Attack applies here. I think there is - there are all the issues that I described in relation to nuclear stewardship, which we need to be thinking through, and it's not - it's kind of, I almost feel, above my paygrade, but it is just the concept that everything is more far more robust. And so we need to be thinking about that."

That basically covers it and I think gives a basic understanding where things need to happen and what most likely will happen. On the face of it, you may just have yourselves a good Defence Minister.
 

Stampede

Well-Known Member
I was hoping the government would give a defence review update in November, but apparently that is not happening and is only confidential/non public.

I worry about lack of platforms for fighting in the next 10 years:

Collins coming out of water for a very significant and extensive LOTE, to try to stretch their operational life into the later 2050's, but mean there will be significantly less capabilities during the later 2020's and the early 2030s..
Hobarts coming out of water for radar and combat system upgrades, $5+ billion worth of work, almost equaling their initial build cost. Less capabilities during the later 2020's and the early 2030s. We basically lose any deployable, reliable destroyer capability. Presumably the LHD and other assets will have to stay in local waters only and we will be cancelling our regional engagements.
Anzacs coming out of water for further upgrades, while smaller they are still significant, and overlapping with Collins/Hobart upgrades. Again less capabilities during the later 2020's and the early 2030s.
Other projects are also unclear.

F-35 to go through blk4 upgrades, which will likely be a slow and probably the most significant upgrade these aircraft will go through as we have already 54 delivered, and the blk4 upgrade gives the platform a lot of capability. Including 16 new weapons integrated, new sensors, new computers, new sub systems, etc. Basically none of the RAAF will be TR3 builds, so this will involve basically pulling apart the entire aircraft and rebuilding them. We may need to buy another squadron of aircraft so we have some capability while this is occurring. SH if we are keeping them around may need to go through with a blk III upgrade to keep them relevant. Time frames are working against us, there is a balance between here and now capabilities and the wants of tomorrows. How do we keep pilots while under going and taking out of service so many, many airframes.

Drone strategy is also unclear.

Then we have the rumored curtailing of the Land400 program. Army looks like riding around in M113's for the time being.. M1A2 is unclear. Some amphibious and landing capabilities are also unclear.

Plus what do we do with our people while all of this is happening as its likely to negatively affect careers, morale, satisfaction and eventually retention.

Suffice to say not sure of the ADF fighting capability in the 2025-2035 period. Particularly if every major platform and fighting unit is in pieces on hardstands or on the ground, or driving around in 1960's vintage items. This affects Army, Navy and Airforce.


Would like to see some sort of update, if not answers, then at least what is being considered.

Marles certainly is a capable person. He also has a personal friendship with Dutton. Arguably Australia does see defence as a significant priority, we are concerned about the global situation, China, Russia, the war in Europe, US stability. There is heaps of scope for bipartisan progress, in solving a huge number of issues, as we go into a hugely dynamic geopolitical time.

We can acknowledge the limitations of earlier governments from both sides. They were a different time, and for nearly 15 years both sides face internal squabbling and backstabbing ontop of 20-30 years of defence decline since Vietnam.

But we are now at the critical point where things need to happen. It would be nice to see, something.
All good questions and I share your concern.

We could all do the fantasy fleet thing across the services, but I'd suggest very little information will be coming out re future defence acquisition in the next few months.
Probably fair enough as an important defence review is currently underway.
I'm sure we would all like to be that fly on the wall to gain an insight into our defence direction going forward.

Unfortunately we have to wait.

Cheers S
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
All good questions and I share your concern.

We could all do the fantasy fleet thing across the services, but I'd suggest very little information will be coming out re future defence acquisition in the next few months.
Probably fair enough as an important defence review is currently underway.
I'm sure we would all like to be that fly on the wall to gain an insight into our defence direction going forward.

Unfortunately we have to wait.

Cheers S
Admittedly this is my opinion only, but I strongly suspect that the only platforms which would be available in the event of a conflict within the next 10 years are those platforms which are either already in service, in production, or on order.

Opportunities might (emphasis MIGHT) exist to order additional units of aircraft like the F-35 and P-8 or C-130 which could potentially be in service within a decade depending on the order book, but otherwise the ADF is most likely going to be confined to using what is already in or planned for inventory.
 

Stampede

Well-Known Member
Admittedly this is my opinion only, but I strongly suspect that the only platforms which would be available in the event of a conflict within the next 10 years are those platforms which are either already in service, in production, or on order.

Opportunities might (emphasis MIGHT) exist to order additional units of aircraft like the F-35 and P-8 or C-130 which could potentially be in service within a decade depending on the order book, but otherwise the ADF is most likely going to be confined to using what is already in or planned for inventory.
It a fair observation.

Whats or order or in production.
What should be ordered to replace tired inventory.
These are not capability's for today nor realistically the immediate future.
10 Years out maybe, but realistically that looks a long way off.

An obvious comments maybe; but the old cliche of you go with what you have still rings true.

I did crack a grin recently when it was announced that the Boxer IFV had reached IOC.

25 vehicles sourced from overseas and still not with their Spike ATGM.................Yes the ATGM is on the way but IOC with such a small cadre of vehicles for a production run going through to 2027..............................What's this about!
ASLAV will be the realistic go to if things go sour in the immediate future. Why, because you cannot not do much with 25 vehicles!

I trust that the Defence review looks at some very short term capability add on to our existing kit across the services.

Like the Boxer scenario, its the in service stuff that will shoulder the load for the immediate years ahead.


Cheers S
 

Morgo

Well-Known Member
Just to clarify something that is bugging me, when you say RAA are you referring to, Regular Australian Army? because the term RAA is actually shorthand for the Royal Australian Artillery, the correct shorthand term for the Regular Army as a whole is ARA (Australian Regular Army)
Nope. I can see how you may have thought that but I was referring to the Royal Australian Artillery. Lots of additional SAMs, AShM and probably PrSM heading their way I would expect.

Probably not much additional investment for Army more broadly (amphibious watercraft maybe?) but I’m hoping cuts will be minimal.
 

Redlands18

Well-Known Member
Nope. I can see how you may have thought that but I was referring to the Royal Australian Artillery. Lots of additional SAMs, AShM and probably PrSM heading their way I would expect.

Probably not much additional investment for Army more broadly (amphibious watercraft maybe?) but I’m hoping cuts will be minimal.
Thanks for the clarification.
Agree the RAA looks like it is going to do very well, may need some help from RAAC getting up to speed on operating tracked vehicles with no experience at all in that area. The ADF has no experience at all in operating land based SSMs or MRLs so they are going to be a steep learning curves.
 

ADMk2

Just a bloke
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
It always seems to coincidently work out that defence reviews seem to align with the views previously expressed by whatever government is in charge at the time. The hints that have been dropped do seem to be a variation of the Dibb plan. I must admit I am somewhat concerned that the role of the army may end up being somewhat diminished in favour of an ADF geared towards the A2/AD.
Army should invest in some critical thinking on how to gear up quickly when the time comes. When the next Somalia / Rwanda / Cambodia / Timor / Iraq / Soloman Islands / Aghanistan comes along, it will be Army that will be turned to as usual.

So instead of butting heads now, which seems all but futile anyway, save that capital for when the ‘urgent operational requirements’ start flooding in.

Because they will. Every war we’ve ever fought has required significant boots on the ground and I don’t see that changing, no matter how popular other ideas may be.
 

ADMk2

Just a bloke
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
I was hoping the government would give a defence review update in November, but apparently that is not happening and is only confidential/non public.

I worry about lack of platforms for fighting in the next 10 years:

Collins coming out of water for a very significant and extensive LOTE, to try to stretch their operational life into the later 2050's, but mean there will be significantly less capabilities during the later 2020's and the early 2030s..
Hobarts coming out of water for radar and combat system upgrades, $5+ billion worth of work, almost equaling their initial build cost. Less capabilities during the later 2020's and the early 2030s. We basically lose any deployable, reliable destroyer capability. Presumably the LHD and other assets will have to stay in local waters only and we will be cancelling our regional engagements.
Anzacs coming out of water for further upgrades, while smaller they are still significant, and overlapping with Collins/Hobart upgrades. Again less capabilities during the later 2020's and the early 2030s.
Other projects are also unclear.

F-35 to go through blk4 upgrades, which will likely be a slow and probably the most significant upgrade these aircraft will go through as we have already 54 delivered, and the blk4 upgrade gives the platform a lot of capability. Including 16 new weapons integrated, new sensors, new computers, new sub systems, etc. Basically none of the RAAF will be TR3 builds, so this will involve basically pulling apart the entire aircraft and rebuilding them. We may need to buy another squadron of aircraft so we have some capability while this is occurring. SH if we are keeping them around may need to go through with a blk III upgrade to keep them relevant. Time frames are working against us, there is a balance between here and now capabilities and the wants of tomorrows. How do we keep pilots while under going and taking out of service so many, many airframes.

Drone strategy is also unclear.

Then we have the rumored curtailing of the Land400 program. Army looks like riding around in M113's for the time being.. M1A2 is unclear. Some amphibious and landing capabilities are also unclear.

Plus what do we do with our people while all of this is happening as its likely to negatively affect careers, morale, satisfaction and eventually retention.

Suffice to say not sure of the ADF fighting capability in the 2025-2035 period. Particularly if every major platform and fighting unit is in pieces on hardstands or on the ground, or driving around in 1960's vintage items. This affects Army, Navy and Airforce.


Would like to see some sort of update, if not answers, then at least what is being considered.

Marles certainly is a capable person. He also has a personal friendship with Dutton. Arguably Australia does see defence as a significant priority, we are concerned about the global situation, China, Russia, the war in Europe, US stability. There is heaps of scope for bipartisan progress, in solving a huge number of issues, as we go into a hugely dynamic geopolitical time.

We can acknowledge the limitations of earlier governments from both sides. They were a different time, and for nearly 15 years both sides face internal squabbling and backstabbing ontop of 20-30 years of defence decline since Vietnam.

But we are now at the critical point where things need to happen. It would be nice to see, something.
I think that is a tad pessimistic…

Only one Collins will be out of the water at a time, as LOTE coincides with their scheduled 2 year FCD’s anyway. War time availability will also be different to peacetime availability, so will I suspect, the pace of the work.

Similarly with the Hobart class. Yes we’ll be down to ‘2’ available when one is out of the water getting it’s MLU and so availability will be curtailed in more instances than ‘normal’ but the capability won’t be totally absent, it will be one boat after another.

JSF is a series of rolling upgrades, as are Blk 3 upgrades for SH, some of which they already have. There will be no substantial periods of large numbers of aircraft unavailability.

Army Head of Land Capability - Major General Jeremy KING confirmed in October, that M1A2, plus the engineering vehicles are already in production and the program contracted in full. So they are on their way, as is SPG and Apache, both at IOC by 2027.

Boxer is contracted and underway with Phase 1 IOC declared, the other week and Phase 2 vehicles start arriving in 2023. LAND 400 Ph.3 remains unclear, as does HIMARS and Blackhawk but both very likely to go ahead. SPG will have a Regiment ready in mid to late 2020’s and Apache will have a squadron ready then too. Army has done planning around “likely” capabilities they will be expected to accelerate under DSR and they expect (subject to Government direction of course…) that will be long-range fires, expeditionary littoral manoever, air defence and special operations capability.

I expect we will see genuine, rapid capability improvements in those areas over the next 3-5 years, with existing “legacy” programs fortuitously delivering in that timeframe as well.

In addition by mid to late 2020’s, Army will have battery strength deployable NASAMS and have confirmed they will retain RBS-70 in the VSHORAD role.

Army overall will be in a good and still improving position by 2027.

RAAF will have all it’s JSF in-service, all weapons and upgrades being installed on a rolling basis. Additional air combat capability is also scheduled to begin entering service around the end of the 2020’s.

SH will have JASSM-ER and LRASM integrated by 2025-26 and weapons deliveries will have arrived. Similarly RAN with ESSM Block II, NSM and probably SM-2 Block IIIC by then. One would imagine with a continuing strategic decline and the possibility of near term war, a significant survivability upgrade for our amphibious and afloat support ships would likely be on the cards as well.

So from the above, I see an ADF that will actually be in an excellent “fighting” position, with only relatively minor imposts from unavailable platforms in the late 2020’s.

RAN will be the hardest hit, but short of buying second-hand vessels, there is simply no getting around the lack of platform issues because Government direction for so long has been this bare minimum state we are in…
 

Redlands18

Well-Known Member
I think that is a tad pessimistic…
RAN will be the hardest hit, but short of buying second-hand vessels, there is simply no getting around the lack of platform issues because Government direction for so long has been this bare minimum state we are in…
What 2nd hand Vessels? The days of the NATO Navies divesting 20yo Naval ships with useful life left in them are long gone. In the 90s most NATO Navies replaced them on a 1 for 2 ratio and they are running them out past 30 years now.
 

ADMk2

Just a bloke
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
What 2nd hand Vessels? The days of the NATO Navies divesting 20yo Naval ships with useful life left in them are long gone. In the 90s most NATO Navies replaced them on a 1 for 2 ratio and they are running them out past 30 years now.
Who can say? But you would have had the same response 5 years before we bought Choules, so you can never say never.

For the record, I doubt it will happen, but if we need additional ships in 3-5 years, taking existing orders close to completion or buying second hand will be the only possibilities regardless of need.
 

StingrayOZ

Super Moderator
Staff member
So from the above, I see an ADF that will actually be in an excellent “fighting” position, with only relatively minor imposts from unavailable platforms in the late 2020’s.
I guess I am pessimistic, certainly, in many cases, it may just be lack of public confirmation or finalising decision that may significantly affect the state of play. But I have concerns about the ADF as a whole maintaining "an excellent "fighting" position", with lower avalibility rates during upgrades and some of the side effect of that.

I definitely think the Army and Airforce can probably manage their availability and upgrade timeframes, and the end result will be a more capable force. But best laid plans can become complicated, I just worry if we have put enough advanced planning and consideration if things get complicated. The Blk IV F-35 upgrade shouldn't be under-estimated, in pushing for earlier builds we will be one of those forces significantly affected by TR-3/Blk4 upgrade issues. With the Army, I think I am just looking for commitment to the land400 ph3. But there is many more announcements and commitment to make in many spaces for both the army and the air force.

But the RAN does face real challenges. With only 2 destroyers, that very much hollows out the capability while that is occurring. It is hard to have a networked hardened force in which a single unit is only available part of a year. That platform is also one of the key launch platforms for air defence, land and naval strike, and is a key sensor, sensor fusing and command platform, not just for Australia, but for the region. We can't ask New Zealand, or Singapore, or Malaysia to fill that capability for us. In fact it may look like we can't ask the UK or the US for that kind of bridging capability either during this time period. War time will unlikely be able to accelerate this kind of work in any significant way.

The submarine is another capability that can not easily be backfilled, and our allies (US/UK) are also facing huge challenges at the same time.


RAN will be the hardest hit, but short of buying second-hand vessels, there is simply no getting around the lack of platform issues because Government direction for so long has been this bare minimum state we are in…
The lack of options is further worrying. The US is also facing its own cruiser crisis. There are issues larger than Australia at play. Western fleets are well and truly past the excesses of cold wars. There are bigger issues as they all face their own issue upgrading. The US will also be reducing its active destroyer fleet as they upgrade the older flight II burkes, there is a backlog of maintenance the is building up on surface and submarines.

The US also is going through retiring its F-22's and will have to upgrade its much earlier blk F-35's. It will also be shedding its older F-15/F-16 fleets, and even its C5 is aging out. It has also been desperate to try to accelerate the E7 acquisition as its older E3's quickly become unservicable.

But I am being pesimistic.
 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
I guess I am pessimistic, certainly, in many cases, it may just be lack of public confirmation or finalising decision that may significantly affect the state of play. But I have concerns about the ADF as a whole maintaining "an excellent "fighting" position", with lower avalibility rates during upgrades and some of the side effect of that.

I definitely think the Army and Airforce can probably manage their availability and upgrade timeframes, and the end result will be a more capable force. But best laid plans can become complicated, I just worry if we have put enough advanced planning and consideration if things get complicated. The Blk IV F-35 upgrade shouldn't be under-estimated, in pushing for earlier builds we will be one of those forces significantly affected by TR-3/Blk4 upgrade issues. With the Army, I think I am just looking for commitment to the land400 ph3. But there is many more announcements and commitment to make in many spaces for both the army and the air force.

But the RAN does face real challenges. With only 2 destroyers, that very much hollows out the capability while that is occurring. It is hard to have a networked hardened force in which a single unit is only available part of a year. That platform is also one of the key launch platforms for air defence, land and naval strike, and is a key sensor, sensor fusing and command platform, not just for Australia, but for the region. We can't ask New Zealand, or Singapore, or Malaysia to fill that capability for us. In fact it may look like we can't ask the UK or the US for that kind of bridging capability either during this time period. War time will unlikely be able to accelerate this kind of work in any significant way.

The submarine is another capability that can not easily be backfilled, and our allies (US/UK) are also facing huge challenges at the same time.



The lack of options is further worrying. The US is also facing its own cruiser crisis. There are issues larger than Australia at play. Western fleets are well and truly past the excesses of cold wars. There are bigger issues as they all face their own issue upgrading. The US will also be reducing its active destroyer fleet as they upgrade the older flight II burkes, there is a backlog of maintenance the is building up on surface and submarines.

The US also is going through retiring its F-22's and will have to upgrade its much earlier blk F-35's. It will also be shedding its older F-15/F-16 fleets, and even its C5 is aging out. It has also been desperate to try to accelerate the E7 acquisition as its older E3's quickly become unservicable.

But I am being pesimistic.
Many would say you are being realistic. Australia isn’t the only nation that ignored the fact naval construction is a complex process that requires lots of supply chain organization and a reasonable sustained drumbeat of orders….something many pollies do not GAF about.
 

hauritz

Well-Known Member
Here is Richard Marle's full speech and discussion transcript from the Submarine Institute of Australia conference.
It's well worth a read IMO and brings further insight and context to his perspective beyond the quotes which have circulated in the media.

It is easy to apply your own interpretation on what the minister said but there are several points that seem pretty clear. The obvious one is that building nuclear submarines is very hard and that we will have to rely very much on the Collins class and the cooperation of our allies to get us through this.

Putting aside the obvious difficulty in building these boats you will also need to train the crews as well. This would seem to involve Australian submariners being seconded on US and Royal Navy vessels. This raises the problem of whether we can find the personnel to both man our current submarine fleet and train on US and RN boats. This seems to be really stretching these resources pretty thin given that we are already struggling to man what we already have.

I really can’t see us avoiding a capability gap until these new submarines arrive. There are just so many disparate parts of this program that need to come together for this to all work. So many potential points of failure.
 
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Wombat000

Well-Known Member
“We can't ask New Zealand, or Singapore, or Malaysia to fill that capability for us”

why can we not ask or EXPECT NZ to contribute?
What is this fixation with the ADF/Aust mindset that somehow NZ just exist in their irresponsible fantasy bubble, god forbid they actually have a role in all of this!
what is asked of them!?

is there ANY scenario effecting the Australasian archipelago that does not directly involve NZ? ….. ANY?
Seriously, strategically they are are the bludging cousins who live on the couch and when they get inconvenienced, will plead to borrow your car.

the actual reason we currently cannot expect any contributions from NZ is because Australian govt arrogant apathy has dismissed their relevance, and NZ govt is as a result curled up in some flower garden somewhere.

whatever the predicament, it’s essential that we continue to expect nothing from our inevitable ‘partner’ and just make sure no one ever mentions them.

Rant over. Preaching to converted.
my comments are aimed at the NZ Govt and Aust Govt/ADF planners.
-PS: I think their new oiler is an awesome strategic asset.
 

ADMk2

Just a bloke
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
I guess I am pessimistic, certainly, in many cases, it may just be lack of public confirmation or finalising decision that may significantly affect the state of play. But I have concerns about the ADF as a whole maintaining "an excellent "fighting" position", with lower avalibility rates during upgrades and some of the side effect of that.

I definitely think the Army and Airforce can probably manage their availability and upgrade timeframes, and the end result will be a more capable force. But best laid plans can become complicated, I just worry if we have put enough advanced planning and consideration if things get complicated. The Blk IV F-35 upgrade shouldn't be under-estimated, in pushing for earlier builds we will be one of those forces significantly affected by TR-3/Blk4 upgrade issues. With the Army, I think I am just looking for commitment to the land400 ph3. But there is many more announcements and commitment to make in many spaces for both the army and the air force.

But the RAN does face real challenges. With only 2 destroyers, that very much hollows out the capability while that is occurring. It is hard to have a networked hardened force in which a single unit is only available part of a year. That platform is also one of the key launch platforms for air defence, land and naval strike, and is a key sensor, sensor fusing and command platform, not just for Australia, but for the region. We can't ask New Zealand, or Singapore, or Malaysia to fill that capability for us. In fact it may look like we can't ask the UK or the US for that kind of bridging capability either during this time period. War time will unlikely be able to accelerate this kind of work in any significant way.

The submarine is another capability that can not easily be backfilled, and our allies (US/UK) are also facing huge challenges at the same time.



The lack of options is further worrying. The US is also facing its own cruiser crisis. There are issues larger than Australia at play. Western fleets are well and truly past the excesses of cold wars. There are bigger issues as they all face their own issue upgrading. The US will also be reducing its active destroyer fleet as they upgrade the older flight II burkes, there is a backlog of maintenance the is building up on surface and submarines.

The US also is going through retiring its F-22's and will have to upgrade its much earlier blk F-35's. It will also be shedding its older F-15/F-16 fleets, and even its C5 is aging out. It has also been desperate to try to accelerate the E7 acquisition as its older E3's quickly become unservicable.

But I am being pesimistic.
It is clearly true availability will be worse with only 2x AWD available for operations, depending on maintenance schedules etc, but as we can see with the LHD’s and Supply class that only having 2x vessels available hardly equals zero capability.

Hopefully some more capability can be eked out of the ANZAC Class in years to come as I suspect if the shooting starts a pair of AWD’s, however many ANZAC’s we can muster and maybe 5x Collins will be all we have…
 

Wombat000

Well-Known Member
Wondering and hoping that there is some (dare I suggest Australian inspired) momentum for RNZN to adopt some Surface Combat capability, and perhaps even a similar ASW upgrade in lock-step with the RAN, after all, they are on our eastern seaboard and potentially an ally?

Perhaps even a cheap Harpoon upgrade?

I ask this on the ADF thread, as I presume it’s of direct interest to the ADF capability resource-wise and that might allow for two more useful assets.
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
“We can't ask New Zealand, or Singapore, or Malaysia to fill that capability for us”

why can we not ask or EXPECT NZ to contribute?
What is this fixation with the ADF/Aust mindset that somehow NZ just exist in their irresponsible fantasy bubble, god forbid they actually have a role in all of this!
what is asked of them!?

is there ANY scenario effecting the Australasian archipelago that does not directly involve NZ? ….. ANY?
Seriously, strategically they are are the bludging cousins who live on the couch and when they get inconvenienced, will plead to borrow your car.

the actual reason we currently cannot expect any contributions from NZ is because Australian govt arrogant apathy has dismissed their relevance, and NZ govt is as a result curled up in some flower garden somewhere.

whatever the predicament, it’s essential that we continue to expect nothing from our inevitable ‘partner’ and just make sure no one ever mentions them.

Rant over. Preaching to converted.
my comments are aimed at the NZ Govt and Aust Govt/ADF planners.
-PS: I think their new oiler is an awesome strategic asset.
IMO Australia could certainly ask NZ to provide an effective contribution. Whether or not it would safe or reasonable to expect such a contribution is a bit of a different question. I rather suspect that ADF planners and Australian policy-makers are rather reluctant to make such plans given NZ policy statements and decisions, and especially the resourcing of the NZDF over the last ~40 years. If memory serves, I seem to recall that prior to the axing of the ACF, the RNZAF had an A-4K Skyhawk detachment in Australia acting as an OpFor which helped to train RAN personnel in air defence. When the NZG chose to eliminate the ACF, the RAN had to find another way to keep such training going.
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
My biggest concern for the ADF going forward is continuing to waste money on PBs and failing to acquire an IFV.

Everything thing else is either already in-service or progressing to service. The numbers (equipment and personnel) mightn't be sufficient, but the capability exists and can be grown.

Another big concern I have is technical skills. We continually hear of skills shortages, in particular in engineering, and that we can't do things locally because of a lack of talent. I would be more specific though and point out the issue is more one of special interests and bias, compounded by poor management and a narrow sighted fixation on "efficiency".

Up until the 90s or possibly the 2000s, a great many technical, production and product managers, even a few engineering managers, came up through trade and technical, and did not have engineering degrees. There was much greater use of non degreed technical people, some even rose to be in-charge of degreed engineers.

Now except for a shrinking number of baby boomers, almost all the managers, directors, supervisors and leads are engineers, not just engineers but engineers chartered by Engineers Australia, and recognised under the Washington Accords.

The engineering shortage is due in a large part to forcing engineers to become managers and hence, stop being engineers. Some engineers make good managers, some make great ones, others suck. Why not let engineers be engineers, pay them for their knowledge and experience and let suitable people without engineering degrees also work and rise to where their skills best suit.
 

StingrayOZ

Super Moderator
Staff member
It is clearly true availability will be worse with only 2x AWD available for operations, depending on maintenance schedules etc, but as we can see with the LHD’s and Supply class that only having 2x vessels available hardly equals zero capability.
These are different types of vessels. The LHD has been designed to extended deployment and is capable of being fixed and supported while on mission and for long mission duration. They are big flexible vessels, and it is possible to support ships like that, this way and particularly if not carrying maximum embarked, are designed around higher hotel and stores which can allow them to sustain for longer. I would also point out there have been plenty of issues where our amphibious capability was disrupted by the availability of the vessels and their role was assumed (for regional HDAR) by other ships like Choules and those wacky offshore support ships, the icebreaker Aurora Australis and by New Zealand's converted ferry, Canterbury.

I would gladly point out the fragility of only two LHD's or only two AOR, and the Navy has planned some mixed logistics AOR/amphibious lift ship to address this very proven and well known issue.

The Destroyers are well destroyers.
High performance, highly optimised ships built tightly around their missions with nearly no flexible spaces. An Anzac frigate or a formidable class frigate won't be able to do any of the missions of a Hobart class, it is like asking a Bushmaster PMV to be a M1A2 tank. There is no SM-2 or SM-6 anti air capability. There is no credible antishipping capability. There is no land strike capability with Anzac. Their sensors, while capable, aren't capable of networking into allied fleets, which will be absolutely essential regionally. They are not suitable to lead an air defence for a task group or fleet into less than benign waters.

We will not be able to continue to the type of operations and the tempo of operations we have currently. This may mean ceasing IndoPacific Endeavour operations, perhaps even RIMPAC, and working to a more skeleton selection of home water operations. There is not the crew, not the stores, nor the endurance, to be able to continue the rather hectic pace with 33%+ less assets. Any delay or challenges with the upgrade will also have extremely negative effects on capability.

We have seen the USN drive its destroyer fleet/crew into the ground with being over committed when assets are in short supply possibly contributing to accidents and incidents, equipment failures, crew fatigue etc.

Hopefully some more capability can be eked out of the ANZAC Class in years to come as I suspect if the shooting starts a pair of AWD’s, however many ANZAC’s we can muster and maybe 5x Collins will be all we have…
ESSMII and NSM will not enable a Anzac to take on Hobart missions, which by 2028 may not be able to be conducted by older versions of Hobart either. Also its not limited to just Hobarts. Arguably the Collins LOTE is far greater risk and challenge, (new engines, new mast, new weapons, new combat system, new sensors) and we will experience challenges in other areas of the ADF as will our allied partners.

I guess the question is there anything that can be done to help mitigate issues and minimise reduction in capability with our other resources and with our partners.

At this stage, if China openly announced, in public, it would invade Taiwan, in Jan 2028. Would the ADF be in any sort of position to deal with the situation or would we find ourselves very short as one destroyer comes out of refit but not FOC, while another goes onto hard stands, one Collins is in pieces while another again, would be preparing for that, various upgrades of other war fighting equipment such as the F-35, would our sovereign missile capability be established, or deliveries and weapon systems FOC? What would that even mean for sustaining and finishing upgrades of our platforms if things then became very thin on the ground.

The worry I have is the ADF is some what siloed in its thinking particularly across major high end war fighting platforms, and the lower levels of awareness of the current state of our big and powerful friends. Typically we have always relied on the US to cover holes, and I am not sure that will always be the case. We often focus heavily on future capability, and less about the near future capability.

I think there are solutions, I would just feel more comfortably if they were verbalised by the government and the ADF as measures to be in play.
 
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