NATO

[ngatimozart]

I actually did and it's self explanatory : 'what I'm doubting is the notion that on paper capabilities will lead to the expected results in actuality'.

I have no doubt that the technology is impressive and significantly improves the ability to perform SEAD/DEAD. What's good on paper however and what actually occurs in reality can be profoundly different; I will not assume that just because a particular side has a major technological edge; that it's given that in an actual conflict we'll see what we expect or hope to see - in a previous post you mentioned assumptions and basing facts around that.

I will also not make blanket statements like ''Russian GBAD is not a threat to the F-35'' for the simple reason that we have no idea what a next war will be like and that the enemy also has a say. It would be silly to assume that just because the Russian GBAD has perform relatively poorly in the Ukraine that this will be case in a Russia/NATO war or that technological superiority is a guarantee for anything.

We do have an idea what the next war will be like. Just look at the Russo - Ukrainian war. But you are right about one thing assumptions are the mother of all stuff ups. However evidence so far of Russian GBAD utilisation shows that it is either technically poor or I think more likely, the training and actual war use are two different stories entirely. There is a distinct disconnect and it's not just in that either. I agree that blanket statements like ''Russian GBAD is not a threat to the F-35'' are fanciful at best.

 

[STURM]

Whenever Soviet/Russian AD systems performed badly or not as well as expected; whether in the Arab/Israeli wars, in Libya and Syria more recently and in other places; the usual claims are made: the crews were poorly trained; the systems were downgraded export models and were poorly deployed, not according to prescribed doctrine. There's certainly a lot of truth in these claims.

At times it's also a of case of the wrong systems deployed; the issue of the Pantsirs in Syria and Libya come to mind but is Pantsir actually designed to engage low flying unmanned targets with a small RCS and low IR signature? In a similar situation how would NASAMs and Spyder have performed? During the Cold War we kept hearing about how capable the Soviet GBAD was. At one time the Soviet operated GBAD in Angola was described by Jane's as being one of the most extensive and capable outside of the Warsaw Pact and Libya's SA-5 sites were said to be very capable and a serious threat. To be fair Soviets systems operated by others have a times done their job; in the early days of the 1973 war SA-6s accounted for a few Israeli aircraft; the same happened during the War Of Attrition and a few years ago a F-16 was downed by a Syrian SA-5.

Ultimately I think the only real indicator as to how capable the Russian GBAD really is would be if NATO went head to head against a layered and networked Russian operated GBAD fully operating according to prescribed doctrine.

 

[SolarWind]

We do have an idea what the next war will be like. Just look at the Russo - Ukrainian war. But you are right about one thing assumptions are the mother of all stuff ups. However evidence so far of Russian GBAD utilisation shows that it is either technically poor or I think more likely, the training and actual war use are two different stories entirely. There is a distinct disconnect and it's not just in that either. I agree that blanket statements like ''Russian GBAD is not a threat to the F-35'' are fanciful at best.

It may also be possible that Russian GBAD is not using its most up-to-date units/capabilities, or not using its radars in maximum power mode in order to conceal its true capabilities from the West. In essence, this discussion may be based on pure speculation because neither Western nor Russian secrets would be revealed so easily at this stage, as the war in Ukraine is mostly fought on the ground without any serious air threat to Russia.

 

[STURM]

In essence, this discussion may be based on pure speculation because neither Western nor Russian secrets would be revealed so easily at this stage, as the war in Ukraine is mostly fought on the ground without any serious air threat to Russia.

Of course it's speculation which is why as I wrote "Ultimately I think the only real indicator as to how capable the Russian GBAD really is would be if NATO went head to head against a layered and networked Russian operated GBAD fully operating according to prescribed doctrine"..

 

[Todjaeger]

Of course it's speculation which is why as I wrote "Ultimately I think the only real indicator as to how capable the Russian GBAD really is would be if NATO went head to head against a layered and networked Russian operated GBAD fully operating according to prescribed doctrine"..

One of the big questions to get answered, which could aid in determining whether or not ex-Soviet/Russian GBAD & IADS would be all that effective is to look at the degree of datalinking and information sharing between various assets.

I am uncertain about the current overall level of datalinking in Russian forces, but I am aware that while it did exist in the past, it was no where near as comprehensive or universally available as in NATO forces. If Russian forces are still operating in a theatre without a common operating picture and have their respective situation awareness limited to their locales and largely the reach of their own organic sensors, then it might very well be that the GBAD systems would not prove quite as effective as had been feared in the past. To some degree this is rather unsurprising given how much trouble GBAD systems around Hanoi gave US combat aircraft over N. Vietnam, and the resulting drive to develop weapons and countermeasures.

 

[STURM]

If Russian forces are still operating in a theatre without a common operating picture and have their respective situation awareness limited to their locales and largely the reach of their own organic sensors.

I would guess that this is indeed the case with AD units deployed in the Ukraine. Then again it's possible that some AD units in the Ukraine might be benefiting from input provided by sensors within Russia via data link.

Amidst all this talk about the effectiveness of Russian AD systems it's also worth noting that a Western supplied AD network has never been put through an actual against a concentrated effort to destroy/degrade it. The closest I can think of was Iraq's KARI whose architecture was Western [supplied by Thomson CSF] but which also contained a lot of non Western systems. Like Soviet/Russian systems various Western AD systems have been successfully employed in various conflicts but a Western supplied GBAD per see has not. There was also the ARAMCO attack a few years ago; the site was under Patriot coverage but wasn't a layered defence comprising systems intended to deal with a swarm of mini UASs.

gave US combat aircraft over N. Vietnam

The Soviet operated GBAD along the canal zone during the War Of Attrition also gave the Israelis some grief. Some years later however the Israelis had no problems against a Soviet supplied but Syrian operated GBAD in the Bekaa Valley.

 

[ngatimozart]

One of the big questions to get answered, which could aid in determining whether or not ex-Soviet/Russian GBAD & IADS would be all that effective is to look at the degree of datalinking and information sharing between various assets.

I am uncertain about the current overall level of datalinking in Russian forces, but I am aware that while it did exist in the past, it was no where near as comprehensive or universally available as in NATO forces. If Russian forces are still operating in a theatre without a common operating picture and have their respective situation awareness limited to their locales and largely the reach of their own organic sensors, then it might very well be that the GBAD systems would not prove quite as effective as had been feared in the past. To some degree this is rather unsurprising given how much trouble GBAD systems around Hanoi gave US combat aircraft over N. Vietnam, and the resulting drive to develop weapons and countermeasures.

The North Vietnamese made the Hanoi area a nightmare for American aircrews and I think even today it provides a good example of how an IADS works properly, even if its a first generation one. Their operators were also highly motivated and that certainly helps. Whereas currently in Ukraine i don't believe that the Russian troops are really motivated at all. They remind me somewhat of the American troops sent to Vietnam from 1967 / 68 onwards; what are we here for type thinking. If that is the case then the Russian will have increasing problems with its troops in the long run.

 

[John Fedup]

NATO allies Canada and Denmark now share a land border.


425
'Flag war' with Denmark over tiny Arctic island set to end peacefully with deal

 

[ngatimozart]

NATO allies Canada and Denmark now share a land border.


425
'Flag war' with Denmark over tiny Arctic island set to end peacefully with deal

That takes all the fun out of a nice little "war" now Trust the pollies to ruin it.

 

[John Fedup]

An article on industrial capacity for military kit and current consumption estimates in the Ukraine, no real surprises, the West’s capacity has shrunk.

Interesting comment about US civilian gun culture helping small arms manufacturers viability in supplying small arms to the military. Hopefully NRA fans don’t start pushing for civilian ATGMs to help bolster the US missile industrial base.

The Return of Industrial Warfare

Can the West still provide the arsenal of democracy?

rusi.org

 

[T.C.P]

An article on industrial capacity for military kit and current consumption estimates in the Ukraine, no real surprises, the West’s capacity has shrunk.

Interesting comment about US civilian gun culture helping small arms manufacturers viability in supplying small arms to the military. Hopefully NRA fans don’t start pushing for civilian ATGMs to help bolster the US missile industrial base.

The Return of Industrial Warfare

Can the West still provide the arsenal of democracy?

rusi.org

Eradicating wildhog populations with hellfires and smoking white tails with Tows.

 

[Vivendi]

NATO press conference today, some of the highlights:

• NATOs battlegroups in the eastern part of the Alliance will be expanded up to brigade-levels.
• NATOs high readiness forces will be expanded to well over 300,000.
• 2022 is the eighth consecutive year of increases across European Allies and Canada.
• Nine Allies now reach – or exceed – the 2% target.
  Nineteen Allies have clear plans to reach it by 2024.
  And an additional five have concrete commitments to meet it thereafter.
• Two percent is increasingly considered a floor, not a ceiling.

NATO - Opinion: Pre-Summit press conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, 27-Jun.-2022

 

[ngatimozart]

An article on industrial capacity for military kit and current consumption estimates in the Ukraine, no real surprises, the West’s capacity has shrunk.

Interesting comment about US civilian gun culture helping small arms manufacturers viability in supplying small arms to the military. Hopefully NRA fans don’t start pushing for civilian ATGMs to help bolster the US missile industrial base.

The Return of Industrial Warfare

Can the West still provide the arsenal of democracy?

rusi.org

Fer gawds sake don't give the NRA ideas. Can you just image US civilian gun nutters with ATGMs mounted on their pickups. Mind you it would make the cops on the Freeways lives interesting. I've taken to watching cop chase dashcams; beats watching F-1 racing or what the Americans call car racing.

 

[Vivendi]

• NATOs high readiness forces will be expanded to well over 300,000.

NATO - Opinion: Pre-Summit press conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, 27-Jun.-2022

Apologies for quoting my own posting -- I just wanted to highlight that currently the NATO high readiness force is 40,000. So expanding to more than 300,000 is more than 650% increase, which, at least to me, is quite substantial and demonstrates the massive changes in NATO triggered by Russia's latest invasion of Ukraine. NATO - Topic: NATO Response Force

 

[Milne Bay]

Turkey has agreed to support Sweden and Finland's application to join NATO.
According to the attached report, agreement has been reached with both countries around the sticking issues surrounding the PKK and YPG Militia.
I wonder if Turkey demanded other concessions.
Good news for Sweden and Finland, and NATO as well I would think
MB

Turkey backflips on veto threats, agrees to Sweden and Finland joining NATO

Turkey drops its threat to block Sweden and Finland's accession into NATO after the three countries reach a breakthrough agreement.

www.abc.net.au

 

[ngatimozart]

This appeared in my daily newsfeed today. A Kiwi executive director of a Kiwi business think tank postulating about a future Turkish war against Greece. The possibility does exist, but is it feasible? Erdogan if he's desperate enough might try something like this, but who's to know. Then again who thought Putin would mount an all out invasion of Ukraine. Why Europe’s Next War Could be Between Greece And Turkey | Newsroom

The problem for NATO would be what to do in the case of all out war between to NATO members. AFAIK the situation hasn't occurred before apart from the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 or thereabouts.

 

[Musashi_kenshin]

The problem for NATO would be what to do in the case of all out war between to NATO members. AFAIK the situation hasn't occurred before apart from the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 or thereabouts.

I expect it would have to be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. There are too many variables to say with confidence how NATO would react to two members slugging it out, except that they'd pressure both sides to agree a ceasefire as soon as possible.

But I think Erdogan would be mad to start a war with Greece simply to avoid electoral defeat. I think that there would be the real possibility of Turkey's membership of NATO being suspended and the country being sanctioned, as well as military assistance being given to Greece - the article you posted mentioned that the majority side with Greece right now. Unless Erdogan turned the country into a police state - which nullifies the point of a war to win an election - the resulting economic crisis would quite likely have him booted out of office.

Now occupying a few uninhabited Greek islands (I'm not sure that really counts as a war) and withdrawing after an election, that Erdogan might do. But it would still be very foolish in the long-run, not least because Turkey might have indirect military sanctions placed on it by other NATO members.

 

[Vivendi]

After the 2016 coup attempt Erdogan purged parts of the military quite hard, in particular many pilots were removed. In addition the US has withheld upgrades for Turkeys F-16 fighter jets. I doubt Erdogan will start something major with Greece, I don't think he will even occupy inhabited Greek islands. Seems to me his main focus right now is on Kurds in Syria and perhaps also Iraq.

 

[STURM]

Turkey has its attention towards the far north, the Ukraine. It's involved in Libya and Syria. The danger is not Erdogan starting a war but an encounter between Turk and Greek jets over the Aegean turning hot and things rapidly spiralling.

 

[swerve]

This appeared in my daily newsfeed today. A Kiwi executive director of a Kiwi business think tank postulating about a future Turkish war against Greece. The possibility does exist, but is it feasible? Erdogan if he's desperate enough might try something like this, but who's to know. Then again who thought Putin would mount an all out invasion of Ukraine. Why Europe’s Next War Could be Between Greece And Turkey | Newsroom

The problem for NATO would be what to do in the case of all out war between to NATO members. AFAIK the situation hasn't occurred before apart from the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 or thereabouts.

If NATO country A attacks NATO country B it's simple: NATO defends B.

Cyprus didn't turn into war between Greece & Turkey. There were one or two clashes over the Aegean but both sides avoided escalation.

The Greek soldiers in Cyprus fought alongside the Greek Cypriot troops (I worked with someone who was there when I was in Athens), but Greece didn't try to reinforce them.

Greece won't attack Turkey. Greece's armed forces are starting to get new equipment but that's after almost 15 years of dearth. Turkey's forces have had a lot more new kit in that time. Turkey is able to make a lot more of its own equipment, & can maintain its old stuff. Parts for F-16s & the like that Turkey can't make have been supplied. Only US upgrades have been withheld. And Turkey is very unlikely to attack Greece. What for? It would be an economic disaster, & turn all NATO against it. Any hypothetical Russian help (if Russia could supply any) would be very, very costly in terms of Erdogan's attempts to increase Turkey's standing.