The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Part 1 of 3: An attempt to move beyond ill-informed conjecture

572CBE85-5DE6-433B-A537-A3C5D69912EA.jpeg1. Despite the intense use of Su-34s, artillery, MLRS and missiles, the renewed Russian offensive in the Donbas seems to have yielded negligible gains. This is the physical component is Russia’s military capabilities trying to achieve functional effects on Ukrainian targets. This includes their ineffective use of fighter bombers, training infrastructure, weapons, ammunition, sensors, and comms networks

2. Amid all the noise and ill-informed conjecture, there are some commentators who stand out for their clear-eyed analysis of the geopolitics and of the war in Ukraine — to understand what is going to happen, I follow what both gentlemen say closely, for their insights. I extract a transcript of retired Lt. Gen. Mark Hertling’s comments on CNN.

3. Might be worth a look, for others who are as interested as I am.
Some food for thought — it’s debatable but certainly a valid view point.
Title: CNN Tonight - CNN Tonight Mark Hertling
Transcript Generated by SnapStream Enterprise TV Search


not a win for Putin. >> That's the Biden administration view. Let's take that question and others to the former U.S. Army commanding general, retired Lieutenant General Mark Hertling. To that first question, mark, you've been a skeptic from the beginning and rightly so really in a lot of cases of Russia's ability here to win the war and to gain the ground they want to gain. Do you take Boris Johnson's view that the Russians can wind the Ukrainians down or the administration's view. >> I take the administration's view but for different reasons, Jim. I'm not going to talk about the domestic politics inside Russia or what Mr. Putin can or cannot accept from his population when body bags start coming home.

What I'm talking about and what I've been talking about from the very beginning is the military capacity of the Russian force. You have this general who is the commander of Russia's central military district, the largest military district, saying -- that's the one that consists of the bulaga and the euros and the siberian district. I met this guy when he was a younger general officer. Saying that the new strategic objective is to get to odesa and beyond. I will say now what I said earlier in this campaign. They can't do it. They do not have the forces to do it. They do not have the capacity to do it.

When you take a look at some of the areas that they're talking about in the south, you're talking about the town of mykolaiv, which they have not taken yet. 500,000 in the population. It's the size of Kansas City, Missouri. Odesa, 900,000. That's the size of Indianapolis. It's 420 miles from mariupol to odesa. They can't sustain the supply lines for that long a time and no matter how many forces we are saying are piled up on the eastern border getting ready to go into the country, they just do not have the size of a force to take over these cities. They've proven that. The Russians have proven they can't take mariupol, which is a pretty big city in and of itself. They've been thwarted there.

[00:02:04]


Even though they have killed a lot of civilians, murdered a lot of civilians, they still haven't controlled the road junctions going in and out of there. So, yeah, I don't buy Boris Johnson's commentary, different commentary than what the white house is giving out. >> Okay. One of the issues in the north around Kyiv, where the Russians failed was -- you highlighted the supply line. They just couldn't get the ammo, the fuel, the food, and the command and control to those troops there. So, they pulled back.

[00:02:35]


The advantage in the east for the Russians is they're closer to the Russian border. They can drive the stuff right across and get to those forces there. Do the Russians have an advantage in the east that they did not have in the north? >> It is certainly a shorter distance. But it's still over 100 miles, Jim. And they don't have the equipment. But most importantly, they don't have the people. We have seen so many Russian soldiers killed. We have seen a lack of leadership on the part of the senior level, middle level, and junior level.

[00:03:05]


They have not proven themselves to be a good combined armed force. So, yes, they certainly have the artillery. But that gets to the package that the administration and nato is providing with Ukraine now in this second part of the war. They can count -- the Ukrainians can counter this with counterartillery fire. Russians cannot maneuver in this area. Ukraine is on their home turf. They have home field advantage on this. They know how to maneuver. They have not been successful

[00:03:36]


yet in the east. They've tried several reconnaissance and force missions in the donbas so far. As Sam mentioned earlier, they have hit with artillery several towns. But their maneuver has not been such where they've taken over towns or they control towns. And in fact, they're not moving all that much. And I personally think Ukraine is playing it very smart, the Ukrainian generals. They're allowing them to think that they're moving just a little bit, and the counterattacks by the Ukrainian forces are soon to come.

[00:04:07]
 
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hauritz

Well-Known Member
Two more Russian generals have been killed near Kherson, according to the Ukrainian ministry of defence's intelligence directorate. A third is in critical condition.
 

STURM

Well-Known Member
Which is an excellent point - but I think we're starting to run out of immediately available items to transfer that are already in operation,
There is/was a Bulgarian company which has/had very large stocks of Soviet era small arms, RCLs, mortars, mines, etc. It supplied quite a bit of stuff to Africa over the years. If I recall correctly there was also a Romanian company which had large stocks of stuff and was involved in various dodgy dealings.

Ironically the Ukraine had very large stocks of Soviet era gear but a lot of it was sold - unofficially - in the 1990's and early 2000's to various countries; including those involved in the 'African World War'; a protracted and extremely bloody conflict which involved dozens of players but which remains largely unknown.
 

swerve

Super Moderator
I guess the problem with familiar kit now is sourcing it. Inventories from former Warsaw Pact countries must be getting low. The M777s that Canada and the US are providing will require some training but it should be minimal compared to Western MBTs, helicopters, or fighters.
Not yet. They have hundreds of guns & howitzers they could spare. Quite a lot of 122mm & 152mm (both towed & SP) are in storage, or scheduled to be replaced soon, e.g. the Czechs have Caesar 155mm on order to replace DANA 152mm SP. The Poles are building more Krab 155mm SP, & have both DANA 152mm & 2S1 122mm SP, many of the latter in storage.

There are more 122mm than 152mm available, & I expect the Ukrainians would prefer 152mm, but 122mm could still be useful.

Same with tanks. From ca 200 to perhaps over 500 T-72, depending on whether the Poles would be willing to hand over those they've upgraded or scheduled for upgrade.

And so on.
 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
Not yet. They have hundreds of guns & howitzers they could spare. Quite a lot of 122mm & 152mm (both towed & SP) are in storage, or scheduled to be replaced soon, e.g. the Czechs have Caesar 155mm on order to replace DANA 152mm SP. The Poles are building more Krab 155mm SP, & have both DANA 152mm & 2S1 122mm SP, many of the latter in storage.

There are more 122mm than 152mm available, & I expect the Ukrainians would prefer 152mm, but 122mm could still be useful.

Same with tanks. From ca 200 to perhaps over 500 T-72, depending on whether the Poles would be willing to hand over those they've upgraded or scheduled for upgrade.

And so on.
Interesting, clearly the need is critical so I guess team NATO has to get their “stuff” together and get this “familiar” kit to the frontlines!
 
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Sandhi Yudha

Well-Known Member
Not yet. They have hundreds of guns & howitzers they could spare. Quite a lot of 122mm & 152mm (both towed & SP) are in storage, or scheduled to be replaced soon, e.g. the Czechs have Caesar 155mm on order to replace DANA 152mm SP. The Poles are building more Krab 155mm SP, & have both DANA 152mm & 2S1 122mm SP, many of the latter in storage.

There are more 122mm than 152mm available, & I expect the Ukrainians would prefer 152mm, but 122mm could still be useful.

Same with tanks. From ca 200 to perhaps over 500 T-72, depending on whether the Poles would be willing to hand over those they've upgraded or scheduled for upgrade.

And so on.
Remarkable that the Czechs do not modify/modernize the Dana 152 mm, into something like the ShKH Zuzana 155 mm what the Slovaks doing.



If this is true, then this is not such a wise move, in my opinion. If a heavy cruiser can not defend itself against anti-ship missiles, how is an unarmed 110 years old ship able to survive, if its starts to float around on the same spot as the Moskva?
 
If this is true, then this is not such a wise move, in my opinion. If a heavy cruiser can not defend itself against anti-ship missiles, how is an unarmed 110 years old ship able to survive, if its starts to float around on the same spot as the Moskva?
Given the low/no military value, the slim possibility that the Moskva was carrying nuclear weapons that need investigating, and limited munitions - there could be an argument for the UA not firing on the Kommuna?
 

koxinga

Well-Known Member
The practical reason is the Kommuna has no/limited military value. With limited anti ship missiles at the Ukrainian disposal, it is a pretty poor choice for a target.

The other reason why she might not be a suitable target is legality. The Russians might claim her to be operating under Article 18 of GC II (Geneva Convention on the Wounded, Sicked and Shipwrecked), given Russia has reported missing sailors
 

phreeky

Active Member
there could be an argument for the UA not firing on the Kommuna
Ukraine has shown incredible restraint in striking Russian assets not contributing to the war i.e. no retaliation strikes on civilians in border towns.

Regardless of whether that is due to moral reasons or simply not wasting resources against targets of no strategic or tactical value, I can't see this old ship being targeted.

Like I suspect a lot of people, this old thing being in service absolutely blows my mind. I'll definitely be doing some reading up on it when I get a chance.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Ukraine has shown incredible restraint in striking Russian assets not contributing to the war i.e. no retaliation strikes on civilians in border towns.
I have repeated reports of Ukrainian strikes against Russian border towns that began to appear largely with the withdrawal of Russian forces from the north. When you consider the limited ability of Ukraine to strike Russia, I suspect the main reason is not restraint but capability.
 

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
I have repeated reports of Ukrainian strikes against Russian border towns that began to appear largely with the withdrawal of Russian forces from the north. When you consider the limited ability of Ukraine to strike Russia, I suspect the main reason is not restraint but capability.
Have you posted them here? I know Russia claimed Ukrainian strikes on Belgorod when 2 helicopters infiltrated and attacked fuel tanks, were on civilian targets.

A nice Twitter thread, albeit 0 material beyond his words. Not familiar with him enough to determine reliability:

His general message is doom for Russia in Donbass.
Continued Ukrainian counter-offensives confirm my theory of very limited Russian offensives and a gradual switch to defensive posture.
 

Vivendi

Well-Known Member
Updated Analysis by Mick Ryan: Mick Ryan, AM on Twitter: https://t.co/tpW9hyz7sJ" / Twitter

Interesting read, the construct of "fighting power" is very interesting, defined in chapter 4 in this document: LWD 1, The Fundamentals of Land Power, 2017 (army.gov.au)

Ryan's analysis seems to match pretty well with the latest analysis by Michael Kofman, see post by Big_Zucchini above.


A Twitter thread I also found very interesting: Trent Telenko on Twitter / Twitter

My knowledge in the field of artillery is virtually zero. Telenko's analysis sounds very convincing to me. Do the experts on this forum agree with his thinking?
 

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Part 2 of 3: An attempt to move beyond ill-informed conjecture

A Twitter thread I also found very interesting: Trent Telenko on Twitter / Twitter

My knowledge in the field of artillery is virtually zero. Telenko's analysis sounds very convincing to me. Do the experts on this forum agree with his thinking?
3. I don’t think what he writes sound very convincing to me. Telenko tries to write in a trendy manner to lay persons but ignores a number of factors/concepts on the Russian employment of artillery. He tries to mirror image what he knows about WWII use of artillery and find or say something bad about Russian 152 mm howitzer ammo and fusing used. Some of it is true (in the logistics aspect, where Russian practices in moving around rounds manually suck a lot or their dud rate); but is that the only way to view things on the battlefield?

Q1: Has Telenko over simplified matters on the Russian use of artillery?​
Ans: I suspect so. I worry that Telenko, as a logistics specialist, does not seem to understand different types of fire missions and an army’s planning norms. For example, a FO attached to single Russian BTG may call for:​
(i) harassing fire (or what we call part renewal) to prevent movement by an Ukrainian unit in defence, as the BTG’s fire support coordination line moves along with planned BTG movement; and​
(ii) at a later time call for final fires.​
4. Let me admit things I don’t know. For example, I don’t know the worthwhile payload of HE on Russian 152 mm howitzer ammo —Ukrainians make their own 152 mm high explosive fragmentation projectile (ammo) too. I doubt Telenko knows.

5. I am not an expert on 155mm artillery but I do know the importance of the fire support coordination line, in plans and execution. Even I know that for Russian on-call fires, the volume of fire, fusing and presence of an FO (or the lack of one) will result different effects on an Ukrainian target.

6. The Russian FO and FDC actions to call and respond to fires interact to affect the artillery ammo usage. This deliberate decision making process is not captured in Telenko’s posts. For many dug-in targets at the JFO, with overhead shelter, air burst munitions don’t work at all. The FO and FDC chooses the effect and fusing — it may simply be a choice.
 
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Rock the kasbah

Active Member
Part 2 of 3: An attempt to move beyond ill-informed conjecture


3. I don’t think what he writes sound very convincing to me. Telenko tries to write in a trendy manner to lay persons but ignores a number of factors/concepts on the Russian employment of artillery. He tries to mirror image what he knows about WWII use of artillery and find or say something bad about Russian 152 mm howitzer ammo and fusing used. Some of it is true (in the logistics aspect, where Russian practices in moving around rounds manually suck a lot or their dud rate); but is that the only way to view things on the battlefield?

Q1: Has Telenko over simplified matters on the Russian use of artillery?​
Ans: I suspect so. I worry that Telenko, as a logistics specialist, does not seem to understand different types of fire missions and an army’s planning norms. For example, a FO attached to single Russian BTG may call for:​
(i) harassing fire (or what we call part renewal) to prevent movement by an Ukrainian unit in defence, as the BTG’s fire support coordination line moves along with planned BTG movement; and​
(ii) at a later time call for final fires.​
4. Let me admit things I don’t know. For example, I don’t know the worthwhile payload of HE on Russian 152 mm howitzer ammo —Ukrainians make their own 152 mm high explosive fragmentation projectile (ammo) too. I doubt Telenko knows.

5. I am not an expert on 155mm artillery but I do know the importance of the fire support coordination line, in plans and execution. Even I know that for Russian on-call fires, the volume of fire, fusing and presence of an FO (or the lack of one) will result different effects on an Ukrainian target.

6. The Russian FO and FDC actions to call and respond to fires interact to affect the artillery ammo usage. This deliberate decision making process is not captured in Telenko’s posts. For many dug-in targets at the JFO, with overhead shelter, air burst munitions don’t work at all. The FO and FDC chooses the effect and fusing — it may simply be a choice.
I just want to say I really appreciate you're ability to teach
Not all of us can get our heads around military matters
Cheers
 
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phreeky

Active Member
I have repeated reports of Ukrainian strikes against Russian border towns that began to appear largely with the withdrawal of Russian forces from the north. When you consider the limited ability of Ukraine to strike Russia, I suspect the main reason is not restraint but capability.
That statement seems very contradictory. So the main reason is a lack of capability, but you've repeated reports of strikes against border towns? Which is it?

I certainly recall the oil refinery strike, though I wouldn't say that it necessarily has zero military value (at least perceived, if not real). What I mean though is strikes of residential areas etc which I don't recall.

I'd be surprised if Ukraine couldn't use drones for strikes beyond their borders if they wanted to. I expect they know it's of limited tactical value, and in fact negative strategic consequences. In a similar way that hitting a ship that isn't an offensive capability would be viewed.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Have you posted them here? I know Russia claimed Ukrainian strikes on Belgorod when 2 helicopters infiltrated and attacked fuel tanks, were on civilian targets.
I have. Go through the update posts that have appeared after the withdrawal of Russian troops from the north.

That statement seems very contradictory. So the main reason is a lack of capability, but you've repeated reports of strikes against border towns? Which is it?

I certainly recall the oil refinery strike, though I wouldn't say that it necessarily has zero military value (at least perceived, if not real). What I mean though is strikes of residential areas etc which I don't recall.

I'd be surprised if Ukraine couldn't use drones for strikes beyond their borders if they wanted to. I expect they know it's of limited tactical value, and in fact negative strategic consequences. In a similar way that hitting a ship that isn't an offensive capability would be viewed.
There has been a number of small scale strikes, artillery and air, that seem to be aimed at small towns/villages near the border, and that don't appear to be aimed at targets of significant (or any) military value. The scale, scope, and nature of the strikes, in my opinion, is indicative of capability limitations not intentional restraint. If the capability were there, we would see bigger strikes and deeper strikes against a wider range of targets.

For UAV strikes, they're certainly possible in principle, however Ukraine's fleet of UAVs is limited, and Russian air defenses are formidable. Risking those assets in low-value strikes across the border isn't a good idea. They are better employed to direct Ukrainian fires on the battlefield, and carry out strikes against Russian troops on the front.
 

swerve

Super Moderator
Remarkable that the Czechs do not modify/modernize the Dana 152 mm, into something like the ShKH Zuzana 155 mm what the Slovaks doing.
The enterprise which designed & built it is based in Trenčín, in Slovakia. I presume the French offered a better deal than the Slovaks.

The Czechs are buying the 8x8 version of Caesar (already sold to Denmark) which is based on a Czech Tatra chassis - just like the Dana. I think assembly is being done in Czechia.

They modernised their Danas with a new fire control system some time ago.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Update.

Kiev Area.

Ukrainian An-26 going down near Kiev. It appears two An-26s were lost recently, this one was allegedly shot down by Russia.


Kherson-Nikolaev-Odessa.

A multistory apartment building in Odessa got hit. It's not clear whether it was a strike, or the results of an intercept attempt, but the damage is severe. Last link as the moment of impact visible, but not the object itself.


Ukrainian air defenses firing, Odessa.


Cruise missiles near Odessa.


Destroyed Ukrainian BMP-1, Kherson region. This is likely old.


4 Russian BDKs parked in Crimea.


Russian sources claim that Ukrainian territorial defense fighters from 191st btln of the 123rd brigade staged a video dressed as Russian troops, with vehicles marked with Zs, and looted residential houses in Nikolaev region, and videotaped themselves. Note this could be a case of Russian troops looting, and Russia trying to get out ahead of it. It could also be real.


Zaporozhye-Dnepropetrovsk.

Russian cruise missiles pass over Energodar.


Russian strikes, Dnepropetrovsk.


Battle damage from a Russian strike in Dnepropetrovsk.


Kharkov-Sumy.

Russian Orlan-10 downed in Kharkov region.


Ukrainian forces attempting to break through the Russian border at Kazachya Lopast' but failed and took heavy losses. Russian forces claim up to 30 Ukrainian armored vehicles were involved, and that the attack was hit by a Grad strike while in progress. In the materials we see 2 destroyed BMP-2s, a T-64BV (I think) turret, a destroyed truck. Warning footage of corpses.


Ukrainian KrAZ Spartan destroyed, Kharkov region. This might be the Izyum Salient.


Russian National Guard, Kharkov region.


Ukrainian Mets ATGMs and 60mm mortar shells captured in Balakleya.

 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
The Izyum Salient.

Russian forces in the Izyum salient have entered Donetsk region, allegedly taking Lozovoye and Redkodub. Fighting has shifted to Yampole.


Destroyed Ukrainian armored humvee, near Izyum.


Russian air strikes, the Izyum Salient.


Reports of a major strike against a Ukrainian staging area near Kramatorsk, 3 missiles.


Russian strike against Krasniy Liman.


Krasniy Liman, the hospital burns.


Russia's 30th Motor-Rifles are confirmed in the Izyum Salient.


Interesting Russian column in, I believe the Izyum Salient. It has 6 T-72Bs, (4 B3 and 2 B), 8 BMP-1AMs, and 1 regular BMP-1 (I think it's a BMP-1, the turret seems small for a BRM-1). Some regular BMP-1s were (for god knows what reason) still in service with iirc two brigades in the Far East. They were also the ones who started receiving the BMP-1AM upgrade. I believe there are two options here. 1 is that equipment if being shifted to refit units that took losses. Another is that we have a new unit on the scene. In favor of the first supposition is the relatively uncommon (though not unheard of) mix of T-72Bs and B3s not just in one btln, but probably in one tank co. Given that it's normal for a brigade to form one BTG, it would only need one tank company fully re-equipped with B3s to avoid sending Bs to the front line. It could be that losses were replaced from storage, with T-72Bs, and IFV losses were replaced with BMP-1AMs straight from refit, supplemented by a regular BMP-1 to round out the numbers, due to limitations on the availability of AMs.


LDNR Front.

Rebel forces firing an AGS-17, indirect fire.


DNR artillery strikes near Donetsk.


Russian strike near Avdeevka.


Overrun Ukrainian positions near Kremennaya. Based on weapons and uniforms the infantry element is recon or SpN. Note, if earlier reports are correct, then these positions might contain only small elements covering the retreat of Ukrainian forces out of the Severodonetsk-Lisichansk pocket towards Kramatorsk-Slavyansk.


Destroyed and abandoned vehicles, presumably Ukrainian, near Kremennaya, around Severodonetsk. We have a KrAZ, a BRDM-2, and a T-64BV.


Destroyed T-64BV, allegedly Ukrainian, near Severodonetsk.


More footage from around 29th checkpoint, taken by LNR forces. Note how well entrenched the positions are.


LNR fighter claim they took out Georgian fighters, and overran their position.


Battle damage in Yasinovataya, allegedly from Ukrainian shelling.


Rebel sappers mine clearing near Rubezhnoe.


Russian Su-25 over Gorlovka.


LNR forces have allegedly returned an AT105 Saxon to service.


LNR forces repairing captured Ukrainian vehicles, I see 1 BMP-1 2 BMP-2, 2 unknown BMPs (1 or 2), 4 MT-LBu, many trucks, 3 tanks, 1 damaged 2S7.


Mariupol'.

Footage allegedly from inside Azovstal'.


Battle damage, Mariupol'.


Old footage from DNR Ministry of Interior, fighting around Azovstal'.


Combat footage, near Azovstal', a local city administration office. Date unclear.


Russian T-72B3mod'16s leaving Mariupol'.


The West.

Russian strike against alleged Ukrainian logistics center in L'vov.


Misc.


Ukrainian RPG or ATGM rocketeer fires, and immediately takes return fire.


UR-77 firing at an alleged Ukrainian strongpoint, location and context unclear. Note there is a huge delay between the shot and the explosion.


Russian strikes, location and context unclear.


Russian Iskander and BM-30 launches, Ukraine.


Russian air operations over Ukraine.


Ukrainian position after a strike.


Captured Ukrainian Varta armored car and BTS with a ZU-23-2.


Captured western comms gear, Ukraine.


Captured AT105 Saxon, likely not the same as above, different paint job.


Russian helos covering a Russian column. Such practice has become common to protect movements of troops and supplies.


Russian forces in Ukraine, assorted footage.


Russian SpN in Ukraine, note the weapons and uniforms, they are similar to the infantry we see in the fighting at Kremennaya (hell the guy with the reflex sight might be the same one).


Very strange Russian guntruck, Ukraine.


Russian T-72B3 carrying what appears to be looted Ukrainian ERA tiles in addition to its regular armor.


Ufa, Russian National Guard returns from Ukraine.


NATO/EU.

Czech 2S1s being transported to Ukraine.


Slovak T-72M1s have shown up in Ukraine, up-armored with K-1 tiles.


Vector UAVs have arrived in Ukraine.


Polish Warmate loitering munitions arrive in Ukraine.

 

T.C.P

Well-Known Member
@Feanor a couple of questions.

1. Recently I have been seeing a lot of video of ambushes conducted by alleged Russian Spn. They are the night vision videos, of small group of Russian forces ambushing UA patrols and check points, and late night low altitude drone strikes on UA forces hiding int the forests. I posted around 3 of them here and your updates had the more recent ones. Have these groups been active since the start of war and we are only seeing videos because they are releasing them now or is this a shift in Russian tactics? I know combat clips are not a good indicator of over all tactics and progress, but these night vision videos have more enmy KIA on average than even the most optimistic Russian propaganda videos launched before.

2. Are there any Russian or Ukrainain sources that are showing the actual effects of Russian cruise missile strikes. We have seen enough videos of them, but what is the actual assessment of their effectiveness. the videos look impressive, but those are really expensive muntions. All those Khalibres, Bals, Iskanders, Oniks etc. what is their real combat efficacy. I am an aboslute novice and know almost nothing of proper military strategy or tactics, but a 1000 cruise missile hits (if we take the pro UA social media claims of 50% of the cruise missile failing, (I doubt the failure rate is that high)), should be doing a lot of damage.

3. LNR DPR guys dont really follow opsec much andd upload a lot, and recently ( last one month) they have been showing the usage of drones much more heavily. There is no way they had this many drones in Feb or March, otherwise they would have uploaded it, the Russian regulars dont upload that much, so their videos are not an indicator of their numbers of drones, but the DPR LNR start posting bragging videos of every equipment they have. So did these guys get new shipments of small UAVs from Russia and if so, where are these being sourced from? UA is getting huge number of commercial drones for surveillance, but tis not like Russia can tap into the same channel.

4. I have seen the UR-77s in action in Ukraine only recently in the manner they are being used now. This is something Russia used a lot in Syria. Using these mine clearer to clear our urban areas from the anti assad forces. Is the usage of the UR-77 a sign of the new Russian general and officers who have done tours in Syria?

I singled out Feanor as he can read Russian and Ukrainain and has access to some solidonline sources, but if any one else can answer these please do so. I am grateful to any replies. Don't judge my questions too harshly, I am a civillian who has no clue about what war is really like.
 
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