The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

OPSSG · Apr 23, 2022

Part 1 of 3: An attempt to move beyond ill-informed conjecture

1. Despite the intense use of Su-34s, artillery, MLRS and missiles, the renewed Russian offensive in the Donbas seems to have yielded negligible gains. This is the physical component is Russia’s military capabilities trying to achieve functional effects on Ukrainian targets. This includes their ineffective use of fighter bombers, training infrastructure, weapons, ammunition, sensors, and comms networks

2. Amid all the noise and ill-informed conjecture, there are some commentators who stand out for their clear-eyed analysis of the geopolitics and of the war in Ukraine — to understand what is going to happen, I follow what both gentlemen say closely, for their insights. I extract a transcript of retired Lt. Gen. Mark Hertling’s comments on CNN.

3. Might be worth a look, for others who are as interested as I am.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1517581255268868096
Some food for thought — it’s debatable but certainly a valid view point.

Title: CNN Tonight - CNN Tonight Mark Hertling
Transcript Generated by SnapStream Enterprise TV Search

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1517677094247055361

not a win for Putin. >> That's the Biden administration view. Let's take that question and others to the former U.S. Army commanding general, retired Lieutenant General Mark Hertling. To that first question, mark, you've been a skeptic from the beginning and rightly so really in a lot of cases of Russia's ability here to win the war and to gain the ground they want to gain. Do you take Boris Johnson's view that the Russians can wind the Ukrainians down or the administration's view. >> I take the administration's view but for different reasons, Jim. I'm not going to talk about the domestic politics inside Russia or what Mr. Putin can or cannot accept from his population when body bags start coming home.

What I'm talking about and what I've been talking about from the very beginning is the military capacity of the Russian force. You have this general who is the commander of Russia's central military district, the largest military district, saying -- that's the one that consists of the bulaga and the euros and the siberian district. I met this guy when he was a younger general officer. Saying that the new strategic objective is to get to odesa and beyond. I will say now what I said earlier in this campaign. They can't do it. They do not have the forces to do it. They do not have the capacity to do it.

When you take a look at some of the areas that they're talking about in the south, you're talking about the town of mykolaiv, which they have not taken yet. 500,000 in the population. It's the size of Kansas City, Missouri. Odesa, 900,000. That's the size of Indianapolis. It's 420 miles from mariupol to odesa. They can't sustain the supply lines for that long a time and no matter how many forces we are saying are piled up on the eastern border getting ready to go into the country, they just do not have the size of a force to take over these cities. They've proven that. The Russians have proven they can't take mariupol, which is a pretty big city in and of itself. They've been thwarted there.

[00:02:04]

Even though they have killed a lot of civilians, murdered a lot of civilians, they still haven't controlled the road junctions going in and out of there. So, yeah, I don't buy Boris Johnson's commentary, different commentary than what the white house is giving out. >> Okay. One of the issues in the north around Kyiv, where the Russians failed was -- you highlighted the supply line. They just couldn't get the ammo, the fuel, the food, and the command and control to those troops there. So, they pulled back.

[00:02:35]

The advantage in the east for the Russians is they're closer to the Russian border. They can drive the stuff right across and get to those forces there. Do the Russians have an advantage in the east that they did not have in the north? >> It is certainly a shorter distance. But it's still over 100 miles, Jim. And they don't have the equipment. But most importantly, they don't have the people. We have seen so many Russian soldiers killed. We have seen a lack of leadership on the part of the senior level, middle level, and junior level.

[00:03:05]

They have not proven themselves to be a good combined armed force. So, yes, they certainly have the artillery. But that gets to the package that the administration and nato is providing with Ukraine now in this second part of the war. They can count -- the Ukrainians can counter this with counterartillery fire. Russians cannot maneuver in this area. Ukraine is on their home turf. They have home field advantage on this. They know how to maneuver. They have not been successful

[00:03:36]

yet in the east. They've tried several reconnaissance and force missions in the donbas so far. As Sam mentioned earlier, they have hit with artillery several towns. But their maneuver has not been such where they've taken over towns or they control towns. And in fact, they're not moving all that much. And I personally think Ukraine is playing it very smart, the Ukrainian generals. They're allowing them to think that they're moving just a little bit, and the counterattacks by the Ukrainian forces are soon to come.

[00:04:07]

hauritz · Apr 23, 2022

Two more Russian generals have been killed near Kherson, according to the Ukrainian ministry of defence's intelligence directorate. A third is in critical condition.

Ukraine Army destroys enemy command operations center, eliminates two Russian generals

The Armed Forces of Ukraine have destroyed a command operations center of the 49th Combined Arms Army of the Russian Armed Forces, eliminating two enemy generals. — Ukrinform.

www.ukrinform.net

STURM · Apr 23, 2022

StobieWan said:
Which is an excellent point - but I think we're starting to run out of immediately available items to transfer that are already in operation,

There is/was a Bulgarian company which has/had very large stocks of Soviet era small arms, RCLs, mortars, mines, etc. It supplied quite a bit of stuff to Africa over the years. If I recall correctly there was also a Romanian company which had large stocks of stuff and was involved in various dodgy dealings.

Ironically the Ukraine had very large stocks of Soviet era gear but a lot of it was sold - unofficially - in the 1990's and early 2000's to various countries; including those involved in the 'African World War'; a protracted and extremely bloody conflict which involved dozens of players but which remains largely unknown.

swerve · Apr 23, 2022

John Fedup said:
I guess the problem with familiar kit now is sourcing it. Inventories from former Warsaw Pact countries must be getting low. The M777s that Canada and the US are providing will require some training but it should be minimal compared to Western MBTs, helicopters, or fighters.

Not yet. They have hundreds of guns & howitzers they could spare. Quite a lot of 122mm & 152mm (both towed & SP) are in storage, or scheduled to be replaced soon, e.g. the Czechs have Caesar 155mm on order to replace DANA 152mm SP. The Poles are building more Krab 155mm SP, & have both DANA 152mm & 2S1 122mm SP, many of the latter in storage.

There are more 122mm than 152mm available, & I expect the Ukrainians would prefer 152mm, but 122mm could still be useful.

Same with tanks. From ca 200 to perhaps over 500 T-72, depending on whether the Poles would be willing to hand over those they've upgraded or scheduled for upgrade.

And so on.

John Fedup · Apr 23, 2022

swerve said:
Not yet. They have hundreds of guns & howitzers they could spare. Quite a lot of 122mm & 152mm (both towed & SP) are in storage, or scheduled to be replaced soon, e.g. the Czechs have Caesar 155mm on order to replace DANA 152mm SP. The Poles are building more Krab 155mm SP, & have both DANA 152mm & 2S1 122mm SP, many of the latter in storage.

There are more 122mm than 152mm available, & I expect the Ukrainians would prefer 152mm, but 122mm could still be useful.

Same with tanks. From ca 200 to perhaps over 500 T-72, depending on whether the Poles would be willing to hand over those they've upgraded or scheduled for upgrade.

And so on.

Interesting, clearly the need is critical so I guess team NATO has to get their “stuff” together and get this “familiar” kit to the frontlines!

Sandhi Yudha · Apr 23, 2022

swerve said:
Not yet. They have hundreds of guns & howitzers they could spare. Quite a lot of 122mm & 152mm (both towed & SP) are in storage, or scheduled to be replaced soon, e.g. the Czechs have Caesar 155mm on order to replace DANA 152mm SP. The Poles are building more Krab 155mm SP, & have both DANA 152mm & 2S1 122mm SP, many of the latter in storage.

There are more 122mm than 152mm available, & I expect the Ukrainians would prefer 152mm, but 122mm could still be useful.

Same with tanks. From ca 200 to perhaps over 500 T-72, depending on whether the Poles would be willing to hand over those they've upgraded or scheduled for upgrade.

And so on.

Remarkable that the Czechs do not modify/modernize the Dana 152 mm, into something like the ShKH Zuzana 155 mm what the Slovaks doing.

If this is true, then this is not such a wise move, in my opinion. If a heavy cruiser can not defend itself against anti-ship missiles, how is an unarmed 110 years old ship able to survive, if its starts to float around on the same spot as the Moskva?

H I Sutton - Covert Shores

Dead Money · Apr 23, 2022

Sandhi Yudha said:
If this is true, then this is not such a wise move, in my opinion. If a heavy cruiser can not defend itself against anti-ship missiles, how is an unarmed 110 years old ship able to survive, if its starts to float around on the same spot as the Moskva?

H I Sutton - Covert Shores

Given the low/no military value, the slim possibility that the Moskva was carrying nuclear weapons that need investigating, and limited munitions - there could be an argument for the UA not firing on the Kommuna?

koxinga · Apr 23, 2022

The practical reason is the Kommuna has no/limited military value. With limited anti ship missiles at the Ukrainian disposal, it is a pretty poor choice for a target.

The other reason why she might not be a suitable target is legality. The Russians might claim her to be operating under Article 18 of GC II (Geneva Convention on the Wounded, Sicked and Shipwrecked), given Russia has reported missing sailors

phreeky · Apr 23, 2022

Dead Money said:
there could be an argument for the UA not firing on the Kommuna

Ukraine has shown incredible restraint in striking Russian assets not contributing to the war i.e. no retaliation strikes on civilians in border towns.

Regardless of whether that is due to moral reasons or simply not wasting resources against targets of no strategic or tactical value, I can't see this old ship being targeted.

Like I suspect a lot of people, this old thing being in service absolutely blows my mind. I'll definitely be doing some reading up on it when I get a chance.

Feanor · Apr 24, 2022

phreeky said:
Ukraine has shown incredible restraint in striking Russian assets not contributing to the war i.e. no retaliation strikes on civilians in border towns.

I have repeated reports of Ukrainian strikes against Russian border towns that began to appear largely with the withdrawal of Russian forces from the north. When you consider the limited ability of Ukraine to strike Russia, I suspect the main reason is not restraint but capability.

Big_Zucchini · Apr 24, 2022

Feanor said:
I have repeated reports of Ukrainian strikes against Russian border towns that began to appear largely with the withdrawal of Russian forces from the north. When you consider the limited ability of Ukraine to strike Russia, I suspect the main reason is not restraint but capability.

Have you posted them here? I know Russia claimed Ukrainian strikes on Belgorod when 2 helicopters infiltrated and attacked fuel tanks, were on civilian targets.

A nice Twitter thread, albeit 0 material beyond his words. Not familiar with him enough to determine reliability:

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1517856532976881664

His general message is doom for Russia in Donbass.
Continued Ukrainian counter-offensives confirm my theory of very limited Russian offensives and a gradual switch to defensive posture.

Vivendi · Apr 24, 2022

Updated Analysis by Mick Ryan: Mick Ryan, AM on Twitter: https://t.co/tpW9hyz7sJ" / Twitter

Interesting read, the construct of "fighting power" is very interesting, defined in chapter 4 in this document: LWD 1, The Fundamentals of Land Power, 2017 (army.gov.au)

Ryan's analysis seems to match pretty well with the latest analysis by Michael Kofman, see post by Big_Zucchini above.

A Twitter thread I also found very interesting: Trent Telenko on Twitter / Twitter

My knowledge in the field of artillery is virtually zero. Telenko's analysis sounds very convincing to me. Do the experts on this forum agree with his thinking?

OPSSG · Apr 24, 2022

Part 2 of 3: An attempt to move beyond ill-informed conjecture

Vivendi said:
A Twitter thread I also found very interesting: Trent Telenko on Twitter / Twitter

My knowledge in the field of artillery is virtually zero. Telenko's analysis sounds very convincing to me. Do the experts on this forum agree with his thinking?

3. I don’t think what he writes sound very convincing to me. Telenko tries to write in a trendy manner to lay persons but ignores a number of factors/concepts on the Russian employment of artillery. He tries to mirror image what he knows about WWII use of artillery and find or say something bad about Russian 152 mm howitzer ammo and fusing used. Some of it is true (in the logistics aspect, where Russian practices in moving around rounds manually suck a lot or their dud rate); but is that the only way to view things on the battlefield?

Q1: Has Telenko over simplified matters on the Russian use of artillery?

Ans: I suspect so. I worry that Telenko, as a logistics specialist, does not seem to understand different types of fire missions and an army’s planning norms. For example, a FO attached to single Russian BTG may call for:

(i) harassing fire (or what we call part renewal) to prevent movement by an Ukrainian unit in defence, as the BTG’s fire support coordination line moves along with planned BTG movement; and

(ii) at a later time call for final fires.

4. Let me admit things I don’t know. For example, I don’t know the worthwhile payload of HE on Russian 152 mm howitzer ammo —Ukrainians make their own 152 mm high explosive fragmentation projectile (ammo) too. I doubt Telenko knows.

5. I am not an expert on 155mm artillery but I do know the importance of the fire support coordination line, in plans and execution. Even I know that for Russian on-call fires, the volume of fire, fusing and presence of an FO (or the lack of one) will result different effects on an Ukrainian target.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1517972074249310208

6. The Russian FO and FDC actions to call and respond to fires interact to affect the artillery ammo usage. This deliberate decision making process is not captured in Telenko’s posts. For many dug-in targets at the JFO, with overhead shelter, air burst munitions don’t work at all. The FO and FDC chooses the effect and fusing — it may simply be a choice.

Rock the kasbah · Apr 24, 2022

OPSSG said:
Part 2 of 3: An attempt to move beyond ill-informed conjecture

3. I don’t think what he writes sound very convincing to me. Telenko tries to write in a trendy manner to lay persons but ignores a number of factors/concepts on the Russian employment of artillery. He tries to mirror image what he knows about WWII use of artillery and find or say something bad about Russian 152 mm howitzer ammo and fusing used. Some of it is true (in the logistics aspect, where Russian practices in moving around rounds manually suck a lot or their dud rate); but is that the only way to view things on the battlefield?

Q1: Has Telenko over simplified matters on the Russian use of artillery?

Ans: I suspect so. I worry that Telenko, as a logistics specialist, does not seem to understand different types of fire missions and an army’s planning norms. For example, a FO attached to single Russian BTG may call for:

(i) harassing fire (or what we call part renewal) to prevent movement by an Ukrainian unit in defence, as the BTG’s fire support coordination line moves along with planned BTG movement; and

(ii) at a later time call for final fires.

4. Let me admit things I don’t know. For example, I don’t know the worthwhile payload of HE on Russian 152 mm howitzer ammo —Ukrainians make their own 152 mm high explosive fragmentation projectile (ammo) too. I doubt Telenko knows.

5. I am not an expert on 155mm artillery but I do know the importance of the fire support coordination line, in plans and execution. Even I know that for Russian on-call fires, the volume of fire, fusing and presence of an FO (or the lack of one) will result different effects on an Ukrainian target.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1517972074249310208
6. The Russian FO and FDC actions to call and respond to fires interact to affect the artillery ammo usage. This deliberate decision making process is not captured in Telenko’s posts. For many dug-in targets at the JFO, with overhead shelter, air burst munitions don’t work at all. The FO and FDC chooses the effect and fusing — it may simply be a choice.

I just want to say I really appreciate you're ability to teach
Not all of us can get our heads around military matters
Cheers

phreeky · Apr 24, 2022

Feanor said:
I have repeated reports of Ukrainian strikes against Russian border towns that began to appear largely with the withdrawal of Russian forces from the north. When you consider the limited ability of Ukraine to strike Russia, I suspect the main reason is not restraint but capability.

That statement seems very contradictory. So the main reason is a lack of capability, but you've repeated reports of strikes against border towns? Which is it?

I certainly recall the oil refinery strike, though I wouldn't say that it necessarily has zero military value (at least perceived, if not real). What I mean though is strikes of residential areas etc which I don't recall.

I'd be surprised if Ukraine couldn't use drones for strikes beyond their borders if they wanted to. I expect they know it's of limited tactical value, and in fact negative strategic consequences. In a similar way that hitting a ship that isn't an offensive capability would be viewed.

Feanor · Apr 24, 2022

Big_Zucchini said:
Have you posted them here? I know Russia claimed Ukrainian strikes on Belgorod when 2 helicopters infiltrated and attacked fuel tanks, were on civilian targets.

I have. Go through the update posts that have appeared after the withdrawal of Russian troops from the north.

phreeky said:
That statement seems very contradictory. So the main reason is a lack of capability, but you've repeated reports of strikes against border towns? Which is it?

I certainly recall the oil refinery strike, though I wouldn't say that it necessarily has zero military value (at least perceived, if not real). What I mean though is strikes of residential areas etc which I don't recall.

I'd be surprised if Ukraine couldn't use drones for strikes beyond their borders if they wanted to. I expect they know it's of limited tactical value, and in fact negative strategic consequences. In a similar way that hitting a ship that isn't an offensive capability would be viewed.

There has been a number of small scale strikes, artillery and air, that seem to be aimed at small towns/villages near the border, and that don't appear to be aimed at targets of significant (or any) military value. The scale, scope, and nature of the strikes, in my opinion, is indicative of capability limitations not intentional restraint. If the capability were there, we would see bigger strikes and deeper strikes against a wider range of targets.

For UAV strikes, they're certainly possible in principle, however Ukraine's fleet of UAVs is limited, and Russian air defenses are formidable. Risking those assets in low-value strikes across the border isn't a good idea. They are better employed to direct Ukrainian fires on the battlefield, and carry out strikes against Russian troops on the front.

swerve · Apr 24, 2022

Sandhi Yudha said:
Remarkable that the Czechs do not modify/modernize the Dana 152 mm, into something like the ShKH Zuzana 155 mm what the Slovaks doing.

The enterprise which designed & built it is based in Trenčín, in Slovakia. I presume the French offered a better deal than the Slovaks.

The Czechs are buying the 8x8 version of Caesar (already sold to Denmark) which is based on a Czech Tatra chassis - just like the Dana. I think assembly is being done in Czechia.

They modernised their Danas with a new fire control system some time ago.

Feanor · Apr 24, 2022

Update.

Kiev Area.

Ukrainian An-26 going down near Kiev. It appears two An-26s were lost recently, this one was allegedly shot down by Russia.

Dambiev

Кадры военно-транспортного самолета Ан-26 ВВС Украины перед падением. Самолет был сбит российскими средствами ПВО возле села Жуковцы Киевской области в феврале 2022 года.

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The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

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