Middle East Defence & Security

[Big_Zucchini]

After ~17 years of relative calm with few Palestinian terror attacks, mostly with improvised weapons, primarily knives and therefore non-lethal, a new wave of lethal attacks with firearms has started.

The last wave of deadly terror attacks occurred between 2000-2005, leaving more than a thousand Israelis dead from mass shootings, suicide bombings, car rammings, and other creative ways.

What stopped it eventually was the consolidation of numerous efforts to limit the capabilities of wanna terrorists, including a wall, a series of checkpoints, increased military presence, active arrests of potential terrorists and seizures of illegal weapons and materials.
Not a week goes by without some notable bust of smuggled or home-built firearms in the West Bank.

In just 1 week, 3 terror attacks were conducted, with a total of 11 fatalities among civilians (not including the terrorists). 2 of them with firearms. The knife attack was also exceptionally deadly.
All attacks were claimed by ISIS, and in Sunni-Shia solidarity, were highly praised by Hamas and Hezbollah alike.

This new phenomenon is terrifying even the resilient Israelis. People are being hardened in their views, radicalized and calling for hard measures.
The approach taken by the Israeli government in the long run will likely have an effect on its foreign policy with its newfound Arab allies.

Defeating the new terror wave: The challenge, the temptation, the precedent

With 11 people killed in three attacks in eight days, the fear is that Israel is facing a fresh, intifada-style onslaught. It isn't... at least, not yet

www.timesofisrael.com

Speaking of which, the Israeli air force is mulling a new alliance, centered around the aerial threat, between Israel and regional friendly Arab states.
The target - Iran's aerial campaign.

Not a great many details were shared, so I'll end this here. However, it's worth noting the article also talks about the IAF also creating a missile force, that will utilize ground launched munitions for deep strikes. Israeli industries have developed and showcased over the years various types of long range rockets, anything from 150km to almost 500km. They are prime candidates.
Other alternatives are ground-launched versions of aerial munitions, as claimed in the article. However, we should not take their wording at face value. Journalists do make mistakes.

מול איומים איראניים: חיל האוויר מקדם ברית הגנה אזורית עם צבאות ערביים

לאחרונה ננקטו פעולות חסרות תקדים בחיזוק שיתוף הפעולה המבצעי בין חילות אוויר שכנים שמדינותיהן בשלום עם ישראל, לבין צה"ל. המטרה: הרחבת העומק האסטרטגי של ישראל ויירוט איומים הרחק מגבולות הארץ. חיל האוויר חושף: עשרות מבצעים משמעותיים בוצעו בשנה האחרונה בזירה הצפונית

m.ynet.co.il

 

[Big_Zucchini]

Arab rebels in Iran claim responsibility for an attack on a petrochemical plant:

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1509788725684883496

 

[STURM]

During an interview with IDF radio an Israeli PM spoke of Israel not seeing Iran as an enemy but as a strategic partner. The PM was Yitzak Shamir in 1987 during a period where Israel fully understood that official Iranian rhetoric was entirely different to its actual geo strategic policy and when Israel was trying to convince the U.S. to talk to the Iranians. In this interesting video the speaker starts out a bit on the centuries long
Persian/Jewish relationship; from there he takes us the time of the Shah who for strategic reasons was quite chummy with Israel [it was the Shah who decided that Iran needed nukes - against the Soviet threat].

When things started getting shaky for the Shah; the Israelis were worried as Iran's new rulers were either going to be a new Islamic government or the communists which had a strong standing; neither of which were expected to be friendly to Israel. As it turns out Iran's new rulers weren't focused on.Israel: focused on Iranian domestic issues and Saddam's war. During the 1980's Iran/Israel relations were driven by realpolitik; Israel seeing Iran as a ounterweight against Saddam.

Together with Vietnam; Israel enabled Iran to obtain spares for various U.S. made gear and before the Iran Contra deal had already started supplying Iran with certain gear [I remember a pic from either Times or Newsweek during this period showing a disabled Iranian veteran at a rally brandishing an Uzi]. During this period overbought it was bleeding from the war with Iraq; Iran was allocating resources to Lebanon to support its Shia brethren.

Iranian policy towards to the Palestinians was somewhat different during this period. It certainly sympathised with the Palestinians but had other issues to contend with. The speaker mentions interviewing a Iranian reformist who spent a few hours with Khomeini discussing the Palestinian issue. Khomeini eventually decided on 3 things : Iran would not be in hostilities with Israel, it would only support the Palestinans with rhetorical and ideological support and it would keep pressuring the Arabs to stand by the Palestinians. Post Gulf war when Saddam was significantly weakened and when Israel under U.S. pressure started seriously looking at accommodation with the Palestinans; the strategic calculus changed.

Israel [Shamir and Perez issued statements in 1991 about Iran being an existential threat] Israel saw Iran as a potential spoiler in any agreement reached with the Palestinians and started pressuring the Americans who were surprised at this change of policy. Israel was also worried about its position in the event of an Utanian/U.S. rapprochement. During this period Iran under Rasfanjani had been sending out feelers to the Americans on improved relations.

 

[John Fedup]

Bottom line, Saddam was an awful piece of work but he was a useful counter weight against Iran. I really don’t believe Iran under Khomeini would ever be a friend. Two unfriendly nations kicking the $hit out of each other, not great for the locals but the neighbours weren’t exactly promoting a kumbaya solution.

 

[STURM]

Bottom line, Saddam was an awful piece of work but he was a useful counter weight against Iran

Iran was also a counter weight against Saddam. If it had been swiftly defeated Saddam might have turned on certain Arab states.

I really don’t believe Iran under Khomeini would ever be a Sr friend. .

If we look.at the region since 1945 very few countries have ever been permanent friends - alliance/partnerships frequently evolved subject to prevailing geo political and strategic factors.

 

[Big_Zucchini]

Almost ancient history aside, Iran has chosen to make its previous allies who still reached out for peace and friendship after the revolution, into enemies, and to become a regional empire.

Could and should have toppling Saddam been accompanied by some solution to Iran's newfound hostility to the west and the middle east? Probably not. But it is still a blunder.

 

[STURM]

Almost ancient history aside, Iran has chosen to make its previous allies who still reached out for peace and friendship after the revolution, into enemies, and to become a regional empire.

Various countries reached out and Iran also reciprocated [it wasn't a one way street] but it all driven by realpolitik and self interests - wasn't driven by "peace" and "friendship".

"Ancient history" whether 2-3 decades ago or during the time of the Babylonians or the first Viking raids on the British isles have an impact - directly or otherwise - to where we are today and it would be shot sighted to dimiss history or overlook its significance.

to become a regional empire

Have no idea about the "empire" part but like it or not Iran for centuries has been a regional power in its own right with various levels of influence along its periphery.

Could and should have toppling Saddam been accompanied by some solution to Iran's newfound hostility to the west and the middle east?

Iran's change of policy and the same on the part of others was driven by the changing strategic calculus in the region. It was a blunder like many other things but driven by decisions during that period. As the speaker who at one time worked at Congress, recounts, a comprehensive peace proposal was presented to the Americans by the Iranians via the Swiss; it included everything which was a bone of contention. Initially it was welcomed but later ignored by the U.S. for various reasons.

 

[Vivendi]

Various countries reached out and Iran also reciprocated [it wasn't a one way street] but it all driven by realpolitik and self interests [..]

I am not so sure if it's only realpolitik -- there are several indications that the Iranian leadership is driven by some kind of religious ideology (to be blunt, and IMHO the phrase "religious nutcases" comes to mind..). If this is correct, then any analysis based on assumptions about realpolitik may be flawed and incomplete.

 

[STURM]

there are several indications that the Iranian leadership is driven by some kind of religious ideology (to be blunt, and IMHO the phrase "religious nutcases" comes to mind..). and IMHO the phrase "religious nutcases" comes to mind..). If this is correct, then any analysis based on assumptions about realpolitik may be flawed and incomplete.

Branding Iran's rulers "religious nutcases" is easy and convenient way to dismiss actions which may not be understood or approved of but it's simplistic and flawed. There are also many indications to show - provide one wants to look or knows what to look for - that the leadership are not what outsiders often assume them to be - ''mad mullahs'' whose actions are driven by religion.

As the speaker in the video points out [BTW nothing in his talk suggested religion was a main driver in Iranian policy]; shortly after 1979 when Israel was waiting to see how it would be affected by new policies introduced by Iran's new rulers; it discovered that Iran's rhetoric and it's actual policies were different in that they didn't match. Also, if we want to go on the assumption that Iran's actions are largely driven by religion we have to decide which period are we looking at : during the 1980's in the decade after the revolution when Iran's rulers were new to the game; insecure about how long their regime would last and were caught in a war with Iraq; in the 1990's when Iran's threat calculus changed or at present? If we look at Iran's actions in Syria [to prop up its only Arab allay and to defeat IS]; Lebanon [to support its Shia coreligionists and have strategic depth]. Iraq [to support its Shia coreligionists in their sectarian war against the Sunnis; to aid the insurgency against the Americans and to defeat IS], Yemen to [support its Shia coreligionists and have strategic depth as part of the Cold War fought against the Sunni Gulf Arabs], these are all driven by self interests [not religion per see] in line with threat perceptions and the overall geo strategic situation as seen by Tehran.

Also if you want to talk about religion driving policy or actions; sure Iran during the 1980's made a major blunder with its rhetoric of spreading the 'revolution' Westwards towards the Gulf Arabs. This caused a lot of concern but by the early 1990's they had got over this delusion. Saudi Arabia in contrast was and is still a an extent active spreading via various ways its Wahhabism creed.

 

[John Fedup]

Branding Iran's rulers "religious nutcases" is easy and convenient way to dismiss actions which may not be understood or approved of but it's simplistic and flawed. There are also many indications to show - provide one wants to look or knows what to look for - that the leadership are not what outsiders often assume them to be; ''mad mullah'' whose actions are driven by religion.

As the speaker in the video points out; shortly after 1979 when Israel was waiting to see how it would be affected by new policies introduced by Iran's new rulers; it discovered that Iran's rhetoric and it's actual policies were different in that they didn't match. Also, if we want to go on the assumption that Iran's actions are largely driven by religion we have to decide which period are we looking at : during the 1980's in the decade after the revolution when Iran's rulers were new to the game; insecure about how long their regime would last and were caught in a war with Iraq; in the 1990's when Iran's threat calculus changed or at present? If we look at Iran's actions in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen [to protect its Shia coreligionists; strategic depth; prop up its only Arab ally against IS which bordered Iraq, etc] these are all driven by self interests in line with its threat perceptions and the overall geo strategic situation as seen by Tehran. Also if you want to talk about religion driving policy or actions; sure Iran during the 1980's made a major blunder with its rhetoric of spreading the 'revolution' Westwards towards the Gulf Arabs. This caused a lot of concern but by the early 1990's they had got over this delusion. Saudi Arabia in contrast was and is still a an extent active spreading via various ways its Wahhabism creed.

Both Iran and Saudi have religious issues. Agree, Saudi Wahhabism is probably the bigger problem now.

 

[STURM]

Quite a few countries [not all Muslim] have 'religious issues' to different extents. Saudi Wahhabism is still a problem but as far as I'm aware they've scaled back a bit in their 'export' of it; doing it in more subtle or different ways. A paradox is despite Iran largely being seen as a 'Islamic fundamentalist' state led by ''mad mullahs'; traditionally it's people had a greater level of freedom compared to Saudi; it had/has an opposition [muffled as it is] and women [allowed to work, drive and go out accompanied] and minorities had less curbs placed on them. Under MBS [I'm no fan of his] Saudi is slowly evolving though. On Wahhabism quite of bit of it is actually based on Arab culture/norms/practices which existed way before Islam. just like how the Taliban's ideology [based to an extent on Wahhabism] contains a lot of Pashtun culture/norms/practices.

 

[Big_Zucchini]

If a state/religion is aggressive externally but liberal internally, it would be more relevant to deal with than one that is in the reversed order.

Iran is a country led by religious nutjobs. But it does at least appear to be separate from its ideology of imperialism, aka "exporting the revolution", which is led by political nutjobyism.

 

[STURM]

Iran is a country led by religious nutjobs.

For reasons which have been discussed/explained; this is a commonly and easily made but incorrect assumption. Ultimately however everyone is entitled to their personal opinions and assumptions.

 

[koxinga]

For reasons which have been discussed/explained; this is a commonly and easily made but incorrect assumption. Ultimately however everyone is entitled to their personal opinions and assumptions.

Saudi is a feudal state led by the House of Saud. In the case of the Sauds, I always felt that Wahhabism was means to an end. That end is to ensure the House of Saud stay on that throne forever and by the larger extent, Saudi being relevant in the global/regional power play.

Iran exist as a Shiite theocracy led by the mullahs. They are less interested on exporting Shia Islam globally but more interested maintaining Persian influence/imperialism in the region.

Neither are nutjobs by any definition from a realpolitik stance. Funding proxies, playing one off the other, those that the standard playbook of the US and any big power. The only thing they do different is to weaponize religion to their respective causes. Everyone wants to claim to have God on their side.

 

[STURM]

always felt that Wahhabism was means to an end.

You could be right. It was also a means of ensuring friendship and cementing influence; whether in Afghanistan or other places. It however backfired; often overlooked is that in the early to mid-2000's Saudi was faced with it's own terrorism threat; from a AQ network which was intent on overthrowing the monarchy. We also have the incident when extremists took over the Kaaba in the 1970's.

Iran exist as a Shiite theocracy led by the mullahs. They are less interested on exporting Shia Islam globally but more interested maintaining Persian influence/imperialism in the region.

At one time they were very interested in exporting it and said so. This caused a lot of concern for the West and the Gulf Arabs but after the end of the 8 year war they realised that their 'revolution' had been a dismal failure and that a new approach was needed; hence their change in certain policies which in turn because of a change in policies of certain other countries and the prevailing situation then; Iran had to change course; to one to it originally was not interested in. The nullahs like other politicians or governing elites also want to stay in power for as long as they can.

Iran also has always been divided by 'hardline' and 'moderate' elements; both having differences of opinion as to how things should be done. Traditionally the 'hardliners' will scream that whatever compromises Iran makes; it's opponents will still seek ways to undermine it. U.S. withdrawal of the JCOA [used by ''moderates'' as why Iran should compromise] was used by ''hardliners'' to show that they are right. As it stands the cancellation of the JCOA and the sanctions have led to many ordinary Iranians; who are not supporters per see of their government;; agreeing to its actions which they view - rightly or wrongly - as hypocritical and one sided.

Neither are nutjobs by any definition from a realpolitik stance.

The extent to how religion played a part in driving Iranian policy depends on the actual period but despite the official rhetoric; which was also designed for a certain audience; Iran's actions were driven by realpolitik and doing what it felt it needed to do at that particular juncture. When it had to it cooperated or had understandings with its enemies [who in the Middle East hasn't]; cooperating with the U.S. during the 20003 Iraq invasion, during the war to remove Saddam and in efforts to combat the Taliban but at times it adopted policies intended to harm or be detrimental to American and Gulf Arab interests, If Iran was really led by ''nutjobs'' it wouldn't have survived for so long against a variety of enemies with more greater economic, diplomatic and military power. It would have collapsed by now or would have capitulated to demands set by its opponents.

Funding proxies, playing one off the other, those that the standard playbook of the US and any big power.

The standard script of almost every player in the Middle East too at one point or another.

Everyone wants to claim to have God on their side.

They do; for its powerful and emotional sense of appeal to the masses.

On another matter; this is an interesting talk. In IMO Iran's ballistic missiles are actually a sign of weakness; intended to compensate for other weaknesses to enable a means to strike enemy territory.

 

[koxinga]

At one time they were very interested in exporting it and said so.

Doomed to fail, even if there was no Iraq-Iran War. Shia Islam is just 12% of the total Muslim population world wide. Even here in South East Asia, Shiites keep a low profile because the majority are Sunni. Hard to see how they could have exported it anywhere. Maybe the fevours of revolution clouded their mind

On another matter; this is an interesting talk. In IMO Iran's ballistic missiles are actually a sign of weakness; intended to compensate for other weaknesses to enable a means to strike enemy territory.

A state which is not desired by the convential military of Iran. IRGC continues to take the lionshare of the budget and sometimes I think it is deliberate to keep the professional armed forces weak as much as to develop an asymmetric capability against Israel.

 

[STURM]

Doomed to fail, even if there was no Iraq-Iran War.

I have no idea if they thought it actually had a chance of succeeding. It was largely driven by the fact that the Gulf Arabs were behind Saddam. Could have been largely intended for the psychological and propaganda effects but it backfired. Drove the Arabs even closer to the U.S. and created much sincerity and anxiety.

One of the most knowledge people on Iran I've ever personally met was an Israeli. During a 4 hour journey on a bus in the Philippines we had a great talk. He was a visiting lecturer and helped in doing away with some assumptions I had.

Even here in South East Asia, Shiites keep a low profile because the majority are Sunni.

In Malaysia I know for a fact that being a Shia is illegal. For many Muslims, including embassy staff of a certain Arab Gulf state I used to socialise with; Shias are not seen as Muslims.

I think it is deliberate to keep the professional armed forces weak as much as to develop an asymmetric capability against Israel.

To develop such a capability against anyone Iran might be In conflict with. The missiles not only enable a strike capability but also provide a deterrence. AS the one the speaker's in the video says; the missiles are getting more precise and Iran seems to be limiting the range for operational reasons.

 

[Big_Zucchini]

For reasons which have been discussed/explained; this is a commonly and easily made but incorrect assumption. Ultimately however everyone is entitled to their personal opinions and assumptions

Your argument was that they make rational decisions, but they do mix those rational decisions with irrational ones motivated by religion as a dominant factor.

Rather than serving the people, they serve an elite. A religious elite. Rather than seeking to protect the people, they protect an elite.
This elite is highly religious, and does not reflect the average level of religiosity in Iran.

So to further the interests of the elite, they will take measures that from the perspective of either the people, or foreign entities like states, will look irrational.

For example, their regional conflicts are irrational. Nothing rational about waging war on Israel, for example.
The rational aspect can be seen in the micro level, in how they wage war. But the reason they wage war in the first place, is irrational.

So when looking at the elite, it all seems rational. When looking at the state, it seems irrational.

 

[koxinga]

In Malaysia I know for a fact that being a Shia is illegal. For many Muslims, including embassy staff of a certain Arab Gulf state I used to socialise with; Shias are not seen as Muslims.

Reminds me of the time I was at an ASEAN meeting in Singapore and trying to make sure the delegates go the right moseque for the Friday prayers. There happens to be one particular mosque that I had to remove from their information/briefing booklet when someone pointed out it was catering to Shia Muslims. Nobody wants to be associated with them. Not sure what they had in mind when they want to export Shia Islam, since they are considered apostate by most Sunni.

 

[T.C.P]

Reminds me of the time I was at an ASEAN meeting in Singapore and trying to make sure the delegates go the right moseque for the Friday prayers. There happens to be one particular mosque that I had to remove from their information/briefing booklet when someone pointed out it was catering to Shia Muslims. Nobody wants to be associated with them. Not sure what they had in mind when they want to export Shia Islam, since they are considered apostate by most Sunni.

It depends on which school of Sunni is more prominent in the country I guess and also history of inter sect conflict in the region. Here in Bangladesh we have a small minorty percentage of Shias, around 2%. Which keep in mind is still around 3+ million. Shias are different, but not seen as otherly as in SEA perhaps. While they have their own mosques, a lot of shias worship in sunni mosques and without any trouble. They take part in almost all religious fests together. Shias have a few of their own religius celebrations and holy days and one of them is a national holiday too.

Bangladeshi sunni is mostly Hanafi sunni with strong Sufi influence and we have no real hitory of major sunni-shia conflicts, so that probably is why they are more integrated here. Iran also never really tried to infleunce the Shias to do any anti state activites here and over all Bangladesh-Iran relationship is very warm despite the international sanctions which prevent closer economic ties.

Also interestingly enough there is Shia practice that is now banned in Iran and Lebanon but still very common here. The Shias have a tradition where the SHia men march on the streets and flagelate themselves on Ashura. This sometimes cause problem with local liberal media as children as young as 7-10 take part in this with their fathers, but recently, that has changed a bit, we see a lot less little kids and it seems parents only allow their boys to take part in it after they reach teenage.