Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0

[John Newman]

I'm sorry I failed, I will try harder. I still would like to know what all those billions of dollars have actually been used for, while we never got past a paper boat. Lot's of long boozy lunches for some folks. I also hope some lessons have been learnt, but if their is no critical enquiry into how it happened then the chances of learning something is small.

* Fact - At the start of this project the ‘nuclear’ option was ‘not’ on the table
Agree, a decade ago there wasn't, but with increasing PRC belligerence there may have been an option later in the decade, perhaps even by 2016 when the decision was made.

* Fact - the LNP would have been more inclined to go nuclear from the start, but as we all know the ALP has strong ‘anti nuclear policies’, eg, no bipartisan support for nuclear.
Yep, but with engagement on this issue with Labour, this may not have been true, so this is an assumption rather than fact.

* Fact - There was no conventional MOTS option to replace Collins.
I believe so.

* Fact - All options required a bespoke solution, the French Barracuda SSN design came closest to a ‘reference’ design of the same size,
High risk option, and with the aid of the retrospectoscope a very, very bad choice to pick a French 'Frakensub'. Do you think the Gov could have at least tried to sell the idea of a nuclear boat then? if the government/ADF had said no conventional submarines meet our needs and things are deteriorating in our neighbourhood, so a nuclear submarine is by far the best option. I suspect if Labour were in power they have chosen 'son of Collins'.

* Fact - The French reference design was chosen in April 2016, six years ago.
Yep, that ones a fact

* Fact - The ‘strategic environment has changed’ as you’ve acknowledged above.
Yep, also a fact.

* Fact - The Attack class project ran for approx five years, total cost approx $5b, or approx $1b per year on yearly average.
Yep, and all for nought. I really don't think people should trivialise wasting 5 billion dollars.

* Fact - Due to the change in our strategic circumstances, the Government made the choice to go nuclear and create AUKUS with our UK and US friends.
True. The only issues I have with it is the subs are a very long way off and the challenges of constructing and maintaining a nuclear boat.


IIRC have seen the figure quoted as 3.5-4 billion having actually been spent already. I assume the rest is getting out of the contractual arrangements. From the Senate Estimates committee on Friday:

Under questioning from Labor's Penny Wong, Defence Department deputy secretary Tony Dalton confirmed the final cost of the aborted program could exceed $5 billion.

"We now have a situation where the taxpayer will pay up to $5.5b for non-existent submarines?'' Senator Wong asked.

Mr Dalton responded that: "The final negotiated settlement will be within that price, senator."

Mate, I’ll give you an ‘A’ for effort, ok?

A 50% mark, a pass, just, you especially lost points on spelling.

The ‘L’ in ALP is spelt ‘Labor’ not ‘Labour’, you did it twice, you’ll have to stay after school and attend the remedial spelling class, ok?

At the end of the day I don’t think you and I will agree, that’s ok, we all have differing opinions and views.

But I would suggest one thing, you appear to be really focused on the $5b.

You remind of the story of the guy standing only a few inches from the wall, only focusing on the dot ($5b) in front of your eyes.

Step back half a dozen paces and have a good look at the whole wall.

The view is a bit different when you take the whole picture in!

 

[Volkodav]

V,

Well we could go through all the political machinations of what could or should have been, which party should have done something, etc, etc.

But it always ends up, woulda, coulda, shoulda,

“If the Queen has balls she’d be the King”

I was simply putting it in perspective. There is all this harping on about how much this has cost when the real issue is everything to date was years later than it should have been and delivered nothing.

The issue isn't that we have spent what we have spent, or that the SSNs are not going to enter service for two decades, the issue is the SSNs are replacing the Collins, rather than complementing and then replacing the Collins replacement.

Delaying programs, stretching programs, cancelling programs and changing direction are all false economies that adversely affect and undermine sovereign capability. They result in young Australians operating gear that is older than them and less capable and survivable than what is needed.

 

[ADMk2]

The $5 billion while not a small amount to the average person and would have been very useful for other programs in the grand scheme is still chicken feed. Over the time period from when it was selected to cancelled something to the tune of $2.4 trillion was collected in taxes and other government revenue in Australia... So all intents we wasted just north of about 0.2% of that tax revenue.

In the end the submarine debacle comes down to two issues, Failure in leadership (From all sides) in having the thing so long delayed. I mean the first bloke to think of getting something started was bloody Kevin Rudd back in 2008. Had politics on both sides not gotten in the way we could have been building our new boats today which would have alleviated if not wiped out risk of a capability gap. The other being changing geopolitical circumstances. In a little over 2 years the world has gone from grumbling acceptance to threats of nuclear strikes. No one could have foreseen then and had anyone done so the majority of the worlds people would have laughed them off as a conspiracy nutter. Things changed so fast for the worst there has been little time to gradually adapt but rather one has to throw the book out and start all over if they want a chance to survive.

If we had stuff already under construction then it would have allowed us breathing room to adapt, Could have continued on and take a more appropriate speed in acquiring nuclear boats but global situations have changed that on us.

Money lost sucks but at the same time lessons learnt, knowledge acquired etc may also help to aid in bringing in our future nuclear boat's more quickly then starting from an entirely blank slate.

Ideally BAE, GDEB/HII and ASC will each take a 1/3rd stake in the new Enterprise and combined every ones best people that are free to do so in getting it done. Its only wasted money if we dont take advantage of the lessons and knowledge acquired so lets use them.

FYI, the French were responsible for the submarine, they were not responsible for the weapons nor the combat system and you’d have to imagine that some of that work would be directly transferrable to ANY submarine we acquire, regardless of how it is powered…

As an example, the Mk.48 Mod 7 ADCAP heavy-weight torpedo (and future variants) will as far as we have been informed, operate on future Australian submarines, regardless of origin…

 

[Wombat000]

Im somewhat suspect of the notion of success, from a theoretical early/on-time Attack submarine program?
…..yes, we may’ve had an on time boat doing sea trials as suggested? Certainly in advanced stage of construction.

but it’d now be an orphan. …an anomaly!
all that expense would’ve been spent on a program that is in effect a redundant hull design.

it would be so much harder to sell politically and publicly the nuclear AUKUS variant solution if an Attack hull now (at that theoretical time) was at the stage of doing sea trials.

yes an on-time Attack sub program would’ve perhaps superseded a Collins extension program, but a program of sorts would’ve been required anyway/either way.

superficially at least, perhaps the now evolved updated Collins plan is actually easier and cheaper than an entire interim (at best), Attack program?

 

[aussienscale]

Im somewhat suspect of the notion of success, from a theoretical early/on-time Attack submarine program?
…..yes, we may’ve had an on time boat doing sea trials as suggested? Certainly in advanced stage of construction.

but it’d now be an orphan. …an anomaly!
all that expense would’ve been spent on a program that is in effect a redundant hull design.

it would be so much harder to sell politically and publicly the nuclear AUKUS variant solution if an Attack hull now (at that theoretical time) was at the stage of doing sea trials.

yes an on-time Attack sub program would’ve perhaps superseded a Collins extension program, but a program of sorts would’ve been required anyway/either way.

superficially at least, perhaps the now evolved updated Collins plan is actually easier and cheaper than an entire interim (at best), Attack program?

I will make an assumption here, that you are alluding to what Volk said above ? Because what Volk is saying is that had the proper timelines been kept Labor would have made the decision of the Collins replacement and that would already be about to enter service, meaning an AUKUS RAN SSN would then follow at the first of the on time Collins replacements would be paid off.

A decade + delay leaves us in this spot of bother no matter what action was taken by the current Government because Labor, and no not a political statement, rather a statement of fact, kicked the decision down the road because they would not touch it !

But it also does beg the question, had that been done and we were now sea trailing for first of the Collins replacements, would AUKUS and our access to nuclear sub tech still have happened ? well who knows !! Crystal balling of course

Cheers

 

[Wombat000]

I’m still stewing over the timeline ramifications.
the ALP (not being political) inertia of the time annoys me beyond clinical reasoning.

but I’m simply surmising (in a general discussion way) that perhaps we mayve fallen into an unforeseen hole of some benefit???

im rationalising that an Attack in advanced construction would’ve been a HUGE expense to suddenly be redundant.
trying to salvage an argument to an ignorant media/public/politik of the requirement to suddenly dump it for a nuke option, maybe been too much to ask.

Perhaps this is indeed a very well hidden obscure blessing???

 

[Scott Elaurant]

I have just been catching up with the conversation on the announced loss on cancelling the Attack class and the general question of AUKUS and who is responsible for what happened up to now. I think there are two separate issues and it is best not to mix them together. One is how the Attack Class contract was managed, and the other is the AUKUS / SSN decision and the cost of the Attack Class cancellation.

Regarding the AUKUS decision and going to SSNs, in my view that is correct. The security environment in the Indo Pacific has changed greatly since Xi Jinping came to power and started expanding the Chinese navy. There is now a substantial regional naval arms race and many nations are building advanced diesel subs. SSKs no longer appear “regionally superior” and so the SSNs are a great opportunity that Australia has been offered and would be foolish to refuse. Designing any new sub from scratch, even an “advanced Collins” takes years and would only delay the Collins getting replaced. We should proceed on the SSNs ASAP in my view.

It could be argued that the RAN should have decided on this course five or even ten years ago, but that does not make the AUKUS decision wrong now. If SSNs had been offered to Australia five or ten years ago then perhaps we should have done so, but I do not know if we were ever given that choice. Assuming that we were not, then some loss on cancelling the Attack Class was inevitable.

The management of the Attack Class contract is a subject I find very difficult to judge, with much conflicting information. That is where I would make my criticism - not the loss of time or money, which may have been unavoidable, but the inconsistent and inadequate information. We don’t know if it was good or bad, and the not knowing is the bad part. Defence assured us the Attack Class design was proceeding smothly for several years, but gave very few details of progress or costs, and then seemed to change its tune in switching to SSNs.

I am not expecting Defence to divulge design secrets or explain which part of the hull or sonar design was running late. But as public servants they have a legal obligation to inform the Senate (at least) of progress and any delivery risks. I am not clear they did that fully. Obviously, by giving few details, it makes it almost impossible to know whether the Attack contract was running smoothly or not. This makes it hard to take corrective action before it is too late if things go wrong. That is not satisfactory in my view.

in trying to get to the bottom of what the Attack Class (or SSNs) might cost, I have been reading public documents on each of the French, UK and USA submarine programs for cost benchmarks. Australian Defence project reporting is very poor by comparison. I don’t suggest they never have problems either (Suffren and Astute were both delivered years late) but they seem to report them sooner and with explanation of why. For example:

https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11826

Lastly, I have to say (and this is an Adelaide-centric view) that I was a bit surprised and disappointed by naval spending in the budget. There is no reference in Budget Paper 2 to any new expenditure at ASC on either SSN construction or dockyard upgrading in preparation for SSN construction. The latter bothers me most, because it delays when SSN construction can start. There is a small extra budget for ANSTO but nothing I saw for ARPANSA who would need to sign off nuclear safety protocols for construction before it could begin.

Just my view (I was a Commonwealth public servant back in the Howard era).

 

[John Fedup]

It would interesting to know if the French pressed Australian decision makers on the advantages of their SSN as compared to the denuked Attack class boats. I can understand why they may have been reluctant to do so at the time as anti-nuke sentiment was significant and the geopolitical situation was somewhat benign (although the negative trend was starting).

 

[Redlands18]

I will make an assumption here, that you are alluding to what Volk said above ? Because what Volk is saying is that had the proper timelines been kept Labor would have made the decision of the Collins replacement and that would already be about to enter service, meaning an AUKUS RAN SSN would then follow at the first of the on time Collins replacements would be paid off.

A decade + delay leaves us in this spot of bother no matter what action was taken by the current Government because Labor, and no not a political statement, rather a statement of fact, kicked the decision down the road because they would not touch it !

But it also does beg the question, had that been done and we were now sea trailing for first of the Collins replacements, would AUKUS and our access to nuclear sub tech still have happened ? well who knows !! Crystal balling of course

Cheers

Also would have given us a much more experienced Submarine building Workforce and would have made the transition to building the SSNs somewhat easier.

It would interesting to know if the French pressed Australian decision makers on the advantages of their SSN as compared to the denuked Attack class boats. I can understand why they may have been reluctant to do so at the time as anti-nuke sentiment was significant and the geopolitical situation was somewhat benign (although the negative trend was starting).

The French lack of a Life of Boat Reactor made the French SSN option a non starter as the British and US options would have been up until they took out the need for replacing the Reactor. The fact that the RAN will not have to replace either the PWR3 or the S9G Reactor has made Nuclear Power acceptable.

 

[spoz]

You are also making assumptions about what was included in the figure, not all of which will not be reutilised in any future boat. The construction yard, combat system grooming facilities and the products of some of the other contracts that were let will be reused whatever boat is chosen.

 

[MickB]

I think we need to commence designing an evolved Collins with SAAB ASAP. If nothing else, this would be a prudent risk mitigation strategy and should not wait 12 months until the AUKUS nuclear pathway is clearer.

There are so many risks with the nuclear option. Technical, regulatory, financial and not to mention political to name a few.

In one or two years time we can assess how an evolved Collins design is looking and consider whether or not to proceed with a build in the light of progress on the nuclear option.

This is a better position than where we are now.

Doing nothing to address the huge risks we face is not an option IMO.

With so many people bemoaning the loss of money on a sub that did not eventuate, you want to send x billions more on designing yet another sub.
As a new design not yet started it would not be ready any quicker than a proposed nuke.

To design it properly would take a significant portion of our skilled and experienced people, who I think would be better used to ensure the most efficient delivery of the nuc option.

 

[BSKS]

With so many people bemoaning the loss of money on a sub that did not eventuate, you want to send x billions more on designing yet another sub.
As a new design not yet started it would not be ready any quicker than a proposed nuke.

To design it properly would take a significant portion of our skilled and experienced people, who I think would be better used to ensure the most efficient delivery of the nuc option.

Yes, I agree, not ideal, but what is your backup plan/interim solution?

We have wasted 10 years and cannot afford another forced pivot in 5 years time if the Nuc's are delayed. At this stage we expect the first sub delivered by 2040, 18 years from now. If LOTE is successful, the Collins might just make it. If the SSN's are delayed we are faced with a second LOTE but that can only proceed if the hulls are still in good condition. i.e. Huge risk to service continuity.

History tells us that delay is a likely outcome and there is also a chance it could be abandoned altogether, but let's assume that doesn't occur.

While the SSN initiative is fantastic and the right direction, it makes sense to me to also work on a viable interim solution as a hedge against delay. If even a billion was spent on advancing an evolved Collins design, perhaps building on the LOTE design work (which also leverages some of the Attack class work), it would be money well spent given we are talking hundreds of billions for sub acquisition overall.

I don't need to mention the deteriorating geopolitical environment, but bottom line is we need this capability for the future and need to properly manage the contingencies.

 

[Scott Elaurant]

Designing an evolved Collins might have been a good idea ten years ago. But when you understand the shortest times (10+ years) nations experienced in submarine design have taken to get new designs completed and built, you realise it would only cause delay now.

 

[BSKS]

If you do that you’re almost guaranteed to get a future government selecting that option, especially if the sticker price is lower.

SSNs should be a national priority and are too big too fail. We need to throw whatever we need at it to make it work. This is well within the wit and wealth of Australia. The question is will.

Yes they could, but it would be a decision taking into account all of the relevant factors. Not least of which, the expected Nuc final delivery date and the strategic environment. Can we not conceive of an situation where an interim solution is required? What if delivery is delayed until 2050 or later? What if a second Collins LOTE is not viable?

The possibility of a nuclear sub capability is fantastic and should be a national priority so I agree with you on that, but it is very risky and we need to manage that risk. If it is delayed we need to pivot to a hopefully viable alternative.

 

[BSKS]

Designing an evolved Collins might have been a good idea ten years ago. But when you understand the shortest times (10+ years) nations experienced in submarine design have taken to get new designs completed and built, you realise it would only cause delay now.

Yes, I agree would have been great to do so 10 years ago and it would not be required if it delayed a relatively certain SSN delivery. But I don't think that describes our situation. We have an initiative only at this stage and very uncertain delivery schedule. We are not just building a sub, but a whole industry including the infrastructure and regulatory environment and then there are the political risks in the US. Same apply to a lesser extent in Australia.

We need a back plan...

 

[Scott Elaurant]

It would interesting to know if the French pressed Australian decision makers on the advantages of their SSN as compared to the denuked Attack class boats. I can understand why they may have been reluctant to do so at the time as anti-nuke sentiment was significant and the geopolitical situation was somewhat benign (although the negative trend was starting).

Quite apart from the LEU reactor and frequent refueling issue, I have two other concerns with the French option for SSNs.

First endurance and capability. Once the decision is made for Australia to go to SSN, endurance is really about supplies and number of days at sea. The French SSN is much smaller than Astutes or Virginias and its listed endurance is 70 days, presumably based on crew size and stores. (This is the same as the existing Collins Class). Whereas the Astutes and Virginias both have endurance of 90+days, depending on whether or not they also carry a special forces team.

The French sub is modern and stealthy, but much smaller than the Astutes and Virginias. The latter are faster, carry more weapons, and can carry larger sonar suites. They are simply more capable. Finally on capability, the Astutes and Virginias do not need refuelling, whereas the Barracuda SSNs would need to return to France every ten years to be refueled. The refuelling is quick, but the return voyage would make them unavailable for months each time this was done. I think when the Chief of Navy, who presumably was aware of any French SSN supply option, went to seek RN and USN help with their SSN designs, we should accept that he must have had good reasons for doing so.

Second is deliverability. France/Naval Group has never built SSNs at the maximum rate of the UK or USA, either now or during the cold war. Suffren was delivered three years late, after 8 years of design and 13 years of construction. Measured from the start of design, the Barracuda SSN is no more modern than Astute or Virginia SSNs. Naval has a fixed price contract with the French Navy to deliver four more Barracuda SSNs (2 launchd so far), after which they must build the replacement French SSBN class, which are also urgent.

They were also delayed by a fire on the SSN Perle in 2020, which obliged them to spend a year repairing the Perle by taking the bow half of the retired SSN Saphir and joining it to the Perle stern section. This was unlucky, but I see no reason to believe that France/Naval would be any quicker to help Australia build SSNs than UK or USA would be.

 

[Scott Elaurant]

Yes, I agree would have been great to do so 10 years ago and it would not be required if it delayed a relatively certain SSN delivery. But I don't think that describes our situation. We have an initiative only at this stage and very uncertain delivery schedule. We are not just building a sub, but a whole industry including the infrastructure and regulatory environment and then there are the political risks in the US. Same apply to a lesser extent in Australia.

We need a back plan...

If we did have to have a back plan, I would say it should be to take the best readily available SSK design that could be built here with as little modification as possible. To me, that would be the TKM Type 212 CD (Germany and Norway) or Type 218 (Singapore) submarines, that are now being built. They would have less range than the Attacks would have had, but the longest readily available in off-the-shelf designs, and would be capable in Australian waters. Presumably they would be fitted with the (Collins) US combat system. We would still gain/regain SS building capability, and the Germans have a good record at working with foreign buyers to build subs locally. This was how the South Korean sub building program got started.

 

[Stampede]

Had the Collins replacement kicked off prior to 2010, when it was required, the first Australian designed and built boat would be undergoing sea trials now.

Twelve conventional boats in service by 2040, is much better than a couple of SSNs entering service around 2040. The reality is, had we done this properly, AUKUS could still be looking to provide SSNs, but there wouldn't be a panic Collins LOTE, just a phased replacement of the older SSGs with SSNs.

Don't disagree that 12 conventionals would be better than 2 SSN's in 2040.
The reality is we just don't know in the public domain the "what and when" of our future SSN capability and the submarine force structure as we transition going forward.
Even when we get an updated plan it is difficult to believe that a program of this longevity will not have some bumps and changes along the way.
Many players and uncertainty with this SSN aspiration.

It may be a good outcome

However

Clarity is needed


Regards S

 

[BSKS]

If we did have to have a back plan, I would say it should be to take the best readily available SSK design that could be built here with as little modification as possible. To me, that would be the TKM Type 212 CD (Germany and Norway) or Type 218 (Singapore) submarines, that are now being built. They would have less range than the Attacks would have had, but the longest readily available in off-the-shelf designs, and would be capable in Australian waters. Presumably they would be fitted with the (Collins) US combat system. We would still gain/regain SS building capability, and the Germans have a good record at working with foreign buyers to build subs locally. This was how the South Korean sub building program got started.

If a Type 218 is the backup preference (BTW, back was a typo!), I would like to see a feasibility study on that too, esp the combat system integration that could be required.

But for me, evolving Collins builds on the already committed LOTE work and some Attack class work (which in a small way helps with the painful wasted money a bit?). I would expect an evolved Collins to have the same main motor, diesel's and electrical distribution system as the LOTE enhanced boats, as well as similar combat systems and possibly sonar since that was recently upgraded too. This commonality means much easier sustainment and an easier transition to operations for submariners. A TKM would be a whole new class and all the disruption that brings. In a sense the fact we have to perform LOTE means we have started evolving Collins anyway.

Your comment on Korea's experience in starting with a TKM design and now they have their own industry says more about ROK's approach to evolving existing designs than the association with TKM per se.

 

[Scott Elaurant]

BSKS

I don’t think going from Collins LOTE to a new evolved Collins Class would be that simple, and I do not know if any of the Attack Class work would be applicable. As I said, my first preference, by far, is to get on with building SSNs and not be distracted by any plan B. I respect we disagree and I will leave it at that.

The assumption that 12 conventionals would be better than 2 SSNs by 2040 is hypothetical and based on false premises. It assumes that (1) starting from scratch without an agreed design we could build 12 Conventionals by 2040 and (2) that we will only build 2 SSNs by 2040.

Neither of those things was/is planned by the RAN. If we had kept with the Attack Class program they would not have completed 4 conventional SSKs by 2040, not 12. Naval Group were targetting “mid 2030s” for first boat completed, with others following at a two year drumbeat. That would have given 3.5 SSKs completed by 2040 (launching in 2035, 2037, 2039…), That is best case assuming no further slippage. The first SSN has been reported as likely by a similar timeframe.