Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0

Basically usually when we have had a change of government the incoming mob have looked at all the shiny new gear either in service or entering service and assume they can sit on their backsides for a term or two before doing anything.

  • As time goes by they are finally made to realise that the world has moved on and the gear we have is insufficient.
  • They then decide to upgrade existing gear to give themselves some breathing space to decide what to do long term.
  • Government may change at this point but their hands are tied.
  • What they decide to do takes longer than planned so more upgrades are required.
  • Government may change at this point but their hands are tied.
  • Finally the new gear starts to arrive , usually after the old gear has fallen apart.
  • A new or the old government is comfortable with all the new shiny gear so sits back and does nothing.
  • Cycle starts again.
Its bad enough when the new gear is a trio of DDGs, but when its patrol frigates or patrol boats we are in real trouble, because the new stuff isn't as good as the older stuff that has yet to be replaced.

Many here realise, but some wont, that the FFGs were actually patrol frigates, designed as replacements for the convoy escorting DEs in USN service. Although equipped with the same Standard SM-1 and Mk-13 launcher as the DDGs, there were not DDGs, lacking the 3D radar, command and control systems and additional fire control channels of the destroyers. There were more capable than the in service River Class DEs because they were newer with more modern systems but in truth the DEs were the pinnacle of early post war ASW escort design, its just that they were built for too long and then upgraded and retained well beyond their usefulness. The replacement for the Type 12 Frigates (that the DEs were based on) in the RN were the Leanders, the Type 22 Broadswords and then the still in service Type 23s, we replaced ours with ANZACs.

So basically the RN went Type 12, Type 12M (Leander), Type 22 (the Type 21 Amazons were in there as well as an interim acquisition), Type 23 and now Type 26. We went Type 12, ANZAC, Type 26 over the same time frame, relying on expensive, inefficient upgrades and life extensions to stretch the capability and to skip generations.

Not as bad as pretending the FFGs are area air defence ships, we still acquired an AEGIS frigate and called it a destroyer when what the RAn needed was either a larger more capable design, or more hulls of the good enough Hobarts.
Actually SWAN and TORRENS were Leander's not Type 12 and the FFG-7 and DDG-2 both had the same number of FC Channels for SM-1 I think. The DDG-2 had additional AAW capabilities particularly post mod but no Harpoon and no Helo so the 2 classes complemented each other well.
 

ASSAIL

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
So much talk, so many instant solutions, this thread has been full of fanciful suggestions for the surface fleet!
However, the means by which the RAN can gain lethality in the most decisive way is underwater and I believe we are currently on this track.
The PM’s increased manpower announcement this am has indicated the the submarine workforce needs to increase from around 900 to 2000 with the introduction of SSNs and it seems they will be introduced in some form much earlier than we have all assumed and if I controlled the treasure there would be 12 nukes not 8.
This would be an effective deterrent and a strategic problem, way in excess of adding more MFUs, for any aggressor.
 
TBH isn't more Hobarts kinda dead on arrival? I mean, the production lines both here and in Spain are half a decade cold.

What might be doable reasonably quickly (well, quicker than current plans...) is a Hunter-minus... Take the base Type-26 hull and basically just shove the current ANZAC AMCAP upgrade radar and combat system aboard. Not as capable as a full CEAFAR2+AEGIS-9LV-hybrid setup intended for the Hunters but considerably lighter weight meaning no need for major hull redesigns that (per the marginally coherent noise in the media) seems to be one of the big hold-ups on the Hunters.
The only quick option to supplement the RAN surface fleet in a substantial way would be to acquire 2nd hand vessels with all the risks associated with that pathway. RAN could acquire on a hot handover basis an excess USN CG-47 which would bring a lot of VLS to the table and after a 12 -18 month refit would be good for 20 years further service consistent with USN plans. Ships commissioned in the 90s are available. 122 VLS anyone? Crew in RAN service approx. 300.
 

SMC

Member
The only quick option to supplement the RAN surface fleet in a substantial way would be to acquire 2nd hand vessels with all the risks associated with that pathway. RAN could acquire on a hot handover basis an excess USN CG-47 which would bring a lot of VLS to the table and after a 12 -18 month refit would be good for 20 years further service consistent with USN plans. Ships commissioned in the 90s are available. 122 VLS anyone? Crew in RAN service approx. 300.
Short cuts make long delays. The USN is struggling to meet it's own operational needs without on-selling hulls to us. And although I do note USN plans to keep some of their Ticonderoga-class ships in service till the late '30's, does that not show how strapped they are for hulls? With exception to the future subs, we are going to have to plan and build ourselves out of this current bind.
 

John Newman

The Bunker Group
So much talk, so many instant solutions, this thread has been full of fanciful suggestions for the surface fleet!
However, the means by which the RAN can gain lethality in the most decisive way is underwater and I believe we are currently on this track.
The PM’s increased manpower announcement this am has indicated the the submarine workforce needs to increase from around 900 to 2000 with the introduction of SSNs and it seems they will be introduced in some form much earlier than we have all assumed and if I controlled the treasure there would be 12 nukes not 8.
This would be an effective deterrent and a strategic problem, way in excess of adding more MFUs, for any aggressor.
Well said.

Yes the RAN 2.0 Thread is building up to fantasy fleets, yet again.
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Actually SWAN and TORRENS were Leander's not Type 12 and the FFG-7 and DDG-2 both had the same number of FC Channels for SM-1 I think. The DDG-2 had additional AAW capabilities particularly post mod but no Harpoon and no Helo so the 2 classes complemented each other well.
Nope Swan and Torrens were not Leanders they were modified River Class DEs based on the original Type 12 but with a new profile bridge that looked similar to the Leander. That said the Leanders were modified Type 12s, notably with helicopter facilities. The DDGs had two fire control channels the FFG had one plus the ability to use the gun fire control channel for the missiles. The RANs DDGs were modified to fire Harpoon.

They can only complement each other when available, i.e. once the DDGs retired, without replacement, the point was moot.
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Well said.

Yes the RAN 2.0 Thread is building up to fantasy fleets, yet again.
But it is fun ;)

All the ideal solutions are long term because of decisions made going back decades. Back in 2012 I was in on discussions that the replacement submarine program had already been delayed to the point that there would likely be a serious capability gap. Since then we chose an indigenous design with an evolved Collins as a back up, scrapped that to go for a Japanese build of a Japanese design, scrapped that for a conventional version of a French SSN and now that's been scrapped in favour of an SSN sometime in the future. Four distinctly different plans in the place of ten years, for a critical capability that the experts were already warning had been left hanging for far too long.

This is the result of too many MBAs, too many Engineers Australia cornflakes packet Chartered Engineers and too many delusional politicians who think they know it all or can twist it to political advantage. Time for technically competent people to be allowed to do their jobs and to be listen to when they provide advice. Time to plan, implement and stick to it.
 
Nope Swan and Torrens were not Leanders they were modified River Class DEs based on the original Type 12 but with a new profile bridge that looked similar to the Leander. That said the Leanders were modified Type 12s, notably with helicopter facilities. The DDGs had two fire control channels the FFG had one plus the ability to use the gun fire control channel for the missiles. The RANs DDGs were modified to fire Harpoon.

They can only complement each other when available, i.e. once the DDGs retired, without replacement, the point was moot.
Actually the SWAN and Torrens had Leander hulls unlike the previous four and this can clearly be seen in photos. Internals were very different between the first four and the latter two as well.

from RAN website Swan and her sister ship, Torrens, were the final two River Class DEs constructed for the RAN. The first four ships, Parramatta (III), Yarra, Stuart and Derwent, were modified versions of the Royal Navy's Type ‘12’ Whitby and Rothesay Class frigates both of which displayed very good sea keeping qualities. Swan and Torrens (II) were a derivation of the Royal Navy's Leander Class general purpose frigate, which was itself a development of the Type ‘12’.


DDG-2 had 2 X SPG-51 for the Tartar System where as FFG-7 had the CAS and the STIR each system effectively providing 2 channels. Albeit the DDG-2 channels were better eg longer effective range.

The DDGs were never modified properly to fire Harpoon whilst the Mk-13 launcher could fire it they lacked the SWG-1A panel necessary to effectively utilize the missile being restricted to BOL only. The RAN cancelled the panels earmarked for the DDGs.
 
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Short cuts make long delays. The USN is struggling to meet it's own operational needs without on-selling hulls to us. And although I do note USN plans to keep some of their Ticonderoga-class ships in service till the late '30's, does that not show how strapped they are for hulls? With exception to the future subs, we are going to have to plan and build ourselves out of this current bind.
no the USN is going through a CG-47 upgrade but they cant afford to do all of them hence spare ships and early decommissions. Building from scratch especially in Australia will take 10 years assuming we can even generate the additional workforce to do it.
 

Pusser01

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
They can only complement each other when available, i.e. once the DDGs retired, without replacement, the point was moot.
Having served on FFG's & briefly Hobart before she paid off, the only advantages that I could see the DDG had over FFG's was NGS & providing the AIC when conducting fighter control, access to a 3DR in the SPS-52C. I remember arguing with some RAAF ASOPS when I was attached to 3CRU, who claimed their TPS-43 was a 3DR based on the fact it gave height because it read the aircrafts IFF ;)
 

Bob53

Well-Known Member
This is the first election I can remember where both sides are promising to increase defence spending.
[/QUOTE]
The problem is we are the victim of our own political system, eg, three year term of Government.

Get elected, spend first year settling in, second year start implementing policy, third year plan to get re-elected again, repeat endlessly.

As much as it pains me to say it (especially when a party I don’t support is in Government), we need more stable Government by having longer terms in charge.

A friend said this to me many decades ago:

“What we need is a ‘benevolent’ dictator, put them in charge and give them a 10 year plan to complete, at the end of 10 years, take them out the back, shoot them, and put in the next one with the following 10 year plan”.

Extreme? Maybe, maybe not, think about it.
I have the same view of marriage. It should be a 10 year term and at the end you can decide to renew the contract :)
 

ddxx

Well-Known Member
Global uncertainty does seem to plant the seeds for change.


Regards S
And as it should - it’s a real world reminder that as per the DSU we no longer have the luxury of a decade warning window.

It’s unfortunate that so many cling to the long dead ‘defence of Australia’ ideology as if it’s the primary driver of national strategy.

Australia’s most likely and obvious threats are to its interests - I.e. in our inner region. Which requires a wholistic and ambitious approach beyond just Defence.
 
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Massive

Well-Known Member
the submarine workforce needs to increase from around 900 to 2000 with the introduction of SSNs and it seems they will be introduced in some form much earlier than we have all assumed and if I controlled the treasure there would be 12 nukes not 8.
Could not agree more.

Observing the Ukraine I also feel that there needs to be a significant land-attack capability - which to me tips the balance towards the Virginia class - either Block IV or V.

In terms of getting the capability sooner - unless it involved Arkansas & Utah (if Block IV) or Oklahoma & Arizona (Block V) it is going to be 10 years.

Feels like a long time in the world we now live in & is changing so rapidly.

Regards,

Massive
 

Redlands18

Well-Known Member
Could not agree more.

Observing the Ukraine I also feel that there needs to be a significant land-attack capability - which to me tips the balance towards the Virginia class - either Block IV or V.

In terms of getting the capability sooner - unless it involved Arkansas & Utah (if Block IV) or Oklahoma & Arizona (Block V) it is going to be 10 years.

Feels like a long time in the world we now live in & is changing so rapidly.

Regards,

Massive
I would be doubtful the Blk V is in the mix, not sure they can be built as Osborn and Submarines with 40 SLCMs may not be politically acceptable. One thing about the way the UK does it without using VLS and using Torpedo Tubes only, is it gives a greater flexibility with your weapons load. The Virginia's can only deploy SLCMs from the VLS at present. The ability to carry 38 Weapons in the Torpedo room would suggest a lot more room in this area and that may appeal to the RAN going forward, especially if you are looking at deploying UUVs going forward.
 

braddmlewis

New Member
I would be doubtful the Blk V is in the mix, not sure they can be built as Osborn and Submarines with 40 SLCMs may not be politically acceptable. One thing about the way the UK does it without using VLS and using Torpedo Tubes only, is it gives a greater flexibility with your weapons load. The Virginia's can only deploy SLCMs from the VLS at present. The ability to carry 38 Weapons in the Torpedo room would suggest a lot more room in this area and that may appeal to the RAN going forward, especially if you are looking at deploying UUVs going forward.
I think the wild card here is Hypersonics. If you want to field them it would seem to be the only platform to field them would be a VPM solution likely a block V. Remember these boats are going to be in service long after we are mostly gone and by then UAV and Hypersonic support will be key. For that reason alone i think we would be acquiring a boat with future limitations if we go Astute.
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
no the USN is going through a CG-47 upgrade but they cant afford to do all of them hence spare ships and early decommissions. Building from scratch especially in Australia will take 10 years assuming we can even generate the additional workforce to do it.
USN are desperately trying to retire their older Ticonderoga as they are structurally aging to the point they cannot safely or reliably deploy. That is they are suffering cracking in tanks and below water compartments resulting in flooding.

Ticos, like the Kidd's may have been an attractive option in the 90s and 2000s, now they are so worn out we would be facing a repeat of Kanimbla Manoora. The fact they have state of the art systems is irrelevent if the platform is too compromised to deploy.
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Actually the SWAN and Torrens had Leander hulls unlike the previous four and this can clearly be seen in photos. Internals were very different between the first four and the latter two as well.

from RAN website Swan and her sister ship, Torrens, were the final two River Class DEs constructed for the RAN. The first four ships, Parramatta (III), Yarra, Stuart and Derwent, were modified versions of the Royal Navy's Type ‘12’ Whitby and Rothesay Class frigates both of which displayed very good sea keeping qualities. Swan and Torrens (II) were a derivation of the Royal Navy's Leander Class general purpose frigate, which was itself a development of the Type ‘12’.


DDG-2 had 2 X SPG-51 for the Tartar System where as FFG-7 had the CAS and the STIR each system effectively providing 2 channels. Albeit the DDG-2 channels were better eg longer effective range.

The DDGs were never modified properly to fire Harpoon whilst the Mk-13 launcher could fire it they lacked the SWG-1A panel necessary to effectively utilize the missile being restricted to BOL only. The RAN cancelled the panels earmarked for the DDGs.
If you want to look at it that way then the Type 22 and Type 82 are both Leanders. Their hull forms were a development of the Leander. Even within the Leanders there were the original form and the later Broad Beam version.

Nit pick as much as you like, I haven't even reached for my copies of Brown or Friedman to start citing references yet.
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
And as it should - it’s a real world reminder that as per the DSU we no longer have the luxury of a decade warning window.

It’s unfortunate that so many cling to the long dead ‘defence of Australia’ ideology as if it’s the primary driver of national strategy.

Australia’s most likely and obvious threats are to its interests - I.e. in our inner region. Which requires a wholistic and ambitious approach beyond just Defence.
The post defence of Australia and post cold war thinking when we knew we didn't know what was coming in the early 90s is probably the best fit to the current strategic situation.

The end of the cold war introduced uncertainty and removed a lot of political stability in regards to superpower rivalry containing the ambitions of various other parties. The only certainty was the threat was no longer four man insurgent teams operating in northern Australia. The focus was very much on our inner region and what was required to protect our interests there.

This led to thinking in terms of securing trade routes, controlling choke points and having versatile, adaptable force options to respond to a variety of not clearly defined threats. Recasting the security problem in this way exposed serious limitations in our force structure and equipment.

Competing with this was the "peace dividend" delivered by the new world order.

Basically, as we realised that our defence force was too small and two specialised, financial pressures came into play preventing the increase in size, capability and flexibility that was seen to be needed.

The defence capability review in the late 90s attempted to cut the "tail" and enhance the "teeth" but actually lead to further hollowing out of capability by outsourcing if not just outright cutting support and enabling capability.

Timor showed up the many holes and assumptions, but then the War on Terror intervened and saw a switch to counter insurgency and border protection as the main priorities. This in turn led to an expeditionary mindset, and providing niche capabilities to allied operations.

The key remains geography, what do we need to effectively operate in and to defend our region, with, or without assistance from our allies.
 

vonnoobie

Well-Known Member
no the USN is going through a CG-47 upgrade but they cant afford to do all of them hence spare ships and early decommissions. Building from scratch especially in Australia will take 10 years assuming we can even generate the additional workforce to do it.
The USN has been trying to retire the for years, of their current ones a few are early analog systems that struggle today to see some missile threats not counting fact they are costly to operate. So they are an aging ship falling apart many of them not so advanced and expensive to operate. Quite literally to get anything out of them you would need a new hull, machinery, replace 80% of the systems and spend more time and money trying to save a few items which probably won't turn out any cheaper then going new.

Nothing we do today will get us any ships in a short time frame that can hold their own on the line. The best we can do is aim to speed up our efforts in bringing our current plans forward as much as safely possible to do so.

Between China and Russia's actions this year no nation will be selling off their kit so even if their was once a possibility of a solid purchase at low cost requiring minimal work that has well and truly passed in the last two weeks.
 
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