John Fedup
The Bunker Group
Could the region location be responsible for the varying opinions about UNESCO?
2. It's not about Israel. The very structure of the UNHRC is made to facilitate scapegoating and deflection. It is populated by a majority of serious human rights violators, which almost never get condemned in any way.Are the UNHCR & UNESCO doing more harm than good? That's debatable and it depends upon where you sit in the room doesn't it. Some people will have a particularly jaundiced view of it because them doesn't they don't fit into their political world view or bend to their political will. For example US right wing conservatives, the Israeli far right, the CCP, and various far left wing organisations around the world. It doesn't help that some UN members with hold their annual dues and payments for political reasons. Both those two organisations do good on the the ground where they are most needed. That's what is important.
Nonetheless there have been refugees/displaced persons who have benefited from assistance provided by UNHRC; for them it made a big difference.The very structure of the UNHRC is made to facilitate scapegoating and deflection. It is populated by a majority of serious human rights violators, which almost never get condemned in any way.
9. The UNHRC works as an aggregator for money and activities. Therefore it will always have some activities and some money, the latter donated by all UN members. They all donate willingly of course, each to how much they agree to donate.Nonetheless there have been refugees/displaced persons who have benefited from assistance provided by UNHRC; for them it made a big difference.
In a lot of cases literally the difference between life and death.
I suspect that had the UAE actually pulled out of Yemen and abandoned the Saudi-led coalition, it wouldn't be getting targeted right now, which raises the question; is it Iran that's aggressive? I suspect Iran will both the Saudis and the UAE peace, if they withdrawn from Yemen completely. It has been my impression for some time that this is the endgame for both Iran and the Houthis, a complete victory, and a total expulsion of the Saudi coalition from Yemen.Iran attacks its neighbors directly, knowing full well that they are close enough to retaliate strongly. It does so, because of its perception that they are weak and so it has more to gain than lose.
Drones Suspected In Yemeni Rebels' Multi-Target Attack On UAE (Updated)
This is the first official confirmation that the Yemeni rebel group has struck inside the UAE.www.thedrive.com
Its talks with UAE are a farce. Iran has no intentions of having peace with it, nor with Saudi Arabia, or anyone else in the region that isn't easy to subdue.
In this region countries understand strength. Not just military strength but political one. A country that isn't consistent in its policy will quickly make enemies.
With its political stumble with Iran, its dealings with China, and faded prospects of an F-35 buy, the UAE appears to be a less reliable ally than its reputation has shown only a year ago.
It vowed to respond harshly against Iran. The severity of its response will be a determining factor of its balance with Iran.
Deterrence is the best peacemaker, and since the UAE has more to lose than Iran, it doesn't have many choices here.
Is that even remotely possible? Houthis are winning some battles but they do not have this capability to conquer all of Yemen (see these maps). The maps of Yemen on the front-lines and religious divide tells me it is impossible for one group to rule alone.It has been my impression for some time that this is the endgame for both Iran and the Houthis, a complete victory, and a total expulsion of the Saudi coalition from Yemen.
The Saudi led coalition would like to leave but only if it can achieve a face saving agreement. Unless that happens they can't leave; too much prestige at stake and Yemen is currently the main ''front' in the longstanding Cold War being fought between Iran and the Gulf Arabs; which also involves Lebanon, Iraq and Syria. In Iraq and Syria the Iranians have gained the upper hand; due to a variety of reasons; including flawed and short sighted U.S, policy. The ability of the Houthis to maintain various forms of attacks; whilst not decisive; is taking a huge political toll on the Saudi ''coalition of the willing''. Unlike Nasser who was able to cut his losses and leave; the Saudi ''coalition of the willing'' can't. Iran too would like a cessation of hostilities at it wants to focus on areas closer to home and assistance provided to the Houthis is soaking up a lot of resources.It has been my impression for some time that this is the endgame for both Iran and the Houthis, a complete victory, and a total expulsion of the Saudi coalition from Yemen.
I have a feeling that it might be one of those things that looks impossible, but meanwhile, quietly, builds over the years and becomes an inevitability. The Houthis are winning battles on the ground inside Yemen, and slowly but surely pushing back the Saudis and their proxies. Even with foreign support the Hadis are losing, and that foreign support is getting costlier and costlier. If the Saudis and UAE don't withdraw support, they will continue to bleed, including at home. If they do withdraw support, the Hadis could face total collapse.Is that even remotely possible? Houthis are winning some battles but they do not have this capability to conquer all of Yemen (see these maps). The maps of Yemen on the front-lines and religious divide tells me it is impossible for one group to rule alone.
Just because 3 people were killed and 6 were injured after a Houthi drone attack on the UAE does not mean the surrender of Saudi or UAE interests in the outcome of war in Yemen — it’s a pin prick attack in the greater scheme of things.
There is too much at stake for them to withdraw without a face saving formula. Withdrawing will be politically damaging; an admission that they have failed and will further embolden the Iranians who already have the upper hand in Iraq and Syria. We know that the UAE and Iran are engaged in talks; safe to assume that Yemen will be on the agenda.If the Saudis and UAE don't withdraw support, they will continue to bleed, including at home. If they do withdraw support, the Hadis could face total collapse.
There's a point at which they lose too much. Where is that point? How many costs/casualties are they willing to incur? There has already been a distinct shift in the manner of Saudi involvement, and it has much to do with minimizing direct costs. I don't know but I'm fairly confident that point exists. Unless the Saudis are willing to make the Iranians pay similar costs, this won't end well for them.There is too much at stake for them to withdraw without a face saving formula. Withdrawing will be politically damaging; an admission that they have failed and will further embolden the Iranians who already have the upper hand in Iraq and Syria.
I could be wrong but there is no way they can leave at this point. Unless they reach a point where they can; they will stay the course as for them there's way too much at stake. Saudi and it's ''coalition of the willing'' are in fierce competition with Iran for influence in the region. Withdrawing from Yemen at this stage will be a major setback for them and will be a major victory for Iran. For Saudi and its allies some agreement is needed with Iran and the recent announcement of talks between Iran and the UAE points in this direction. Iran too badly needs a way out.There's a point at which they lose too much. Where is that point? How many costs/casualties are they willing to incur?
Agreed. It is possible that this point may be reached in the future; and if it does, Iran would have 'won' in this proxy war. But the costs incurred by Iran (up to this point), is also substantial. All parties seem to lack the prospect of an end-game — ultimately, hard power has real consequences in the Middle East.There's a point at which they lose too much. Where is that point? How many costs/casualties are they willing to incur? There has already been a distinct shift in the manner of Saudi involvement, and it has much to do with minimizing direct costs. I don't know but I'm fairly confident that point exists. Unless the Saudis are willing to make the Iranians pay similar costs, this won't end well for them.
Not to veer off topic but Pollack also writes about logistics being one of the sole areas where the Libyans performed well. Despite being thousands of KM away from Libya; the Libyan expeditionary force in Tanzania was never short of anything.Abu Dhabi deployed and sustained a brigade-sized force in combat in Yemen for roughly five years and supported armored advances of up to 100 kilometers in that war.
Doubt it. It is Assad which needs to further ingratiate himself with Russia. He needs Russia. By continuing to provide Assad with diplomatic and other kinds of support; Russia is already providing more than enough assurance. As for the danger of friction; we can safely assume that Israel and Russia will be communicating as they have been doing over the years. The joint patrols are probably directed at the U.S. to show that Russia is a player in the region and also has its own interests to safeguard and it's allies to support.This here may be a move to reassure Assad and gain his favor, but it vastly increases the friction risk.