Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0

[John Newman]

In regards to the shipbuilding plan, and Hunter's well-known timeline changes, I'm trying to understand how continuous shipbuilding is possible given this and known fleet size? Ship One is now scheduled for Delivery in 2031, with the delay to be recovered by Ship Four which was originally scheduled for late 2034. (source)

Even if then the remaining five hunters and 3 future Hobart replacements are then built on a two-year drumbeat, there's a significant gap of time remaining before Hunter's replacement is required (assuming a 25 year service life). That gap becomes even more significant if you assume a 30 year service life.

I'd be interested in others thoughts as I can't quite see how this all works from a continuous shipbuilding perspective without additional hulls being built? Am I missing something here?

You make it sound like the NSP is already a failure, maybe we should go back to the old ways of naval shipbuilding, build a class as fast as possible, shut the yard down for many years, and repeat.

No doubt the NSP faces challenges, every plan faces challenges, there is very little certainty in life.

In the coming decades I can see many ways ‘gaps’ can be filled in to achieve continuous shipbuilding.

1. Additional FFGs before the DDG replacement.

2. Additional DDGs before the replacement Hunter FFGs.

3. Construction of ‘gap fillers’ between the end of the FFGs and replacement DDGs.

4. The gap fillers could be complete ships or block work for ships built at Henderson.

In the coming decades we will no doubt see fine tuning from time to time, assuming future Federal Governments remain committed to the NSP, there will be ways to make it work.

 

[ddxx]

You make it sound like the NSP is already a failure, maybe we should go back to the old ways of naval shipbuilding, build a class as fast as possible, shut the yard down for many years, and repeat.

No doubt the NSP faces challenges, every plan faces challenges, there is very little certainty in life.

In the coming decades I can see many ways ‘gaps’ can be filled in to achieve continuous shipbuilding.

1. Additional FFGs before the DDG replacement.

2. Additional DDGs before the replacement Hunter FFGs.

3. Construction of ‘gap fillers’ between the end of the FFGs and replacement DDGs.

4. The gap fillers could be complete ships or block work for ships built at Henderson.

In the coming decades we will no doubt see fine tuning from time to time, assuming future Federal Governments remain committed to the NSP, there will be ways to make it work.

Not at all, I completely agree with everything you have said above.

Where I'm a bit perplexed however is that the continuous shipbuilding plan doesn't actually appear to be continuous without future changes and additions, such as your suggestions above. That would be quite easily fixed with clarity surrounding the size of the future surface combatant fleet.

I think it's fair to expect public policies and plans to both align with and support one another?

 

[John Newman]

Not at all, I completely agree with everything you have said above.

Where I'm a bit perplexed however is that the continuous shipbuilding plan doesn't actually appear to be continuous without future changes and additions, such as your suggestions above. That would be quite easily fixed with clarity surrounding the size of the future surface combatant fleet.

I think it's fair to expect public policies and plans to both align with and support one another?

I think you are way over thinking this.

You are looking for answers today that won’t be addressed, or need to be addressed, for another two decades.

The NSP is the skeleton for the future, it’s not totally complete, still needs some meat on the bone, no multi decade plan remains unchanged.

Mate, sit back, relax, have a beer or two (or a JB or two), and enjoy the Christmas break, ok?

If we get well into the 2030s and there are no answers, then let’s start to worry then, ok?

 

[ngatimozart]

I think you are way over thinking this.

You are looking for answers today that won’t be addressed, or need to be addressed, for another two decades.

The NSP is the skeleton for the future, it’s not totally complete, still needs some meat on the bone, no multi decade plan remains unchanged.

Mate, sit back, relax, have a beer or two (or a JB or two), and enjoy the Christmas break, ok?

If we get well into the 2030s and there are no answers, then let’s start to worry then, ok?

Spot on.

How come you're still capable of of typing and coherent? I thought that you would be six sheets to the wind celebrating the cricket win.

 

[oldsig127]

Where I'm a bit perplexed however is that the continuous shipbuilding plan doesn't actually appear to be continuous without future changes and additions, such as your suggestions above. That would be quite easily fixed with clarity surrounding the size of the future surface combatant fleet.

I think it's fair to expect public policies and plans to both align with and support one another?

You better go back and read RAN thread 1.0

It was always planned that the life of type would be reduced to avoid the cost of mid life rebuilds. RAN would end up with continually improving assets and reduced ongoing costs for supporting old vessels. The drumbeat was set based on the number of frigates and destroyers required and the shorter expected life span, and the yard sized to allow the drumbeat to be shortened if we needed to expand the fleet.

All a matter of public record. One of my abiding memories of watching Senate Estimates is of CN explains how that worked for both OPVs and MFUs to Senator "thick as a bag of hammers" Hanson and her being utterly incapable of understanding.

I might add that "clarity surrounding the size" etc. (or rather the rarity of 30year horizon crystal balls) is one of the principal reasons it's intended to do this.

oldsig

(Edit: Sorry @John Newman, I've just managed to partly repeat your post. I should read ahead. Not 30 years though)

 

[oldsig127]

Spot on.

How come you're still capable of of typing and coherent? I thought that you would be six sheets to the wind celebrating the cricket win.

I blame that for repeating @JNs post. Yeah, that. Not old age and PPP)

oldsig127

 

[ddxx]

I think you are way over thinking this.

You are looking for answers today that won’t be addressed, or need to be addressed, for another two decades.

The NSP is the skeleton for the future, it’s not totally complete, still needs some meat on the bone, no multi decade plan remains unchanged.

Mate, sit back, relax, have a beer or two (or a JB or two), and enjoy the Christmas break, ok?

If we get well into the 2030s and there are no answers, then let’s start to worry then, ok?

I'll take any excuse for another beer - fair call!

 

[rand0m]

Possibly a silly question. When I look at the cost of the Arafura class they are stated circa $300m per ship (2018) - ref Wiki. But then if you look other countries higher spec ships such as the TNI Martadinata-class Frigate that allegedly cost the same or even less than the Arafura class OPV.

Do the Australian government measure the "cost" of a ship differently or are we paying a premium? (ie possibly due to being built here?).

 

[Redlands18]

Possibly a silly question. When I look at the cost of the Arafura class they are stated circa $300m per ship (2018) - ref Wiki. But then if you look other countries higher spec ships such as the TNI Martadinata-class Frigate that allegedly cost the same or even less than the Arafura class OPV.

Do the Australian government measure the "cost" of a ship differently or are we paying a premium? (ie possibly due to being built here?).

First problem is you are referencing Wiki, not considered reliable. The Australian Government doesn't actually release the construction price per Ship cost but only the entire project costs for the program. In this case it is Project Sea 1158 phase 1 and the cost has been given as about $5B for 12 Vessels but that includes the costs of setting up the Shipyard, Trg of workers etc, all the other costs involved in getting a ship to acceptance.

 

[John Fedup]

The Canadian AOPS program also included infrastructure costs and another two ships were added for the CCGS. Not sure if the life cycle costs were included for AOPS, probably not but they are for the CSC. I believe Australia’s ship building plan factors in life cycle costs and money infrastructure costs. Bottom line, domestic builds cost more but this is offset by local tradespeople support and a domestic supply chain.

 

[Volkodav]

Not specifically related to the RAN, but more in regards to Australian shipbuilding, I noticed an interesting quote in a piece sponsored by Babcock:

With a low cost, unique modular design and open architecture combat system, the Arrowhead 140 has had significant interest from navies across the world, with five live campaigns currently underway. “This provides a great opportunity for Babcock in Australia to support the local region” says Davis. “It would be great to see Australia become a regional hub for building, fitting out or supporting Arrowhead 140 and given the level of interest generated in the region, that is certainly a possibility worth exploring.” (Andy Davis, Babcock’s Managing Director - Defence)

Babcock Australasia delivering genuine maritime sovereign capability

If you look at the original requirement for the ANZACs the Arrowhead 140 would fit the bill quite well, better infact than the ANZACs did.

The decision was deliberately made to go for eight patrol frigates, fitted for but not with a variety of systems, instead of six high end ASW frigates fully outfitted as such from the start.

With three DDGs and six FFGs all ready in service and planned for long term like for like replacement, this was not seen as and issue. It could be argued in hindsight, that a smaller number of high end ASW would have actually been less suitable and versatile than the ANZACs have proven to be (following the failure the adequately replace the high end DDGs/FFGs in a timely and effective manner).

Anyway, long term, rather than up-arming the Arafuras perhaps a better option would be to look at cascading them to replace the MCMVs, Survey vessels, Capes (RAN and Border Force) as well as look at using them as a modern APD (assault transport) for SOF and CD missions etc. and HADR. Their RAN role could then be taken on by a new build corvette / GP frigate such as the Arrowhead 140 / Type 31/32. Looking at the base Iver Huitfeldt, it can even have a 32 cell Mk41 VLS.

 

[ddxx]

If you look at the original requirement for the ANZACs the Arrowhead 140 would fit the bill quite well, better infact than the ANZACs did.

The decision was deliberately made to go for eight patrol frigates, fitted for but not with a variety of systems, instead of six high end ASW frigates fully outfitted as such from the start.

With three DDGs and six FFGs all ready in service and planned for long term like for like replacement, this was not seen as and issue. It could be argued in hindsight, that a smaller number of high end ASW would have actually been less suitable and versatile than the ANZACs have proven to be (following the failure the adequately replace the high end DDGs/FFGs in a timely and effective manner).

Anyway, long term, rather than up-arming the Arafuras perhaps a better option would be to look at cascading them to replace the MCMVs, Survey vessels, Capes (RAN and Border Force) as well as look at using them as a modern APD (assault transport) for SOF and CD missions etc. and HADR. Their RAN role could then be taken on by a new build corvette / GP frigate such as the Arrowhead 140 / Type 31/32. Looking at the base Iver Huitfeldt, it can even have a 32 cell Mk41 VLS.

I couldn't agree more, the flexibility the platform provides is pretty impressive: AH140 Brochure

The base design allows for up to 32 strike length Mk-41 cells, four large mission bays for RHIBS, containerised systems or USV/UUVs, a range of 9,000 nmi, and a top speed over 28 knots - all with a core crew of under 100. And according to a recent interview, it's also capable of fielding Aegis.

Both the UK and US are moving away from dedicated MCM vessels, and rather embracing (relatively) smaller multirole surface combatants as the delivery platform for autonomous systems. To me this makes a lot sense, as it provides much more through-life flexibility alongside adding weight to their respective surface combatant fleets with potentially similar total crew requirements.

 

[ngatimozart]

If you are looking for a corvette, you have to define the requirement. You want something that is bigger and more fighty than an OPV but not as big as or as fighty as an FFG. I think that a 6,000 tonne frigate is somewhat of an overkill. Something in the range of 3,000 - 3,500 tonnes is probably far better. This will be 1,000 - 500 tonnes lighter than the ANZACs. Said corvette doesn't require 32 Mk-41 VLS or all the bells and whistles of a 6,000 tonne frigate. It's not going to take on a PLAN CBG on its lonesome.

 

[StingrayOZ]

Size probably isn't the key factor.

Crewing probably is, over the life of the ship, in pretty much any modern western nation, the crewing costs will far exceed procurement platform costs. It is fairly easy to allocate budget to build or buy, much harder to recruit, train, retain, crew. Particularly as the RAN and the ADF are expanding in other areas.

Australia isn't particularly/overtly concerned with costs of things like steel, labor to manufacture, fuel, engines, combat systems, radars, and soon missiles etc. Many of these things can be supplied locally, and across the fleet. There is a priority for endurance and range as those have significant effects on availability, operation and projection of power.

The A140 is particularly attractive due to its potential low crewing and its ability to carry sizable arms like a 5", 32VLS, 8 x antishipping missiles, torpedo's and CIWS (although no longer a minimally crewed frigate).

With Corvettes, crewing quickly escalates, why have a 2000t corvette with a crew of 80-90 with a crew of a 90 gets to Mogami, or 100 could get you into a A140. The A140/Type31 also has the advantage of a RN crew pool to assist training or pilfer/lateral recruit off.

Niche capability in the RAN still means 3 ships minimum (1 continuously deployed), with 6 or more being preferred. So the question comes up where do we crew these from? Do we build less of something else, to build more of these?

The argument for them is the one that is being hammered by ASPI. Henderson/Osborne could likely build these. They would create new VLS in ships in less than 10 years. Possibly.

I would say locally the government is coming under increased pressure to deliver, something, projected within the next 10 years. There are some harsh words being put on Dutton via the media at the moment.

Dutton’s bringing ‘sexy’ back to defence

The politician’s tough talk on China underscores the growing importance of the defence portfolio - traditionally a ministerial graveyard.

www.afr.com

Former US president Theodore Roosevelt famously made the phrase “Speak softly and carry a big stick” the central tenet of his foreign policy: an emphasis on quiet diplomacy backed with military might.

Since becoming Defence Minister in March, Peter Dutton has flipped that on its head, talking up the threat posed by China despite carrying a comparative twig.

Dutton is a likely successor to ScoMo. Since moving into defence, his image has improved. But not if things don't start appearing. Not fully staffing the Nuclear taskforce and having no good news initiatives to announce running into an election put them into a bit of a bind. Tillets piece outlines areas that there will be much more press on. The lack of confirmed ship building projects "in the pipe" is also a concern for SA/WA as well as defence concerned voters. its all fixable, but the environment in Australia political, is getting aggressive. With the Election, shadow minsters will start attacking minister portfolios.

I know in many western countries defence spending is unsexy. That isn't the case in Australia. On the announcement of AUKUS and nuclear submarines, a huge shift in policy, the biggest backlash was "where is the tangible outcome to this announcement". The electorate didn't really care about upsetting France, or the EU (and our still non-existent FTA). Or nuclear questions. Or the expense. None of that is a deal breaker.

While DT is probably more than a little biased toward defence, with China openly stating in the Australian press it wants to "Crush Australia". The threats are no longer just theoretical. The voters want to see more than just tough talk, they want action.

 

[Stampede]

Agree that the Arafura's could be repurposed solely for the MCM and Survey role with a more military robust platform purchased to fulfill the missing middle tier of navy's surface combatants. This would however play with the current build numbers for the Arafura class, yet this would still be my preferred way forward.....................................................Unfortunately I can't see it happening!

As fantasy fleets are off the agenda, the CONSTANT is the current plan of 12 constabulary OPV's with an additional eight for MCM and Survey work.

The new VARIABLE is the replacement of the Leonardo 40 mm canon.

Navy may just get another 40 mm from a different manufacturer or alternatively just stick with the 25 mm Typhoon which may later be upgraded together with other mounts across the fleet to a new standardized weapon of 30 mm caliber.
This would certainly be compatible with the expectation of the Hunter Classes getting a 30 caliber medium sized gun.

All is possible and suggest realistic.

At this stage we are all trying to read a lot out of the very limited feed back from defence re the dropping of Leonardo's 40 mm canon.
Is it due to technical issues or the need to up arm the vessel?

In late 2021 we just don't know.

What is acknowledged is that the Arafura's are only so big.

Looking at their sister Darussalam Class; I doubt the Arafura's could mirror their ASMs mounts due to our large RHIB's and cranes.
Their 57 mm gun however would still have potential.

For the later, this mount is the MK 3 which is some 14 t in weight.
As an alternative to the 57 mm, it would not be inconceivable for the forward area to have both a Typhoon and another small weapon system.

It would need to be non deck penetrating, but importantly it could give a military option the Typhoon does not offer.

It's choice and selection would reflect what government and Navy want from the class.

As a side note, APDR have confirmed the flight deck can take a medium sized helicopter but the ship is deficient in some of the handling equipment for such tasks.
As a priority, suggest the later should be rectified ASAP.

Also suggest the OPV's deck is left for flying things and mission modules, not weapon systems.

Cheers

Regards S

 

[alexsa]

First problem is you are referencing Wiki, not considered reliable. The Australian Government doesn't actually release the construction price per Ship cost but only the entire project costs for the program. In this case it is Project Sea 1158 phase 1 and the cost has been given as about $5B for 12 Vessels but that includes the costs of setting up the Shipyard, Trg of workers etc, all the other costs involved in getting a ship to acceptance.

And its through life operating costs. Including crew. It is an attempt to look at the cost over the life of the asset. If you look at the project cost of the AOR’s the cost of construction was about a third of the project cost.

 

[Volkodav]

If you are looking for a corvette, you have to define the requirement. You want something that is bigger and more fighty than an OPV but not as big as or as fighty as an FFG. I think that a 6,000 tonne frigate is somewhat of an overkill. Something in the range of 3,000 - 3,500 tonnes is probably far better. This will be 1,000 - 500 tonnes lighter than the ANZACs. Said corvette doesn't require 32 Mk-41 VLS or all the bells and whistles of a 6,000 tonne frigate. It's not going to take on a PLAN CBG on its lonesome.

Steel is cheap and air is free, people (including political and uniform types) are talking about arming the OPVs due to the shifting strategic situation, aging ANZAC fleet and delays to the Hunters. Money has also been freed up with the cancellation of the FSP / kick off of the SSNs, strategic factors also suggest money is more available now.

There is a need for something warrier than the OPVs but available sooner than the Hunters, the shortage of VLS cells in the fleet has also been mentioned, very often.

NZ is looking for a replacement for their Anzacs with the Hunters likely too expensive. There is a perceived need to increase the size of the fleet here and across the ditch.

It has been suggested we look to build a second batch of Hobart's before the Hunters. There are concerns that the Anzacs, even upgraded won't last long enough.

Solution build an off the shelf design with minimal changes to suit Australian requirements, accept a level of for but not with, using ballast if necessary to ensure sufficient reserve is available for what will likely be required in the future.

The Arrowhead 140 / Type 31/32 is based on the Danish Iver Huitfeldt, modified for RN requirements, and appears to be going surprisingly smoothly. It could be a low risk option, potentially lower risk than life extending the ANZACs even further. The systems currently used on and planned for the ANZACs could be incorporated in the A140, the build could be split between Adelaide and Perth, potentially also NZ if the RNZN selects the type and don't forget Indonesia has selected a derivative as well. A potential Aust, NZ and Indo joint build with at least common propulsion and auxiliary systems if not CS items?

What sort of fleet are we talking?

In the late 80s early 90s, when we were heading into the peace dividend it was determined (based on geography as well as conceivable threats) we needed 3 DDGs, 6 FFGs, 8 FFHs and 12 enhanced patrol vessels (corvettes with ESSM, Harpoon and Super Sea Sprites with Penguin). Now we have 3 FFG/DDG, 8 FFH (enhanced) and some really crap patrol boats that have never been fit for purpose and a planned 3 FFG/DDG, 9 FFG, 12 OPV and 6 newer but still crap PBs (note: I really despise the Armidale's and Capes).

Long story short, when we are facing a far greater strategic threat than we did in the early 90s, our proposed fleet, let alone our actual fleet is smaller and weaker than what was proposed by a left wing peace loving, (supposedly) anti defence government, 30 plus years ago. The only shining light is the Romeos, but even then Hellfire is no Penguin as well as AEGIS. If I recall correctly in the mid 90s the RAN was pushing for a licence build or FMS acquisition of 3 Flight IIA ABs, even if it meant accepting something like the German Type 123 with ESSM as an FFG replacement rather than an FFG with an area air defence system, what we ended up with was 4 upgraded FFGs, replaced by 3 modified F100 frigates and 8 upgraded ANZACs.

Yes we acquired the LHDs after the almost embarrassment in Timor, but they really are a case of preparing to fight the last war as their sole hot war addition to capability would be to carry additional ASW helicopters and the potential to operate someone else's F-35Bs. They were never envisioned to conduct opposed landings and deploying them in a conflict with China would be tantamount to murdering their crews. We have what we have but is it good enough?

 

[hauritz]

I think the original idea for the ANZAC class frigate was perfectly valid. It was intended as a patrol frigate for operations inside our EEZ. Of course that all went of the rails a little and the ANZACs were given new roles. Really the NZ version is closest to what was originally intended for this ship.

I don't believe that role of an EEZ patrol ship has gone away. In fact you could probably argue that it will be more relevant now than it was in the 1980s.

The Hunters will no doubt be impressive warships but I don't see them as being a replacement for the role that the ANZACs were originally intended to fill. Could be a requirement for the navy to plug that gap around the 2030s if not sooner.

 

[swerve]

First problem is you are referencing Wiki, not considered reliable. The Australian Government doesn't actually release the construction price per Ship cost but only the entire project costs for the program. In this case it is Project Sea 1158 phase 1 and the cost has been given as about $5B for 12 Vessels but that includes the costs of setting up the Shipyard, Trg of workers etc, all the other costs involved in getting a ship to acceptance.

Blanket dismissal of Wikipedia is silly. Look at the sources. Good Wikipedia articles (& there are very many) give references & they can be checked.

 

[Volkodav]

I think the original idea for the ANZAC class frigate was perfectly valid. It was intended as a patrol frigate for operations inside our EEZ. Of course that all went of the rails a little and the ANZACs were given new roles. Really the NZ version is closest to what was originally intended for this ship.

I don't believe that role of an EEZ patrol ship has gone away. In fact you could probably argue that it will be more relevant now than it was in the 1980s.

The Hunters will no doubt be impressive warships but I don't see them as being a replacement for the role that the ANZACs were originally intended to fill. Could be a requirement for the navy to plug that gap around the 2030s if not sooner.

In some ways the ANZACs filled a recurring requirement that has existed since before WWII, the seaward defence vessel. In WWII and the years after this was filled by the Bathurst Class Corvettes, supplemented by the River and Bay Class Frigates, the PB equivalents where the HDMLs and Fairmile Bs.

The Attacks, Fremantles and now ACPBS and Capes fill the lower end requirement but the higher end patrol function was never really filled, even counting the ANZACs. There was the original DDL concept that grew into a full FFG/DDG before being cancelled, then the ANZACs but other options considered included a 1960s/70s examination of a modified Type 21 Amazon class frigate/sloop with US weapons and sensors (maybe Dutch sensors too). Proposals initially put forward for our OPVs included the USCG Legend Class high endurance cutter, a modified Freedom Class LCS and the Austal trimaran corvette.

The thing is NSSM (later ESSM), a 76 or 57mm gun, Harpoon and a helicopter with Penguin was seen in the late 80s / early 90s, as the minimum requirement, not just for the "Patrol Frigate" but for the replacement for the Fremantle Class PBs. This was in addition to 3 DDGs and 6 FFGs with SM-1MR and desired SM-2MR with a minimum of USN New Threat Upgrade level capability, if not Aegis. The corvettes were intended to have pretty much the same firepower as the ANZACs as commissioned and here we are 30 years later with nowhere near that capability planned for our EEZ protection assets.