Try to read more and make friends in the forum. That way more people will be willing to respond to your posts.There remain many things I don't understand.
(i) If you want to talk about A2A combat, then only consider a jet in the class of the F-16 (whose performance is optimised in the trans-sonic zone). Forget about the subsonic L159, as it is too slow and has too many other limitations to be 'fit for purpose' in an A2A combat role. Correctly understood, the L159 has some self defence capability but it is not a true A2A fighter.Comparing subsonic L159 to turboprop light attack for the four ANAAC requirements:
1) L159 is better at air to air combat
2) L159 is better at suppressing ground based air defense. But how much better?
3) I don't see why the L159 would be better than turboprop at close air support (CAS) and strategic bombing. {L159 flies faster and could reach its target more quickly; however the turboprop could dwell near the potential target longer and might be more accurate in its air strikes.}
4) L159 is much more expensive to operate per hour in the air than a turboprop, but how much more expensive? What are the costs for the two aircraft per hour flown (fuel + maintenance)?
(ii) ANAAC does not have a requirement for air defense suppression. Read up on the key words DEAD, SEAD and electronic warfare to see why you are mistaken. Kindly also see my response on defensive aids further below.
(iii) Read the DT thread I cited again. You are not reading it carefully enough to enable you to understand the unique advantages of slow movers (that fast movers cannot match). If I maybe honest, you are reading it with your existing preconceived notions. Your preconceived notions are interfering with your ability to understand. This is why you are asking the wrong questions. Let me explain:
(a) Only rich countries can orbit their fighters waiting for action in support of a planned mission (which is why tankers are put to so much use by the US). Poor countries only fly sorties when needed. When the fuel runs out during a sortie, the air support support ends. That is why turboprops are good and their loiter time is valued for planned missions. As these are planned missions, ANAAC turboprops have their slow transit time factored in.
(b) ANAAC will never have the resources to provide ad-hoc CAS missions that USAF have in place to support US troops. This means that when the ANA call for unplanned missions, the ANAAC will easily need another 30 mins to 2 hours to get ready for a mission from the time of call for help. When you factor in transit time to remote locations, help can take a long time to come (which means that the fight could be over before air support arrives). Fast movers reduce response time over a wider area. This will enable the ANAAC to have less air bases and to contribute in preventing ANA outposts from being overrun over a wider area.
(b) ANAAC will never have the resources to provide ad-hoc CAS missions that USAF have in place to support US troops. This means that when the ANA call for unplanned missions, the ANAAC will easily need another 30 mins to 2 hours to get ready for a mission from the time of call for help. When you factor in transit time to remote locations, help can take a long time to come (which means that the fight could be over before air support arrives). Fast movers reduce response time over a wider area. This will enable the ANAAC to have less air bases and to contribute in preventing ANA outposts from being overrun over a wider area.
Therefore both aircraft types (slow movers vs fast movers) have different unique advantages and are suited to serve different purposes. Slow movers perform a complimentary role to the role performed by attack helicopters and it is not useful to compare them to fast movers. If you've got a hot LZ, attack helicopters and slow movers are ideal for suppressing ground fire as your transport helicopters attempt to land. Fast movers are less than idea in the role of suppressing ground fire on a hot LZ. These limitations are explained in the DT thread cited.
(iv) If the equipment is 'NOT fit for purpose', operating cost considerations is irrelevant (ie. ANA bought the wrong gear). OTOH, even if a piece of gear expensive, if it is absolutely essential for operations, then costs be dammed. An example of essential expensive stuff is precision guided munitions (PGMs). PGMs need not be targeted by the latest fancy USAF gear (which can stream live video for the guys on the ground), it could be something cheaper. Laser guided Paveway bombs (LGBs) can work just as well, if there is a trained guy on the ground. All the Afghan FAC on the ground needs is a laser designator to guide the LGBs. If the ANAAC don't have them, even if the aircraft arrive and the troops are in contact (ie. the enemy hugs them and are too close), the aircraft would not be able to deliver ordinance to support the fight. If you don't have this class of weapons, it will become a strategy of the Taliban to neutralize ANAAC airpower. Fundamentally, air power prevents the Taliban from moving in large groups and on roads in groups, as it is too dangerous - so just having the right gear constrains your opponent's tactical choices, which will have important consequences for your plans.
What ANAAC needs is aircraft with 'defensive aids' (and these aids are already specified by US military) that can deal with hand held SAMs. ANAAC does not have a requirement for air defense suppression. You are mistaken. Air defense suppression is a tertiary air force capability - not something we want to help the ANAAC achieve and not necessary in the fight against the Taliban.If the need for ground attack is managed by turboprop, then the question becomes what aircraft is best at managing air to air and ground based air defense suppression.
(i) When you say better. Better for what? If you are dealing with the Third World - don't think like that. Think of these key words: 'fit for purpose'. If it can do the job then it is fit for purpose. No need to nitpick over small differences.Are supersonic aircraft much better than subsonic aircraft at these two functions?
(ii) On Afghan A2G missions, the targeting tools, the size of combat load, the aircraft's range and ease of maintenance are more important than supersonic speed. This is partly because with a full A2G combat load, most jet fighters operate at subsonic speeds anyway.
(iii) Supersonic speeds is only important if it is a existing requirement based on each country's threat matrix. Let me use 2 examples to explain:
(a) If I may over simplify it, for the Indian Air Force (InAF), they assume that they will not be able to operate in an air superiority environment (given that they have capable potential aggressors). Therefore the InAF prefer supersonic aircraft that are able to jettison their A2G munitions to run away. This feature will enable their guys to fight another day.
(b) For the SAF, we always assume that we will be fighting a bigger aggressor, with bigger numbers and resources. Therefore, the RSAF has a singular focus on sortie generation as part of our strategy to achieve air superiority. Sortie generation multiplies our air power. Hence an all supersonic fleet is a preferred requirement. In fact even our lead-in-fighter-trainers (LIFT) will be pressed into service, as our offensively orientated conscript army will only be fighting in a war of national survival (and never a war of choice). If we lose, we don't exist as a country.
(b) For the SAF, we always assume that we will be fighting a bigger aggressor, with bigger numbers and resources. Therefore, the RSAF has a singular focus on sortie generation as part of our strategy to achieve air superiority. Sortie generation multiplies our air power. Hence an all supersonic fleet is a preferred requirement. In fact even our lead-in-fighter-trainers (LIFT) will be pressed into service, as our offensively orientated conscript army will only be fighting in a war of national survival (and never a war of choice). If we lose, we don't exist as a country.
In the case of the ANAAC, supersonic performance is not a requirement in contrast to the above over simplified Indian and Singaporean examples. Remember, if a country has a big COIN threat, a slow mover is usually part of air power requirements.
I don't know. Not an area of my interest.Another question I have is the relative cost per hour flown between an F/A 50 (or Guizhou JL-9, Hongdu L-15 Falcon) and an L159?
Many Chinese aircraft models are not an area of my interest. Don't give me a list of single engined jets made in the Third World and ask if they are as good as the F-16 as a multi-role fighter. IMO, they are not (even the Aviation Industry Corporation of China admitted that China’s WS-10 engine is unsatisfactory in quality). Read up on the following technology key words listed below, as a starting point for further research:I would think that the ANAAC should probably have:
-12 F/A 50s, Guizhou JL-9, or Hongdu L-15 Falcon (air to air and ground air defense suppression)
-30 to 35 light attack turboprop (A29 or KT-1) for ground attack;
rather than the current proposal for 20 L159s and 14 turboprops light attack aircraft.
(i) the impact of helmet cueing systems such as DASH (and Python-4) and JHMCS (and AIM-9X) for off-boresight cueing of WVR missiles in A2A combat (see surprisingly good article on helmets by a man that is disliked by many in this forum);
(ii) the impact of radar and BVR missile development in A2A combat, more specifically, the F-16's AN/APG-68(V)9 radar for the block 52s and the AN/APG-80 AESA Radar for the block 60s. You can also read up on the AIM-120C7 (and the development work on the AIM-120D) for BVR combat;
(iii) the impact of targeting pods like Lockheed Martin's Sniper XR targeting pod and other competitor pods for A2G missions like the older LANTIRN, which is a system of two pods (and how it can be used to guide Paveway bombs); and
(iv) the impact of the Great Engine War for how GE (F110 Engine) & PW (F100 Engine) competed in F-15 and F-16 engine development.
(ii) the impact of radar and BVR missile development in A2A combat, more specifically, the F-16's AN/APG-68(V)9 radar for the block 52s and the AN/APG-80 AESA Radar for the block 60s. You can also read up on the AIM-120C7 (and the development work on the AIM-120D) for BVR combat;
(iii) the impact of targeting pods like Lockheed Martin's Sniper XR targeting pod and other competitor pods for A2G missions like the older LANTIRN, which is a system of two pods (and how it can be used to guide Paveway bombs); and
(iv) the impact of the Great Engine War for how GE (F110 Engine) & PW (F100 Engine) competed in F-15 and F-16 engine development.
There's a reason why the J-10 is considered as within the F-16 class but for more details you will need to ask other forum members who have the appropriate China military expertise (ie. not me).
I would not compare conscript armies to all volunteer tier-one armies (like that of the US or Australia). I think it would be a mistake to overstate the SAF's capabilities, as I was a former conscript in it. Further, we have some equipping gaps and some very old equipment. Take for instance our AMX-13 SM1s. When the Indians soldiers saw them, they were surprised and asked why we are still using their father's generation of light tanks (ie. old and outdated)... To understand that, you must get used to un-American idea of 'fit for purpose'. The trick is to understand the true purpose of the equipment.The vast majority of militaries in the world are low quality. Only a couple such as Singapore's, Australia's, South Korea's, Japan's, some NATO countries are competent.
IMO, the SAF is only well regarded for our offensive orientation in capability development, our planning (which means making hard choices with limited funds) and our level of logistics integration. Please see this defence logistics video below:
[ame=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2GElkNDqvTM]Defence Logistics[/ame]
IMO, in the areas that matter, yes (they are more than competent). Keep in mind, that while the Malaysians had external help, in the end they prevailed against the Malayan Communist Party. They beat their insurgents and won their counterinsurgency war - so they are fit for purpose. However, they do have significant logistics issues and capability gaps that take away from their fighting ability. The blame for their problems can be placed on the shoulders of 1 person - Tun Dr Mahathir bin Mohamad, their former PM (which was discussed in the RMAF thread).Is Malaysia's competent? I don't know.
Remember, Black Hawk down in Mogadishu? It was Pakistani tanks and Malaysian APCs that came to the rescue of the US Rangers. One Malaysian died and eight others were wounded to save US lives - you should remember their contribution.
But you forget. The Indonesians were not given their independence. In their 1945-49 war of independence, they were able to drive out the Dutch, who were the colonial power of the day. You may think they suck but the TNI really don't care about what you think, as they have intend and are prepared to fight with a guerrilla ethos against any foreign power (like the Vietcong). Since their founding the TNI has been engaged in COIN type of 'constructive pacification' against internal rebels, such that, their war machine remains well oiled. As the 4th most populous country in the world, their point of view is that they have an endless supply of people and they have the benefit of terrain. Trying to fight the TNI on their own turf would make the American involvement in the Vietnam War look like a Sunday walk in the park. Further, the country sits right on a Maritime Chokepoint - the Malacca Straits.Indonesia's sucks.
IMO, the TNI's current problem is lack of force projection capabilities and the presence of significant gaps in their capability matrix.
Pakistan's army is capable and it is prepared to fight the Indians who do conduct large scale 10 division sized exercises. This means that the Pakistan's army can operate at division, corp and army level (whereas the Afghan Army operates mainly at battalion level). However, the Pakistani Army is not ready to fight insurgents. So they are capable but they are a little caught off guard in this fight.So does Pakistan's. Pakistan has lost more dead soldiers and police to the Taliban recently than the sum of all foreign troops that have died in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2001. If you compare the ANA to Pakistan's army, they aren't doing quite as bad as some critics of the ANA imply.
That's a promising sign. In the days ahead, the ANAAC will need to be able to provide direct and indirect fire support to ANA troops so as to overwhelm the Taliban.If the international community funds educating more officers and NCOs, the quality of the ANA is likely to improve significantly. In particular, ANAAC shouldn't have a shortage of educated highly capable personnel within a few years. {Afghanistan now has 45,000 freshman a year in college versus about one thousand per year in 2001.}
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