Challenging cognitive dissonance and denial — Part 3
9. In the face of Great Power competition in the South China Sea, increased air force cooperation and training between Indonesia and Singapore (eg. Ex Elang Indopura — using fighters; and Ex Camar Indopura — using MPAs), provides backbone to ASEAN when faced with external pressure from Chinese incursions in Indonesia’s EEZ waters north of the Natuna Islands.
10. In the area of international military cooperation to enhance deterrence against external pressure, both the TNI AU and the RSAF, as small air forces, have benefitted from the schooling and support by the USAF with regard to developing the appropriate fighter CONOPS for air warfare.
12. Further, in modern fighter CONOPS, no pilot fights alone. He needs support from his wingman and other assets, which is why the RSAF not only invests in multi-aircraft simulators but also send all pilots for its 60 F-16C/Ds and 40 F-15SGs (at some point on their career) to Red Flag to train with the USAF on large force employment. To spread out defence spending, the RSAF has been progressively stocking up on American and Israeli missiles and JDAMs over many years through multiple purchase orders.
14. Even as a second choice, the TNI AU should get at least 6 to 14 more F-16Vs, to top up the fighters in the two squadrons (to form full squadrons of 20 to 24 aircraft) — to increase the existing fleet of 34 to between 40 to 48 aircraft. Indonesia badly needs more single engine fighters to make up for a lack of fighters. The TNI AU should give an incentive to the Lockheed Martin to improve the F-16Vs capability to accept in more munitions — such as integrating the MICA NG (that will be service with the TNI AL) to the American fighter — so that in desperate times, TNI AU and TNI AL missile inventory can be used on American made fighters. The F-16 has 71 air-to-air victories and two air-to-air losses — there is some dispute on the kill ratio but it’s also pretty overwhelming.
9. In the face of Great Power competition in the South China Sea, increased air force cooperation and training between Indonesia and Singapore (eg. Ex Elang Indopura — using fighters; and Ex Camar Indopura — using MPAs), provides backbone to ASEAN when faced with external pressure from Chinese incursions in Indonesia’s EEZ waters north of the Natuna Islands.
10. In the area of international military cooperation to enhance deterrence against external pressure, both the TNI AU and the RSAF, as small air forces, have benefitted from the schooling and support by the USAF with regard to developing the appropriate fighter CONOPS for air warfare.
(a) As an example of this helping hand by the USAF — from June 14 - 25, 2021, six Japan based USAF F-16CMs of the 13th Fighter Squadron flew into Sam Ratulangi International Airport for Exercise Cope West 2021— to train with the TNI AU’s Viper pilots, in Manado, North Sulawesi, Indonesia.
(b) On missions over the South China Sea, USAF F-16CMs based in Japan (from either the 13th or 14th Fighter squadron) are each armed with 5 beyond-visual-range AIM-120C-7 and a single AIM-9. Under the belly, each F-16CM was fitted with an AN/ALQ-184 electronic countermeasures self-protection pod. From the missile load-out, pretty clear that the game plan for the F-16CM is to shoot the AIM-120C-7 way before the merge. Unlike normal Vipers, USAF F-16CMs are also equipped with the AN/ASQ-213 HARM Targeting System, to enable the use of HARM anti-radiation missiles, should the need arise.
(c) The instructor pilots for the 34 TNI AU F-16s in Aviation Squadron 3 in in Madiun, East Java, and Aviation Squadron 16 in Pekanbaru, Riau have adopted some of RSAF’s F-16 training methodology by cross attendance of courses and the use of our aircraft simulators, including multi-aircraft simulators to train.
(d) Assuming that the TNI AU’s 34 F-16s, flying 3 sorties per day, use 6 missiles per day, the total number of missiles fired in the 1st day of war is 204 air-to-air missiles. Which is why I recommend that Indonesia buys 250 to 500 missiles with any fighter purchase. This will ensure a few days of supply in missiles as a base level stocking for a troubled peace scenario, to address China’s liminal warfare strategy in the waters north of the Natuna Islands.
11. In an all out war scenario (that does not apply to the PLA(N) and PLAAF threat presented north of the Natuna Islands), for 34 fighters to survive 7 days of war (assuming each fires 6 missiles per day), Indonesia needs to buy 1,428 missiles, which makes it obvious that the TNI AU will not be funded to acquire this amount of missiles. That is why my recommendation is for the TNI AU to acquire a base level of missiles stocks is so low (i.e. less than 1/3 of the war stocks needed). Indonesian fanboys should take note of this point.
12. Further, in modern fighter CONOPS, no pilot fights alone. He needs support from his wingman and other assets, which is why the RSAF not only invests in multi-aircraft simulators but also send all pilots for its 60 F-16C/Ds and 40 F-15SGs (at some point on their career) to Red Flag to train with the USAF on large force employment. To spread out defence spending, the RSAF has been progressively stocking up on American and Israeli missiles and JDAMs over many years through multiple purchase orders.
13. Buying 36 Dassault Rafale, instead of the F-16V, will mean that Indonesia will have acquire a new flight simulator and to send some future instructor pilots to France for training and they will need to take some basic French classes.
(a) To enhance deterrence and increase interoperability with the Armée de l'Air et de l'Espace, the TNI AU should place a follow-up order of 4 more Dassault Rafales within 2 years of the first order. This way the French will be incentivised to fly to Indonesia to conduct joint training with the TNI AU, as skills and TTP transfer is crucial to developing a naval strike capability.
(b) Capable of firing the Exocet MM40 Block 3 (used by the TNI AL), the two Dassault Rafale squadrons (if acquired) will be excellent for the anti-shipping role. IIRC the Dassault Rafale also has the option of using the Scorpion Helmet Mounted Integrated Targeting system, at an extra cost — where the TNI AU can by clever buying give an incentive to the French to improve its capability to accept in more munitions — such as integrating Aim-9X to the type — so that in desperate times, TNI AU missile inventory can be used on French made fighters.
14. Even as a second choice, the TNI AU should get at least 6 to 14 more F-16Vs, to top up the fighters in the two squadrons (to form full squadrons of 20 to 24 aircraft) — to increase the existing fleet of 34 to between 40 to 48 aircraft. Indonesia badly needs more single engine fighters to make up for a lack of fighters. The TNI AU should give an incentive to the Lockheed Martin to improve the F-16Vs capability to accept in more munitions — such as integrating the MICA NG (that will be service with the TNI AL) to the American fighter — so that in desperate times, TNI AU and TNI AL missile inventory can be used on American made fighters. The F-16 has 71 air-to-air victories and two air-to-air losses — there is some dispute on the kill ratio but it’s also pretty overwhelming.
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sorry about that. It's just your initial similar with his initial. Anyway, that's why I put, if some in TNI-AU brass lines already involve him in their workshop. My presumptions are some of them already inline with his findings and conclusions.
