Middle East Defence & Security

[Big_Zucchini]

I also do not fault the Associated Press for bending to intimidation by Hamas, as this is to be expected.

AP have decided to operate in Gaza fully knowing they will have to bend to Hamas's will. They also decided to keep reporting and never withdraw their reporters. That makes them complicit to the global phenomenon of mass disinformation.
What further aggravates this case is that they have a high reputation.

Also, by operating in an area known to have terrorist activities that capitalize on civilian losses, including sub-terrannean by the local government, they have taken the calculated risk that their infrastructure would be damaged/destroyed, by either party.

By sparking an outrage over the loss of a building, they are playing into Hamas's hand, and inadvertently legitimizing Hamas's policy of targeting its own civilians for PR.

This will further encourage Hamas to maintain this policy and even expand it.

 

[OPSSG]

Thinking about my thinking — Part 3

By sparking an outrage over the loss of a building, they are playing into Hamas's hand, and inadvertently legitimizing Hamas's policy of targeting its own civilians for PR.

This will further encourage Hamas to maintain this policy and even expand it.

13. Like you, all who have served in a professional military (especially those in an intelligence or staff level planning background), will know that the press is not your friend when operations are ongoing.

​

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1395227360228638728

(a) Nonetheless, at command level, in most armies, this relationship usually is cultivated in an attempt to ensure that reporting on ongoing operations remains fair — it looks like the IDF has made a command decision to conduct the strike on Al-Jala Tower that was housing the Associated Press and other media outlets — there are consequences to follow. Just as AP made a decision to collaborate with Hamas, to protect their reporters — they too must accept the consequences to follow.​

​

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1394867811575603201

(b) Once the prominent terrorist sites are destroyed after 9 days of bombing, the IDF are forced to target mainly mixed use facilities in densely populated, civilian areas. The problem is that when a Hamas-linked mixed use structure is destroyed, militants automatically relocate to another nearby civilian structure to continue their nefarious activities. With each pummeled tower, the IDF crosshair has to grow larger.​

​

14. The response of American Jewry to Israel during its current battle with Hamas represents a striking departure from the past. Netanyahu has frayed the "unshakeable" ties between America and Israel, and have ensured the progressive part of the Democratic Party cannot support him. This trend extends to young American Jews. Some analysts have said that Netanyahu's legacy is the end of strong bipartisan support for Israel.

​

(a) With his muted response to the Gaza conflict for the 1st 8 days of war, President Joe Biden stuck to a time-worn U.S. playbook; despite pressure from two Senators of the Jewish heritage serving in the US Senate— Bernie Sanders of Vermont and Jon Ossoff of Georgia — who have taken leading roles in calling for even handed American policy on the Israeli-Palestinian issue and for an immediate cease fire.​

​

(b) Interestingly, the Jewish lobbying group, J Street, has provided political support for politicians, whether Jewish or not, to criticize Israel's relentless bombing of Gaza in response to Hamas' rocket attacks on Israel without the risk of being smeared as being anti-Israel or even anti-Semitic.​

​

(c) "Israel has the absolute right to live in peace and security, but so do the Palestinians. I strongly believe that the United States has a major role to play in helping Israelis and Palestinians to build that future,” writes US Senator, Bernie Sanders (who is of Jewish origin) on 14 May 2021 in the New York Times.​

15. The estrangement of the American Jewish lobby accelerated during the rule of former President Donald Trump, and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s pandering to the right wing groups. Part of the reason may be the fact that American Jews don’t know who to support anymore as the road to peace is littered with obstacles. CSIS has suggested that there are at least three equivalents of “failed states” in the practical sense, and to some extent five — which is worth a read.

16. Journalist Youmna al-Sayed, reporting from Gaza City’s al-Shifa hospital, said that more than 72,000 internally displaced people are facing “extremely difficult conditions” due to a shortage of food, water and electricity. In view of the above, the French, Egyptian and Jordanian governments called on all sides to agree to a cease-fire and pledged to work through the U.N. Security Council to achieve this. “The three leaders emphasized the urgency of addressing the root causes of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by resuming effective negotiations to achieve a just and lasting peace," the countries said in a joint statement. The three leaders also said that the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on the basis of the two-state solution remains indispensable for a comprehensive peace in the region.

 

[Big_Zucchini]

(b) Once the prominent terrorist sites destroyed after 9 days of bombing, the IDF are now forced to target mainly mixed use facilities in densely populated, civilian areas. The problem is that when a Hamas-linked mixed use structure is destroyed, militants automatically relocate to another nearby civilian structure to continue their nefarious activities. With each pummeled tower, the IDF crosshair has to grow larger.

This is a logical thought process, but not really relevant. The type of strategic infrastructure and assets that are of high value, are static.
These can be facilities for production, storage, testing, analysis, cyber attack and defense, and other special operations and projects.
Once targeted, it takes years to restore. Moving some personnel to another building will no longer yield a significant effect.

The added bonus is that a tower is expensive, and its destruction is demoralizing.

(a) Nonetheless, at command level, in most armies, this relationship usually is cultivated in an attempt to ensure that reporting on ongoing operations remains fair — it looks like the IDF has made a command decision to conduct the strike on Al-Jala Tower that was housing the Associated Press and other media outlets — there are consequences to follow. Just as AP made a decision to collaborate with Hamas, to protect their reporters — they too must accept the consequences to follow.

Yes, and in that case, Hamas has to put truly strategic assets, those absolutely critical to its operations and planning, under such towers to either ensure they are safe, or to automatically inflict massive PR damage to Israel.
We just don't know, and because of the nature of intel warfare it's very much possible we will never know, or only know when it's far too late to change people's minds.

 

[OPSSG]

Thinking about my thinking — Part 4

13. I am starting to see the application of significant diplomatic pressure by the Biden Team for Israel to start negotiations for a ceasefire, in time to show progress at the next U.N. Security Council meeting.

​

(a) Given all that has happened on the diplomatic front, I suspect a ceasefire or concluding rounds of such negotiations, will be announced soon — if fighting does not start on a second front in Lebanon. In view of the fact that Operation Protective Edge lasted 7 weeks, therefore, it might take longer for the war to stop.​

​

(b) Not sure of the basis of Hamas political official, Moussa Abu Marzouk’s belief: "I expect a ceasefire to be reached within a day or two, and the ceasefire will be on the basis of mutual agreement." IMO, the IDF will stop when they achieve their military goals — campaign end will not be according to a timeline dictated by Hamas.​

​

(c) The latest tunnel-detection technology developed by Elbit Systems, uses advanced sensors to give the precise location of underground excavation work. Once identified, IDF can directly attack the tunnels at various locations with bunker busters. The problem at the moment is that the system has difficulty making sense of intersections, and cannot detect smaller tunnel openings. Engineering troops active during Protective Edge in 2014 noted that the tunnels are not necessarily straight lines with an opening at both ends. They often discovered three or four entrances and multiple connections with other tunnels.​

​

(d) I note that President Joe Biden is missing a key player who could help bring longer term calm to the volatile situation: a U.S. ambassador in Jerusalem. An unusual public lobbying campaign over two names in particular is drawing controversy. Following reports that Biden plans to nominate Tom Nides, a banker and former State Department official, some lawmakers and activists are pushing back. They are urging Biden to instead choose Robert Wexler, an ex-lawmaker who’s spent years to trying to end the decades-old conflict. The Biden White House has been slower than other new administrations to name “political” ambassadors, to posts in Singapore, Tokyo, London and Paris. There are typically about 50 ambassadorial posts reserved for a president’s friends or political allies.​

14. I suspect that there must be some pressure asserted by Iran on Hezbollah, in Lebanon, to show limited support for Hamas. This is best shown by threatening to open a second front. However, I believe Hezbollah, at this time, is not keen to allow the IDF to start operations in this sector; hence the giving of deniable support by allowing rocket launches by 3rd parties but not engaging in the same by itself.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1395222333384691715

15. Hamas leadership then made an intentional decision to go to war. Their tactical intent was to kill innocents and their strategic intent was to seize the mantle of leadership from Mahmoud Abbas, who had just cancelled the first Palestinian elections in fifteen years. They did so while knowing with absolute certainty what Israel’s military response would be, and as a result hundreds of Palestinians died and many thousands more continue to suffer.

​

(a) In the end, entirely predictably, Israel reestablished deterrence and degraded Hamas’s capabilities, but at a terrible price —Hamas is being absolutely hammered with its huge metro tunnel network destroyed, by air power alone in multiple waves of air strikes, with up to 150 fighters per wave — the scale of destruction (of 96.5km or 60 miles of tunnel network), is an operational surprise that must have been enabled from intelligence gathered since Protective Edge in 2014. For more details, see: Your Complete Guide to Hamas' Network of Terror Tunnels.​

​

(b) Gazans have been using tunnels regularly since the mid-1990s, when they were dug under the Gaza-Egypt border in Rafah for smuggling purposes. By 2001, and again in 2004-2005, Hamas terrorists used tunnels to plant explosives under IDF installations. In 2006, Hamas dug a tunnel into Israel near Kibbutz Kerem Shalom, ambushed a tank unit, kidnapped Corporal Gilad Shalit—who would be held in captivity for five years—and killed two of his fellow soldiers.​

​

(c) The destruction of the metro is the IDF’s attack on tactical tunnels dug by Hamas. These tunnels are meant to assist Hamas in a war if Israel sends in ground troops. Prior to Operation Guardian of the Walls, these tunnels had formed a subterranean web underneath Gaza, to give Hamas fighters freedom of movement, allowing them to evade capture, hide from aerial assault, and maintain the element of surprise. Destroying them also removes the rockets, launchers, and ammunition stored in these tunnels. Without these tunnels Hamas fighters cannot continue firing while under aerial attack. I see the latest IDF deception plans as an operational surprise that has affected the enemy’s will to fight. Even for me, watching on the sidelines, the scale of destruction of a significant portion of Hamas’ military capability built over a decade and its tight execution by up to 12 squadrons, up in the air at the same time, is really impressive.​

​

(d) Between 2005 and the eve of Protective Edge, Hamas and Islamic Jihad terrorists launched more than 11,000 rockets at Israeli civilians. Protective Edge saw another 4,700 rockets fired. All had been smuggled in whole or in part through Hamas’ tunnels, with the tunnel infrastructure being a primary military asset and a major threat to Israel’s security.​

​

(e) Hamas and Islamic Jihad terrorists also have been caught storing weapons in UN funded schools. On 16 July 2014, it was reported that a 120 MM mortar tube, a mortar bipod and twenty 120 MM mortar-round containers, with ammunition, were discovered under a blanket in the corner of a locked classroom at UNRWA Gaza Beach Elementary Co- educational “B” School. The weapons were photographed.​

​

(f) The next Gaza war in 2025 is not inevitable. By combining intelligence, military and technological efforts, and a discreet and concerted diplomatic push to restrain Hamas and speed up reconstruction, a 5th round of fighting can be pushed off significantly. It’s certainly worth a try. In the meantime, Operation Guardian of the Walls continues to yield valuable lessons for the art of war, on the use of air power in an urban warfare scenario, that is worthy of more study.​

 

[OPSSG]

Thinking about my thinking — Part 5

16. Roughly 9,000 homes were destroyed during Protective Edge, and very few have been rebuilt; despite the fact that building supplies have flowed into Gaza. But according to declassified intelligence reports, these supplies are routinely stolen by Hamas in order to serve the group’s terrorist purposes. Hamas smuggles in cement, diverts from construction and humanitarian donations, and even raids civilian construction sites in order to rebuild its tunnels.

17. The metro tunnel network destroyed by the IDF in the last few days, are a zero-sum game. If the same materials were put into reconstruction, the Gazan people would be better off and, lacking this crucial asymmetric warfare capability, Hamas would be less tempted to attack Israel. On the other hand, with the same limited materials going to terror tunnels, the people of Gaza continue to live in ruins while Hamas continues to rebuild its war machine, after each war.

18. Select timeline of significant events on 19 May 2021 (9th day of fighting):

19:00 - IDF: As of 19:00, since the beginning of operation "Guardian of the Walls", approximately 4000 rockets have been fired from the Gaza Strip at Israeli territory, of which approximately 600 failed launches fell in the Gaza Strip.

The Iron Dome Air Defense System has an intercept rate of approximately 90%.

18:35 - IDF: Overnight, The IDF and the ISA neutralized three Hamas terror operatives located in an operational hideout apartment in Gaza City belonging to the Hamas cyber unit. The target was struck by IDF fighter jets.The hideout apartment was used by the terror operatives for offensive cyber activity against Israeli targets. These actions are clear proof of Hamas terror activity in the cyber domain. The apartment was located adjacent to a kindergarten, proving once again that the Hamas terror organization deliberately endangers civilians by placing its military infrastructure in the heart of densely populated civilian areas.

18:08 - IDF: Following the previous report regarding a terror attack, a short while ago an armed female terrorist with an M-16 assault rifle arrived at Elias junction at the entrance to Kiryat Arba. The terrorist started shooting while advancing towards IDF troops and civilians who were at a bus stop at the junction. Two IDF soldiers fired towards her and neutralized her. No IDF injuries were reported.

16:37 - IDF: Following the previous report regarding the sirens which sounded in the Lower Galilee and Krayot area, four rockets were fired from Lebanon into Israeli territory. The Iron Dome Aerial Defense System intercepted one of them and the rest most likely fell in open areas.

In response, IDF Artillery are striking a number of targets in Lebanese territory.

14:13 -IDF: A short while ago, an IDF aircraft neutralized a Hamas terror organization operative immediately after firing rockets towards Israeli territory from the eastern Gaza Strip. The IDF also struck a rocket launcher belonging to the Hamas terror organization in Khan Yunis.

These can be facilities for production, storage, testing, analysis, cyber attack and defense, and other special operations and projects.
Once targeted, it takes years to restore. Moving some personnel to another building will no longer yield a significant effect.

19. Guidance greatly appreciated — happy to learn from you and to reflect on my thinking.

20. President Joe Biden conveyed his most explicit message yet to Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, saying he expected to see “a significant de-escalation today on the path to a cease-fire” during their afternoon phone call. For the sake of the Gazans caught in between the IDF and Hamas, I hope this will happen.

21. Select timeline of significant events on 20 May 2021 (10th day of fighting):

20:04 -IDF: Since this morning, the IDF has struck approximately 30 rocket launching posts in the Gaza Strip, located above and below ground, several of which were armed and aimed at Israeli communities. In addition, the IDF struck a number of terror operatives while they were launching rockets into Israeli territory.

Over the past few days, the IDF struck approximately 430 Hamas and Islamic Jihad rocket launchers, as well as over 20 rocket-launching operatives. The sites that were struck were used by the terror organizations to fire towards Israel, and include rocket launchers and launching posts. These IDF attacks harm the launching capabilities of the terror organizations.

19:02 - IDF: A short while ago, IDF aerial and ground troops struck a Hamas Anti-Tank missile launching post in Beit Lahia. The post that was struck appears to have been the one that had fired at an Israeli bus this morning.

In addition, a short while ago, an IDF aircraft thwarted a potential attack by armed Hamas Anti-Tank missile operatives, while they were driving in the northern Gaza Strip.

Additionally, in the last few hours, IDF fighter jets struck two Hamas military tunnel shafts, located in Beit Lahia and Maghazi.

19:00 - IDF: As of 19:00, since the beginning of operation "Guardian of the Walls", approximately 4,340 rockets have been fired from the Gaza Strip at Israeli territory, of which approximately 640 failed launches fell in the Gaza Strip.

The Iron Dome Air Defense System has an intercept rate of approximately 90%.

15:24 - IDF: A short while ago, IDF fighter jets struck two Hamas terror tunnels that were under construction in Gaza City and in the area of Beit Hanoun.

In addition, an IDF fighter jet struck a Hamas military tunnel shaft located inside a building in Beit Hanoun.

11:30 - IDF: A short while ago, IDF fighter jets struck a Hamas terror tunnel in Beit Hanoun, as well as two underground rocket launchers in Jabalia, which were used to fire rockets at Tel Aviv. In addition, an IDF fighter jet struck a military operations room of the Hamas terror organization used by Hamas for combat management.

7:00 - IDF: In the past 24 hours, IDF fighter jets struck dozens of additional underground terror targets as part of the ongoing extensive operation to strike the Hamas 'Metro' tunnel system across the Gaza Strip, causing significant damage to Hamas's underground network. At this time, IDF fighter jets continue to strike underground terror targets.

Furthermore, the IDF struck a number of additional terror targets across the Gaza Strip overnight, among them: terror infrastructure used for conducting military operations located in the residence of a company commander of the north Khan Yunis battalion, Ali Abu Zarqa, a Hamas weapons manufacturing facility and a number of above ground and underground rocket launch sites.

01:48 - IDF: Over the past few hours, IDF fighter jets and aircraft struck a weapons storage unit located inside the residence of the former Minister of Justice and Released Prisoners who previously served as a member of the Hamas Political Bureau. In addition, the IDF struck military infrastructure located in the residences of Hamas officials in the Gaza Strip.

Among the targets struck:

• Military infrastructure that served in the current operation, located in the residence of Ashraf Al-Jabari who is in charge of training in the Hamas terror organization's military wing, in the city of Khan Yunis.
• A weapons storage unit located in the residence of a Hamas terror operative in Gaza city.
• Military infrastructure in the residence of Muhammad Abu Mustafa, a commander in the Nuhba Forces of the Hamas East Khan Yunis battalion.
• Military infrastructure in the residence of Muhammad Bu'ab, the commander of the Hamas East Rafah battalion.
• Military infrastructure in the residence of Osama Abu Anza, who serves as head of the surface to surface missile unit in the Khan Yunis Brigade.

 

[OPSSG]

Breaking news!

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1395527615721754639

1. Israel and Hamas agree to a ceasefire after 11 days of conflict that saw over 4,340 rockets fired from the Gaza Strip; in a war that also killed 232 Palestinians and 12 people in Israel.

​

(a) All credit to the Egyptians and Jordanians for the thankless task and their hard work. The ceasefire is conditioned with calmness in return of calmness. No talks about conditions or agreements or negotiations.​

​

(b) After Israel agreed to a ceasefire with the Hamas terror group, ending 11 days of fighting in the Gaza Strip, many politicians in Israel from across the spectrum, and some local officials, criticized the government over the move just hours after it went into effect on Friday morning.​

​

(c) Yesh Atid leader Yair Lapid, currently tasked with forming a government, albeit with apparently reduced chances after the fighting in Gaza stalled negotiations, tweeted that “the military succeeded in the tasks it was given, [but] the government failed.” “[Prime Minister Benjamin] Netanyahu’s failures extend from Meron to Gaza, from the Temple Mount to Lod. It’s time to go,” he added, referring to the Mount Meron disaster that killed 45, and the recent unrestin mixed Jewish-Arab cities.​

2. Israeli police chief Kobi Shabtai has condemned of both sides in the domestic unrest in mixed cities, labeling both Jews and Muslims who perpetrate violence as terrorists. In my view, this is exactly what all sides within Israel need to hear — as I said earlier, a divided Israel is a weakened Israel. I am also disgusted that this war and so many unnecessary deaths has saved Netanyahu’s right wing agenda and political career.

3. The US, Egypt and Jordan will need to continue to deescalate tensions for the parties at war, for the ceasefire to take root. Under former Presidents Obama and Trump, the Americans provided hundreds of million in funding for the Iron Dome.

4. In the days ahead, President Biden will also do the same, to pay for and replenish the Tamir interceptors used in this round of fighting.

​

4. The US, Egypt and Jordan will need to continue to deescalate tensions for the parties at war, for the ceasefire to take root. Under former Presidents Obama and Trump, the Americans provided hundreds of million in funding for the Iron Dome. In the days ahead, President Biden will also do the same, to pay for and replenish the Tamir interceptors used in this round of fighting.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1395456317511307275

5. Concurrently, 8 House Democrats, write to Biden calling for an immediate ceasefire and indefinite hold on the new weapons sale to Israel — this support from the progressive wing of the Democrats for the Palestinian agenda emboldens Hamas, PIJ and their sponsor Iran, which makes the next war more likely to recur sooner.

6. As a centralist within the Democratic Party, it is not surprising that Biden restored U.S. funding to the Palestinian Authority in April 2021 — even though this funding may be at odds with the bipartisan Taylor Force Act, which makes illegal any funding, whether direct or indirect, to the Palestinian Authority that may be funneled to terrorists. Biden has also pledged millions to the UNRWA. While the jury is still out, I suspect that the Biden administration's Middle East foreign policy is not going to be of much help in managing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

 

[Big_Zucchini]

Israeli police chief Kobi Shabtai has condemned of both sides in the domestic unrest in mixed cities, labeling both Jews and Muslims who perpetrate violence as terrorists. In my view, this is exactly what all sides within Israel need to hear

Yes, what he says specifically here is true. However, he is also perhaps the most hated police chief in recent history, despite a very short term beginning in January this year.
Under his supervision occurred one safety disaster in which 45 people died, and another with much fewer casualties. The police under his command also failed to contain the violence that occurred in mixed cities, and when it did, it was far too late.

I am also disgusted that this war and so many unnecessary deaths has saved Netanyahu’s right wing agenda and political career.

On one hand this war has indeed delayed the "change bloc" efforts to form a coalition, with a time limit of 21 days, on the other hand the exchange came as a result of aligning factors that created a rare opportunity for Hamas.

On one hand, conflicts are such a classic opportunity to unite people around a cause or distract from problems and appear as a savior. On the other hand, I do recall reading an analysis that showed that at least in Israel, conflicts and wars have consistently reduced the incumbent PM's popularity.
However I cannot find that analysis anymore, so take it however you wish. Any analysis of similar phenomenon in western countries, if anyone can find one, will definitely contribute here.


Biden's approach is interesting. His performance dealing with the UNSC is definitely another point for him in the relationship. But he has to deal with resistance from within, and I personally haven't noticed any pushback against that.
Cancelling arms sales at such sensitive times, if successful, would make a strong impact on not only the American-Israeli relationship, but with every American ally, as it would make the US less trustworthy to its allies.

This is a threat to American diplomatic might, and posture. Biden must address these threats before they grow and start throwing obstacles at his every step.

 

[OPSSG]

Part 1: Is there a pathway to peace? Or is this ceasefire a short detour before the next war?

1. With their armed confrontations subsiding, Israel and Hamas are set to restore a “very violent” equilibrium that forces the Gaza Strip back “out of sight, out of mind,” warns Tareq Baconi, a senior analyst at the International Crisis Group and author of “Hamas Contained: The Rise and Pacification of Palestinian Resistance.”

2. Both Hamas and the Israeli right wing, under Netanyahu will claim victory in this war but this is not victory. The seeds of domestic discord and defeat has been sown.

​

(a) Bezalel Smotrich, head of the far-right Religious Zionism party, said that if the truce is indeed without conditions, the Temple Mount flashpoint holy site should be reopened immediately to Jews. “So what was the goal of the operation? Ceasefire? Achieving quiet? And what will be done during this silence? Will Netanyahu transfer money again so that Hamas will have even more missiles to launch at us in the next round?”​

​

(b) In contrast, Labor party leader Merav Michaeli tweeted. “It is time to stop denying: once again the IDF acted professionally, the public showed resilience, and Netanyahu used all of this to strengthen Hamas and to strengthen himself.”​

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1397207540631576591

4. Under Israel's approach of managing rather than resolving the conflict, Hamas's demand for Palestinian sovereignty has effectively been neutralized by its containment in Gaza. This dynamic has perpetuated a vicious cycle of fighting every 2 to 4 years.

​

(a) Hamas, PIJ and 15 other Palestinian militant groups have launched over 4,340 rockets and mortar attacks from the Gaza Strip from 10 May 2021 to 21 May 2021, according to the Israeli Air Force. Other than firing big salvos of rockets in the 1st two days, the Hamas leadership in Gaza, spent 9 of the 11 days helplessly watching as the Israeli Air Force systematically bombed all of its attempts at tactical innovations and see millions of dollars’ worth of its terrorist/military infrastructure demolished. Hama’s Al-Qassam Brigades, and PIJ ’s Saraya al-Quds were the most active groups in publishing evidence of their attacks. Both groups also used their online platforms to unveil rockets and drones not seen in previous clashes. These 17 terror groups have spent a decade building war-fighting capabilities meant to challenge Israel on new and unexpected fronts. But they all proved ineffective or outright useless, with the refusal of the IDF to deploy ground troops into Gaza.​

​

(b) Over 11 days in May 2021, Hamas had its metro tunnels neutralised, its naval suicide submarines and squads destroyed, its UAV threat minimised, its impotent ATGM’s teams reduced to attacking civilian buses and soft skinned vehicles before they were killed by a counter missile strike — and conversely, the IDF has demonstrated it can destroy a large part of these terror tunnels in days — when it takes Hamas years to rebuild.​

​

(c) Initially, an attempt was made by approximately one dozen Palestinian factions to appear as a united front via its much touted ‘Joint Operations Room’ (JOR) — in anticipation of a ground invasion by the IDF that never happened (this time). Several statements were published referencing attacks against Israeli targets but as fighting wore on, publications became less frequent, leading up to a complete cessation of published statements for 9 days.​

​

(d) The absence in statements suggests the JOR may be more of a façade to give the appearance militant factions are fighting as a Palestinian quasi-army. But in reality, the fighting involved a loose connection between most of the militant factions in Gaza. There were several attempts by so-called Axis of Resistance groups in Lebanon and Syria to distract Israel, in an attempt to relieve some of the pressure Gaza factions were under.​

​

(e) Israel also showed it had deeply penetrated the Hamas ranks, targeting a long list of mid-level commanders and then publicizing the list. The names were unknown to Israelis and drew some skeptical eyebrow-raising from military analysts. But few in Hamas missed the message: Hamas’s ranks are perforated with Israeli intelligence assets.​

5. We need to start thinking not just about the fact that a Palestinian in Gaza and a Palestinian in the West Bank have the same approach to Israel, but that there are also different tactics of fighting the containment regime imposed by the IDF. While those could be divisive for the Palestinians, but that doesn’t mean that the division of opinion are on different parts of that battle.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1396920811513131009

6. The Gaza head of UNRWA (the UN agency for Palestinian humanitarian matters), Matthias Schmale said that he "would not dispute" Israel's claim that its airstrikes were "very precise." This includes the IDF attacking rocket launchers placed within a multi-storey apartment complex, without destroying the entire building at times. Therefore:

​

(a) in Hamas’s vision, the pain endured by Gazans over the past 11 days was a worthwhile price to pay for the great boon of sidelining accommodationist Fatah in the West Bank and reunifying the Palestinian ranks around an illogical narrative of an anti-colonial struggle (that we see on American, European and Malaysian social media, even when there are no IDF troops in Gaza);​

​

(b) the Palestinians with 243 dead (57 from Hamas & 19 from PIJ for a total of 160 militants) in the last 11 days, will need a more holistic narrative that’s able to hold all of these complexities and nuances, and which is able to push against the idea that there is the Gaza-Israel escalation, and then there are other factors and actors;​

​

(c) of the 83 civilians in Gaza killed (at least 40 to 50 were killed by their own rockets) — meaning that IDF’s total collateral damage in May 2021 was between 33 to 40 civilians; and​

​

(d) it is also noteworthy to say this conflict isn't only about Israel vs Hamas and PIJ. Beyond Hamas and PIJ, there are also another 15 armed Palestinian groups that are seen as actively participating in this conflict. Watching this conflict intensely, I estimate that of the 243 killed, a 160 are militants (with 83 civilians killed from Israeli air attacks or misfires from militant rockets).​

 

[OPSSG]

Part 2: Is there a pathway to peace? Or is this ceasefire a short detour before the next war?

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1396402734715260928

7. In Operation Guardian of the Walls, the Badr 3 (an unguided rocket that was first introduced by Palestinian Islamic Jihad in 2019), has emerged as a crude family bomb shelter killer, if by chance it hits the correct weak spot of the shelter.

​

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1399788993600966664

(a) What makes the Iranian designed Badr 3 (and others like it), stand-out is its warhead with a weight of between 300 and 400kg (sources differ) and it has a range of more than 13km; which is much heavier than warheads of regular Palestinian rockets, and due to its larger than normal warhead size, it is designed to penetrate bomb shelters.​

​

(b) The Badr 3 is known to be not reliable nor does it even fly very well or far — which offers Iran and its proxy, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad a double bonus. If it lands in Israel it gives a Big Bang; but if it fails to reach Israel, the 300 to 400 kg warhead on the rocket kills even more Palestinian families than regular terror rockets (that it will blame on Israel). There is even pictures of these misfired warheads being recycled in Gaza. According to Joe Truzman and Toby Dershowitz, “approximately 30% of the rockets Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad fired from Gaza landed inside Gaza itself, killing up to 50 Palestinians.”​

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1396213576105435142

8. While Israel was engaged in a 11 day military confrontation with Hamas, Hezbollah refrained from any direct military action against Israel and contented itself with emphasizing its support for Hamas's struggle for Jerusalem as part of the "axis of resistance." It encouraged solidarity demonstrations with Palestinians throughout Lebanon and along the border with Israel; these included damage to the border fence and attempts by protestors to infiltrate into Israeli territory, which were thwarted by the IDF. At the same time, a few rockets were launched from Lebanon at Israel on three occasions and one UAV was launched from Syria under Iranian supervision. The rocket fire was attributed to Palestinian organizations.

9. But now that a ceasefire has been reached with Hamas, the international pressure for reconstruction will likely be immense. Blinken arrived in Egypt after stops in Jerusalem and Ramallah, when he pledged that the US would provide new aid to help rebuild the Gaza Strip, including US$5.5m in disaster relief and nearly US$33m for the UN Palestinian aid agency. What is less certain, however, is whether Israel under Prime Minister Netanyahu will acquiesce to requests on the loosening restrictions on construction materials entering Gaza (as it did after the 2014 conflict).

​

(a) Between 2009 to 2021, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad have visibly improved their military capabilities following each round of fighting, so Israel may no longer be willing to maintain its “quiet for quiet” policy in Gaza. The IDF may within a short time recommend that the state mow the grass again; and soon.​

​

(b) “The state of Qatar announces US$500 million in support for the reconstruction of Gaza,” Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani said in a tweet. There are real IDF concerns that Qatar’s funding for Gaza’s rebuilding efforts will be significantly diverted and allow Hamas and PIJ to once again build up their rocket arsenal, military capabilities and tunnel network. As Prime Minister Netanyahu vowed, “What was in the past will no longer be in the future.”​

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1397223795555979272

(c) As both sides begin preparations for the next war promised by Abu Marzouk, the safe money, as always, is on the pessimists. Things are going to get a lot worse before they start getting better. Barring a fundamental change in Gaza’s balance of power, the prospect of another round of fighting in the next 2 to 6 years, remains the same as it did after:​

• Operation Cast Lead in 2009 (23 days of fighting);
• Operation Pillar of Defense in 2012 (8 days of fighting);
• Operation Protective Edge in 2014 (50 days of fighting); and
• Operation Guardian of the Walls in 2021 (11 days of bombing).

 

[OPSSG]

Part 3: Is there a pathway to peace? Or is this ceasefire a short detour before the next war?

10. Gaza is where both Iran and its local terror group openly talk-about or even boast about Iran's transfer of missile production technology to kill Israeli and Palestinian civilians — which I see as a war crime that is being ignored at the U.N. — for others like Helga Baumgarten (professor at Birzeit University in the West Bank), the dangers of the Biden-Netanyahu duo’s approach to the Palestinian issue, reduces it to the threat posed by the rockets fired from Gaza, while she keeps ignoring the Iran factor.

(a) In Lebanon, Syria, Yemen and (to some extent) Iraq the same Iranian strategy seems to be applied but much more quietly. In public communications, Tehran has eagerly jumped at the chance to portray militants’ barrages on Israel as revenge for Israeli attacks on Iran. They are cheering on and highlighting Tehran’s role in arming and training Hamas; but they are also creating a competitor to Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ).​

(b) In the final analysis of the May 2021 round of fighting, Hamas and PIJ initiated the conflict as a non-state actor that could launch over 4,340 rocket and mortar attacks on Israeli civilians and civil facilities over an extended period of time but had little other warfighting capability other that using its own densely populated urban areas as barriers. They did so in part because their effective means of combat was neutralised by IDF’s intelligence efforts.​

​

(c) The IDF used artificial intelligence (AI) and supercomputing during the May 2021 campaign against Hamas and PIJ in the Gaza Strip. Having relied heavily on machine learning, the Israeli military is calling Operation Guardian of the Walls the 1st AI war (See: Israel's operation against Hamas was the world's first AI war).​

​

“For the first time, artificial intelligence was a key component and power multiplier in fighting the enemy,” an IDF Intelligence Corps senior officer said. “This is a first-of-its-kind campaign for the IDF. We implemented new methods of operation and used technological developments that were a force multiplier for the entire IDF.”​

​

(d) It seems likely that from 2014 to 2021, Israel developed a 3D mosaic of Hamas and PIJ targets (using highly detailed imagery and COMINT were supplemented by effective HUMINT). This AI software helped the IDF create a remarkably accurate 3D map of Hamas and PIJ targets in Gaza (being sold as Fire Weaver). This remarkable AI software is locally known as ‘smart trigger’ that has been sold abroad applies AI algorithms, to process data and prioritizes fire allocation. It calculates the optimal shooter for each target while minimizing collateral damage, and applying the rules of engagement in real time, which is a particularly important remedy against low cost terrorist launched balloons launched from residential areas.​

​

(e) As I said earlier, modeling and simulation are required to understand the complex interaction of systems within dense urban terrain. Urban systems modeling is a staff process of creating detailed terrain estimates of urban environments and combining them with conceptual, agent-based, and system dynamics models to simulate the dynamic complexity of a given cityscape.​

​

(f) Thanks to AI combined with the geo-tagged 3D map (that the IDF updated on a near realtime basis), Israel knows which apartment or tunnel in Gaza to strike. The IDF also cooperated directly with Israel‘s civil intelligence branch – the Shin Bet – in developing its target list, which gave the IDF improved access to Palestinian HUMINT as well as technical intelligence. Conversely, Hamas relied on the population density of Gaza and the presence of international press and civilians to deter timely IDF attacks, by co-locating its terror infrastructure in multi-storey buildings to delay IDF attacks.​

11. In May 2021, thanks to the use of super computers and AI, Israel fought Hamas with far more precision and efficiency than it fought the war against both Hamas in 2014 and the Hezbollah in 2006. In this round of fighting, Israel was able to go war after months of detailed planning based upon the lessons of the fighting in 2014. After concerted efforts to adapt its air, ground, and naval forces to those lessons, the Israeli Air Force greatly stepped up its training and readiness, restructured its C4I system to suit the needs of asymmetric warfare, and developed an AI enabled specific drawer plan for May 2021, that it executed well in 11 days.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1397955223625342986

12. In this May 2021 lawfare example, Hamas is able to ignore the human cost in Gaza, and use maskirovka (“masking”) to affect perceptions of the IDF’s bombing campaign in the debate within the American media outlets, and the Democratic Party without adverse consequences, while threatening U.N. staff in Gaza for speaking the truth. Guerrilla and insurgent forces have used human shields and the population as a key means of defence throughout history, and war between states and non-state actors has been seen as legitimate at some point in the history of every state, like Israel, that attempts to classify such Hamas and PIJ tactics as illegal or terrorism.

​

(a) With regard to the growing legitimacy of Hamas (despite American and Israeli narrative otherwise), we need to look at the voting trend in the latest U.N. Human Rights Council resolution that that adopts a PLO-drafted resolution (ignoring Hamas rocket attacks while seeking an inquiry to condemn Israel).​

​

(b) More interesting than the yes votes (by Russian, as P5, the Mexican, as G20 and OAS member or the Pinoys, as ASEAN member and as the 3rd most useless American ally, diplomats/idiots at the UN) and the 9 ‘no’ votes to the PLO-drafted resolution, there is a list of 14 countries that ‘abstained’ from voting (along with 24 yes votes or 9 no votes) — which is seen by me as helping Hamas gain legitimacy at the expense of American or Israeli attempts to label them only as terrorists.​

​

(c) In an increasingly multi-polar world, I see India, Japan, Korea, Netherlands and Poland, as important powers crafting their respective foreign policies (with realpolitik swing votes at the UN), that is increasing independent of current American attempts at international leadership (by Team Biden), thanks to 4 years of gross stupidity under Trump. These countries, some of whom are US allies, will ask what’s in it for me, to vote with an America in decline. A selection of the ‘abstained’ list in the latest U.N. Human Rights Council resolution includes Brazil (as G20 and OAS member), Denmark (as NATO and EU member), France (as P5, NATO, EU, G7 and G20 member), Italy (as NATO, EU, G7 and G20 member), India (as G20 member, Group of 77), Japan (as an US ally, G7 and G20 member), Korea (as an US ally and G20 member), Netherlands and Poland; each of who have an advanced domestic military-industrial complex — whose sympathy do not lie with Israel.​

​

(d) In past operations by:​

​

(i) the Russians against the Chechens;​

​

(ii) the Mexicans against narco-terrorists; or​

​

(iii) the Pinoys against any Muslim insurgent group,​

​

there is more collateral damage inflicted on civilians for much longer periods than 11 days. These three countries joined the ranks of serial human rights abusers (eg. countries like China, Cuba, Libya, Pakistan, and Venezuela), by backing a crooked UN inquiry that is immediately cheered by Hamas. That’s not a club that normal countries should aspire to join or in this case, to actually join. So not sure why these hypocritical Russian, Mexican or Pinoy diplomats would decide to be amongst the 24 countries who voted ‘yes’ to the PLO-drafted resolution.​

 

[Big_Zucchini]

Those who may have followed, a new Israeli government is set to be sworn in next week. There are still some hurdles and it might fall if someone defects, but as it is, it seems like a fairly sure victory.
The new government is a mix of all opposition parties, with many conflicting ideologies. It is seen as a healing government that is supposed to pass a budget, get the ministries working, give new momentum to the economy, and prevent a 2nd Netanyahu by limiting terms.
However, it is not expected to bring any change in foreign policy until its successor takes its place.

 

[John Fedup]

With conflicting ideologies…setting aside foreign policy, just getting this coalition to take care of day to day business seems like a stretch. How long will this coalition take to tear itself apart?

 

[Big_Zucchini]

With conflicting ideologies…setting aside foreign policy, just getting this coalition to take care of day to day business seems like a stretch. How long will this coalition take to tear itself apart?

What you're saying is well known and the coalition party heads have been public about it. This is not supposed to be a full term, coherent coalition. They will pass critical legislation that will prevent a repeat of the political crisis that hit Israel in mid 2019, pass a budget, and then dissolve.
The day to day activities will be handled by the ministries, which were intelligently spread out to all coalition parties.

Those relevant to the topic are the Minister of Defense Benny Gantz of the centrist Blue and White party who served as Chief of Staff during Operation Protection Edge and Defense Minister during Operation Guardian of The Walls.
He has recently spoken about a softer tone with the US regarding Iran, and making diplomacy quiet and behind closed doors, and not through the media, which is seen as provocatory.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs is Yair Lapid of the centrist Yesh Atid party, an opposition veteran who often spoke about the threat of making Israel a partisan topic and the need to mend relations with the Democrats.

The Prime Minister is Naftali Bennet of the Yamina religious right wing party. He's a bit of a nutcase, but he has an adorable baby face. His approach to foreign policy is also a bit heavy on the religious side, which may definitely creep some of Israel's non-religious supporters. On internal affairs he's a bit unpredictable. In his early days as Defense Minister, he took a strongman approach versus violent settlers (although internationally indistinguishable, in Israel there are multiple clear categories of settlers), but backed down after criticism from his voters. So, again, unpredictable.

 

[ngatimozart]

@Big_Zucchini There's been talk in various foreign media of Netanyahu working hard to kill this coalition before the Knesset vote. They also think that the Speaker may try to delay the vote as long as possible in order to give Netanyahu as much possible time to kill the coalition. Do you think both options are viable?

 

[OPSSG]

Post 1 of 2: The Power of the media comes with a corresponding responsibility to provide context — Problems with the misleading 28 May NY Times cover page

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1399658184617439232

1. In my prior guesstimate, I suspect that of the 83 civilians in Gaza killed, at least 40 were killed by rockets from Gaza — meaning that IMO, IDF’s total collateral damage in May 2021 is between 33 to 40 civilians — these civilians, including the children featured on the NY Times cover are not IDF targets; rather these children are collateral damage due to their close proximity to Hamas and PIJ military targets being attacked. It is still a tragedy that between 33 to 40 innocent civilian lost their lives over 11 days. However it must be noted the IDF employs multiple techniques to avoid as many civilian casualties as humanly possible during war. Let me elaborate on the 3 main problems or mistakes made by main stream reporting on these Gaza wars.

​

(a) The first mistake was the use of false images in the 28 May 2021 NY Times cover page; and their treatment of the 253 Gazans killed (up from 248), over 11 days in May 2021.​

​

(b) The second was to assume that all the photos were deaths caused by IDF air strikes. This is not true. On the first day of the fighting, a family was killed in Beit Hanoun area (where it is verified that the IDF was not operating). According to IDF spokesman they were killed by an errant Gazan rocket —there were an estimated 680 Hamas and PIJ rockets that fell within Gaza in the 11 day war — giving credence to the likelihood that those insurgent fired rockets killed far more Palestinian civilians (around 40) than than Israeli civilians.​

​

(c) The third mistake in NY Times cover was that a 17 year old was actually a member of a terrorist organization. Therefore, I agree with other reporters that say there is nothing wrong with mourning the death of civilians, especially children in Gaza; as the deaths of all children killed in war, is horrific. However, this misplaced sympathy for those killed should not extend to dead child combatants (that are engaged in other forms of terrorism from Gaza, such as, knife attacks, firebombs, and stone throwing that is intended to kill IDF troops or policemen).​

2. In this conflict (Operation Guardian of the Walls), known child terrorists sent by Hamas or the PIJ are often killed, hurt, or arrested, but their militant actions are whitewashed by Hamas and the PIJ, and only their age or body are listed or shown (in an attempt to strip away the context on why the shooting in self-defence occurred). Palestinians held in Israeli prisons, include 41 women and 140 minors, and 440 administrative detainees. But many of these women and children detained are working for a militant group, are rock throwers caught in the act or are child/women soldiers working to attack or undermine the IDF.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1399669536773791752

3. When the Cold War ended in 1991 and the Soviet Union disappeared, many Western intelligence agencies thought they had seen the last of large scale Soviet style maskirovka (“masking”) and dezinformatsiya (“disinformation”) operations. That was an unrealistic expectation.

​

(a) IMHO, the Palestinians, the Arabs (like the Qatari or the Egyptians), the Persians, the Turks, the North Koreans, the Vietnamese, and the Chinese are still using various deception practices. Terror groups and countries, like Hamas, PIJ, Hezbollah, Iran, Qatar, Turkey, North Korea, Vietnam, and China have never stopped using variations of the maskirovka and dezinformatsiya techniques they had learned, over the years.​

​

(b) The U.N. agency for Palestinian refugees (UNRWA) says it has recalled its Gaza director after he faced threats over remarks in which he appeared to praise Israel’s precision in its air strikes during last month’s Gaza war. ANY U.N. attempt to engage in unmasking of Hamas or PIJ propaganda will be met with threats to neutral U.N. Officials (which will not be reported by propaganda agents of Hamas like Al Jazeera). For unpardonable crime of providing a factual response and calling Israeli airstrikes “precise,” therefore not indiscriminate, UNRWA’s Gaza⁩ director gets recalled and replaced. What are chances the press will ever hear another truthful word from occupant of that job? On 3 Jun 2021, the UNRWA Commissioner-General was forced to make the following statement:​

​

“…I am seriously concerned by the gravity and magnitude of the attacks directed against the senior management of UNRWA in the Gaza Strip over the past week, including the assembly of a very large protest in front of the UNRWA Gaza Field Office compound on Monday 31 May 2021...​

​

UNRWA strongly protested and contested the position conveyed by the De Facto authorities in Gaza that they could no longer guarantee the safety and security of our staff. Regrettably, such a position left the Agency with no other choice than to ask the staff to leave the Gaza Strip as their security is of paramount priority to UNRWA...”​

​

(c) In relation to UNRWA Zaitoun Preparatory Boys’ School “A” and Elementary Boys’ School “A”, where terror tunnels were discovered after air strikes, the UNRWA on 4 Jun 2021 condemned the use by Palestinian armed groups of tunnels underneath its schools; and said that it is unacceptable that students and staff be placed at risk in such a way and asks that their neutrality be respected.​

 

[Big_Zucchini]

@Big_Zucchini There's been talk in various foreign media of Netanyahu working hard to kill this coalition before the Knesset vote. They also think that the Speaker may try to delay the vote as long as possible in order to give Netanyahu as much possible time to kill the coalition. Do you think both options are viable?

The current Knesset speaker was appointed by Netanyahu's former coalition, and the new coalition failed to vote in favor to replace him. So yes, he will delay it.
Netanyahu's only remaining vector of action is to draw defectors from the coalition into his bloc.
The most vulnerable ones were from Yamina party with 7 MKs, but most of them have already sworn allegiance to Bennet and went publicly against Netanyahu in response to calls to defect. Of those who pledged allegiance was one MK who was deemed most likely to defect.
So the chances this coalition will go down are quite slim.

 

[OPSSG]

Post 2 of 2: The Power of the media comes with a corresponding responsibility to provide context — Problems with the misleading 28 May NY Times cover page

4. There is an active social and main stream media campaign to warp and misrepresent information that comes out of Gaza, and to appeal to progressives that frame this May 2021 conflict solely by amount of children dead — when Hamas and PIJ are literally digging tunnels under UNRWA schools to hide from IDF air strikes. What makes sorting journalists from activists more and more difficult is that many journalists have become activists — that is, they see their job not as helping you understand events, but as pushing you toward their conclusions. They engineer their reporting to that end. Many Western reporters, the NY Times included supported by the world of activist NGOs, believe that Israel is the problem. It follows, if the NY Times writer is an activist, that what’s needed is not an understanding of Israel’s concerns on Gaza, but a character assassination that will stoke anger and punish Israel and the IDF as the guilty party.

​

(a) Being an activist is fine, but it’s important to understand who’s who. An activist doesn’t need to tell you everything, just the things that will draw you to his point of view. To take examples from the Israeli context, groups such as Breaking the Silence or B’Tselem are activist groups, and so, on the other side of the spectrum, are groups like StandWithUs. Their material isn’t meant primarily to explain what’s going on, but to induce you to support a particular position.​

​

(b) We need to remember media outlets like the NY Times often rely on activist groups, NGOs and the Gaza health ministry for information on Gaza; but the health ministry is Hamas and many of these NGOs that are allowed to operate in Gaza have links to terrorist organizations (or even active members of these terrorist groups within their ranks) and activist groups only intend to present a particular position (often stripping the context away).​

5. I keep reading on Malaysian social media that war crimes are being committed. But is that the case? I suspect not. The reason is because this is a war of necessity — it is necessary for the IDF to achieve its military goals —and military operations was launched to end the increasing threat that Hamas poses to Israel’s security and the lives of its citizens. Therefore, I also agree with earlier comments that the IDF's May 2021 campaign shares the same objectives as the 2014 ground incursion into Gaza. Both Operation Protective Edge and Operation Guardian of the Walls, serves three objectives:-

One, to weaken the capabilities of 17 militant groups in Gaza, in particular, to significantly reduce rocket arsenal of Hamas and PIJ to a more manageable level.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1395470841584963588

Two, to protect Israeli citizens from rocket and missile attacks (so that the Iron Dome retains its core strategic function - to provide Israel with the option to selectively respond to rocket attacks by Hamas and PIJ).​

Three, to dismantle the network of terror tunnels which extend from the Gaza Strip into Israel, providing security from attack in the medium term.​

6. As a forum, we need to be very careful to distinguish between:

​

(a) factual reporting of information on Gaza; and​

​

(b) avoid being subject to maskirovka, dezinformatsiya, and other forms of misinformation by disinformation agents like Hind Hassan of Vice News (and formerly of Al Jazeera) that supports the agenda of Hamas or the PIJ (as terror groups known to use children as human shields and recruit child fighters).​

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1399963998460821505

The IDF has killed about 160+ militants in Operation Guardian of the Walls. Using deductive reasoning, I suspect that less than 40 of those 253 killed in the May 2021 fighting (as collateral damage), was caused by unintended ‘targeting errors’ of the IDF. While others have estimated that Hamas and other militant rocket misfires have killed up to 50 people in Gaza, in my guesstimate, I have assumed that 40 civilians were killed.

7. To achieve a lasting peace between Israel and Gaza:

​

(a) Hamas needs to be realistic for its goals in “immediate negotiations” to reach a prisoner exchange with Israel, and provide information on 2 IDF MIAs/KIAs (status unclear) and 2 missing civilians — Oron Shaul (captured or killed in 2014 east of the Al-Tuffah neighborhood in eastern Gaza, in which 14 Israeli soldiers were killed), Hadar Goldin (captured or killed in 2014 at Rafah city, south of the Gaza Strip), Avner Mengistu and Hisham al-Sayed; and​

(b) a peaceful transfer of power from Benjamin Netanyahu in Israel is essential. This is also an aspect of a real democracy that has been the norm in for 73 years. The concerns expressed by Shin Bet chief Nadav Argaman, is an important warning that freedom of speech comes with a sense of responsibility.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1401240829772062727

8. The eight parties in the coalition to unseat Benjamin Netanyahu range from the right-wing nationalist Yamina party to social-democratic Labor and left-wing Meretz. The trends of economic integration and political pragmatism in Israel’s relations with its Arab citizens went hand in hand with similar trends in the Middle East. The Abraham Accords and the push for normalization between Israel and the Arab world created a new regional paradigm based on a pragmatic preference for economic progress, instead of the identity-politics paradigm.

9. For the first time in Israeli history, the coalition includes an Arab-Israeli party, Ra’am, whose four Knesset (parliament) seats enable the coalition to reach a majority — Ra’am leader Mansour Abbas will also be under pressure. Other Israeli-Arab parties and Palestinians in the Occupied Territories have criticised him as a defector. His response is that by joining the coalition he will win increased social and economic benefits for all Arab-Israelis. Another oddity of the new government is that Yamina leader Naftali Bennett will have the first two-year turn of a rotating four-year prime ministership with Ya’ir Lapid, leader of centrist party Yesh Atid.

 

[Feanor]

5. I keep reading on Malaysian social media that war crimes are being committed. But is that the case? I suspect not. The reason is because this is a war of necessity — it is necessary for the IDF to achieve its military goals —and military operations was launched to end the increasing threat that Hamas poses to Israel’s security and the lives of its citizens.

I have a problem with this line of reasoning. War crimes can occur in any kind of war. The war itself may be legal, illegal, justified or unjustified. War crimes are individual acts. If Israeli soldiers line up and execute Gaza civilians for fun, it doesn't matter how justified the war is, that would be a war crime (note I'm not claiming this happened it's just an example). The only argument against the claim of Israeli war crimes is the lack of evidence of Israeli war crimes. And as far as arguments go, it's about the strongest there is, at least in my book. We have to keep war crimes separate from the politics of the war itself. Otherwise we fall from objective legal standards for war crimes into political ones where on the one hand horrific and unjustified actions get excused or swept under the rug because the war itself is deemed as "good" or "necessary" and vice versa actions that are not in any way an actual war crime get labeled as such because the war itself is seen as illegitimate.

 

[OPSSG]

The law of armed conflict applies to IDF Actions or Omissions — Part 1

5. I keep reading on Malaysian social media that war crimes are being committed. But is that the case? I suspect not. The reason is because this is a war of necessity — it is necessary for the IDF to achieve its military goals —and military operations was launched to end the increasing threat that Hamas poses to Israel’s security and the lives of its citizens.

War crimes are individual acts.

The only argument against the claim of Israeli war crimes is the lack of evidence of Israeli war crimes. And as far as arguments go, it's about the strongest there is, at least in my book.

We have to keep war crimes separate from the politics of the war itself.

1. What you say is technically wrong in law. I am making a technical statement on legality of a war — at an organisational level.

2. The laws of war are, at bottom, constraints on warriors and war-fighting. Military lawyers refer to the laws of war as ‘LOAC’ – the law of armed conflict. Military lawyers in the business of helping their commanders achieve a country’s military objectives by killing the enemy, under the proper ROEs.

​

(a) At a Division or a Corps level, military lawyers write manuals, and operational handbooks that are, in effect, book-length advice on what the law means. Within brigades or lower, military lawyers help train soldiers in the laws of war, and ROEs. And in operations, military lawyers provide the task group commander case-by-case oral advice.​

​

(b) One important consequence of taking the law of necessity seriously is that military lawyers want to leave the judgement calls about what is necessary to military commanders, without after-the-fact second-guessing by courts, or investigating commissions. Consider proportionality calculations in LOAC, which under the law require weighing the concrete and direct military advantage of an operation against the anticipated ‘incidental’ damage to civilians and civilian objects.​

​

(c) LOAC takes necessity seriously, and favours wide discretion and deference to military commanders in judgement calls, reads treaties narrowly and formalistically under the assumption that states gave up as little as they could when negotiating them.​

3. On the one hand, LOAC forbids the use of human shields – which, from the point of view of guerrillas or partisans, amounts to requiring the fish to leave the water voluntarily. On the other hand, the law requires militaries confronted by an enemy that (illegally) uses human shields to maintain the principle of distinction, where possible. Additional Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions (1977) apppies to the conflict in Gaza and codifies the basic jus in bello rules for protecting civilians (the principles of distinction and proportionality) but provides no detailed rules protecting civilians, for example, rules requiring warnings and prohibiting excessive collateral damage. It is even possible to argue that the IDF meets the higher standards set by Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions (1977).

4. The terminology is stereotyped. I do not mean to imply that every lawyer in the miltary accepts the military version of the law of war (or LOAC) on all issues, nor that every lawyer working for human rights organizations accepts the humanitarian vision of international law.

5. To make matters worse, military lawyers must at times overcome the suspicion that they are not really part of the band of brothers – or, more insidiously, they must deal with their own suspicion that the combat soldiers regard them as ‘jobniks’ even when that is not true.

 

[ngatimozart]

1. What you say is technically wrong in law. I am making a technical statement on legality of a war — at an organisational level.

2. The laws of war are, at bottom, constraints on warriors and war-fighting. Military lawyers refer to the laws of war as ‘LOAC’ – the law of armed conflict. Military lawyers in the business of helping their commanders achieve a country’s military objectives by killing the enemy, under the proper ROEs.

(a) At a Division or a Corps level, military lawyers write manuals, and operational handbooks that are, in effect, book-length advice on what the law means. Within brigades or lower, military lawyers help train soldiers in the laws of war, and ROEs. And in operations, military lawyers provide the task group commander case-by-case oral advice.​

(b) One important consequence of taking the law of necessity seriously is that military lawyers want to leave the judgement calls about what is necessary to military commanders, without after-the-fact second-guessing by courts, or investigating commissions. Consider proportionality calculations in LOAC, which under the law require weighing the concrete and direct military advantage of an operation against the anticipated ‘incidental’ damage to civilians and civilian objects.​

(c) LOAC takes necessity seriously, and favours wide discretion and deference to military commanders in judgement calls, reads treaties narrowly and formalistically under the assumption that states gave up as little as they could when negotiating them.​

3. On the one hand, LOAC forbids the use of human shields – which, from the point of view of guerrillas or partisans, amounts to requiring the fish to leave the water voluntarily. On the other hand, the law requires militaries confronted by an enemy that (illegally) uses human shields to maintain the principle of distinction, where possible. Additional Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions (1977) applies to the conflict in Gaza and codifies the basic jus in bello rules for protecting civilians (the principles of distinction and proportionality) but provides no detailed rules protecting civilians, for example, rules requiring warnings and prohibiting excessive collateral damage. It is even possible to argue that the IDF meets the higher standards set by Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions (1977).

4. The terminology is stereotyped. I do not mean to imply that every lawyer in the miltary accepts the military version of the law of war (or LOAC) on all issues, nor that every lawyer working for human rights organizations accepts the humanitarian vision of international law.

5. To make matters worse, military lawyers must at times overcome the suspicion that they are not really part of the band of brothers – or, more insidiously, they must deal with their own suspicion that the combat soldiers regard them as ‘jobniks’ even when that is not true.

But using your argument only Israel can be legally held responsible for any criminal offending committed by members of its forces against the Geneva Convention LOAC and only if it is a signatory to the Convention. By the same token HAMAS, the PIA, Palestinian Authority, and the other terrorist group cannot be held legally accountable under any of the Geneva Convention Accords because they are not recognised nation states and therefore cannot be signatories to the Conventions. So that could be a problematic approach. A better option maybe to use the Crimes Against Humanity approach instead which covers a multitude of sins and all suspects.