cdxbow
Well-Known Member
Hindsight is a wonderful thing. The right decision always looks easy through the retrospectoscope. I wonder if they could be turned into an unmanned platform using the loyal wingman 'smarts'.
Redlands18
Well-Known Member
Might be worth a read back through this thread, it started in 2006 so there is plenty of coverage on the Air 87 decision, generally believed to be, that Australia was mislead on the maturity of the Tiger at the time and being assembled here in Australia probably didn’t hurt either.
Yes I have been following it here for a few years. It’s understandable that Australia wanted industrial offsets. Interestingly in my day job I deal with Airbus on a weekly basis and I wouldn’t be at all surprised if they misled Australia on the capability and the maturity of their systems. We deal with… how shall I put it?… a lack of capability vs what’s promised.
This has been discussed at length through this topic but a for quick synopsis:
- Tiger was the best fit for the requirements at the time.
- Tiger was over sold as MOTS even though it was still developmental.
- It was a quantum leap in capability but also complexity over the Kiowa.
- It was more advanced and capable than the versions of the Apache and Sea Cobra on offer at the time.
- The other platforms on offer would have suffered similar issues when introduced as many problems related to the program structure, funding and support assumptions, not the actual platform.
- The government's use / deployment decisions related as much or often more to aversion to risk as they did to availability or capability.
- The news cycle relating to defence matters is often several years behind reality, i.e. issues are reported in the public domain long after they occured, and long after they had been rectified.
- Tiger is a much better performer than MRH, i.e. it has never needed to be supplemented by another platform.
John Newman
The Bunker Group
Actually the history of Tiger ARH goes back even further, it was late 2001 that a contract was signed, selection process goes back further in time too.
People often say why didn’t we select AH-64 Apache, but they also forget that the AH-64E of today didn’t exist, it was an earlier version.
I’ve always been a fan of Tiger ARH, the ‘aircraft’ itself, but unfortunately as a ‘system/capability’ its never lived up to the expectation.
And unfortunately I can’t see any further use for it in Australian Army service, it can’t be re-rolled as a utility aircraft owing to the nature of the design, a two seat tandem airframe.
I’d be trying to do a deal with Airbus for the airframes and the spare holdings (Tiger is no longer in production), I can see value in Airbus buying them as a means of supporting the Euro operator fleets.
Anyway, just my opinion.
Cheers,
Yep I've wanted to like the Tiger as well.
I know it's now to be consigned to history, but using my retrospectoscope ( Thanks cdxbow for that one )
I wonder if we had initially extra numbers ( 29 ) of Tiger ARH in the first place if that may have given enough redundancy to enable some deployable platforms.
Sure there were many layers of challenges, but the ability to cannibalize while not a perfect solution, does give an option for lack of lack of spares.
Moving forward in the bigger picture it does raise the question of the capability of a platform and the numbers to achieve a specific capability.
Many to choose from but to mention just one
Land 400 phase 2 comes to mind.
Less Cav vehicles to get the more expensive Boxer.
Less Boxers actually having a gun turret
Less turrets actually having a ATGM.
Fitted for and not with...........Again
We'll see
Regards S
Even if the tigers were put in storage, they would still require maintenance.
If they were then re activated in time of need, we would face training and intergration problems all over again. Spares would need to be looked after as well. Better to sell them off if we can find a buyer.
To put it in context, the way requirement were developed in the 90s and 2000s was the government would go to industry and say "this is what we think we want to do, how do you think we should do it", and "we need X number of flight hours, sea days etc. How do you suggest we do it for a given budget".
If I recall correctly, had the AH-64C (a AH-64D without the Longbow radar) or the AH-1W been selected, the cap on capital expenditure would have meant fewer than 22 airframes could have been afforded. This would have caused even greater availability and capability issues.
Now the irony is the only type that could have been afforded in greater numbers was the simpler, but still highly affective AW Mangusta. The thing is there is no guarantee the government would have gone for the thirty odd airframes needed, irrespective of price, because I don't think they ever realised how many they needed.
With the Mangusta's use of the T-800 engine in evolved versions, it would have been a good match to the T-800 powered Super Lynx, had that been acquired instead of the Super Sea Sprite. Mangusta is being upgraded and, I believe, is still in production. Combined with Super Lynx, then Wildcat, it could have been a very interesting RAH option, with a high level of commonality with a very good shipboard and light utility / support helicopter.
Ah what could have been.
If I recall correctly, had the AH-64C (a AH-64D without the Longbow radar) or the AH-1W been selected, the cap on capital expenditure would have meant fewer than 22 airframes could have been afforded. This would have caused even greater availability and capability issues.
Now the irony is the only type that could have been afforded in greater numbers was the simpler, but still highly affective AW Mangusta. The thing is there is no guarantee the government would have gone for the thirty odd airframes needed, irrespective of price, because I don't think they ever realised how many they needed.
With the Mangusta's use of the T-800 engine in evolved versions, it would have been a good match to the T-800 powered Super Lynx, had that been acquired instead of the Super Sea Sprite. Mangusta is being upgraded and, I believe, is still in production. Combined with Super Lynx, then Wildcat, it could have been a very interesting RAH option, with a high level of commonality with a very good shipboard and light utility / support helicopter.
Ah what could have been.
Apaches weren't really a loved platform in the early 2000's. High maintenance, low availability rate, reliability, crashes, shortage of spares, etc. But like many US programs, the service persisted and things got better. Then they just kept evolving as the Americans use the dam things and had money and time to further develop. Its easy to look back 20+ years and say its the obvious platform now, but at the time, it wasn't. I think it was mainly just bad timing, we had a need and the American gear was still trapped in development difficulties. Airbus sensed that and sold us on something with a lot of unknowns rather than something that was having known issues at that time.
Tigers should have some resale, and for a force not as networked, not pulling high numbers of hours and not looking for deployment/training outside of Europe, they would probably be livable. Its just that isn't Australia. A customer like Poland, might be very interested in them, and they would be an excellent buy. A euro customer, strong French/German connections, urgent need for an attack helo, price sensitive. Would not have any issue buying slightly used Australian gear. While Australia doesn't see how the tiger links into their future force, for Poland it would be a huge step up from cold war Russian gear on now very tired platforms with minimal Russian support, it would be a dream for them, and a nice time to get into the platform.
With the Apache, Australia gets real capability, new airframes (with link 16), before the production line closes in 2026. The next gen platform is likely to have a long development cycle as its not just an upgrade, its likely to have a whole new configuration and new aircraft type, which is exactly what we are trying to get out of. We will do what we always do, hammer the gear, put a billion flight hours on it in no time. We can keep lock step with the US army for updates and we can interoperate with all those other apache customers (eg. UK, Singapore, Indonesia, Korea, India, Japan, US). When we are ready to move on, that gear will also be desirable. For Australia that wizbang new platform may not be a huge benefit for AUS, drones, and other spaces are moving fast. The apache isn't a dead end, its likely to evolve its mission as new uav's come on line.
Apaches Are Ailing Warriors
fas.org
Tigers should have some resale, and for a force not as networked, not pulling high numbers of hours and not looking for deployment/training outside of Europe, they would probably be livable. Its just that isn't Australia. A customer like Poland, might be very interested in them, and they would be an excellent buy. A euro customer, strong French/German connections, urgent need for an attack helo, price sensitive. Would not have any issue buying slightly used Australian gear. While Australia doesn't see how the tiger links into their future force, for Poland it would be a huge step up from cold war Russian gear on now very tired platforms with minimal Russian support, it would be a dream for them, and a nice time to get into the platform.
With the Apache, Australia gets real capability, new airframes (with link 16), before the production line closes in 2026. The next gen platform is likely to have a long development cycle as its not just an upgrade, its likely to have a whole new configuration and new aircraft type, which is exactly what we are trying to get out of. We will do what we always do, hammer the gear, put a billion flight hours on it in no time. We can keep lock step with the US army for updates and we can interoperate with all those other apache customers (eg. UK, Singapore, Indonesia, Korea, India, Japan, US). When we are ready to move on, that gear will also be desirable. For Australia that wizbang new platform may not be a huge benefit for AUS, drones, and other spaces are moving fast. The apache isn't a dead end, its likely to evolve its mission as new uav's come on line.
Takao
The Bunker Group
In order to meet the % rate (exactly how you describe in your first para) Boeing said you need 21 AH-64, Bell said 19 AH-1Z and Eurocopter said 22 Tiger.
We couldn't afford 21 Apache, only 19 (and they were effectively A's because we had to ditch most D bits to get 19). We could afford 19 AH-1Z, but the aircraft was so far behind the other two it wasn't worth it (and as of 2012 when I last checked, was still behind Tiger in development), we could afford 22 Tiger, especially when we could also include additional simulators and spares.
Based on my experience and knowledge of numbers, 29 Tiger would have been perfect. Note that the decision to go to Afghanistan or Iraq lay across the lake from Russell, we had the jets ready to go. But 27 - 29 would have been perfect. Of course, we couldn't have afforded that, nor been able to justify that based on the data provided.
Thanks for that, I know it was something along those lines although I thought it was the Whisky not the Zulu on offer because I believe Zulus IOC was well behind Tigers.
The Mangusta intrigues me as I believe it was more affordable to acquire and sustain than the others and more capable at least than the Whisky Cobra.
While I would happily see the army increase to 48 company/squadron sized maneuver units I am not sure divisions is what we need.
I found the attached Aide-Memoire (a bit dated now) very useful in thinking about how the Army is organised and forces generated.
Please ignore if I am telling you how to suck eggs.
Regards,
Massive
Anthony_B_78
Active Member
Such a number would be a big increase. As I understand it, if we counted - as is traditionally the case - only infantry and armour when we talk about manoeuvre, then regular combat teams would total 29. That's six infantry battalions with three apiece, plus 2RAR (Amphibious) with two, and three armoured cavalry regiments with three apiece. So, yeah, 48 would be a big jump, no?
There has been some discussion in this thread about proposed / planned reforms that would make the document you shared a little outdated, but they won't create more manoeuvre units, as far as I can see. Instead, the Army is looking to field new capabilities we don't currently have - SP artillery (which might mean one new regiment?), a SSM regiment, and a new air defence system.
FoxtrotRomeo999
Active Member
I am going out on a limb, and say that the recent grouping of (mostly) two Reserve Brigades with one Regular Combat Brigade gave us a nascent and affordable Three Division structure. Canada has a similar construct and has four Regional based Divisions, each with a Regular Brigade and a plethora of under-strength Reserve units and a fifth Division for deployed units Bases and Units - Canadian Army.
What for though?
What will these additional divisional headquarters add?
Regards,
Massive
The thing with armies is they still rely on boots on the ground.
Air forces and navies have benefited from technology reducing the number of personnel required to operate and sustain their platforms while the capability, versatility and interoperability of their platforms has increased. The army on the other hand still relies on sections, platoons and battalions of soldiers, primarily armed with rifles.
Hardening the army has helped but armour still needs infantry. Modernising and increasing the capability of artillery, engineers, aviation, ISR etc. Increases capability and versatility, but there is still a finite number of infantry.
The RAAF and RAN today could easily increase numbers of platforms due to the reduced personnel overheads of modern systems, but the army still needs X number of rifles and bayonets per brigade, unless there is far more radical reform in how they do their business.
Air forces and navies have benefited from technology reducing the number of personnel required to operate and sustain their platforms while the capability, versatility and interoperability of their platforms has increased. The army on the other hand still relies on sections, platoons and battalions of soldiers, primarily armed with rifles.
Hardening the army has helped but armour still needs infantry. Modernising and increasing the capability of artillery, engineers, aviation, ISR etc. Increases capability and versatility, but there is still a finite number of infantry.
The RAAF and RAN today could easily increase numbers of platforms due to the reduced personnel overheads of modern systems, but the army still needs X number of rifles and bayonets per brigade, unless there is far more radical reform in how they do their business.
Anthony_B_78
Active Member
Agreed, and there seems to be an issue with "hollow" units the Army across not only the reserves but even the regular forces.
Several pages ago there was a discussion about further reforms and I note that there is a plan to re-raise 4RAR in Darwin, albeit with the same structure as 2RAR. From what I've seen, including the discussion here, 2RAR is a shell of an infantry battalion, with, IIRC, just four rifle platoons plus a Reconnaissance and a Small Boats platoons. The thinking being that the battalion is responsible for the amphibious Pre Landing Force - of about a reinforced company, and can field two (each with two rifle platoons, half the recon and small boats platoons). This is all well and good but it seems like a cost-cutting way to create amphibious capability. Wouldn't it be better to have 2RAR and the re-raised 4RAR manned and structured as full battalions? Wouldn't this increase flexibility?
Depends on your long term plan… If you can incrementally get approval to expand the number of infantry battalions we have, in this manner…
Why stop there? It would be far more flexible to have three full battalions instead of two. Or why not raise two full brigades instead? What about a marine corps with two divisions?
This is where argument on the internet often loses its value, because the answer is always more. Of course two full battalions would be more flexible. But where are the soldiers going to come from? What capabilities are you going to give up to get them? It is easy to say the government should just provide more money, but even then the problem doesn't go way. If the government increased the budget so we could add, say, an extra 10 000 soldiers, we would still have to wring the most capability out of those soldiers as we can. Even the US Army, nearly 500 000 strong, agonise over small force structure changes because they don't have the numbers to do everything.
As it is, if you stress tested the amphibious force, the limiting factor would not be the number of infantry soldiers. So in a zero sum game, why invest in more infantry soldiers rather than the capabilities that are the limiting factor?