Defence of Taiwan

[Panacea]

Maybe people have different take on this issue and it's debatable. [Mod Edit: Facts are not debatable — unless you are here not to learn but spew misinformation. Last warning, before we ban you.]

Russia And Japan Are Still At War — At Least On Paper

Japan's prime minister will be in Moscow Tuesday, amid speculation that Russia and Japan might be about to sign a peace treaty. The two countries have still not officially ended World War II.

www.npr.org

Well, ban me, please, I just signed up and checked out this forum today and have no intention to stay anyway.

Mod edit: Member banned at own request, following Warnings on posting behavior by other members of the Mod team.
-Preceptor

 

[RogerP]

That is complete drivel, not least because it would take longer than an hour for Chinese troops to arrive and disembark on Taiwanese beachers, let alone defeat the Taiwanese military. I can't think of any modern war that was over in just an hour.



China can veto any sanctions on the UN Security Council.

Honestly, are you here to troll or have you just been fed Chinese propaganda from birth?

What Troops have to arrive, the missiles would land and render the country militarily vulnerable in under 1 minute after launch. Every military target would be destroyed along with the civilian population. The factories would be spared naturally.

Remember the chinese do not value life in any way

This isn't the 1940's

Mod edit: Submit proof of claims made or retract them.
-Preceptor

Proof not all missiles China has are nukes, and a hyoersonic missile travels at 1.7 miles per second, since Taiwan is 50 miles from China the missiles would arrive in about 30 seconds. Is there proof that this could not happen?

If the chinese valued life would they have welded people in their own apartments to die of covid or starve to death?

 

[Preceptor]

What Troops have to arrive, the missiles would land and render the country militarily vulnerable in under 1 minute after launch. Every military target would be destroyed along with the civilian population. The factories would be spared naturally.

Remember the chinese do not value life in any way

This isn't the 1940's

Mod edit: Submit proof of claims made or retract them.
-Preceptor

Proof not all missiles China has are nukes, and a hyoersonic missile travels at 1.7 miles per second, since Taiwan is 50 miles from China the missiles would arrive in about 30 seconds. Is there proof that this could not happen?

If the chinese valued life would they have welded people in their own apartments to die of covid or starve to death?

Temp ban implemented while the Mod team discusses the poster's behavior. For the general membership, a requirement of proof from a member of the Mod team is to be taken seriously, and including a bunch of images of PRC missile systems does NOT prove that the PRC has the capability to achieve the claim of;

Every military target would be destroyed along with the civilian population.

Further, stating that the Chinese do not value life in anyway, and then adding a claim that people were welded into their own apartments to die would be considered both derogatory and additional claims made without proof. The Mod team will discuss and made a decision.
-Preceptor

 

[Sandhi Yudha]

Begin next year France and the UK will join a Japanese-American naval exercise. The exact location is unclear yet, but the combined amphibious drills will take place around Japan's remote Islands in May 2021.

Japan, USA and France set for Combined Amphibious Exercise - Naval News

The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF), the U.S. Navy, and the French Navy (Marine Nationale) will take part in combined amphibious drills in Japan's remote Islands in May 2021.

www.navalnews.com

So, the upgrade of 22 out of 144 F-16A/B Block 20 will be finished end this month. Under the Peace Phoenix Rising programme, which was launched in 2016 and is being carried out by Lockheed Martin and Taiwan’s Aerospace Industrial Development Corporation (AIDC), about 140 F-16A/Bs are to be upgraded to the F-16V configuration by the end of 2023.
In august 2019, Taiwan ordered also 66 new F-16V Block 70.

Taiwan aiming to complete upgrade of 22 F-16A/B fighters by end of 2020

Taiwan’s plan to complete the upgrade of 22 Republic of China Air Force (RoCAF) F-16A/B multirole fighter aircraft to the latest F-16V configuration by the end of 2020...

www.janes.com

 

[Musashi_kenshin]

Why so many so fast.

I would have thought it's fairly obvious. China is gearing up for an invasion of Taiwan. Xi painted the CCP into a corner with his 2049 deadline for restoring the nation (or however he put it), and I think he'll want Taiwan secured long before then as he's aiming to be bigger than Mao. Therefore Taiwan has to be occupied well in advance of his potential retirement. He won't risk his successor taking credit for it.

 

[OPSSG]

I would have thought it's fairly obvious. China is gearing up for an invasion of Taiwan. Xi painted the CCP into a corner with his 2049 deadline for restoring the nation (or however he put it), and I think he'll want Taiwan secured long before then as he's aiming to be bigger than Mao. Therefore Taiwan has to be occupied well in advance of his potential retirement. He won't risk his successor taking credit for it.

I disagree. Xi only wants to have the option of invasion — to prevent a Taiwanese declaration of independence (as a country).

The “1992 consensus,” a term former Mainland Affairs Council chairman Su Chi (蘇起) in 2006 admitted making up in 2000, refers to a tacit understanding between the KMT and the Chinese government that both sides of the Taiwan Strait acknowledge there is “One—China,” with each side having its own interpretation of what “China” means. President Tsai Ing-wen’s (蔡英文) administration’s refusal to recognize the consensus is tantamount to unilaterally abolishing the accord, former president Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) said.

On 7 Nov 2015, Ma Ying-jeou, President of the Republic of China, and Xi Jinping (習近平), General Secretary of the Communist Party of China and President of the People's Republic of China met in Singapore and came to an understanding. If Taiwan honours the 1992 consensus or the 2015 understanding arrived at in Singapore, there is ZERO chance of war or invasion.

1. Having said the above, we also need to be aware that:

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(a) from a JMSDF and US Navy’s 7th Fleet joint operations perspective, Taiwan is the keystone of any attempt at China's naval containment; and​

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(b) lose Taiwan to a Chinese invasion (however unlikely it is at the moment), both JMSDF and the US Navy lose the ability to keep the PLA(N) hemmed up against their own coast line. Lose Taiwan, and both the JMSDF and the US Navy’s 7th Fleet, lose control of their SLOCs. While it is easy to say that lose Taiwan, and Japan loses the extended island chain defense system that protects its home waters; who is to say that Taiwan is on Japan’s side on the longer term? Especially given the extensive Taiwanese business interests in the mainland; and the intense activity of Chinese agents there.​

2. Japanese and American admirals understand the importance of the 1st island chain.

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(a) In the case of Japan, they have always understood the importance of Taiwan’s geography (to their defence).​

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(b) I suspect this is why the Imperial Japanese Navy insisted upon Taiwan's annexation in 1895, and it is why Taiwan contingencies have been an important part of the Japan Self Defense Force's thinking since the 1950s. Naval war planners understand—even if most Japanese civilians do not.​

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(c) The loss of Taiwan would give the Chinese incredible leverage over Japan.​

 

[Musashi_kenshin]

I disagree. Xi only wants the option of invasion — to prevent a Taiwanese declaration of independence (as a country).

I wish that were the case, but for the following reasons I think that's too optimistic a view:

• As noted above, Xi has effectively set the deadline for an invasion (2049). That anniversary has been hyped so much the CCP will find it hard to explain to its own people how China can be considered rejuvinated with Taiwan still separate.
• China has previously said that Taiwan putting off unification for "too long" will lead to an invasion. With the importance of the 2049 anniversary, taking no action by then will suggest to Taipei that China will never invade, so long as they're not so stupid as to change the constitution or make a UDI. That would be a huge concession and one that currently there's no reason to believe the CCP would make.
• China's military has continued to grow since 1996. The time to make a UDI would have been 15-20 years ago. Doing so at some point in the future would make no sense unless it was clear an invasion was imminent or underway.
• There's no reason to believe Taipei will declare independence in a way that will provoke an invasion. Why? Because President Tsai has already said numerous times that Taiwan is independent, and Beijing has not done anything in response. The DPP is smart enough to realise that there's nothing to be gained by crossing China's obvious red line. They can assert their independence from the PRC in order to keep unofficial ties with major countries (bar China) and raise international awareness, yet not formally dispense with the idea that Taiwan is part of "a" China.

Even if Beijing is deluded enough to currently think that by the mid 2030s or 2040s Taiwan will just roll over because "inevitably" it will recognise China's greatness, when that doesn't materialise I believe it's virtually certain there will be an attack, unless there is a change of leadership in the CCP (and right now there is no peace faction that we know of).

 

[OPSSG]

@Musashi_kenshin, I don’t understand why you buy into this Taiwanese DPP bullshit. If the Taiwanese want to provoke a war, they can fight it by themselves. The 1992 consensus is an agreement on how the 2 sides can disagree. But no, the DPP have to trash talk, without investing in actual military capability.

...continued from above:

3. Objectively speaking, anyone with a basic knowledge of geo-politics and understand international relations issues as a diplomat of substance, like Antony Blinken or Bilahari Kausikan (as a former diplomat), would know that Taiwan is at fault — due to the toxic domestic politics occurring there. Taiwanese political trash talking against China has real world consequences. If the Taiwanese want to trash talk, I say talk only after building 8 submarines, not before. Trash talk after the 66 F-16Vs have been delivered, not before.

4. Antony Blinken, U.S. President-elect Joe Biden's pick for secretary of state, a former director of the Taipei Office of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) knows that:

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(a) Taiwan is at fault and needs to dial it down; and​

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(b) pressure point Taiwan is a useful tool of leverage for the US to get cooperation from China — after 20 Jan 2021, I fully expect Biden’s team to privately tell President Tsai Ing-wen’s (蔡英文) to dial it back.​

Edit: Points 5 to 9 added to provide a naval context, to prevent this from becoming an off-topic sea blind discussion (and to help readers understand the often unspoken Japanese Navalists’ collective concerns and the Chinese reaction to such thinking by their investments in the PLA(N)’s fleet of ships and their rapid growth of the amphibious capability of the PLA Marine Corps).

5. If the now-still-unthinkable were to occur and Taiwan and China enter into direct armed conflict, Northeast Asian SLOCs security would not be the only exploitable vulnerability of the JMSDF, the ROK Navy and the US Navy’s 7th Fleet, combined. Taiwan would then be the perfect basis for the PLA(N) and the 20,000 strong PLA Marine Corps to island-hop through the Japanese controlled Ryukyu island chain – which is much closer to Taipei and Shanghai than to Tokyo – and quickly reach Okinawa or beyond. Given that Japan only has a 3,000 strong Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade, it wouldn’t be excessive to consider a Chinese takeover of Taiwan or the Ryukyu island chain an existential national security threat to Japan.

6. As Ian Easton explains: PLA intentions and plans for a conquered Taiwan are made plain in an internal document, The Japanese Air Self Defense Force, a handbook studied by mid-career officers at the PLA Air Force Command College in Beijing. The stated purpose of the text is to help Chinese pilots and staff officers understand the strengths and weaknesses of their Japanese adversaries. Buried amidst hundreds of pages of detailed maps, target coordinates, organizational charts, weapons data, and jet fighter images are the following lines:

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As soon as Taiwan is reunified with Mainland China, Japan's maritime lines of communication will fall completely within the striking ranges of China's fighters and bombers...Our analysis shows that, by using blockades, if we can reduce Japan's raw imports by 15-20%, it will be a heavy blow to Japan's economy. After imports have been reduced by 30%, Japan's economic activity and war-making potential will be basically destroyed. After imports have been reduced by 50%, even if they use rationing to limit consumption, Japan's national economy and war-making potential will collapse entirely...blockades can cause sea shipments to decrease and can even create a famine within the Japanese islands.​

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7. But the problem posed by Chinese control of Taiwan is not really limited to the shipping that passes through the Taiwan and Luzon Straits. American naval war planners understand the importance of the "1st Island Chain," a group of islands that keeps the PLA Navy and PLA Air Force hemmed into the East and South China Seas; and these islands include the Philippines Archipelago, Taiwan, the Japanese Archipelago, and the Ryukyu Islands.

8. In times of peace there is little to stop Chinese naval and air forces from crossing out into the Pacific as they wish, but in times of war things will be different. The Japanese:

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(a) have been quietly stocking these islands close to Taiwan with anti-ship and anti-air missile units — which includes the upgraded Type 12 surface-to-ship guided missiles (that are truck mounted) whose range will be extended from 200 km to 900 km (with the final goal of 1,500 km). According to media reports, a Kawasaki P-1 MPA equipped with 4 air-based Type-12 missiles (it can carry up to 8 missiles) made its first test flight from a JMSDF Air Facility Atsugi on 10 Feb 2020. The improved air-launched variant of the latest Type 12 anti-ship missile;​

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(b) have decided in 2017 to acquire the 280km range Norwegian JSM (for its 147 F35A/Bs) and the 560 km range AGM-158B JASSM and AGM-158C LRASM for its 98 upgraded F-15Js; and​

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(c) in Dec 2020, decided to spend 33.5 billion yen (US$322 million) to develop Japanese stand-off missiles, due to the significant improvements in other countries' early warning and control capabilities. Further, MHI was awarded a 8.9 billion yen (US$85 million) contract for the the development of the improved ASM-3 to be carried on the F-2. The development of the improved ASM-3 (above Mach 3) will continue even after the ASM-3A goes into mass production. Thus the ASM-3A is considered to be a stop-gap solution to counter China’s naval threats; and the development of the improved ASM-3 will be carried out from FY2020 to FY2025. Taku Otsuka, head of the LDP's National Defense Division, told reporters that the possibility of Japan using the missiles to strike an enemy base is a separate issue.​

Over time, these Japanese A2AD deployments would to keep the PLA(N) bottled within the 1st island chain will not only grow but serve as lilly-pads to push Japanese A2AD forces into dispersal locations to evade the waves of Chinese missile salvos. Given this scenario, it would be difficult to imagine a significant number of Chinese commerce raiders slipping out to prey on Japanese shipping outside the Taiwan Strait as long as they have to slip between hostile Japanese and Taiwanese island bastions.

9. The traditional Chinese strategy of engaging Japan while at the same time working to undermine its control of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands has hit a wall. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi sought to present a friendly and proactive face during his 24 Nov 2020 visit, but in Japan the visit will be mostly remembered for the controversy at the joint press conference — after which Japan’s Foreign Minister Motegi had to forcefully denounce the offending Chinese remarks in front of the Diet and to emphasize how clear he had made the Japanese position on the issue. The Japanese press, for its part, was happy to emphasize the incident without providing context or analysis of Wang’s exact remarks. The current atmosphere in Tokyo leaves little space for a nuanced and moderate debate on policy toward China. Instead, calls to adopt more drastic measures to defend the disputed islands are becoming more urgent. If the relationship continues on its current trajectory, hopes for a successful state visit by President Xi Jinping, which were reasonably high one year ago, will grow ever more faint.

10. A real Chinese attempt to solve the Taiwan issue by force remains unlikely till after 2049. President Xi currently has a lot on his plate, especially in the wake of the coronavirus outbreak, a rise in diplomatic acrimony between China, and the U.S, India, and Australia, has taken centre stage in Asia. Further afield, European Union member states are also heading towards adopting a tougher attitude on the strategic challenge that China’s growing assertiveness represents. The PLA is also well aware of the fact that invading and controlling Taiwan are two different things entirely.

 

[Musashi_kenshin]

@Musashi_kenshin, I don’t understand why you buy into this Taiwanese DPP bullshit.

What bullshit are you talking about? That there is an effective deadline for an invasion of Taiwan whatever Taipei does? This isn't controversial.

Even a few years ago pro-Beijing newspapers like the SCMP were saying Xi would invade before he resigns. Obviously that's not definitive, but I have seen no credible publications suggest that China will not invade even after 2049 provided there is no UDI or change to the ROC's territorial boundaries in the constitution. If you've seen some credible articles saying China will not invade, I would like to see them because I must have missed them.

If the Taiwanese want to provoke a war, they can fight it by themselves.

That's sort of the point. If they wanted to provoke a war they could - but they have no reason to.

The 1992 consensus is an agreement on how the 2 sides can disagree. But no, the DPP have to trash talk.

In 1992 Taiwan was not a democracy. The first free and fair election was in 1996. So the Taiwanese government cannot be bound by "agreements" made when it was controlled via a one-party state.

Also the 1992 "consensus" was not agreed between the PRC and Taiwan at the government level. It was allegedly concluded by the ROC's then negotiator in Hong Kong. However, Su Chi admitted in 2006 that he made the term up to try to defuse matters. In reality there was no agreement. Even if Su Chi had reached a tentative agreement with Beijing's representative at the time, he had to get it ratified by the ROC government - which never happened. Lee Teng-hui was President in 1992 and he disputed that the 1992 consensus was genuine.

I fully expect Biden’s team to privately tell President Tsai Ing-wen’s (蔡英文) to dial it back.

Dial what back? What specific actions has she taken that are "bad"?

 

[OPSSG]

Dial what back? What specific actions has she taken that are "bad"?

You cannot cherry pick your facts — You can pretend all you want but you know how unreasonable DPP’s starting point is — no past agreement Taiwan is a party to is valid, if DPP disagrees. Only DPP assholes cannot accept that there are different ways to interpret things with regard to the One China policy — a policy that even chickensh!t hawks in America adhere to (i.e. an agreement to disagree).

1. Taiwan is not a member of the UN and did so by choice. Having made that choice, it is not recognised as a country by the US. It is not also recognised as a country by the UK. More importantly, all members of the P5 in the security council do not recognise Taiwan as a country; and she does not have diplomatic recognition by even any non-perm member of the security council.

2. Taiwan is not a member of any regional association of countries and has no prospect of joining any regional association. Therefore, she is not recognised, as a country, by any G20 member or lesser organisation of countries. Taiwan does not have the normal rights of a country at the UN, as it is not able to vote at the General Assembly.

Edit: 3(c) onwards added for clarity.

3. Is there a DPP and KMT consensus that Taiwan must stand with Japan, if Japan is attacked by China? The Taiwanese are very good a calculating what is to their advantage; but cannot conceptualise bearing a burden for an ally or a potential ally — which is why I disapprove of DPP’s current attempt at leading Taiwan down the road of brinksmanship to make China an enemy (due to domestic politics). Thanks to:

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(a) behind the scenes move to support Taiwan, the island is able to get some indirect rights in the past. That support will disappear at some time in the near future as the DPP supporters are like the <M - delete> crowds at <T - delete> rallies — hostile and stupid;​

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(b) behind the scenes Japanese support, Taiwan can attempt to build its 8 submarines; and​

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(c) Taiwan’s hyper-partisan political and media environment, Taiwanese leaders' misguided defence priorities can make a perverse sort of sense. The Taiwanese are isolated on the international stage, not officially recognized by any of their most critical economic and defense partners, and constantly subjected to a crippling Chinese propaganda campaign designed to undermine public confidence in Taiwan’s diplomatic standing and military strength. As a result, any international incident—anything that could be seen to diminish Taiwan’s position in the world—is an opportunity to score political points against the party in power.​

4. Consider Taiwan’s competition with China for official diplomatic recognition. Whether small countries officially recognize Taiwan has no material effect on the country’s economy or security. The impact is psychological and political. When El Salvador severed ties with Taipei in 2018 and transferred recognition to Beijing, a spokesperson for the Kuomintang (KMT), the main opposition party in Taiwan, accused the ruling Democratic Progressive Party of cultivating disaster: “The DPP must take full responsibility for Taiwan’s isolation and apologize to our people,” the spokesperson thundered. “I would like to personally ask Tsai Ing-wen: Just where is it you are leading the Republic of China to?”

5. To deter China, Taiwan in 2017 adopted an asymmetrical defense strategy known as the Overall Defense Concept (ODC).

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(a) The concept focuses on using asymmetric conventional capabilities optimized to resist a PLA invasion, with a 1st phase focused on littoral combat (100 km from Taiwan’s shores) and a 2nd phase focused on fighting on the beaches. It emphasizes the role of smart mines, anti-ship cruise missiles, mobile air defense, and the ability to employ lethal fire on the limited number of potential landing zones over traditional military platforms.​

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(b) The ODC calls on the military to increase investments in key capabilities including mobility, deception, camouflage, concealment, jamming, redundancy, rapid repair, and reconstitution. But this approach faces constraints imposed by limited resources, lack of public support, and interservice politics on Taiwan.​

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(c) Problems also persist in Taiwan’s defense efforts, including challenges in shifting to an all-volunteer military and in the readiness of its reserve force. Taiwan’s reserves receive as little as 5 days of training every 2 years, after 4 months of initial active-duty training prior to entering the reserves, and thus cannot make any contribution to deterring a Chinese attack.​

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(d) If you spend any time studying Taiwan defence procurement priorities, you quickly realize something has gone wrong. American defence experts agree on a rough picture of what the Taiwanese military needs to do if they want to deter a Chinese invasion force. They will have disagreements on the margins—some will be for that weapons system here, or against that one there—but the big picture is always the same.​

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(e) Throughout it all, American analysts are insistent that Taiwan's defense is not hopeless. If Taiwan is willing to move beyond token efforts of spending a pitiful 2.3% of GDP on its military, it can be saved. But and it’s a giant BUT, the Taiwanese are not interested in investing in their own credible defence.​

 

[ngatimozart]

@Musashi_kenshin It appears to this Kiwi the you are blinded by your political bias towards Taiwan, and do not objectively analyse the data and information that is available. Others are attempting to discuss this politely and logically with you, but you are not resiling from your hardened inflexible blindspot.

 

[Musashi_kenshin]

Taiwan buys US mobile system that could help counter Chinese cyberattack

The Field Information Communications System is as significant as other, more high-profile weapons Washington has sold to Taipei, analyst says.

www.scmp.com

I thought this news report about a DSCA approval of communications equipment for was interesting. Although Taipei has placed orders for spare parts frequently I can't recall it purchasing communications equipment like this. Maybe a sign that it's looking to improve the boring but vital technical side of how it might defend itself via a Chinese attack rather than just go for more shiny weapons.

 

[Musashi_kenshin]

OPSSG, let me start by saying thanks for the amended post.

You cannot cherry pick your facts — You can pretend all you want but you know how unreasonable DPP’s starting point is — no past agreement Taiwan is a party to is valid, if DPP disagrees.

I suppose I should be somewhat careful about how I address that given the recent bust-up between the UK and EU, and how the Johnson government was accused of breaking an agreement.

If we're talking about the 1992 Consensus, I do recognise that after 2008 the KMT in government was advancing a One China policy. I can respect an argument that the DPP should have continued that position. However, even if it might be geopolitically expedient for the DPP to take the same position as the KMT, I would say that a new government is free to change a negotiating position before a diplomatic agreement, especially one with constitutional implications, is ratified. Otherwise outgoing leaders could maliciously make huge foreign policy concessions in order to annoy their opponents (sort of like Trump's attempted scorched earth policy). One also has to realise that the One China policy is not popular in Taiwan, not just with DPP voters but also independents.

As for having different views as to what One China means, I could be wrong, but isn't it the case that China (the PRC) doesn't accept that there are multiple ways to consider the meaning of One China? If I remember correctly Beijing's position is that there is one China, which is the PRC, and Taiwan is a breakaway province. It doesn't agree to disagree, which was the KMT's position.

and she does not have diplomatic recognition by even any non-perm member of the security council

Yes, you are quite correct that Taiwan does not have formal diplomatic relations with the vast majority of countries in the world. However, I don't think that's determinative as to what Taiwan should do going forwards.

Is there a DPP and KMT consensus that Taiwan must stand with Japan, if Japan is attacked by China?

You mean diplomatically or militarily? If Japan were attacked tomorrow, diplomatically I think Taiwan would support Japan. Militarily - no idea, I guess it would depend on Washington and Tokyo. They might quite easily ask that Taiwan not get directly involved to avoid an escalation, much as how Israel was told to stay out of the (First) Gulf War.

As for the KMT, your guess is as good as mine as to what its policies will be by 2024. There were times when it tried to whip up anti-Japanese sentiment but also maintain unofficial ties with Japan.

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(a) behind the scenes move to support Taiwan, the island is able to get some indirect rights in the past. That support will disappear at some time in the near future as the DPP supporters are like the <M - delete> crowds at <T - delete> rallies — hostile and stupid;​

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(b) behind the scenes Japanese support, Taiwan can attempt to build its 8 submarines; and​

​

(c) Taiwan’s hyper-partisan political and media environment, Taiwanese leaders' misguided defence priorities can make a perverse sort of sense. The Taiwanese are isolated on the international stage, not officially recognized by any of their most critical economic and defense partners, and constantly subjected to a crippling Chinese propaganda campaign designed to undermine public confidence in Taiwan’s diplomatic standing and military strength. As a result, any international incident—anything that could be seen to diminish Taiwan’s position in the world—is an opportunity to score political points against the party in power.​

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a) I'm not sure what current indirect rights you're thinking of, so I can't comment. You might be right that there are some benefits Taiwan has that could be withdrawn.​

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b) So if I understand you correctly, you think Tokyo might pull its support for the SSK project if the DPP doesn't change direction? I haven't heard that suggestion advanced before. It's conceivable but right now I'm not sure why Japan would do that, as it could be interpreted by Beijing as a sign of weakness by Japan. I think it would require a clear escalation by Taipei for Japan to end that defence cooperation.​

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c) I think that feeds into your other comments about Taiwan's defence priorities. You've made some very forthright and I think fair observations about Taiwan's defence policy, even if I don't agree with all of them.​

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Maybe just returning to the original point, I do understand that Beijing is unhappy with the DPP's policies. However, I am honestly concerned that China will invade to resolve the Taiwan question even if there is no formal declaration of independence, for political reasons.

You're right that from 2008 to 2016 there was virtually no risk of an attack. However, I also remember a lot of discussion about how after 2016 it was expected that China would heavily pressure the KMT to start signing political agreements leading to unification if it won that election. That would have been very hard for the KMT as officially it had previously said there would be no unification until China became a democracy. It's questionable whether a future KMT government would even abide by the 1992 consensus, given Johnny Chiang's views that the party needs to adapt to win in 2024 and his criticism of the CCP. Then again he might be replaced by a more traditional KMT politician at the end of his term as party chair.

If China defers military action against Taiwan until after 2049, it would be very wise. But at the moment I subscribe to the view that 2049 is the deadline given the state of Chinese nationalism in the PRC, and it could be even sooner if Xi wants to go down in Chinese history as China's greatest modern leader. I'm just pessimistic.

 

[OPSSG]

Part 1 of 2: @Musashi_kenshin, for now:

1. Let me repeat that the PLA just need to maintain the credible threat of an invasion and the ability to hold "American interference" at an arm's length — there is no intention or need to invade. With these 2 conditions met, PLA’s approach has the luxury of time (to let things play out) because Taiwan spends a pitiful 2.3% of GDP on its military. This tiny amount (with the smallest defence budget in NE Asia) is further divided into personnel (US$5.2 billion, 46 percent), operations (US$3.1 billion, 27%), and defense technology and acquisition programs (US$3.1 billion, 27%). In other words, the Taiwanese defence ministry in FY 2020 spends less than tiny Singapore’s defence ministry on new weapons procurement and R&D. In direct contrast to Taiwan’s R&D efforts, Singaporeans are much more innovative in our platform sub-systems integration efforts, and use of AI and encryption for network centric warfare.

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(i) President Tsai has reversed the trend of declining military spending as a percentage of GDP, but the defense budget continues to fall short of the target of 3% of GDP, pledged by President Ma Ying-jeou in 2008 and reaffirmed by President Tsai — successive Taiwanese Governments have never kept their own pledges on defence spending levels.​

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(ii) The proposed FY 2021 military budget is US$12.4 billion, an increase of about 4.4%, which compares poorly with a PRC military budget estimated by SIPRI at US$261 billion for 2019.​

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(iii) Taiwan plans an additional US$1.9 billion in defense-related expenditures by other parts of the government in FY 2021. Without a sustained decade long effort of year on year increases, Taiwan will not have a military that can contribute to its own defence; much less contribute forces to defend an ally or partner. Taiwan has its own Marines and their ability to attack unguarded spots of the PLA(N), would complicate and divert PLA Marine Corps forces away from their main target the Japanese Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade.​

2. Logically, if Taiwan wants Japan’s JMSDF to help defend it, it needs to have the capability to contribute significant amphibious or ASW forces to Japan’s defence of its SLOCs as an ally (or intelligence sharing partner). As you said, you expect the Taiwanese to give at least verbal support. I think that sort of response is the reason why I think it is a waste of time thinking about defending Taiwan as their ally.

3. Communist China take seriously Japan’s ability to wage ASW and offensive mine warfare along the narrow seas and chokepoints. But Chinese perceptions of such immutable factors as geography relative to PLA(N)’s capability have also begun to evolve.

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(i) The PLA(N) see vulnerability in Japan’s southern flank. These far-flung islands are far from the Japanese main islands, the logistics foundation of Japan’s defending forces. JSDF’s purchase of 5 Satcom equipped V-22B Block C Ospreys, supported by their 147 F-35A/Bs will ensure that the recon elements of the Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade can land on the Ryukyu Islands (a chain of Japanese islands that stretch southwest from Kyushu to Taiwan), directly from their land bases.​

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1281846183116320769

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(ii) Should war break out, the JMSDF would have to rush naval forces from Yokosuka, and Sasebo, to provide logistics support for the 3,000 strong Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade. The 20,000 strong PLA Marine Corps in their Type 075 landing helicopter docks and the PLA(N) carrier task groups could seek to interdict such reinforcements, which must flow across long and tenuous lines of communications. The PLA(N) has studied Operation Chromite in detail; and would seek to conduct their own version of it on the Ryukyu Islands or Taiwan.​

4. In 2008, Ma Ying-jeou (馬英 九)—who personally supports eventual unification — moved the KMT toward the political center. His advocacy of “no unification, no independence, and no use of force” and his support of the “One-China, respective interpretations” version of the “1992 Consensus” (九二共識) essentially sought to redefine the KMT as a party favoring the status quo. He easily won election on that platform. Considering that Taiwan may one day elect another leader favouring unification, again, the US can’t even consider selling F-35s to Taiwan.

5. In 2016, Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文), who supports eventual independence, also adopted a pragmatic approach. Back in 2016, she stopped publicly rejecting “One-China.” The DPP has long stated that there was no consensus in 1992 because no joint document was issued. The KMT has held that a tacit agreement did exist and provided a basis for dialogue when the KMT was in power. The KMT describes that tacit agreement as “one China, respective interpretations.” Neither party accepts the CCP’s “One-China Principle” that forms the basis for its definition of the “1992 Consensus on one China.”

6. 2019 was a pivotal year for Taiwan and cross-Strait relations. Xi Jinping’s (習近平) address in Jan 2020 adopted a harder line on reunification. In insisting that peaceful unification will be achieved, he stated that the “one country, two systems” framework was the way it would be accomplished. He asserted that Beijing’s definition of “One-China” was a given, but that discussions about how it would apply to Taiwan should be pursued. He reiterated that Beijing would not reject the possible use of force.

​

(i) Partly because of Beijing’s failure to renounce the use of force with regard to Taiwan, Tokyo’s foreign policy operates under a dualism when it comes to China. Tokyo has recognized the need to build some semblance of diplomatic comity while at the same time firmly opposing China’s maritime advances.​

​

(ii) In Sino-Japanese exchanges, emphasis has been placed on mutual gains, especially economic ones, rather than on confrontation. Yet Tokyo has never softened its stance. Unlike Hong Kong, whose fate does not directly affect Japan’s security interests, Taiwan is indeed considered a crucial national defense matter for Tokyo.​

​

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1342423985070329856

(iii) "We are concerned China will expand its aggressive stance into areas other than Hong Kong. I think one of the next targets, or what everyone is worried about, is Taiwan," State Minister of Defense Yasuhide Nakayama told Reuters. In a Dec 2020 interview, Nakayama, Japan's deputy defence minister, urged Biden to take a similar line on Taiwan as outgoing President Donald Trump, who has significantly boosted military sales to the Chinese-claimed island and increased engagement.​

​

(iv) Decades ago as senator, Biden questioned whether the United States had an "obligation" to defend Taiwan. But many in his foreign policy circles acknowledge that U.S. imperatives have changed. A crisis surrounding the island would probably push both Washington and Tokyo to switch forcefully toward confrontation in their relations with Beijing.​

 

[Musashi_kenshin]

So keeping this at the purely military level, I think the issue is that Taiwan isn't in a position to support a country like Japan militarily as things stand because China would use their intervention in a Sino-Japanese conflict as an excuse to escalate, and therefore I doubt Washington and Tokyo would want Taiwan to intervene directly. I'm sure Taiwan would cooperate as much as it could without making things worse, e.g. intelligence sharing. But for Taiwan to get involved it would probably require a full Sino-Japanese War (i.e. things couldn't get much worse).

Besides, military alliances are normally formal structures and as things stand it would be a red line for the US and Japan to enter into one with Taiwan as far as China is concerned. Japan would struggle to get legislative agreement to formally commit to Taiwan's defence, and currently the US doesn't want to formally commit to helping Taiwan either because of the likely response from China. It's not an issue of Taipei being offered membership of an alliance and refusing to participate.

 

[OPSSG]

Part 2 of 2:

7. President Tsai decisively won re-election in Jan 2020 on a platform that rejected “one country, two systems”. KMT read their defeat as a sign of the need for new leadership and a new policy toward the mainland that was more in tune with popular sentiment. How far apart are the two main parties on China in 2020? The DPP’s record and Tsai’s policies are known. The KMT under new Chairman Johnny Chiang (江啟臣) has issued two papers on China. These documents and other statements provide a basis for examining similarities and differences between the two parties’ policies — which is not appropriate for discussion in DT (as it is purely domestic Taiwanese politics).

8. In 2020, the DPP have officially taken a hardline position against China and chosen a path to greater hostility with China. Some background is necessary to understand why I think DPP should not be needlessly hostile, until they invest in real capability. On 1 Jan 1979, the USA and the PRC establish diplomatic relations, where Kissinger sought to play the China Card to pressure the USSR on SALT II and Ethiopia, and the PRC sought it to gain leverage over Vietnam. In the process of Nixon’s historic visit to China, the PRC made concessions on the Taiwan issue that led to Washington’s One-China policy — in one stroke Taiwan became a Pariah. In contrast, Tokyo never explicitly endorsed the “One-China” principle. In the first official diplomatic document between the PRC and Japan – the joint communique of 1972, Japan only expressed its “full understanding and respect” for China’s position. That stance was never altered.

9. Prevailing Taiwanese popular sentiment is to abandon the “1992 Consensus” (九二共識), to engage in talk of independence (and risk war) but not to adequately spend on defence. Deterring the PLA has costs. It will require taxes. It will require having a conscription system capable of producing motivated fighting troops (that serve full-time for a period of 18 to 24 months, instead of just 4 months). It will require reservists attend annual currency training and can be counted on to reach their mobilisation centres in ‘X’ hours and have ammo and equipment loaded and be ready to enter the fight, in their assigned defence sector, as a battalion by ‘3X’ hours. It will mean turning Taiwan into something like a garrison state, like Korea or Singapore. Inspiring the Taiwanese people to make these sacrifices is the job of President Tsai and the leading members of her party. Thus far she has elected not to do this. Indeed, her administration has focused on almost everything but this.

​

(i) There certain advantages Taiwan would have in any armed conflict with the PLA. Many of these geographical advantages still hold true. Taiwan is a mountainous island. A proper invasion of Taiwan would mean the largest amphibious invasion in human history. An operation on this scale could not be disguised or hidden. Everyone in Asia would know about it weeks, in advance. The weather in the Strait is treacherous; there only a few months every year where such an invasion could occur, and only a few beaches where an invading force could safely land. But Tanner Greer, the author of the Spring of 2018 article in Foreign Policy "Taiwan Can Win a War With China,” no longer believes in the title.​

​

(ii) Having said all that it is possible to divide the challenges Taiwan faces into two parts: (a) problems of military strategy; and (b) problems of training, culture and morale, which is the greater problem.​

​

(iii) The problem of training, culture and morale can be laid at the feet of the Taiwanese military (especially its army), but behind them lies another, more serious layer of dysfunction. This layer is more serious because it infects not the military but the civilian leadership tasked with reforming the defense system. IMO, Taiwan is deeply demoralized. Successive governments have all but given up on the idea of national defence, the conscription term has been cut to almost nothing. What was originally a national rite-of-passage — is now basically a joke. The military is a pension farm, and thoroughly compromised by Chinese intelligence. Taiwanese industry is very dependent on Chinese markets and labor, and the business elite of Taiwan have all named their price.​

​

(iv) As Tanner Greer noted, responsibility for military strategy and morale ultimately lies with Taiwanese politicians, and to a lesser extent, the voters who bring them to office. But Taiwan is marred by a dysfunctional civil-military relationship, destructive partisan infighting, and a spirit of defeatism. These political dynamics make it difficult for Taiwan to make the reforms that might guarantee its safety and autonomy.​

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1345239149033508864

10. Despite President Tsai’s attempted out reach, Beijing's hostile policy toward Taiwan is likely to continue in 2021, according to a year-end report released by the Institute for National Defense and Security Research (INDSR). I remain hopeful that the Biden administration could make positive changes to the U.S.' China policy. Hopefully, this will give Beijing an incentive to recalibrate its approach on Taiwan. IMHO, the correct solution to the Taiwanese attitude, is for Joe Biden’s Administration and Yoshihide Suga’s Administration, in a coordinated fashion, to tell the Taiwanese (behind closed doors) that:

(i) the Americans will limit future arms sales to Taiwan from 2022 onwards unless they get their act together; and​

(ii) the Japanese will stop the export of dual use technology to Taiwan from 2022 onwards,​

to persuade the DPP to cease their path towards confrontation — while working on a multi-year plan to really increase capability.

****I will end my contribution on Taiwan here, for this month.****

 

[Musashi_kenshin]

I think that there are two possible reasons Taiwan has not until recently boosted defence spending above 2% of GDP:

1. The DPP did not have control of the legislative until 2016. In the past 4 years the DPP was focused on economic issues to try to ensure it could retain power. The KMT, whether because it wanted to curry favour with Beijing or had other reasons, wouldn't significantly increase defence spending from 2008 to 2016 (and blocked much defence spending from 2000 to 2008). Ma's 3% promise was largely seen as a lie to show he would be firm in negotiating with China; and
2. There is a lingering suspicion of the ROCA amongst much of the Taiwanese population due to it being complicit in the KMT's historic suppression of Taiwan. Therefore there is less sympathy for the military when they say they're short of funds.

That said, I think that enough time has passed that by now that the DPP should maintain defence spending at a more productive level with public support (let's say a minimum of 2.5% of GDP, aiming for 3%). It can't put those difficult choices off any longer.

As for reforming the reserves, the government seems to realise it is necessary and has already put forward some changes. How far they'll go over the next four years is anyone's guess. Again, you're right that more changes are required, although at this stage I doubt there will be any moves to 18-24 months' training. I think they'll test the waters with a move towards 6, 8 or 12 months first.

 

[Sandhi Yudha]

"Taiwan is a vibrant democracy and reliable partner of the United States, and yet for several decades the State Department has created complex internal restrictions to regulate our diplomats, servicemembers, and other officials’ interactions with their Taiwanese counterparts. The United States government took these actions unilaterally, in an attempt to appease the Communist regime in Beijing. No more."

Interesting development....

Lifting Self-Imposed Restrictions on the U.S.-Taiwan Relationship - United States Department of State

Taiwan is a vibrant democracy and reliable partner of the United States, and yet for several decades the State Department has created complex internal restrictions to regulate our diplomats, servicemembers, and other officials’ interactions with their Taiwanese counterparts. The United States...

www.state.gov

 

[ngatimozart]

"Taiwan is a vibrant democracy and reliable partner of the United States, and yet for several decades the State Department has created complex internal restrictions to regulate our diplomats, servicemembers, and other officials’ interactions with their Taiwanese counterparts. The United States government took these actions unilaterally, in an attempt to appease the Communist regime in Beijing. No more."

Interesting development....

Lifting Self-Imposed Restrictions on the U.S.-Taiwan Relationship - United States Department of State

Taiwan is a vibrant democracy and reliable partner of the United States, and yet for several decades the State Department has created complex internal restrictions to regulate our diplomats, servicemembers, and other officials’ interactions with their Taiwanese counterparts. The United States...

www.state.gov

Interesting indeed. Now we await the self righteous howling and screeching that will undoubtedly emanate from Beijing.

 

[Musashi_kenshin]

Interesting development....

Whilst long overdue this does have the optics of the Republicans trying to poison the well before they leave power. The question is how far Biden will row that back towards the recent status quo. If Biden is smart he will avoid any big movement, otherwise China will rightly or wrongly assume everything will be swiftly restored to how it was during the Obama administration.