I think that the next Iraqi Prime Minister will deliver a formal note to the US requiring it to withdraw its forces forthwith. He will have the support of a significant portion of the population in this, as well as the backing of the Parliament.
It will be interesting because it will give Trump a face saving excuse to pull out of Iraq, given that he has always wanted to withdraw from the region. His national security advisors will not be happy units about this development. Whether or not the US withdraw from Iraq is another story, however I would think that they'd be foolish to ignore the Iraqi demand. However their political leadership hasn't always been the brightest sparks on the planet, which isn't a condition that is unique to the US political class. I would equally apply that appellation to the political leaderships and classes of every other nation on the planet. So we will wait to see what eventuates.
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Sectarianism, Governance and Iraq’s future’ published in 2018, provides a backgrounder of the issues still relevant today. IMO, there are 5 questions to ask:
1. There are competing visions for the future of Iraq and the region that have manifested themselves through violent, sectarian conflict over the Iraqi state and its resources, such as the 2006 civil war between Arab Sunnis and Shiites and the war on ISIS. Sectarianism also takes the form of divisive identity politics and the institutionalization of mistrust, which has resulted in dysfunctional governance. At the same time, it has been used by Iraq’s political elites to deflect attention away from poor governance, corruption, and lack of services. Some Shia politicians in Iraq are beholden to Tehran for both political and financial support. Iran often brokered agreements that ended various Iraqi political stalemates and had in its command a variety of militias.
- Q1: Are the protests against the United States’ presence just another manifestation of Shiite sectarianism?
2. Comprising 30% of the population, Arab Sunni buy-in is critical to achieve a national consensus between its competing communities in Iraq. In its absence, the political legitimacy of the government has declined. This was clearly revealed by the 44.5 percent turnout rate at the May 2018 national elections, Iraq’s worst turnout to date. Its public institutions, at both the central and local level, have lost the public’s trust, while systematic crimes and human rights violations have shaped public perception toward the public policymaking processes in Baghdad. Political decentralization that sees limited interference from Baghdad, if any at all, could provide respite for Iraq’s Arab Sunni communities that then paves the way for a more effective decentralization process that addresses good governance shortcomings. Ultimately, the process could be a generational one: a phased approach to decentralization would move from the elite bargain at the top-down to then take account of local politics and economies.
- Q2: Will the Sunni community rise up in arms again, if the United States withdraws troops too quickly?
3. Even before the 2011 departure of US troops, then Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki sought to put people loyal to him in key command positions. Command positions became increasingly prone to decisions taken on sectarian or family lines. The departure of US forces at the end of 2011 ended the close mentoring and training of Iraqi units.
- Q3: Will a rapid departure of the 5,000 strong US forces and the end of the close mentoring and training of Iraqi units post-2020, lead to another rapid collapse of the Iraqi military?
4. Corruption in Iraq is rife - the very antithesis of the sort of professional military the US had hoped to create. Under the Maliki government, the Iraqi military was a sectarian force. As ISIS swept forward in 2014, a fear of the likely retaliation of the government forces, as much as fear of ISIS irregulars, drove thousands from their homes. The Popular Mobilization Forces is an umbrella group for a number of Iran-backed militias that include the Imam Ali Brigades and Sayed al-Shuhada. It is interesting to note that Iran-backed groups have also become the target of popular anger in Iraq. Anti-government protests that began in October 2019 have swept the country's largely Shiite south, with demonstrators demanding an end to Iranian influence in Iraqi affairs.
- Q4: If American forces leave Iraq in haste under President Trump’s orders, will we see the return of sectarian violence that kills a thousand a day?
5. When in office, former Prime Minister al-Abadi attempted to institute reforms that could help remedy Iraq’s crisis of governance and, in the process, alleviate ethno-sectarian tensions. Security details for politicians were cut by 90 percent after the 2015 protests, which has freed up to 20,000 personnel for other duties.
6. The present system intentionally gives a lot of power to the sectarian and ethnic-based parties recognized by the United States and Iran after Saddam Hussein’s overthrow. It is a recipe for both gridlock and an inability to legislate or govern. Serious reform of the current system, which many Iraqis recognize is both ineffective and corrupt, is almost impossible under the current constitution. Many other reform measures are necessary for Iraq, as a country of 40 million inhabitants, to have a functional government today.
- Q5: Can Iraq still exist as an unitary state, post-2020, before reforms take root?
7. Iran’s policy towards Iraq appears focused first and foremost on preventing Iraq from ever again posing a threat to the current Iranian system of clerical government. To achieve this, however, Iran uses the late Major General Qasim Soleimani’s model of making Iraq into another Lebanon, where it wants Iranian-supported and -dominated militias to be a lasting, parallel power structure that will be under Iran’s control, outside the Iraqi constitution. Iran has urged its Iraqi supporters to replace former Prime Minister al-Abadi, who tried to be friends with both Iran and the US, with someone who is in Iran’s pocket. But Iran has no miracle worker among its Iraqi supporters who could deliver on basic services, the economy, and anti-corruption that the protesters—and many Iraqis—are demanding. This leaves Iran with:
(i) trying to ensure control through a crackdown on protesters; or
(ii) increasing efforts to keep Iraq’s parliament leaders acceptable to Tehran.
8. Either approach is almost certain to blow up in Iran’s face. We need to recognize that Iraq’s protesters are ready to hold their own leaders and Iran responsible for the failings of the last fifteen years. The first sign that Iran was losing steam in Iraq came with the massive Shia protests against the Iraqi government and its Iranian patron. Numerous interviews with protesters make clear they
resent the extent of Iran’s influence in Iraq’s politics, including Iran’s near-veto power over who is Iraq’s prime minister. The protesters are well aware of Iran’s corrupting influence in Iraqi politics, which affects a number of both Shia and Sunni politicians. They understand that Iran’s influence is aimed at benefiting Iran, not the Iraqi people. The corruption and incompetence of a government handpicked by Iran was not lost on the Iraqi demonstrators. They demanded representation and a clean government, which they understood could only come about if the Iranian influence receded. But killing Major General Soleimani has distracted from the widespread anti-Iranian protests that were the United States’ greatest hope for checking Iranian influence in Iraq. More to the point these strikes have demonstrated to the Iraqi public that the United States cares more about its conflict with Iran than stability in Iraq. That may not be entirely fair, but that seems to be how many Iraqis have read the situation.
