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RIMPAC 2014 and the Shifting Winds of Change in Asia (Part 7 of 7)
Below, RSN Fleet Commander Rear-Admiral Timothy Lo (left) said, "During Exercise RIMPAC, RSN successfully fired an Aster SAM and is also leading a task unit comprising of ships from the Chilean, Norwegian and US navies."
29. This is the fourth time the RSN has participated in the biennial multilateral RIMPAC maritime exercise. In RIMPAC 2008, RSS Steadfast participated and fired a Harpoon Surface-to-Surface Missile (SSM). In RIMPAC 2010, RSS Supreme fired an Aster SAM. In RIMPAC 2012, a RSN frigate commanded a formation of vessels from the Royal Australian Navy, Royal Canadian Navy, Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force, and the US Navy. And RSS Formidable not only commanded a CTU, it also successfully carried out the simultaneous live-firing of two Harpoon SSMs on 14 Jul 2012:-
Above, the ex-USS Ogden (LPD 5) is hit by a Naval Strike Missile (NSM) from the Royal Norwegian Navy frigate HNoMS Fridtjof Nansen (F 310) during a SINKEX as part of RIMPAC 2014 (see sinking of ex-USS Ogden: Navy Sank the Decommissioned USS Ogden - YouTube). A single NSM was fired along with the launch of two Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles.
30. While it is possible to argue that Europe has no dog in an Asian fight and should distance itself from the American's long list of troubles involving China, some Europeans are conducting a little pivot of their own beyond just attending international conferences. However, no matter how Europe pivots, or America pivots (especially since the American pivot has run out of steam, thanks to a looming budget crisis), China in its calculations is and will continue to be underwhelmed. RIMPAC 2014 is the first time Norway has fired an NSM at a naval exercise in the Pacific, as the missile had only became operational in 2012. “It was a very successful shot. The missile performed exactly as programmed and expected,” Cmdr. Per Rostad, the ship’s commanding officer, said in an interview. Rostad’s crew has had an interesting cruise. In mid-November, just before deploying, they fought a fire aboard the ferry Britannia Seaways off the Norwegian coast. In the Med, they were assigned to escort missions for ships carrying Syrian chemical weapons to Cyprus. After transferring to the HNoMS Fridtjof Nansen (F 310), they took the ship through the Panama Canal to San Diego, where they joined a group sail of US and Chilean warships out to Hawaii. Underscoring the importance of Norway’s participation, Navy chief Rear Adm. Lars Saunes and defense minister Ine Eriksen Søreide came out to Pearl Harbor for the exercises. Representing a symbolic first wave of a European pivot to Asia, Norway's Defence Minister Ine Eriksen Søreide has stated four factors on why participation in RIMPAC is in their interests:-
31. Why do I say that China is underwhelmed by the American and European pivots? It is simple, satellite imagery shows major land reclamation on Johnson South Reef - China is essentially reclaiming an island that is big enough for an airstrip - and nothing that ASEAN or the US does in the diplomatic arena will deter them from continuing with their reclamation work or escalating/de-escalating any existing dispute at a time and place of their choosing (in line with their current white ship strategy). Therefore, there are five facts Vietnam needs to note:-
Below, Chile's CNS Blanco Encalada leaving Pearl Harbour for the start of the 22-day sea phase.
32. Given the lack of support shown to Vietnam by three permanent members of the UN Security Counci (namely, France, the UK, and Russia) and the relative impotence of ASEAN under Indonesian leadership, Vietnam finds itself between a rock and a hard place. It has to come to the same conclusion reached by the other smaller ASEAN states - to look to US and hope for leadership - if it ever comes. Under the Obama administration, they seem to have a policy of leading from the back, in an effort to conserve power. Meanwhile, the Philippines entered into an Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) with the US on 28 April 2014, and other ASEAN members have noticeably tilted towards the US. The EDCA has an initial term of ten years and will remain in force automatically. After 10 years, either US of the Philippines may give a year’s written notice of its intention to terminate the EDCA, which is an executive agreement and not a formal treaty. After eight painful rounds of negotiations that commenced in August 2013, the EDCA authorizes access to agreed locations in the Philippines by US forces on a rotational basis - long after Australia and US announced two new force posture initiatives (for the deployment of US Marines to Darwin and closer cooperation between both air forces) to enhance defence cooperation between Australia and the US on 16 November 2011 - and long, long after the 2005 Singapore-US Strategic Framework Agreement (and the deployment of the Littoral Combat Ships to Singapore from April 2013 onwards). Some have suggested that the big internal foreign policy question for states in Asia is precisely the same. How to benefit economically from China's growth without getting pulled into its geo-political orbit in a manner that limits a country's strategic choices? For them, this is a question for many in South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand or Australia (or the so called 'China choice' question). The 'China choice' question is also question for client states of China like Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam. Astute readers will notice that I left out the Philippines and Japan - these two have no choice, and the trajectory of their bilateral relations with China only has room for further deterioration. In contrast, some do not even see it as a either or binary choice. Rather, the question is how to accommodate China's rise in a world that is becoming more multi-polar.
Above, 30 June 2014, Adm. Samuel J. Locklear, Commander of U.S. Pacific Command presents a USPACOM Plaque to Adm. Haakon Bruun-Hanssen, Chief of Defense of the Norwegian Armed Forces. While in Hawaii to attend RIMPAC, the Norwegian delegation stopped by U.S. Pacific Command to discuss Norway's views on how European Allies & NATO could engage in the Asia-Pacific region. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Jay M. Chu/Released)
Below, RSN Fleet Commander Rear-Admiral Timothy Lo (left) said, "During Exercise RIMPAC, RSN successfully fired an Aster SAM and is also leading a task unit comprising of ships from the Chilean, Norwegian and US navies."
29. This is the fourth time the RSN has participated in the biennial multilateral RIMPAC maritime exercise. In RIMPAC 2008, RSS Steadfast participated and fired a Harpoon Surface-to-Surface Missile (SSM). In RIMPAC 2010, RSS Supreme fired an Aster SAM. In RIMPAC 2012, a RSN frigate commanded a formation of vessels from the Royal Australian Navy, Royal Canadian Navy, Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force, and the US Navy. And RSS Formidable not only commanded a CTU, it also successfully carried out the simultaneous live-firing of two Harpoon SSMs on 14 Jul 2012:-
RIMPAC 2012
RIMPAC 2014
- Exercise RIMPAC 2012 - Ship Shape (Part 1) - YouTube; and
- Exercise RIMPAC 2012 - Sea Phase (Part 2) - YouTube.
RIMPAC 2014
- RIMPAC 2014 Retrospective - YouTube;
- Part 1: Friendship & Patrnership now! Exercise RIMPAC 2014 Part 1 - YouTube; and
- Part 2: Leadership! Exercise RIMPAC 2014 Part 2 - YouTube
Above, the ex-USS Ogden (LPD 5) is hit by a Naval Strike Missile (NSM) from the Royal Norwegian Navy frigate HNoMS Fridtjof Nansen (F 310) during a SINKEX as part of RIMPAC 2014 (see sinking of ex-USS Ogden: Navy Sank the Decommissioned USS Ogden - YouTube). A single NSM was fired along with the launch of two Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles.
30. While it is possible to argue that Europe has no dog in an Asian fight and should distance itself from the American's long list of troubles involving China, some Europeans are conducting a little pivot of their own beyond just attending international conferences. However, no matter how Europe pivots, or America pivots (especially since the American pivot has run out of steam, thanks to a looming budget crisis), China in its calculations is and will continue to be underwhelmed. RIMPAC 2014 is the first time Norway has fired an NSM at a naval exercise in the Pacific, as the missile had only became operational in 2012. “It was a very successful shot. The missile performed exactly as programmed and expected,” Cmdr. Per Rostad, the ship’s commanding officer, said in an interview. Rostad’s crew has had an interesting cruise. In mid-November, just before deploying, they fought a fire aboard the ferry Britannia Seaways off the Norwegian coast. In the Med, they were assigned to escort missions for ships carrying Syrian chemical weapons to Cyprus. After transferring to the HNoMS Fridtjof Nansen (F 310), they took the ship through the Panama Canal to San Diego, where they joined a group sail of US and Chilean warships out to Hawaii. Underscoring the importance of Norway’s participation, Navy chief Rear Adm. Lars Saunes and defense minister Ine Eriksen Søreide came out to Pearl Harbor for the exercises. Representing a symbolic first wave of a European pivot to Asia, Norway's Defence Minister Ine Eriksen Søreide has stated four factors on why participation in RIMPAC is in their interests:-
Below, the Ultra Heavy-Lift Amphibious Connector prepares to enter the well deck of the USS Rushmore to load up heavy equipment during its first mission off the coast of Marine Corps Training Area Bellows, July 11, 2014 during a Marine Corps Advanced Warfighting Experiment.
"Firstly, this is a matter of strengthening our ability to operate together... RIMPAC also gives us an opportunity to strengthen relations with nations that we have had little defense cooperation with in the past. For example Japan, South Korea, India and Australia... The ability to provide mutual security and collective defense depends on us being able to operate jointly... Norway needs to be present where these activities take place...
Secondly, we need to look at this within a broader transatlantic framework – including the need for better burden-sharing. We can no longer take the transatlantic relationship for granted. And we cannot take US commitment to European security for granted... Rather, I am proposing that a robust transatlantic relationship – so crucial for our mutual security – requires nourishment. It needs engagement and investment from both sides... That means that Europe needs to be willing to engage in those areas where the US has security interests...
Below, HNoMS Fridtjof Nansen (F 310) moving into position to conduct replenishment at sea with USNS John Ericsson (and RSS Intrepid in the background) during RIMPAC 2014.
The third point I would make is that the Asia-Pacific is of strategic importance to Norway. Indeed, developments in this part of the world will have global effects... The rise of China, unresolved territorial claims and rising nationalism in the region are important drivers. I believe that these issues will be resolved peacefully... What happens in the Asia-Pacific affects us all. Norway is not a key player, nor do we aspire to play a large role. One frigate in one exercise will in and of itself not be crucial... President John F. Kennedy once said: "All of us have in our veins the exact same percentage of salt in our blood that exists in the ocean, and, therefore, we have salt in our blood, in our sweat, in our tears. We are tied to the ocean". This certainly holds true for Norway and Norwegians. Freedom of navigation and freedom of passage – and the upholding of the rule of law on the seas – is our lifeblood. As maritime nation, it is in our interest to work collaboratively with allies...
Fourthly, our participation allows us to show-case the superior abilities of our Navy, both in terms of technology and personnel. Our Fridtjof Nansen-class with the Aegis system is an extremely versatile platform. Just during the past year, our frigates have been involved in counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden – where our ship was also the command vessel for the NATO force. They have contributed to the removal by sea of chemical agents from Syria, and they have been patrolling off our coast – including in Arctic waters... The distances travelled and the diverging nature of the missions is truly worthy of reflection... And I would urge Rear Admiral Saunes to convey my admiration and gratitude to the remarkable men and women of the Norwegian Navy.
Furthermore, we will use the opportunity in RIMPAC to demonstrate how the Norwegian defense industry is a global leader within certain critical areas. For one we will showcase the unique capabilities of the Norwegian Naval Strike Missile. During the exercise, Fridtjof Nansen will visit the Pacific Missile Range where the frigate will fire a live Naval Strike Missile (NSM). We also look forward to demonstrating our Sea Protector system, designed for close-area protection of the vessel. These are examples of how Norwegian industrial interests also will benefit from our participation."
Above, Raytheon and the Norwegian defense company Kongsberg Gruppen said that they will join forces to field a new, long-distance anti-ship missile on 15 July 2014. The Joint Strike Missile’s development is already funded by the Norwegian government – a key advantage at a time when the U.S. Navy is considering cost-effective solutions for next-generation anti-ship weapons. Norway is also funding its integration into the F-35 Lighting II jet. Raytheon and Kongsberg announced their partnership during the Farnborough International Airshow outside London. For details see: Raytheon Company: Raytheon and Kongsberg to field long-distance, anti-ship missile - Part of a raft of missile announcements at Farnborough Airshow
"Firstly, this is a matter of strengthening our ability to operate together... RIMPAC also gives us an opportunity to strengthen relations with nations that we have had little defense cooperation with in the past. For example Japan, South Korea, India and Australia... The ability to provide mutual security and collective defense depends on us being able to operate jointly... Norway needs to be present where these activities take place...
Secondly, we need to look at this within a broader transatlantic framework – including the need for better burden-sharing. We can no longer take the transatlantic relationship for granted. And we cannot take US commitment to European security for granted... Rather, I am proposing that a robust transatlantic relationship – so crucial for our mutual security – requires nourishment. It needs engagement and investment from both sides... That means that Europe needs to be willing to engage in those areas where the US has security interests...
Below, HNoMS Fridtjof Nansen (F 310) moving into position to conduct replenishment at sea with USNS John Ericsson (and RSS Intrepid in the background) during RIMPAC 2014.
The third point I would make is that the Asia-Pacific is of strategic importance to Norway. Indeed, developments in this part of the world will have global effects... The rise of China, unresolved territorial claims and rising nationalism in the region are important drivers. I believe that these issues will be resolved peacefully... What happens in the Asia-Pacific affects us all. Norway is not a key player, nor do we aspire to play a large role. One frigate in one exercise will in and of itself not be crucial... President John F. Kennedy once said: "All of us have in our veins the exact same percentage of salt in our blood that exists in the ocean, and, therefore, we have salt in our blood, in our sweat, in our tears. We are tied to the ocean". This certainly holds true for Norway and Norwegians. Freedom of navigation and freedom of passage – and the upholding of the rule of law on the seas – is our lifeblood. As maritime nation, it is in our interest to work collaboratively with allies...
Fourthly, our participation allows us to show-case the superior abilities of our Navy, both in terms of technology and personnel. Our Fridtjof Nansen-class with the Aegis system is an extremely versatile platform. Just during the past year, our frigates have been involved in counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden – where our ship was also the command vessel for the NATO force. They have contributed to the removal by sea of chemical agents from Syria, and they have been patrolling off our coast – including in Arctic waters... The distances travelled and the diverging nature of the missions is truly worthy of reflection... And I would urge Rear Admiral Saunes to convey my admiration and gratitude to the remarkable men and women of the Norwegian Navy.
Furthermore, we will use the opportunity in RIMPAC to demonstrate how the Norwegian defense industry is a global leader within certain critical areas. For one we will showcase the unique capabilities of the Norwegian Naval Strike Missile. During the exercise, Fridtjof Nansen will visit the Pacific Missile Range where the frigate will fire a live Naval Strike Missile (NSM). We also look forward to demonstrating our Sea Protector system, designed for close-area protection of the vessel. These are examples of how Norwegian industrial interests also will benefit from our participation."
Above, Raytheon and the Norwegian defense company Kongsberg Gruppen said that they will join forces to field a new, long-distance anti-ship missile on 15 July 2014. The Joint Strike Missile’s development is already funded by the Norwegian government – a key advantage at a time when the U.S. Navy is considering cost-effective solutions for next-generation anti-ship weapons. Norway is also funding its integration into the F-35 Lighting II jet. Raytheon and Kongsberg announced their partnership during the Farnborough International Airshow outside London. For details see: Raytheon Company: Raytheon and Kongsberg to field long-distance, anti-ship missile - Part of a raft of missile announcements at Farnborough Airshow
31. Why do I say that China is underwhelmed by the American and European pivots? It is simple, satellite imagery shows major land reclamation on Johnson South Reef - China is essentially reclaiming an island that is big enough for an airstrip - and nothing that ASEAN or the US does in the diplomatic arena will deter them from continuing with their reclamation work or escalating/de-escalating any existing dispute at a time and place of their choosing (in line with their current white ship strategy). Therefore, there are five facts Vietnam needs to note:-
Below, PLA(N) destroyer Haikou (DD 171) and replenishment ship PLA(N) Qiandaohu (AO 886) conduct replenishment at sea during RIMPAC 2014.
One, Vietnamese leaders have to face the fact that ideological affiliation and socialist brotherhood have failed to prevent China from deploying its oil rig in disputed waters, at a place, time and duration of China's choosing.
Two, the Vietnamese have noted that three other permanent members of the UN Security Council that are Vietnam’s strategic partners – France, the UK, and Russia – only gave Vietnam lukewarm support. In contrast, the strongest diplomatic support for Vietnam cam from the US, a comprehensive, but not strategic, partner of Vietnam.
Three, America’s reluctance to confront China raises questions about its regional security role. The US talks about its national interest in preventing unilateral changes to the status quo, but it has done little to prevent such changes in Asia. China still controls the Scarborough Shoal (which it seized from the Philippines in 2012), and its recent decision to station an oil-rig in Vietnamese waters attracted only verbal condemnation. Yes, the US challenged the ADIZ and has flown intelligence aircraft over the oil-rig and the Scarborough Shoal, but those are pretty low-risk moves. As others have noted the US does not have a low-risk strategy to counter China’s moves, which are calibrated to be below the threshold of external intervention.
Above, RCN Lt. Alan Ng translates for U.S. Navy Lt. Jessica Naranjo while she speaks to People's Republic of China, People's Liberation Army (Navy) medical personnel from the hospital ship Peace Ark (T-AH 866).
Four, support from Japan is of limited use to Vietnam (thanks to the Japanese commitment not to use force), and the noisy but inert support from the Philippines (due a total lack of naval capability) is the sound before defeat in the international diplomatic arena over its concerns in the South China Sea. In the remorseless logic of self-help, whereby nation-states bear primary responsibility for their own defence, still rules international affairs. Appearances count in alliance politics. A lesser ally or partner, like the Philippines or Vietnam, that covets help from a stronger one must demonstrate that it merits the effort. Thus far, from a military modernisation standpoint, the Philippines has demonstrated that it has not tried hard enough; but Vietnam's efforts is a different cup of tea.
Five, greater solidarity among the ASEAN states over the management of disputes in the South China Sea via a multi-lateral 'rules based' approach will not deter China. Further, ASEAN is handicapped by the appeal to a toxic brand of Indonesian nationalism by Indonesian politicians, at the expense of ASEAN unity. In 2007 the Indonesian Navy enforced a sand embargo on Singapore theoretically on environmental grounds. But Indonesian lip service on concerns about the environment is bogus. This bogus concern for the environment is demonstrated in 1997, 1998 and again in June 2013, when Malaysians and Singaporeans were more suffocated than usual by the thick haze caused by forest fires from Indonesia. On an annual basis, Malaysians and Singaporeans are literally being suffocated by the regular occurrence of the toxic trans-boundary haze from Indonesia. There is a definite chill in Indonesia-Singapore relations after Indonesian Navy officers were stopped in 2008 from using their ships to engage in their contraband cigarette smuggling efforts (to evade customs duties amounting to over S$2.9 million in one instance); and thereafter their continued intent to cause continued offence in March 2014 beyond just naming their one of their warship after two terrorists (who were hanged in 1968 after being convicted of setting-off bombs in Singapore and killing civilians during the Konfrontasi). However, relative to the Malaysians, current Indonesia-Singapore bilateral ties are still better than current bilateral ties between Indonesia-Malaysia. For the last few years, the Malaysians have been facing seasonal stone and excrement throwing protests in front of their embassy in Jakarta, over any trivial slight the Indonesian political groups might perceive. Just google 'Ganyang Malaysia' (i.e. Crush Malaysia) or read up on Indonesia-Malaysia relations to see what I mean. The Malaysians have expressed their concern that the media in Indonesia has fostered anti-Malaysia sentiments through numerous instances of distorted news coverage; with the irony that despite outstanding dispute over the Ambalat offshore oil block, Indonesia is not even Malaysia's greatest security concern this year (rather it is the heightened security concerns over a series of cross border raids into Sabah, East Malaysia, by Filipino militant groups to kill the Malaysian police stationed there or kidnap people for ransom).
One, Vietnamese leaders have to face the fact that ideological affiliation and socialist brotherhood have failed to prevent China from deploying its oil rig in disputed waters, at a place, time and duration of China's choosing.
Two, the Vietnamese have noted that three other permanent members of the UN Security Council that are Vietnam’s strategic partners – France, the UK, and Russia – only gave Vietnam lukewarm support. In contrast, the strongest diplomatic support for Vietnam cam from the US, a comprehensive, but not strategic, partner of Vietnam.
Three, America’s reluctance to confront China raises questions about its regional security role. The US talks about its national interest in preventing unilateral changes to the status quo, but it has done little to prevent such changes in Asia. China still controls the Scarborough Shoal (which it seized from the Philippines in 2012), and its recent decision to station an oil-rig in Vietnamese waters attracted only verbal condemnation. Yes, the US challenged the ADIZ and has flown intelligence aircraft over the oil-rig and the Scarborough Shoal, but those are pretty low-risk moves. As others have noted the US does not have a low-risk strategy to counter China’s moves, which are calibrated to be below the threshold of external intervention.
Above, RCN Lt. Alan Ng translates for U.S. Navy Lt. Jessica Naranjo while she speaks to People's Republic of China, People's Liberation Army (Navy) medical personnel from the hospital ship Peace Ark (T-AH 866).
Four, support from Japan is of limited use to Vietnam (thanks to the Japanese commitment not to use force), and the noisy but inert support from the Philippines (due a total lack of naval capability) is the sound before defeat in the international diplomatic arena over its concerns in the South China Sea. In the remorseless logic of self-help, whereby nation-states bear primary responsibility for their own defence, still rules international affairs. Appearances count in alliance politics. A lesser ally or partner, like the Philippines or Vietnam, that covets help from a stronger one must demonstrate that it merits the effort. Thus far, from a military modernisation standpoint, the Philippines has demonstrated that it has not tried hard enough; but Vietnam's efforts is a different cup of tea.
Five, greater solidarity among the ASEAN states over the management of disputes in the South China Sea via a multi-lateral 'rules based' approach will not deter China. Further, ASEAN is handicapped by the appeal to a toxic brand of Indonesian nationalism by Indonesian politicians, at the expense of ASEAN unity. In 2007 the Indonesian Navy enforced a sand embargo on Singapore theoretically on environmental grounds. But Indonesian lip service on concerns about the environment is bogus. This bogus concern for the environment is demonstrated in 1997, 1998 and again in June 2013, when Malaysians and Singaporeans were more suffocated than usual by the thick haze caused by forest fires from Indonesia. On an annual basis, Malaysians and Singaporeans are literally being suffocated by the regular occurrence of the toxic trans-boundary haze from Indonesia. There is a definite chill in Indonesia-Singapore relations after Indonesian Navy officers were stopped in 2008 from using their ships to engage in their contraband cigarette smuggling efforts (to evade customs duties amounting to over S$2.9 million in one instance); and thereafter their continued intent to cause continued offence in March 2014 beyond just naming their one of their warship after two terrorists (who were hanged in 1968 after being convicted of setting-off bombs in Singapore and killing civilians during the Konfrontasi). However, relative to the Malaysians, current Indonesia-Singapore bilateral ties are still better than current bilateral ties between Indonesia-Malaysia. For the last few years, the Malaysians have been facing seasonal stone and excrement throwing protests in front of their embassy in Jakarta, over any trivial slight the Indonesian political groups might perceive. Just google 'Ganyang Malaysia' (i.e. Crush Malaysia) or read up on Indonesia-Malaysia relations to see what I mean. The Malaysians have expressed their concern that the media in Indonesia has fostered anti-Malaysia sentiments through numerous instances of distorted news coverage; with the irony that despite outstanding dispute over the Ambalat offshore oil block, Indonesia is not even Malaysia's greatest security concern this year (rather it is the heightened security concerns over a series of cross border raids into Sabah, East Malaysia, by Filipino militant groups to kill the Malaysian police stationed there or kidnap people for ransom).
Below, Chile's CNS Blanco Encalada leaving Pearl Harbour for the start of the 22-day sea phase.
32. Given the lack of support shown to Vietnam by three permanent members of the UN Security Counci (namely, France, the UK, and Russia) and the relative impotence of ASEAN under Indonesian leadership, Vietnam finds itself between a rock and a hard place. It has to come to the same conclusion reached by the other smaller ASEAN states - to look to US and hope for leadership - if it ever comes. Under the Obama administration, they seem to have a policy of leading from the back, in an effort to conserve power. Meanwhile, the Philippines entered into an Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) with the US on 28 April 2014, and other ASEAN members have noticeably tilted towards the US. The EDCA has an initial term of ten years and will remain in force automatically. After 10 years, either US of the Philippines may give a year’s written notice of its intention to terminate the EDCA, which is an executive agreement and not a formal treaty. After eight painful rounds of negotiations that commenced in August 2013, the EDCA authorizes access to agreed locations in the Philippines by US forces on a rotational basis - long after Australia and US announced two new force posture initiatives (for the deployment of US Marines to Darwin and closer cooperation between both air forces) to enhance defence cooperation between Australia and the US on 16 November 2011 - and long, long after the 2005 Singapore-US Strategic Framework Agreement (and the deployment of the Littoral Combat Ships to Singapore from April 2013 onwards). Some have suggested that the big internal foreign policy question for states in Asia is precisely the same. How to benefit economically from China's growth without getting pulled into its geo-political orbit in a manner that limits a country's strategic choices? For them, this is a question for many in South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand or Australia (or the so called 'China choice' question). The 'China choice' question is also question for client states of China like Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam. Astute readers will notice that I left out the Philippines and Japan - these two have no choice, and the trajectory of their bilateral relations with China only has room for further deterioration. In contrast, some do not even see it as a either or binary choice. Rather, the question is how to accommodate China's rise in a world that is becoming more multi-polar.
Above, 30 June 2014, Adm. Samuel J. Locklear, Commander of U.S. Pacific Command presents a USPACOM Plaque to Adm. Haakon Bruun-Hanssen, Chief of Defense of the Norwegian Armed Forces. While in Hawaii to attend RIMPAC, the Norwegian delegation stopped by U.S. Pacific Command to discuss Norway's views on how European Allies & NATO could engage in the Asia-Pacific region. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Jay M. Chu/Released)
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