Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates

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FORBIN

Member
The Anzacs commissioned over a decade from ‘96 to 06 and according to the shipbuilding plan the final SEA5000 won’t be commissioned until 2038.
Assuming that the Anzacs will be replaced on a one for one basis all of them will be 30years plus when they decommission so it’s hard to imagine any of them being life extended. The added expense of keeping them going can’t be justified, the capability lost can easily be exceeded by a new build with greater capability.

http://www.defence.gov.au/NavalShipBuilding/Plan/Docs/NavalShipbuildingPlan.pdf
Page 15
The 9 future FFGs replace also the 4th Adélaide coz only 3 Hobbart was ordered and to have always 12 MSCs
 
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Todjaeger

Potstirrer
The 9 future FFGs replace also the 4th Adélaide coz only 3 Hobbart was ordered and to have always 12 MSCs
Umm. No, or at least not quite accurate.

In terms of roles, the Hobart-class DDG's are primarily intended to provide area air defence and in this regard, they could be more accurately be described as the successors or replacements for the Perth-class DDG, the last of which decommissioned from the RAN in 2001. The upcoming Hunter-class FFG is intended to be a much improved replacement for both the Adelaide-class FFG and the ANZAC-class FFH.

In terms of the RAN major warship fleet size, only rarely has there been a dozen such vessels over the last two decades. For instance, at the start of 2002 there would have only been nine major warships commissioned in the RAN, six Adelaide-class FFG's, and three ANZAC-class FFH's. There was an 18 month period where the RAN had gotten up to 13 major warships in commission between August 2006 and January 2008, (six FFG's and eight FFH's) however several of the FFG's were undergoing the FFG-UP programme so they were in drydock and not available to deploy. By the end of January, 2008 the RAN fleet had dropped back down to a dozen major warships, and remained at that level (again, with some vessels spend significant time either in drydocks getting upgrades or tied up alongside in 'extended readiness') until November 2015 when another FFG was decommissioned and the number of major warships dropped down to 11. With the commissioning of HMAS Hobart in September 2017 the number went back up to a dozen, but only for two months since the frigate HMAS Darwin was decommissioned in December 2017. As a side note, while HMAS Hobart commissioned in 2017, AFAIK the vessel is still undergoing ship trials and testing, so it might be a bit of a stretch to consider the vessel ready for action.

Realistically, I would expect the RAN to have decommissioned all the Adelaide-class FFG's well before the first Hunter-class FFG is commissioned. If construction on the first Hunter-class FFG does actually start in 2020, the youngest Adelaide-class FFG will be at least 26 years old, while the oldest ANZAC-class FFH in the RAN would be at least 23 years old. By the time the first Hunter-class FFG enters RAN service in the late 2020's, I believe some of the earliest constructed FFH's will also have started getting decommissioned since they will likely be 30 years old by that time.

All in all, while the RAN has managed to have the number of major warships hover 'around a dozen' the RAN has not always maintained a dozen warships.
 

Stampede

Well-Known Member
Umm. No, or at least not quite accurate.

In terms of roles, the Hobart-class DDG's are primarily intended to provide area air defence and in this regard, they could be more accurately be described as the successors or replacements for the Perth-class DDG, the last of which decommissioned from the RAN in 2001. The upcoming Hunter-class FFG is intended to be a much improved replacement for both the Adelaide-class FFG and the ANZAC-class FFH.

In terms of the RAN major warship fleet size, only rarely has there been a dozen such vessels over the last two decades. For instance, at the start of 2002 there would have only been nine major warships commissioned in the RAN, six Adelaide-class FFG's, and three ANZAC-class FFH's. There was an 18 month period where the RAN had gotten up to 13 major warships in commission between August 2006 and January 2008, (six FFG's and eight FFH's) however several of the FFG's were undergoing the FFG-UP programme so they were in drydock and not available to deploy. By the end of January, 2008 the RAN fleet had dropped back down to a dozen major warships, and remained at that level (again, with some vessels spend significant time either in drydocks getting upgrades or tied up alongside in 'extended readiness') until November 2015 when another FFG was decommissioned and the number of major warships dropped down to 11. With the commissioning of HMAS Hobart in September 2017 the number went back up to a dozen, but only for two months since the frigate HMAS Darwin was decommissioned in December 2017. As a side note, while HMAS Hobart commissioned in 2017, AFAIK the vessel is still undergoing ship trials and testing, so it might be a bit of a stretch to consider the vessel ready for action.

Realistically, I would expect the RAN to have decommissioned all the Adelaide-class FFG's well before the first Hunter-class FFG is commissioned. If construction on the first Hunter-class FFG does actually start in 2020, the youngest Adelaide-class FFG will be at least 26 years old, while the oldest ANZAC-class FFH in the RAN would be at least 23 years old. By the time the first Hunter-class FFG enters RAN service in the late 2020's, I believe some of the earliest constructed FFH's will also have started getting decommissioned since they will likely be 30 years old by that time.

All in all, while the RAN has managed to have the number of major warships hover 'around a dozen' the RAN has not always maintained a dozen warships.

Always good to revisit the history.

I like others would like to get up to the number twelve sooner than later.
Be that by retaining the FFG's or retiring the ANZACS at a slower pace as the hunter class come on line is a good debate.
Maybe some of the older ships could fulfil a training role as we build up crew numbers, enabling the active combatants to be at a greater level of efficiency and availability.
Either way it's an issue of time and our ability to respond to regional challenges in the 2020's. I feel we may be stretched infleet numbers numbers and ability as we transition to our new build fleet, so for myself this is the most pragmatic answer.

Alternatively find a Global Q store and get a couple of Destroyers off the shelf..................!!!!

Regards S
 

StingrayOZ

Super Moderator
Staff member
I think retiring ANZAC's slowly, is a reasonable idea, they are now quite capable ships. If we ever wanted more, we could slightly increase the rate of build and service life of the ships.

That is what is awesome about continuous production. If we ever wanted to get to say 14 (war etc), then keeping ships in service slightly longer and maybe squeezing the production speed just a tad are both viable options.

If we ever wanted go completely nuts you could move over the minor vessel line over to a major vessel line or build additional major vessels sporadically on that line (export or similar). Or assign block work to others to speed up the over all process.

Really it doesn't make a whole lot of sense talking about 12 submarines, or 12 surface ships or 12 OPV's. Each as a continuous production line, which means that we are likely to build 12 min per generation off each line. I think, for examples 12 OPV's is just the start, after those 12 we will build another 12 (possibly larger ships) to replace other ships in the RAN.

I don't think Canada's 14 build is superior to Australia's continuous ship building commitment.

Of course the RAN also operates 2 x LHD's, a LPD, AOR's etc etc. . While not surface combatants, they are also major ships.

If we were really short, we could probably pay Spain, or the UK to put a major surface ship in our region. Hit up the US for more frequent patrol and possibly basing some ships out of Australia.
 

beegee

Active Member
When does sea 1448 phase 4B start? And which ship gets the update first?

Edit: I answered my own question, HMAS Arunta and it's happening now.
 
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Todjaeger

Potstirrer
If the world has or is entering an era of prolonged increased tensions, then there could be some merit in the idea of re-assigning a major warship that would otherwise be getting decommissioned and operating it as a training vessel. Then, after operating the vessel for a few years it could be decommissioned and a new, otherwise soon to be decommissioned major warship could replace it and repeat the process.

Assuming the RAN/ADF budget was able to handle the costs associated with such a training scheme, and the number of personnel either able to provide or requiring shipboard training could be met, then this could potentially provide an improved training capability and experience, as well as increasing the number of RAN warships that could be available should a surge deployment be required.
 

Raven22

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
I think the biggest problem with increasing the number of surface combatants will be crewing them all. The RAN can't crew all their current surface combatants. With larger OPVs to come, a doubling of the sub fleet etc, crew numbers will be at a premium.

I don't see a surface combatant being designated a training ship either. The new facility at Randwick Barracks achieves the same effect, as will purpose designed training facilities for new capabilities.
 

John Newman

The Bunker Group
I like others would like to get up to the number twelve sooner than later.
Be that by retaining the FFG's or retiring the ANZACS at a slower pace as the hunter class come on line is a good debate.
Maybe some of the older ships could fulfil a training role as we build up crew numbers, enabling the active combatants to be at a greater level of efficiency and availability.
Either way it's an issue of time and our ability to respond to regional challenges in the 2020's. I feel we may be stretched infleet numbers numbers and ability as we transition to our new build fleet, so for myself this is the most pragmatic answer.
Unless the Poo really hits the fan tomorrow (or very shortly), I really can't see the RAN having 12 Major Fleet Units until the 9th Hunter FFG commissions in the late 2030s.

But 'if' the Poo did hit the fan, and the Government wanted to grow the fleet (organically at least), between now and the 9th Hunter FFG in the late 2030s, there are only a couple of options open.

1. Retain the two remaining Australian built Adelaide FFGs in commission, that would get the MFUs to 13 (3 x DDG, 2 x FFG and 8 x FFH), at least until the first Hunter commissions.

2. And/or, don't retire the first Anzac FFH until the 2nd Hunter FFG commissions (that would get the fleet to 12 in the late 2020s and maintain it at 12 until the 9th Hunter commissions in the late 2030s).

But realistically I can't see either of the above happening unless there is a major shift in Government policy (for whatever reason).

Cheers,
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Realistically the OPVs will be entering service over the same time frame with each of them being vastly more capable than the preceding patrol boats. This will have the effect of freeing up the major combatants currently assigned to border protection and potentially, as more come on line, possibly even replace them in some flag showing and low threat deployments in out greater region.
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
Realistically the OPVs will be entering service over the same time frame with each of them being vastly more capable than the preceding patrol boats. This will have the effect of freeing up the major combatants currently assigned to border protection and potentially, as more come on line, possibly even replace them in some flag showing and low threat deployments in out greater region.
The potential timeline I had in mind for the idea would not start until it came time to start decommissioning the RAN's ANZAC-class frigates at the earliest, which would likely be in the mid to late 2020's.

An area where I lack the knowledge of is whether or not training in a classroom and/or ashore can provide all the needs for RAN crews, or if there is still measurable value in personnel going on training cruises. Relating to that is whether the RAN has (or will have) a surplus of berths that can be suitably filled by junior officers and sailors who lack some of the experience gained by time at sea. I am thinking of the sorts of berths like which would permit someone to gain a Watchkeeping certificate (or whatever it is called) or other relevant certifications and endorsements that some of the higher ranking or more critical positions aboard a vessel require. IIRC the RAN has had problems at times within the last decade or, in assembling a suitable ship's crew because there was too small a pool of personnel with the appropriate credentials to fill all the key roles when needed. Again, IIRC part of the reason for that problem was the some of the roles required credentials that could only be gained after receiving both the appropriate training and then having actual, practical experience and that at times the RAN had too few berths appropriate for personnel to get the required practical experience.
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
The time to increase the fleet size was in the 80s and 90s with the revitalised ship building industry, massive manpower savings on new platforms verses old, and the money allegedly freed up by not replacing the carrier in 82. The idea (and I am not saying whether it was a good or bad one) was that an increased number of major fleet units, each with one or two helicopters, either NATO Sea Sparrow or Standard for air defence, a medium calibre gun etc. could be afforded through not replacing Melbourne and reduced crewing of the modern ships.

This of course coincided with the post cold war peace dividend, the recession we had to have, "cutting the tail and sharpening the teeth" (otherwise known as gutting of ADF support capability and outsourcing), the Asian Economic Crisis etc. End result was the proposed 17 majors (3 DDGs and their one for one replacement, 6 FFGs, 8 ANZACs) plus up to a dozen missile corvettes, became 16 majors (6 new air defence ships to replace the DDGS and first 4 FFGs, two upgraded FFGs, eight ANZACs) plus the corvettes.

Mid 90s the DDG replacement was deferred in favour of upgrading all 6 FFGs dropping planned major numbers to 14 but the corvette program was accelerated and a much more capable helicopter was specified for them and the ANZACs to increase their combat capability. Then there was a change of government and the corvette project died (even though the now unnecessary helicopter program continued), the DDGs began to be retired without a direct replacement and studies began into retrofitting AEGIS to the ANZACs under the ANZAC Warfighting Improvement Program (probably the same thinking that was behind the Super Duper Sea Sprite debacle, i.e. lets fit big heavy complex stuff into a legacy platform, that is too small, in the delusional belief that it will a) be cheaper and b) actually work). The FFG Upgrade Program was no roaring success either with costs blowing out and schedules slipping to the point that only 4 hulls were upgraded for more than all six were meant to cost and FOC was only achieved on the eve of the retirement of the first upgraded platforms. This all saw major numbers drop to 12 with no supporting corvettes, it was also during this time that an offer of 4 Kidd Class DDGs from the USN was rejected as unnecessary.

In between planning to upgrade the FFGs and ANZACs and the work starting proper Timor happened and the government of the day got a real wakeup call as to the true state of the ADF, which is where the AWD came in, originally as a belated replacement for the DDGs, then for them and the un upgraded pair of FFGs, then for the DDGs and FFGs together. Also at this time it was realised (about a decade after it was first realised) that the Fremantle class patrol boats were shagged and needed to be replaced, what to replace them with, glorified aluminium hulled motor yachts that were definitely nothing like OPVs, let alone corvettes.

So now we are approaching 2010 and the increased number of major surface combatants, funded and crewed by the saving made through not retaining a carrier capability and replacing old manpower intensive hulls with new efficient ones, has dropped from 17 plus up to a dozen corvettes (I believe 8 to 10 was more likely) to 12 supported by 12 of the worst patrol vessels the RAN has ever operated (so bad in fact that frigates need to support them as they are not capable of operating in all required sea states). Most of this is though in the middle of the biggest resources boom the nation has ever seen and the government literally had more money than they knew what to do with.

There is a brief period where things start to look up with a fourth AWD being considered and a PB / MCMV / hydro replacement that looks and sound like a multi mission corvette or OPV, and 12!!!!!!!! TWELVE!!!!!! replacement submarines, but then the worst DEFMIN in national history appears and the RAN is left looking at the possibility of 3 AWD/DDG and only 6 ANZAC replacements, while the OCV has disappeared, replaced by talk of maybe a new patrol boat that is not quite as bad as the current ones. I wont even go into the insanity that followed with revolving PMs and senior ministers and the progressively dumber, more populist scams that appeared under each, but I will say where we are now is far better than I believe anyone could have imagined a decade ago, hell much better than I thought possible only three or four years ago.

IMO a lot of money and effort was wasted, a lot of capability lost, with miss-management and politics resulting an a shocking opportunity cost to defence and the economy as a whole. Things are looking good now but the amount of money wasted to get where we are now is horrifying. For what was spent we either should have much more, or more to the point, for what we have, we should have spent much less. A cost that is not often considered is how much we had to pay to rebuild lost capability, both military and industry, that would have been far far cheaper just to maintain.

Yes I know we have the LHDs and Choules now too but they were actually, improved, one for one replacements for existing capabilities that actually turned out ok, not new capabilities per say.
 
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StingrayOZ

Super Moderator
Staff member
I think we can crew a much larger fleet. If it was required.

But Australia has limited resources. We are only 25 million people. Canada is nearly 50% larger in population. UK and other major powers have tremendously bigger economies. We have to make do within our limitations. I think the future plan for the Australian Navy is extremely positive, regardless of the missed opportunities of the past, we have done well to get where we are today.

If:
  • war was the actually break out between two significant powers, then things would change.
  • China and the US were to become openly physically hostile to each other
  • If some nation was to directly threaten Australia or fire on our ships/planes
  • If the US was to collapse or withdraw globally
  • If China was to collapse
  • If Indonesia was to collapse and break up
  • If India and Pakistan were to fire up
  • If India was to become aggressive or unstable
  • If PNG was to collapse and break out into civil war
We are now in the position to have options. Build more ships, build them faster, keep ships for longer, build more of a certain type, upgrade and upgun what we have. On top of this countries like Singapore and Indonesia aren't hopeless any more. Japan has a massive navy. India is increasing in its capabilities.

The ADF in 2030-40 will look like on of the most capable on the planet, and definitely tooled up and as ready as it has ever been. Our 2% will have purchased a very credible and capable force. This is of course able to be expanded and extended, but the ADF changes will also make the whole thing more efficient. Ship building will cost less, operationally ships, boats and planes will cost less, the Army will be infinitely more capable for the dollar.

By the time the first generation of 12 ships is completed, we would have saved money and crewing to look at greater capability or greater numbers.
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
I believe the following may be of interest when discussing manning

Melbourne had a crew or 1000 plus 350 in the air group
The Perth Class DDGs had a crew of 333
Darings 320
Rivers 250
FFGs 180 (I believe over 200 for deployments)
ANZACs 163
Hobarts 202
Canberras 358

A snapshot of 1979 you have 1 CVS (less air group), 3 DDG, 2 DD, 6 DE for a total of 4139 crew

A snapshot of today 2 LHD, 2 (lets call it 3) DDG, 2 FFG, 8 FFH for a total of 3026 crew
 

Redlands18

Well-Known Member
I believe the following may be of interest when discussing manning

Melbourne had a crew or 1000 plus 350 in the air group
The Perth Class DDGs had a crew of 333
Darings 320
Rivers 250
FFGs 180 (I believe over 200 for deployments)
ANZACs 163
Hobarts 202
Canberras 358

A snapshot of 1979 you have 1 CVS (less air group), 3 DDG, 2 DD, 6 DE for a total of 4139 crew

A snapshot of today 2 LHD, 2 (lets call it 3) DDG, 2 FFG, 8 FFH for a total of 3026 crew
And don't forget about 120(give or take) on the Canberra's are Army and RAAF..
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
And don't forget about 120(give or take) on the Canberra's are Army and RAAF..
Very true, I was going to make that distinction but my quick and easy was starting to get a bit complex.

The issues with the size and shape of the fleet don't really relate to the number of personnel required, it relates to the number of trained and experienced personnel the navy needs to grow to replace those they lost and never replaced during the upheaval of the 80s, 90s and 2000s and the money wasted over those years.

Its not just Australia, examining many operations in hindsight shows the same sort of thing over and over. Well not just hindsight as in many cases what happened was predicted but those doing the predicting were ignored, even though in many cases they pointed to past examples of lessons learned.

Assail has mentioned Melbournes role as a CVS which came to mind when I was reading an account of RN plans and concepts in the 1960s and the mention that at the time (late 50s early 60s) they were looking at different options for Escort Cruisers (basically helicopter carrier concepts equivalent to Jean d Arc to Invincible) and eventually the Tiger Class cruiser helicopter conversions, they had no less than three virtually new Colossus and Majestic Class CVLs available (Warrior, Leviathan, and Perseus) that could have been either converted to helicopter carriers or even upgraded to the same standard as Melbourne, for significantly less than the cost of the Tiger conversions. They even had the aircraft and crews available as many were made redundant when the Gannets were removed from the strike carriers.

Its all long in the past now but it is interesting looking back and seeing the same sort of decisions happening again and again with the same sort of results, in an effort to save money lots of capability is lost at the cost of more money than was saved.
 

ASSAIL

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
The potential timeline I had in mind for the idea would not start until it came time to start decommissioning the RAN's ANZAC-class frigates at the earliest, which would likely be in the mid to late 2020's.

An area where I lack the knowledge of is whether or not training in a classroom and/or ashore can provide all the needs for RAN crews, or if there is still measurable value in personnel going on training cruises. Relating to that is whether the RAN has (or will have) a surplus of berths that can be suitably filled by junior officers and sailors who lack some of the experience gained by time at sea. I am thinking of the sorts of berths like which would permit someone to gain a Watchkeeping certificate (or whatever it is called) or other relevant certifications and endorsements that some of the higher ranking or more critical positions aboard a vessel require. IIRC the RAN has had problems at times within the last decade or, in assembling a suitable ship's crew because there was too small a pool of personnel with the appropriate credentials to fill all the key roles when needed. Again, IIRC part of the reason for that problem was the some of the roles required credentials that could only be gained after receiving both the appropriate training and then having actual, practical experience and that at times the RAN had too few berths appropriate for personnel to get the required practical experience.
I believe the days of a full training squadron are over. In my day we had a converted carrier (Sydney), a Battle class destroyer (Anzac), a Type 15 (Queenborough) and in the West a River class frigate (Diamantina). All these ships provided much needed sea training for Ordinary Seamen, Midshipmen and engineers of all stripes.
The training was vitally important and all mentioned spent their first months at sea after completing shore based training and before they posted as rawboned additions to a fleet unit.

The Commonwealth navies’ Seaman Officer training was vastly different to the generalist training in the USN. In order to stand a watch In company an officer first had to complete a year at sea standing watch as either a Midshipman of the watch in larger ships or as Second Officer of the watch in an escort type unit.
On completion of that year they then sat a Fleet Board where, amongst other subjects, a 99% pass in Rule of the Road was mandatory.
A further 3 months of sub specialist training, AAW, ASW, Comms etc followed before a first posting as an Acting Sub Lieutenant (Ensign) to a fleet unit.
Then followed two years at sea as a Second Officer of the Watch during which time one had to gain an Ocean Navigation Certificate and By the end of the posting he must have obtained a Bridge Watchkeeping Certificate, Limited if the requisite 6 months “in company” time had not been achieved, Full if all boxes were ticked
The young Officer could then expect to be posted to a further two 2 year postings at sea before being considered for a Principal Warfare Officers Course.
By the time the officer had become the ships Weapons/Comms/CIC Officer and stand watches either on the Bridge or the CIC he had completed four or five years at sea standing watches.

I don’t think this could happen today as officers enter the fleet later, on completion of their degrees at ADFA although they do have intermittent sea time whilst there.
Further there are now high quality bridge simulators that can test a young officers acuity whilst standing a watch although it doesn’t test their navigation skills (the RAN does not have enlisted men fixing the ship, that’s the responsibility of the OOW usually carried out by the 2OOW under supervision.
It must have been difficult to qualify watchkeepers during the dark years of the frigate Navy as single ship steaming seemed to be the main activity with only the regular exercise in which to experience “in company” time.

I don’t wish to hark on the generalist versus specialist “SWO” differences but by way of illustration and with the caveat that I know the USN was stretched for manpower during the busy Westpac Vietnam era and many ROTC officers were at sea.
I was a very junior officer although not ON watch, on CVS 21 HMAS Melbourne when sh pe collided with the USS Frank E Evans where 74 USN personnel perished. My bridge experience was a total of two years and I was just about qualified to sharpen the chart pencils.
That was more time than the combined time of the two officers standing watch on the bridge of the Evans, both ROTC, the result was inevitable.

I submit this partly in response to your post but also in response to a number of essays and articles written in Proceedings and elsewhere discussing the challenges the USN SWO stream has had following the series of Incidents over the last year or so.
 

Stampede

Well-Known Member
I believe the following may be of interest when discussing manning

Melbourne had a crew or 1000 plus 350 in the air group
The Perth Class DDGs had a crew of 333
Darings 320
Rivers 250
FFGs 180 (I believe over 200 for deployments)
ANZACs 163
Hobarts 202
Canberras 358

A snapshot of 1979 you have 1 CVS (less air group), 3 DDG, 2 DD, 6 DE for a total of 4139 crew

A snapshot of today 2 LHD, 2 (lets call it 3) DDG, 2 FFG, 8 FFH for a total of 3026 crew

The Singapore navy is a good case study of trying to get a modern range of vessels staffed with minimum crew and still be effective.
Their needs are different to Australia's but they do a good job with what they have.


Regards s
 

ASSAIL

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
The Singapore navy is a good case study of trying to get a modern range of vessels staffed with minimum crew and still be effective.
Their needs are different to Australia's but they do a good job with what they have.


Regards s
Yes but remember that all young adults can be conscripted and must spend time? In one of the services.
 

hauritz

Well-Known Member
.If you look at the crewing requirement for the current fleet it comes out to a little over 3700 to man the current fleet. That is a little over a quarter of the navy's available manpower.

It does make me wonder however if the navy is as efficient as it could be with the way it utilises its manpower. Now that the navy seems to have secured a lot of the hardware it requires it should now start to look at improving the efficiency of its workforce.

If the navy proceeds with the continuous shipbuilding plan with a new ship and submarine delivered every 2 years then there is an opportunity to increase the size of the fleet to 15 or 16 destroyer/frigates and a similar number of subs ... provided we could find the personnel to operate them.
 
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