I would like to take the opportunity to address at least the first of your points, namely that of risk. I recognise that you will immediate understand the points I reference, but I wanted to expand on them for a broad audience, as others may not, so please do not construe this as condescending.
There is no doubt one of the enduring positives touted for the F-5000 was that of lower risk, with a consensus that the industry base, namely ASC was familiar with the build and practise for that design. This is only one consideration of the total risk metric used to judge which total submission (not just design) is of lowest risk. Remember that under SEA5000 a considerable expansion of the entire build is being undertaken at the ASC facility as witnessed by the installation of a plate line, new work stations/platforms and other new supporting infrastructure. This adds new elements to the build process which differ from previous, which would apply irrespective of the design chosen. Also it is already acknowledged within ASC, that a significant portion of the skills built during the AWD have started to atrophy. That will need to be rejuvenated for SEA5000 as recognised by the PM and ministers in the announcement. This reduces the value of a known build, and this premise is based on an assumption that you are in fact building the same product. If that was true we would be building another AWD, and that ship has long sailed. I hear you now, your not yet convinced and I would expect a learned man to be rightfully so wary.
So what other elements are factored into an assessment of risk ? How about the ability of the design to meet requirements. As stated, and well reinforced publicly, this design needed to be an ASW platform. This is reinforced by the requirements and the operational scenarios that underpin the assessment criteria. GCS-A provided the best level of capability in matching those requirements, based on a minimum change principal. That is as a designed solution. While a question has been raised about a proven capability versus an intended or designed capability, what is certain is what level of OQE that supports the compliancy of those requirements was scrutinised by experts in the field to make judgement of which design meets those requirements, as the intended designed baseline. Further it is recognised that engineering changes to the current design can enhance compliancy to those requirements, but doing so adds risk to fruition if the platform is inherently not an ASW platform from the onset. You might be surprised, or not, that GCS-A needed the least amount of change to meet those requirements, an in-fact others needed significantly more. This has been recognised by Defence as this was a subject of assessment some years back to determine if it was “feasible” to make the AWD design into an ASW platform. The answer was yes, but at what risk ? On this judgement of risk, GCS-A scored highest. I recognise that it is one thing to state a capability and another to deliver it, so you continue to critique the assessment looking for nicks in the armour. A scorned man scorns best, and those who served scorn with the best of them. In order to quench that scorn, you need to be convinced that a design that is not proven at sea is going to be capable. The significance here is that ALL of the elements that are key to meeting those requirements are at sea, just not embodied in something called the Type 26. These have been witnessed by Navy.
If we consider the other key objectives of the SEA5000 programme, you will note that a continuous Naval ship building program is one. This is not a program where we aim to build the ‘same’ ship each time. Sure that will keep hands busy in the yards, but will it provide the Navy with capability relevant platforms into the future. The CN has stated that Ship 9 will not be the same as Ship 1. What this points towards is a continuous engineering and development cycle in parallel to a continuous build program to enhance overall capability to ensure each and every new build has the best chance of being capability relevant. This is akin to Flights, but at a lower level of granularity. Otherwise we risk providing just good ships that are the same as those that were commissioned many years previous. During the AWD construction, one catch cry what that of the delay due to the impact of change during a build program. A sound and mature approach to managing change, which is efficient, expedient, rigorous and regimented that supports roll out in production build artefacts is absolutely key to minimising the risk of impact to build and subsequent delays to ship delivery. The simple answer is to stop change, so the production workforce has unhampered progression, but then we can never have capability enhancements without ramifications. I for one, make no apology for a build program that is not willing and able to accept change where it relevant to our servicemen needs solely based on the fact it might interrupt their day. The digital ship build process offered with GCS-A is the closest design, procurement, build and production process which can meet this need with any predictably of consequence, and that needs to be understood and embodied into the engineering and production environment as part of the sovereign capability transfer to Australian industry.
Other risk factors include the likelihood of the design being able to embody those future capabilities and that is not just in platform margins, the ability of the parent company to support the objectives, and likelihood and willingness of developing Australian industry, and the list goes on. While all of this may seem to be going down a hypothetical definition or risk, all I am stating is that a singular assessment of risk is not what constitutes a total assessment of lowest risk. When balanced the positives offered under the GCS-A submission well and truly offset any residual risk judgement that remained. It is that metric of balance that gains the favour of the outcome with respect to Risk.
