Australian Army Discussions and Updates

[ADMk2]

The main reason I raised the tank issue is because I have been reading where the US and joint German/France are looking into lighter weight tanks, in the 38 ton range, which will be simpler to transport than 60 plus ton MBTs. I am wondering whether these will come into consideration when they are introduced?

I think in these armies, the lighter weight tanks are meant to supplement the existing MBT’s and be used more as a mobile fire support variant, rather than as a proper MBT.

Given we appear to be struggling to justify a boost in numbers of the tank we already have (as it isn’t approved yet...) I’m not sure a new, additional vehicle is on the cards... Perhaps as a long term replacement for the Abrams, but I’m not sure that is a sufficient vehicle if you are only going to operate one type.

We may have to confront actual tanks one day...

 

[John Fedup]

The question I would have is whether the Abrams were being re-manufactured, or being zero-timed and upgraded.

If they were being upgraded to a newer standard, I could see a need to replace most/all the internals in addition to a high wear item like the engine or power pack.

The tanks were in sad shape and were being re-manufacturered, not upgraded. Can’t remember where but I read an article about the sep 3 upgrade which is a an evaluation run of 500 tanks for an eventual sep 4 which will be a major upgrade for the Abrams force.

 

[John Fedup]

I think in these armies, the lighter weight tanks are meant to supplement the existing MBT’s and be used more as a mobile fire support variant, rather than as a proper MBT.

Given we appear to be struggling to justify a boost in numbers of the tank we already have (as it isn’t approved yet...) I’m not sure a new, additional vehicle is on the cards... Perhaps as a long term replacement for the Abrams, but I’m not sure that is a sufficient vehicle if you are only going to operate one type.

We may have to confront actual tanks one day...

Barring some huge advancement in light effect armour, 60-70 MBTs will be the he norm for major power conflicts. Air transportable 30-40 ton tanks with modular armour will be for secondary wars and peace making missions.

 

[KiwiRob]

The tanks were in sad shape and were being re-manufacturered, not upgraded. Can’t remember where but I read an article about the sep 3 upgrade which is a an evaluation run of 500 tanks for an eventual sep 4 which will be a major upgrade for the Abrams force.

And some of the tanks which came out of the end of the line had Roos painted on them.

 

[old faithful]

Structure of 2 RAR.
Had a quick flick through a defence rag at the newsagent today.
Had a short article about the re structure of 2 RAR.
4 infantry platoons.
1 Recon/Sniper PL.
A Sig PL
Small boat PL
DFSW PL.

So a rifle coy +, and a support coy - plus an HQ.

Kinda sounds like reserve commando company, and I'm guessing their role will eventually be more of a marine commando than marine infantry. Anyone have more insight?

Not sure what to think really....Just read a couple of blogs about the restructure, and to me at least, it seems that 2RAR will be somewhere between a training aid,recon force,and a suicide squad.
One of the roles given is to secure beachheads and LZ,s for a larger force......with 4 PLs!

 

[Raven22]

Structure of 2 RAR.
Had a quick flick through a defence rag at the newsagent today.
Had a short article about the re structure of 2 RAR.
4 infantry platoons.
1 Recon/Sniper PL.
A Sig PL
Small boat PL
DFSW PL.

So a rifle coy +, and a support coy - plus an HQ.

Kinda sounds like reserve commando company, and I'm guessing their role will eventually be more of a marine commando than marine infantry. Anyone have more insight?

Not sure what to think really....Just read a couple of blogs about the restructure, and to me at least, it seems that 2RAR will be somewhere between a training aid,recon force,and a suicide squad.
One of the roles given is to secure beachheads and LZ,s for a larger force......with 4 PLs!

2 RAR is structure day to only provide specialist amphibious capabilities, such as the pre-landing force. The ground combat element will come from the ready brigade as required. The online ARE will be from the Ready Battle Group, on a rotating basis.

Essentially 2RAR is the skeleton on which the ARE/ARU/ARG will be built.

 

[ADMk2]

Structure of 2 RAR.
Had a quick flick through a defence rag at the newsagent today.
Had a short article about the re structure of 2 RAR.
4 infantry platoons.
1 Recon/Sniper PL.
A Sig PL
Small boat PL
DFSW PL.

So a rifle coy +, and a support coy - plus an HQ.

Kinda sounds like reserve commando company, and I'm guessing their role will eventually be more of a marine commando than marine infantry. Anyone have more insight?

Not sure what to think really....Just read a couple of blogs about the restructure, and to me at least, it seems that 2RAR will be somewhere between a training aid,recon force,and a suicide squad.
One of the roles given is to secure beachheads and LZ,s for a larger force......with 4 PLs!

Only after it has been cleared by SOCOMD operations...

No-one in Army is planning for us to seize beach heads with four platoons... Their role is to secure the entry point and enable the ARE to safely make it to shore, not fight through any enemy defensive positions. That isn’t the style of amphibious operations we are planning on conducting.

 

[old faithful]

2RAR will be called 2RAR (Amphib) - CONTACT magazine

I figured that, as 4 PL would be stretched to secure a big LZ alone.
Based on some of the comments from the above link, CO of 2RAR.

There is mention of integrating reserves in the structure.

 

[Raven22]

2RAR will be called 2RAR (Amphib) - CONTACT magazine

I figured that, as 4 PL would be stretched to secure a big LZ alone.
Based on some of the comments from the above link, CO of 2RAR.

There is mention of integrating reserves in the structure.

As AD mentioned, the whole point of the amphib capability is to land your forces where the enemy aren’t.

The reserve companies are basically just a Way for 2 RAR to practice being a battalion, without any permanent rifle companies. The reserves won’t be part of the amphib capability, but basically a training aid.

I’ve seen the planning that’s gone into that aspiration - I can’t see it working very well.

 

[old faithful]

As AD mentioned, the whole point of the amphib capability is to land your forces where the enemy aren’t.

The reserve companies are basically just a Way for 2 RAR to practice being a battalion, without any permanent rifle companies. The reserves won’t be part of the amphib capability, but basically a training aid.

I’ve seen the planning that’s gone into that aspiration - I can’t see it working very well.

Its OK AD and Raven, I get it.
I totally understand about hot DZ,s and apply similar thinking to amphib operations.
Just reading about 2 RAR , and its roll, revised roll, and now revised,revised roll, I can't help but think that resources could be used else where, and a special training cardre be raised in its place, with a demo PL, and training staff for all areas of amphib operations. Call a spade a spade.

 

[ADMk2]

Its OK AD and Raven, I get it.
I totally understand about hot DZ,s and apply similar thinking to amphib operations.
Just reading about 2 RAR , and its roll, revised roll, and now revised,revised roll, I can't help but think that resources could be used else where, and a special training cardre be raised in its place, with a demo PL, and training staff for all areas of amphib operations. Call a spade a spade.

Except 2RAR Amphib actually has an operational role to perform, which your proposed idea would not...

Don’t get me wrong, I don’t think this idea is perfect and clearly neither does Raven as he has already suggested he doesn’t think the reserve company rotation is well thought through.

The fact that our regular army is so tiny that we can’t even assign a full battalion to this role when they bang on to our Army pivoting to being an amphibious force, is a disgrace and our politicians and ADF Head Sheds should hang their heads in shame over this.

 

[old faithful]

I agree.
But 4 PL and a smallish support and admin company, is not much of an operational unit, unless they become very specialised, I.e a marine commando type unit, with bubble blowers etc, but suggesting that it will be a this as well as that unit, is pretty poor.
We have ATM, a very mobile defence force with the 2 LHD,s and Choules, add 8 C17,s and the hercs, and we can move a brigade very quickly.
Trouble is, as always has been, we would have trouble getting a full strength,equipped and trained brigade up and ready, which is again, a disgrace.
When I was in 3 RAR, at one stage, about 89, we were 2 rifle companies and support/admin company strong. C Coy had been reduced to "Hagar PL" with a strength of about 40.
That was during the Hawke/ Keating years, and I havnt voted Labor since.....mind you the current lot of Libs arnt much better.....

 

[ADMk2]

I agree.
But 4 PL and a smallish support and admin company, is not much of an operational unit, unless they become very specialised, I.e a marine commando type unit, with bubble blowers etc, but suggesting that it will be a this as well as that unit, is pretty poor.
We have ATM, a very mobile defence force with the 2 LHD,s and Choules, add 8 C17,s and the hercs, and we can move a brigade very quickly.
Trouble is, as always has been, we would have trouble getting a full strength,equipped and trained brigade up and ready, which is again, a disgrace.
When I was in 3 RAR, at one stage, about 89, we were 2 rifle companies and support/admin company strong. C Coy had been reduced to "Hagar PL" with a strength of about 40.
That was during the Hawke/ Keating years, and I havnt voted Labor since.....mind you the current lot of Libs arnt much better.....

They are becoming specialised with a range of course directly related to the Amphib role and in future riverine warfare skills, but that will take time to roll out.

Beersheba is the attempt to get 3 like Brigades up to a reasonable strength so we can deploy a Brigade and sustain it long term, which will be the first time in a long time we will have had such a capability.

Again, a disgrace that an Army with a regular force of 30,000 + positions has taken so long to organise itself that only now is it getting close to meeting the strategic direction placed upon it 17 years ago under WP2000...

Ie: Deploying a Brigade sustainably for the long term as required, and a separate battalion group to another AO at the same time.

 

[Raven22]

Again, a disgrace that an Army with a regular force of 30,000 + positions has taken so long to organise itself that only now is it getting close to meeting the strategic direction placed upon it 17 years ago under WP2000...

Ie: Deploying a Brigade sustainably for the long term as required, and a separate battalion group to another AO at the same time.

I don’t think that’s fair. The Army has been able to maintain that strategic direction for a long, long time. Ten years ago we had the equivalent of a brigade deployed on ops continually (a battlegroup and a combat team in Iraq, a battle group in Afghanistan, a battlegroup in Timor and a combat team in the solomons), plus the RBG ready to go the whole time (which, with HQ 3 Bde, was able to deploy overnight to Timor in 2006).

Plus, strategic direction has never actually been a brigade and a battlegroup, it has been a major and a minor deployment. The Army chooses to read that as a brigade and a battlegroup, but it’s not quantified anywhere.

 

[old faithful]

One thing I have learned since leaving the Army , is Australians, are actually pretty bad managers in big organizations.
I worked for Halliburton, under Scots and Yanks, they could organise "stuff" and manage staff pretty well. Not always popular, but got it done, also worked for a Brit company who were also very good managers. Now in Australian public service, and management is soooo frustratingly bad. The NT managers were replaced by interstates, NSW,QLD and SA.....just as bad, in fact worse than what we had!
It shows in our lack of leadership at our federal political level as well. Just bad, with not much talent coming through.....

 

[Raven22]

Trouble is, as always has been, we would have trouble getting a full strength,equipped and trained brigade up and ready, which is again, a disgrace.

This is nonsense. The entire army is organised around this very thing. Right now you have the entire 3rd brigade, plus enablers from the other three brigades, sitting on their packs ready to go, at full strength, fully equipped and fully trained (less those actually deployed to Iraq, Afghanistan, the Phillipines and elsewhere).

The 7th brigade is in the process of becoming full strength, fully equipped and fully trained, so they can become the ready brigade in July next year.

 

[old faithful]

Well I'm glad to hear its nonsense.
Things have changed for the better then.

Based on 1RAR,s deployment to Somalia. 1 RAR was the ODF bn at the time. Borrowed a Rifle Coy worth of troops from 2/4 to bring them up to strength.
I had imagined that a brigade would need to borrow at least that many troops to bring them to full strength.

 

[Takao]

This is nonsense. The entire army is organised around this very thing. Right now you have the entire 3rd brigade, plus enablers from the other three brigades, sitting on their packs ready to go, at full strength, fully equipped and fully trained (less those actually deployed to Iraq, Afghanistan, the Phillipines and elsewhere).

The 7th brigade is in the process of becoming full strength, fully equipped and fully trained, so they can become the ready brigade in July next year.

It is not complete nonsense Army has attempted to do this; but for a significant or extended deployment then things would start to fall apart quickly. This is aggravated for any significant combat operations - noting that it is arguable we haven't done that since Vietnam. And note that doctrinally the Ready Bde is not full strength (Readying is meant to be) while reality-wise I'm not sure we have generated a regular Bde to 100%, let alone a reinforced one.

Some questions that Beersheba ignored: Where are the second rotation of enablers coming from? Third? What happens if we start to take casualties? Pers wise there are significant number of limited trades. Platform-wise, the Army is a joke. We have no acceptable attrition reserves for our major platforms. Where are the operational and strategic level logistics? Operational level fires, intelligence or engineers? What happens in a higher level of conflict, when our underskilling and equipping of our armoured forces kick in?

I think that, in the fullness of time, Beersheba will not be seen well.

 

[ADMk2]

I don’t think that’s fair. The Army has been able to maintain that strategic direction for a long, long time. Ten years ago we had the equivalent of a brigade deployed on ops continually (a battlegroup and a combat team in Iraq, a battle group in Afghanistan, a battlegroup in Timor and a combat team in the solomons), plus the RBG ready to go the whole time (which, with HQ 3 Bde, was able to deploy overnight to Timor in 2006).

Plus, strategic direction has never actually been a brigade and a battlegroup, it has been a major and a minor deployment. The Army chooses to read that as a brigade and a battlegroup, but it’s not quantified anywhere.

How? And if so why did they need to create Plan Beersheba?

The strategic direction given to Army was under Section 8.14 of the Defence White Paper 2000, specifically ‘The Government plans to structure the Army to ensure we will be able to sustain a Brigade deployed on operations for extended periods, and at the same time maintain at least a battalion group available for deployment elsewhere.’ (Page 80).

Since they now realise they require 3 like Brigades simply to meet the deployable Brigade requirement from a sustainability point of view, how does this structure cater for the extra battalion group? Are SOCOMD now expected to provide this as well as all their other roles?

Further as mentioned below, where are the enablers to support such deployments? Being structured is all well and good but not particularly practical if you can’t logistically do it as you simply don’t have the breadth of capability needed.

Which is why I stated my earlier view. It seems to me that push back is needed on the Army chain of command as to why they still can’t organise and equip our land forces to meet the stategic requirements, they are charged with meeting...

 

[Massive]

how does this structure cater for the extra battalion group?

My understanding was that the Beersheba brigades can each generate 3 - battalion sized battlegroups. 2 battlegroups = the brigade requirement, 1 = the battalion.

Battlegroup might look like:

1 Cav squadron
2 Infantry companies
1 Artillery battery
Various support elements.

Not perfect but trying to meet the requirement within a 30k manning cap.

Very happy to be corrected though.

Massive