Without a pun being intended 'noises' is the issue. Volk has already told us the RAN wanted the RN Type 23 for its ANZAC solution and whilst the Spanish know how to build warships I am not sure they know how to make the F-5000 'noises' anywhere close to what the RN have specified for the Type 26. Unless the F-5000 can be made significantly quieter it will be submarine target practice in the region where submarines fleets are increasing all the time.
Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates
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The RAN did NOT want the T23. The down select to the final two (Meko and M) was by an RAN team and agreed by the RAN heirachy That’s not to say individual RAN officers didn’t want it; but we had 4 becoming 6 good ASW ships in the FFG7s and the requirement was for a second tier, patrol frigate. Both M and Meko were better fits to that requirement in the view of those who assessed the offers and those who approved their assessments. Any other view is, quite frankly, a perversion of history.
OK forgetting the ANZAC class choices I still worry that the F-5000 maybe too noisy for vessels that will still be built >20 years from now. Many in this forum seem fixated on ABM defence - but forget what lurks in the deep:shudder
Hi John
A good over view for the future.
Something you highlight is the number of single hangar ships in the fleet for the next decade plus. As we discuss the pros and cons of the winner of the future frigate it's a nice reminder that the ANZAC class will still be a workhorse for the RAN for many years to come. In this context it will be important to continually upgrade and improve this class of ship within the limits of its size/weight to maintain it's capability for the years ahead.........
I also feel it import to get the fleets destroyer / Frigate force to a level of twelve vessels ASAP. If the FFG's are to be retired soon then at least keep the ANZAC class in service until the second of the new destroyers enters service before retiring the First ANZAC.
Regarding aviation, well I guess we can always have more of any bit of kit.
My personal view is that three extra Romeos would be an appropriate addition and certainly helicopter numbers for logistics is on the shy side. The Taipan fleet is here to stay and the aircraft's internal volume is certainly a plus. Any extra numbers for this platform will be determined by a holistic look of both Army / Navy.requirements.
Add to the mix the helicopter/UAV capability of the new OPV ( Or lack of ) and numbers start to get complicated.
Is there a place for a smaller HATS sized basic helicopter for both Army and Navy?
The role of UAV's, and also how will the RAN utilise the Canberra class outside of it's amphibious role.......... A lot to take on board.
Anyway a lot to consider and yet a lot to be positive about regarding forward momentum for the RAN.
Regards S
John Newman
The Bunker Group
Hi Mate, there is a lot to be positive about, its not all going to happen tomorrow, it's all going to take time, but as long as the plan that is currently in place is continued by successive Governments and funding levels are maintained, Navy and Defence generally is in a pretty good position.
As to the phase in, phase out, of various classes of ships, currently we actually have 12 Destroyer/Frigates in commission, 1 x AWD, 3 x FFG and 8 x FFH (I think Darwin is planned to decommission by end of year, bringing the fleet back to 11 again).
But as I said in my previous post, I believe that the last two FFG's will be gone by 2020, which will coincide with the 3rd AWD's commissioning, leaving the RAN with 11 Destroyer/Frigates for a fair period of the 2020's, probably a bit after the mid 2020's too.
As to when the RAN will have a 'permanent' force 12 Destroyer/Frigates in commission, that's something that not overly clear, will it be the 'norm' that as a new ship commissions, will it be timed with the retirement of one of the previous class? If that is the case, it will be 2038 before the 'ninth' Frigate commissions.
Depending on funding (and manpower), there is the potential to not start retiring the first of the Anzac's until the 'second' of the Future Frigates enters service for example, that process would allow for a 12 ship fleet of Destroyer/Frigates to happen sooner than later, certainly a decade or so before that ninth Frigate commissions in 2038.
As far as Anzac class upgrades, a further round of upgrades is about to commence:
$148m CEAFAR upgrades for Anzacs
With Future Frigate construction starting in 2020 (which is a couple of years earlier than originally planned many years ago), there are probably not too many reason why the first of Anzac's can't say in commission a few years longer, allowing a fleet of 12 to be a reality sooner.
As to naval aviation, helicopters and UAV's, there certainly are a number of "what if's" to contemplate.
You mentioned an extra 'three' Romeos, I find it hard to put an actual 'number' on it, (wouldn't say no to a few extra), but I still struggle to see that happening, especially much larger numbers of Romeos.
As far as a larger number of utility airframes, that is something I said earlier I believe should happen, and yes, I think Taipan is here to stay too.
Originally the 'split' for Army and Navy with the 46 (now 47) Taipan fleet, was 40 Army and 6 Navy, in the 2016 DIPP the split was rebalanced to a degree, the DIIP stated Army would have the use of 39-41 airframes and Navy 6-8 airframes out of the shared pool of the eventual 47, so there is an increased 'availability' of two extra airframes for the RAN.
The other interesting thing to watch would be if and I say 'if' Government decided to procure a number of Blackhawks for the Special Forces (in conjunction with a fleet of Little Birds or instead of).
If such a thing was to happen, then Army would have a larger pool of Taipan available for utility/troop lift (non Special Forces work), that could open up the door to a further 'rebalance' of the shared Army/Navy pool of Taipan airframes and allow Navy to increase it's utility fleet beyond the 6-8 mentioned in the DIIP.
Anyway, that is an 'if', but an interesting 'if' to look out for if the Special Forces did obtain a new Blackhawk fleet to use.
As to an increased fleet of LUH (such as the 15 HATS EC135 airframes), I certainly see that is something that is missing from current plans, Army and Navy has/had a much larger combined fleet of both Kiowa and Squirrel airframes for not only training but also utility work too.
That is something that I believe is missing from the mix, I can't see that the 15 EC135's procured for HATS will perform any role other than being 1000% dedicated to that primary training role.
Lastly UAV's, I can certainly see over the coming years and decades, a number of different types for a whole range of roles being introduced, too many possibilities to go into detail.
Cheers,
The Mini Type 23 was in the final three because of the RANs very high regard for the base Type 23 design, which the RAN had been interested in as a direct replacement for the River Class before the adoption of the Dibb recommendations. From memory the concerns regarding the Mini Type 23 related to the compromises involved in reducing its size and cost as well as the preference for in-service major systems, i.e. the LM2500.
Just because you haven't heard it doesn't make it a untrue let alone a perversion of history. The short listing of the Mini Type 23 was covered in technical media at the time, such as Pacific Defence Reporter (now APDR) and undoubtedly will be covered in some detail in cabinet papers.
On the four becoming six FFGs, this was the Australian Frigate Project that resulted in the recapitalisation and privatisation of Williamstown Naval Dockyards. Interestingly the Dutch M Class was considered/short listed for this project but sensibly the FFG-07 (in the same baseline as HMAS Darwin) was selected. What became the ANZAC class patrol frigate was meant to have been a smaller number of high end ASW platforms, possibly of the same design selected for the AFP. Procurements' can be very long and convoluted with many changes in requirements along the way, the final outcome, let alone snapshots along the way are only ever a small part of the story.
BAE have done an excellent job in "selling" the T26 as being the "best in the world" ASW platform however the RN is a serial offender in hyperbole. It may be acoustically superior in some respects to the other two contenders, unproven as yet, but if it is it's not a critical factor.
ASW escorts rarely if ever find submarines, fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft and other submarines do that, if first contact is gained by a surface escort the game is over.
Ship designs evolve quite slowly, the ABs are 30 years old and evolving, the AWDs have an evolving pathway through the F 5000 and the FREMMs are being considered by the USN with a similar propulsion system to the Hobarts both of which are very good ASW platforms.
The "noise" or lack thereof in the T26 should not and will not be a critical factor in the final,selection although and it's worth noting that the ASW sensors in all three will be almost identical.
Very true. I believe a recent edition of AA outlined that a baseline LHD with four Romeo's and no changes to its configuration, was a more effective ASW platform than either a Hobart or a Flight IIA Burke, purely down to the capability to surge multiple Romeos. The Burke was next most effective and the Hobart a sorry last.
My understanding is helicopters work best in pairs (or more) and the minimum number of airframes you need to deploy to make two available to sortie at any time is five (plus a spare in the event of damage or loss of one of the five). Very sobering.
That said ABM is an entirely different matter that helicopters and UAVs, no matter their numbers have no bearing on. I find it interesting that the AWD / ABM plus ASW concept for SEA1000 that scored a resounding no from Denis Richardson, is now the way things are going. Very interesting times.
John Newman
The Bunker Group
V, I read that a while ago too, its an ASPI Strategist article:
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/simulating-anti-submarine-warfare/
A word of caution though, the simulation was performed using a computer game:
Matrix Games - Command: Modern Air Naval Operations Wargame of the Year Edition
How realistic the result are, well I suppose that is open to debate.
Cheers,
Certainly, extra helicopters in the short term won't be all that beneficial ... but it seems to me that the quickest and easiest upgrade you can make to an OPV is to whack a helicopter on the back. Current plans seem to be just to operate small UAVs off these vessels ... but from what I have read this seems to be only considered an interim capability. Larger more capable UAVs are being sought for the new frigates so it is possible that they may ultimately opt for larger UAVs for the OPVs as well.
Schiebel counting down to CAMCOPTER S-100 delivery to RAN | Australian Aviation
I take your point that the new frigates will probably only operate one manned helicopter. I believe the USN is planning to use the MH-60R and Fire Scouts in tandem.
Of course helicopters aren't the only option. AUVs and ROVs may yet prove to be even more effective ASW weapons.
Thanks John, very interesting, I hadn't actually read the ASPI original before and must have read a synopsis.
The results actually do ring true as they correlate with the conops of various medium sized navies, especially Italy and Japan. There is actually a very detailed paper by a retired Japanese admiral I linked on this topic several years ago. The word from the horses mouth (serving submarine officers) the biggest threat to any submarine is helicopters with dunking sonar.
I needed to neither hear about it nor read about it, I was involved in it. And, although it was 30 years ago (this month I think) my memory hasn’t completely failed yet! Yes the mini T23 was in the last 3, but it was eliminated before the final offers were considered.
And yes, the last two FFGs were the AFP, and were well underway by the time the ANZAC Project was approaching the decision point.
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
On the site, it listed a max range of 12,500 m, but I suspect that is the max range a projectile could travel, as opposed to the max effective range. The difference being similar to the effective range of a rifle chambered for 5.56 mm NATO being 300 m - 400 m, but the round still being potentially lethal out past 1 km. I would be more interested in the max effective range of the gun, as well as how capable the gun is as dual-use weapon. The 35 mm Millenium Gun for example can act as a CIWS against both fast moving aerial targets like supersonic AShM, as well as against FIAC.
I also noted that the weapon is a BAE gun. BAE has in the past been somewhat less than accurate/honest with reporting the capabilities of their gun systems. The 57 mm Mk 110 gun comes to mind, with a claimed ROF of 200 rpm IIRC. The reality as I remember it, is the ROF was derived by determining how many rounds the gun could fire in 15 seconds, then multiplying that by four to get a full minute. The reality (again, as I recall it) was that all ready to fire rounds would be exhausted after about 40 seconds of fire. After that, the various ammo bustles in the gun would need to be reloaded from the magazine.
I was smarting from "the perversion of history" thing as I read your comment as suggesting that I had posted a falsehood when I know very well the mini 23 was in the final three.
I wasn't there for the ANZAC selection but when working on later projects I made very sure to listen to and learn everything I could from those who had been there before. For example I was surprised at the consensus among operators and maintainers that the FFG-07s, a much maligned design in the media through most of its life and even among old school navy of my fathers generation, has actually proven far better value for money than the ANZACs, have many features lacking in the ANZACs that navy wanted / demanded in the Hobarts, and currently are cheaper to sustain.
As a procurement of a patrol frigate there is nothing to fault with the selection of the MEKO200ANZ. Decisions by successive governments to delay the replacement of the DDGs and upgrade instead of replacing the first four FFGs (along with the much newer Melbourne and Newcastle) with a suitable design led to the class having to step up into a role they were never intended to fill as well as a much higher operational tempo.
The irony is, had there been no plans to maintain a large first tier of skimmers, the procurement of a full blown ASW frigate likely would have continued instead of a patrol frigate.
John Newman
The Bunker Group
V, I don't think there is any doubt that the more ASW helicopter assets available on a ship, or group of ships, is anything but positive, but it's still many years away yet before the RAN has sufficient two hangar ships available for service.
Which does bring me to an interesting question, I wonder how much 'reconfiguration' of the hangar area of the AWD is required to turn it into a twin hangar on the F5000.
The most obvious 'external' change is installing two hangar doors, I would imagine that a dual RAST system would need to be installed to the flight deck.
But the big unknown, for me, is what equipment or machinery would have to be 'relocated' from the single hangar area to allow for a twin hangar.
Is there equipment in the hangar area that has to be relocated elsewhere on the ship?
Sorry, certainly didn’t mean it that way! I was trying to scotch a view that might have gained ground from SteveRs post that we had somehow been done out of what we really wanted for the patrol frigate. Had the requirement been more ASW oriented the outcome might have been different.
The hangar is very tight, needed to be modified to fit the Romeo let alone the NH90. A second helicopter will result in a major rearrangement of the F-100 design as it is already tight without much margin, I am not sure if it can be done without either an increase in volume or compromises elsewhere. Similar situation with power generation etc. the design needs more but where to put the extra / larger generators needed for it?
As an aside, one of the killers for the Baby Burke / G&C International Frigate was the scope creep related to incorporating the RANs evolving requirements resulted in it growing to almost AB Flight IIA size and being a new design probably more expensive. This is why Navantia were not allowed to make the changes they desired to better meet the RANs requirements, the concern over scope creep meant they were very much the existing design whether they met all the requirements or not.
I need to clarify the scenario in the ASPI comparison game for the benefit of fairness to the AWD platform in case members start bagging the AWD ASW capability.
The game compares a hull and varying number of dipping helos and the results reflect the tactical advantage of multiple helos, not the specific virtues of the platforms.
Exactly, its not the platform that matters but the capability, platforms are a life support and transportation system for the sensors, weapons and trained personnel who deliver the actual effect.
An interesting point on helo numbers on a platform is that the support overheads in trained technical personnel required for two helicopters do not differ much from that required for six helos. What is needed is the space and weight to operate them on a single platform, even if they are lily padded to skimmers, including OPVs.
No problem, its school holidays and I am always more stressed and quicker to bight then.
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