I should point out that the reason the F100 was selected for the AWD program was because it was seen as lower cost, lower risk was a consideration too because risk was seen to have an effect on cost and schedule. By selecting the F100 the government planned to build "to print" thereby avoiding the need to worry about building either a design (engineering) or build assurance (quality control) capability and therefore the associated costs and schedule impacts.
The irony is of course, by selecting a green fields shipyard, a designer who had never supported an overseas build before, and a design from a navy we had never had close relationships with, that also did not fully meet the RANs requirements, a robust engineering design, design review and build assurance capability became a must. This meant that the original assumptions that a number functions (if done at all) could be conducted by an individual, or a very small team of people who basically accepted deliveries of accurate, complete, proven and above all ready to go design data were completely wrong.
Literally every function that the government assumed wouldn't be needed, or could be done by small teams of "clerical" engineers, or even by individuals wearing multiple hats, was found to be a show stopper. After having just laid off the majority of the cadre of experienced designers and shipbuilders who would have been necessary for the G&C, not so baby anymore, Burke, new people had to be headhunted and teams formed on the run to fix problems that the government never anticipated would be encountered. This actually caused significant delay and cost increase before any of the build issues relating to design data quality or sub contractors happened, the project had been deliberately cut back to run on a shoestring prior to the critical design review as the CDR itself identified that the build would not work without reconstitution of design and build assurance functions.
Had for instance the G&C, or even an AEGIS evolution of the Type 45 or Type 124 been selected, full design and build assurance functions would have been a must, problems and design, even supply chain and contractor issues would have been assumed to be a certainty and allowed for in the budget and schedule while concurrently being mitigated against. The teams and eventually entire departments that had to be formed in the remediation of the actual program would have already been in place and instead of having to be grown would have instead shrunk as each project stage was validated. More would have been spent up front but overall project costs would have been lower than budgeted for.
The sad thing is the experienced shipbuilders, both local and from overseas (in particular from BIW, ASCs build partner, and ABS experts Raytheon hired in) were warning what could/would happen. Unfortunately government chose to listen to the commercial experts who told them that building to print, using an existing design, existing overseas supply chain, and qualified and experienced local subcontractors would be cheap and risk free, especially if ASCs role and capacity were strictly limited by not making them the prime.
This is why I cringe every time someone makes the point that there is 70% commonality, its an existing design, existing supply chain etc. These are just excuses the usual suspects with use to cut corners, make necessary people in critical functions redundant and repeat all the mistakes from the past.
