Australian Army Discussions and Updates

[Volkodav]

Maybe, but with a weight of 70 tonne and no commonality with a Phase 2 vehicle, I think Namer will struggle.

True, it would need a turret integrated as well, I suppose it will come down to the governments risk appetite. Then again the selection of the Shortfin Barracuda caught us all off guard.

Whatever way it goes I envy you the exciting times ahead, its a great time to be RAAC, this is the stuff we used to discuss in the mess but never thought would happen.

 

[Ballistic]

My money is certainly now on a Boxer/Lynx combo. The probable reduction in numbers for the Phase 3 vehicle based on smaller infantry platoons and 8 man lift will help make it affordable.

I will make a wild assed guess that the armoured force > 2025 will consist of 82 M1A2 SEP V3s, 45 M1 based engineering vehicles in three variants, 225 Boxer and 375 Lynx. If we're all still around in a decade we'll see if I'm right.

What is the thinking with regards to platoon size reduction, and why? Is it simply for reduced costs and manning requirements? Or is platoon design unworkable for some reason? Would this not dramatically reduce the firepower of the platoon, or would this be offset by new weapon systems within the smaller platoon?

If platoons are reduced in size, how big would they be? 28, 32? Could this not be an opportunity to buy enough IFV's across the ACR's to increase lift? Or is that just crazy talk on my part?

 

[Raven22]

The reason for the reduction is to save manpower. More warm bodies are needed to man new capabilities (GBAD, HIMARS, under armour breaching, cyber etc), which means existing manpower has to be reduced as offset. Considering that infantry has one of the lowest training bills, is the easiest to grow, and the easiest to supplement from the reserve, a lot of that offset manpower is going to come from the infantry establishment.

One result is the infantry platoon will shrink. A first step is the platoon's will lose the third fire team from the manoeuvre support section (ie, lose four blokes per platoon) and, pending further analysis, may shrink more. One mooted possibility is the rifle company will return to an orbat very similar to the pre-MIB orbat, with eight man sections per platoon and a single 12 man MSS per company.

This has the obvious second order effect of reducing the number of LAND400 vehicles (and hence crew) needed to lift the platoon/company.

The 450 vehicle BOP of the IFV was based off 40 man platoons and vehicles that could lift only six dismounts. Hence eight vehicles, and 24 crew, were needed to lift the platoon. With an IFV able to lift eight dismounts, this can be reduced to six vehicles (and 18 crew). Reduce the platoon by a single fire team, and you only need five vehicles (and 15 crew) to lift them. Remove the MSS completely, and you only need four vehicles per platoon (although you will also need two extra at company level for the MSS).

So, by stipulating an IFV with eight dismount capacity and reducing the platoon by a single fire team, you save 36 infantry posns per battalion, as well 27 vehicles and 81 crew per lift squadron. Plus extra savings in the training/maintenance pipeline as well obviously.

Considering the affordability of a full-spec IFV was questionable with the original BOP, reducing the number of vehicles should make that shiny new Lynx IFV affordable. The saved manpower can be reinvested anywhere army desires

 

[Ballistic]

Interesting, thanks so much Raven, really appreciate your insight!

I'm getting the feeling this is more to do with govt unwilling to spend more on increasing the end strength of the regular Army in general? Is the personnel cap driven by budget or something else? This seems like a "robbing Peter to pay Paul" scenario...

Surely with the increasing population, regional and general security instability, and growing defence budget, a personnel increase will need to occur at some stage.

Anyways, slightly off-topic from the discussion at hand, apologies.

 

[Raven22]

It is a bit of Peter/Paul situation. The government did provide an extra 1500 positions for army as part of the White a Paper, but that wasn't even enough to end the current hollowness, let alone allow expansion into new capabilities. While, of course, more manpower would always be welcome, the need to manage the manpower bill as efficiently as possible will never go away. Essentially, what is happening is rebalancing of manpower away from the easy to generate combat force towards the combat support force. The reserve will then be expected to generate more forces to provide more 'combat mass' when required. It's actually a pretty mature and forward thinking process, which is a nice change.

 

[Ballistic]

It is a bit of Peter/Paul situation. The government did provide an extra 1500 positions for army as part of the White a Paper, but that wasn't even enough to end the current hollowness, let alone allow expansion into new capabilities. While, of course, more manpower would always be welcome, the need to manage the manpower bill as efficiently as possible will never go away. Essentially, what is happening is rebalancing of manpower away from the easy to generate combat force towards the combat support force. The reserve will then be expected to generate more forces to provide more 'combat mass' when required. It's actually a pretty mature and forward thinking process, which is a nice change.

So the Reserve is actually going to be more of a strategic reserve and actual combat capability than it ever has been? Sounds good, I like that. When I've finished my degree, I might think about re-applying for the Army (Reserve this time though).

When you say 'combat mass' in regards to the Reserves, do you mean the Reserve Battle Group integration with the online brigade?

While I think it's a shame that combat capability is being 'cut' somewhat, I can see the reasoning behind it, and if the issues within support can be mitigated by realigning personnel into other roles, I guess that is a reduction worth undertaking.

I guess we shouldn't get our hopes up for that much imagined fourth brigade...

 

[alexsa]

Well that's a relief. The other two never struck me as being serious options capability wise. You'd have to think that this also makes CV90 and Lynx the front runners for phase 3 now more than ever. I'm hoping we can make the German offerings work - they seem tremendously capable.

Even better if they take up the option of the 35mm on one of them (or both) as this can be fitted with little change to the turret.

 

[Boagrius]

Even better if they take up the option of the 35mm on one of them (or both) as this can be fitted with little change to the turret.

Absolutely. Really promising for the Army who have drawn the short straw on procurement for a while now.

 

[Raven22]

So the Reserve is actually going to be more of a strategic reserve and actual combat capability than it ever has been? Sounds good, I like that. When I've finished my degree, I might think about re-applying for the Army (Reserve this time though).

When you say 'combat mass' in regards to the Reserves, do you mean the Reserve Battle Group integration with the online brigade?

While I think it's a shame that combat capability is being 'cut' somewhat, I can see the reasoning behind it, and if the issues within support can be mitigated by realigning personnel into other roles, I guess that is a reduction worth undertaking.

I guess we shouldn't get our hopes up for that much imagined fourth brigade...

Actually the reserve is moving from being a defacto strategic reserve (despite that not being a directed aim since at least the '80s) to an operational reserve, ie one expected to contribute to day to day operational outcomes, and not just wait for the 'big one'. This is very much a good thing, as when the reserve isn't expected to contribute outside of world war 3, it's very easy to justify a lack of resources, equipment and training. You can't get away with that if you expect them to be able to contribute to ongoing operations.

It won't be all beer and skittles however, as it means that the reserve will be very much tied to the force generation cycle for resources. This will mean that those fmns/units in the readying cycle will get lots of resources for training opportunities, those in ready will get some, but those in reset won't get much at all. It will mean there will be lots of reserve soldiers out there not doing much training for long periods of time, the impact of which is yet to be discovered.

As to how the reserve is contributing, there are lots of different ways. There is the reinforcing battlegroup, which was just tested on Ex Hamel with three combat teams. This will be raised each year as part of the force gen cycle and be certified with the ready brigade, and be kept on a reduced NTM during the ready (albeit, much longer the the ARA).

There will also be a liberal amount of directed gap filling of ARA units, where manning caps have left holes in ARA capabilities. A good example of this is recon scouts for the ACR. The reserve will train up a troop of scouts each year, which will be integrated with the ARA ACR for Ex Hamel, and then be able to be called on during he ready year (again, at a longer NTM than the ARA). Similar things will be happening with engineers and gun regiments and CSS units.

Another way the reserve will contribute (at least in theory - it may never be tested) is by replacing ARA subunits on extended deployments. Analysis has shown that the current Beersheeba brigade doesn't have enough combat mass for success during a large contingency (essentially it only has seven manoeuvre sub units, it really needs nine for three full battlegroups). What will likely happen for the first rotation for a large contingency, is that the ready brigade will steal from the reset brigade to make up this necessary combat mass. The reserve will the be expected to fill these gaps for subsequent rotations (ie, will have 12-24 months to train up to the required standard.) Sounds good in theory, the practical application may be difficult without formal mobilisation (a 'call up', not merely a 'call for').

It's also a bit unfair to say that combat capability is being cut, as these changes are designed to increase combat capability. All that is happening is a rebalancing of personnel away from the manoeuvre forces towards the combat support force. Total manpower is still growing, not shrinking, it's just not going to grow as large in some areas as others. For example, there will still be a third tank squadron raised, which takes about an extra hundred personnel, and even under the best case the lift squadron will have to grow by >40 personnel when Land400 comes online. However, all those new capabilities have to be manned as well. The army is trying to build an army for the next war, and not the last one, which is a nice change.

 

[Joe Black]

Just out of curiosity, Rheinmetall's Lynx seems to be running rubber tracks rather than metal. I know the tactical advantage is that they are quieter. But in real life, how would this work? What happens when the tracks run over IED or mines and break. How do you replace the tracks? Can they be replaced like the metal ones with segments, links, etc. Or do the entire rubber tracks need to be replaced?

 

[Bluey 006]

Just out of curiosity, Rheinmetall's Lynx seems to be running rubber tracks rather than metal. I know the tactical advantage is that they are quieter. But in real life, how would this work? What happens when the tracks run over IED or mines and break. How do you replace the tracks? Can they be replaced like the metal ones with segments, links, etc. Or do the entire rubber tracks need to be replaced?

I think you'll find that the KF41 (8 dismount version) has steel tracks due to its weight. Only the KF31 has rubber tracks.

 

[blueorchid]

Just out of curiosity, Rheinmetall's Lynx seems to be running rubber tracks rather than metal. I know the tactical advantage is that they are quieter. But in real life, how would this work? What happens when the tracks run over IED or mines and break. How do you replace the tracks? Can they be replaced like the metal ones with segments, links, etc. Or do the entire rubber tracks need to be replaced?

The rubber tracks are in one meter sections for easy replacement.

Cheers

 

[Waylander]

The selection of the AMV35 and Boxer look like the decision makers emphasize the right priorities, namely protection and growth potential in combination with proven systems.

Although there are always proponents of the light cavalry ethos who are sceptical of heavier but better protected vehicles the conflicts since WWII have shown that everybody rushes to add protection to existing AFVs once the fighting starts. As of lately this has been the case in Iraq, Afghanistan, Ukraine and Syria.

So in the end a high baseline protection and good growth potential are IMHO essential for a futureproof vehicle.

Let's face it. Lots of future missions won't be about running around the countryside on a classical cavalry mission like recce or screening but about driving around on some godforsaken COIN operation with tight ROEs and getting shot at and blown up on a regular basis.

Naturally I cross my fingers for Rheinmetall. It was after all my taxpayer money which bought the ridicilous expensive Puma while Rheinmetall leverages the development done there to offer an affordable IFV to Australia.

And if the decision makers haven't lost their minds they will select Phase 3 from the same supplier as Phase 2.

 

[MARKMILES77]

The selection of the AMV35 and Boxer look like the decision makers emphasize the right priorities, namely protection and growth potential in combination with proven systems.

Although there are always proponents of the light cavalry ethos who are sceptical of heavier but better protected vehicles the conflicts since WWII have shown that everybody rushes to add protection to existing AFVs once the fighting starts. As of lately this has been the case in Iraq, Afghanistan, Ukraine and Syria.

So in the end a high baseline protection and good growth potential are IMHO essential for a futureproof vehicle.

Let's face it. Lots of future missions won't be about running around the countryside on a classical cavalry mission like recce or screening but about driving around on some godforsaken COIN operation with tight ROEs and getting shot at and blown up on a regular basis.

Naturally I cross my fingers for Rheinmetall. It was after all my taxpayer money which bought the ridicilous expensive Puma while Rheinmetall leverages the development done there to offer an affordable IFV to Australia.

And if the decision makers haven't lost their minds they will select Phase 3 from the same supplier as Phase 2.

One thing not to forget is that a wheeled solution is not out of the question for the Phase 3 IFV. Although a tracked IFV is clearly favoured, Government has asked the manufacturers to provide information on a wheeled option for Phase 3. I am Sure Boxer or AMV 35 could perform the role and having a single fleet of 600 to 700 vehicles has advantages over two distinct types. The AMV is already made in a stretched hull version which could carry 8 dismounts while keeping the 35mm turret.
If the AMV is chosen for Phase 2 BAE has already committed to building it and the Turret in Australia. From a political point of view keeping the production line open for years extra with 400+ additional orders could prove irresistible versus the alternative of importing a tracked vehicle from overseas.

 

[Waylander]

This is something I never really understood. Phase 2 basically buys you a wheeled IFV.

It would save everybody a lot of time and money to decide up front that that's what they actually want for the whole army.

Both contenders could defenitely play that role if required. But deciding that Phase 3 will be the Phase 2 vehicle means that stuff like protection of the wheeled vehicle becomes even more importand as it has to perform as a real IFV taking emphasizis away from the recce/screening stuff.

 

[Boagrius]

Would a Boxer or AMV35 really be up to the task from a mobility and protection standpoint though? I was under the impression that the phase 3 vehicle needed to have the mobility to keep up with the Abrams with "comparable" protection levels.

I would have thought a decked out Lynx or CV90 would boast higher all around protection levels than what was possible on either of their wheeled counterparts?

 

[Raven22]

The short answer is that a wheeled IFV won't be as capable as a tracked one, but will be cheaper. If the budget for Phase 3 wont cover buying 450 tracked, turreted IFVs, what do you do? Simply buy less of them? Buy a mix of turreted and non turreted tracked vehicles? Or buy more of the wheeled Phase 2 vehicles? They are basically the options available to Army.

My preference would be to simply buy less of the most capable vehicles.

 

[Boagrius]

I would have thought the same, particularly for a fleet of vehicles very much intended to be at the pointy end of any future battlegroup. Given the wide range of contingencies they could be deployed for and the scarcity of our Abrams tanks, I could easily see them doing a lot of the "heavy lifting" (no pun intended) in future operations . For that you'd want as capable a vehicle as you can get.

If the proverbial really did hit the fan, you've then got said vehicle already integrated into the army that, worst case scenario, you can simply buy more of (?).

 

[Volkodav]

On the reduction of Infantry battalion size and number of phase 3 vehicles through cutting the size of the MSS it strikes me a possible solution could be to form an integrated reserve MS battalion with its own supporting APC Sqn or three MS coys each with a supporting APC troop, one for each brigade.

The redeployed fulltime slots could be replaced with reservists within the integrated unit and the APC used could initially be Bushmaster but later a weapon carrier derivative of either the phase 2 or 3 vehicle.

If I recall correctly the WWII reconnaissance regiments / battalions (they switched from infantry to cavalry nomenclature during the war) of the British Reconnaissance Corps had (in addition to their scout troops/platoons) anti-tank, mortar and assault troops/platoons. I don't know if it is too much of a stretch but these units served not just in reconnaissance but when required as infantry, anti-tank and support roles.

 

[Waylander]

Jup, from a tactical mobility and protection angle a wheeled IFV won't be on the same level as a reasonably heavy tracked IFV although the mobility of wheeled vehicles has improved over the years and the Boxer features conparable protection to the M2/3 Bradley for example.

I am no big fan of mixing wheeled and tracked vehicles in an armoured/mechanized formation. One may get away with putting stuff like mortars, command and ambulance modules on wheeled platforms but when the basic maneuver elements are mixed (e.g. MBTs and IFVs) one gets the disadvantages of both solutions in one formation.

And as has been said, the pointy end needs all the protection, firepower and mobility it can get. Especially with the reluctance of politicians to send MBTs overseas while IFVs seem to be ok much more often.