My prefered option would have been a stretched ANZAC, or better an evolved Type 123 Brandenburg class frigate with NTU baseline air defense systems to replace the older FFGs instead of upgrading them, following straight on from the ANZACs at Williamstown, once the OCVs had been dropped. This would have been cheaper and delivered more capability than FFGUP plus the cost overruns and blackhole related overheads on the AWD. Depending how the NTU frigate went, three Flight IIA or III Burkes could be bought from the US, built locally, or a local design could even be considered if the frigate project improved further on the success of the ANZACs.
Still would likely have gone for a steel OPV over the ACPB or at least one of the steel or composite hulled designs. in hindsight biting the bullet and going for a corvette could have been doable financially, yard capacity and manning would have been a challenge, even if achievable it would have still resulted in a black hole in the late 2010s early 2020s. The biggest issue is in the early / mid 90s manning was seen as an issue with a ramp up on training executive and engineering branch officers and technical sailors required to fill the extra specialist billets these larger more capable ships would have required, what happened instead was a gutting by successive governments. This was especially telling when older manpower intensive ships were replaced by fewer new ships with smaller crews, or not replaced at all (PERTH, HOBART, BRISBANE, ADELAIDE and CANBERRA). So during the biggest, longest boom in our history we actually reduced the size and capability of the RAN, gutting the engineering and shrinking the executive branches, as well as almost destroying our shipbuilding industry. Totally bizarre when you consider that we had both far more money than we expected to have and a more complex and challenging security situation. I don't think that any reasonable person would question, that, in hindsight, we would be much better off today if we had simply continued with the successful programs and plans we already had underway in the early to mid 90s instead of the failed restructures, politicisation and cost cutting (thatended up costing us more for less) we had instead.
Still would likely have gone for a steel OPV over the ACPB or at least one of the steel or composite hulled designs. in hindsight biting the bullet and going for a corvette could have been doable financially, yard capacity and manning would have been a challenge, even if achievable it would have still resulted in a black hole in the late 2010s early 2020s. The biggest issue is in the early / mid 90s manning was seen as an issue with a ramp up on training executive and engineering branch officers and technical sailors required to fill the extra specialist billets these larger more capable ships would have required, what happened instead was a gutting by successive governments. This was especially telling when older manpower intensive ships were replaced by fewer new ships with smaller crews, or not replaced at all (PERTH, HOBART, BRISBANE, ADELAIDE and CANBERRA). So during the biggest, longest boom in our history we actually reduced the size and capability of the RAN, gutting the engineering and shrinking the executive branches, as well as almost destroying our shipbuilding industry. Totally bizarre when you consider that we had both far more money than we expected to have and a more complex and challenging security situation. I don't think that any reasonable person would question, that, in hindsight, we would be much better off today if we had simply continued with the successful programs and plans we already had underway in the early to mid 90s instead of the failed restructures, politicisation and cost cutting (thatended up costing us more for less) we had instead.
