Royal New Zealand Navy Discussions and Updates

[ngatimozart]

Is there a opportunity for us to get future OPV built in tandem with Australia,or are their specs considered unsuitable for the ops we do?

The opportunity may be present but it depends upon whether or not the NZG decides to go down that path. To answer the second part of your question, that has to be an unknown at present because no specs have been released into the public domain. It maybe that the CoA have not yet defined any specs. The NZG DWP due out this month may begin to address future frigate and OPV issues. Certainly the strategic environment has changed since the 2010 DWP and they will have to begin looking at the frigate replacement project because of the cost, timescale and planning involved.

Addition: DWP release timing
Parliament rises on Wednesday 17th March 2016 for the Easter break. It resits on Tuesday 29th March 2016. Cabinet meets every Monday when the House is sitting and during the period in between as required. NZ govts have a habit of sometimes releasing policy, that they consider could be controversial after the House has finished sitting. Late on the day before a holiday period is a favourite time. I think that the DWP will be released over the Easter period. If the PM wants to do it after a Cabinet meeting, then it will either be next Monday or Monday the 28th March 2016. Otherwise if Gerry Brownlee is controlling the release, it could be any time because he is a cunning pollie.

 

[40 deg south]

It could be argued that the final ANZAC, HMAS Perth, was delivered in 2006 for less than A$100M suggesting that a second pair for the RNZN could have been delivered in 2007 and 2008, as the eleventh and twelfth ships of the class, for even less, not counting the economic benefits of the work carried out in New Zealand. (NZ$ was near parity with the A$ 2006 - 2010 except for a spike Sept to Nov 2007). Considering that there is nothing an OPV can do that and ANZAC can't (except Antarctic patrols) and lots of things ANZACs can do that the Protectors never could, having a fleet of four frigates plus two OPVs and a small amphibious ship such as Singapore's Endurance Class design, would have been vastly more capable and probably no more expensive than the actual two ANZACs plus seven Protector ships.

A belated comment on this. We have a tendency to be a bit fixated on acquisition costs in these threads.

From memory, the ANZACs have a crew somewhere north of 150. The Protector OPVs have a crew of 35. Wages are the largest component of running cost over the life of a ship, so this disparity has a massive impact on the Navy's ongoing operational costs.

I think this is largely what former CoN Admiral Steer was referring to when he was extolling the virtues of the OPVs; they enable to Navy to do a lot of necessary low-key work without too large a drain on the budget.

The downside, as we have have discussed at length, is that the OPVs have very limited use in a high-threat environment.

 

[Volkodav]

A belated comment on this. We have a tendency to be a bit fixated on acquisition costs in these threads.

From memory, the ANZACs have a crew somewhere north of 150. The Protector OPVs have a crew of 35. Wages are the largest component of running cost over the life of a ship, so this disparity has a massive impact on the Navy's ongoing operational costs.

I think this is largely what former CoN Admiral Steer was referring to when he was extolling the virtues of the OPVs; they enable to Navy to do a lot of necessary low-key work without too large a drain on the budget.

The downside, as we have have discussed at length, is that the OPVs have very limited use in a high-treat environment.

Very true on the crew sizes, a regular ANZAC crew in the RAN is 163, including helicopter flight while that of the RNZNs Leanders was 260 to 266, a saving of one hundred personnel per ship. The cancellation of the final pair of ANZACs technically saved another 240 billets over the 200 already cut, a substantial number in any terms.

ANZACs are also more expensive to operate in terms of fuel burn and maintenance of their more complex systems, the RNZN OPVs being low cost, low performance, basically glorified patrol boats. What also needs to be factored in is the overheads of operating frigates, OPVs and IPVs, each with their own support system, including training, logistics, engineering etc. There are also the extra costs associated with the higher tempo required from two pairs of different capability ships verses larger, more easily sustained numbers. These hidden costs also count and should be factored in as an extra pair of frigates would have seen either the OPVs or IPVs dispensed with, reducing these costs.

 

[ngatimozart]

DCNS have targeted the RAN ANZAC FFH replacement project with an extended variant of their FREMM frigate. They also note that NZ is looking for two replacement frigates and note that speculation is that the NZG may go with the Australian choice. That remains to be seen purely based on cost, which always comes first in a Kiwi pollies mind. I still say three frigates are required as a minimum.

 

[ngatimozart]

The RNZN are off to RIMPAC later in the year. This year the USN has invited the RNZN to fill the key leadership position of Commander TF176 (Expeditionary Strike Force). The following will be the NZDF contributions to RIMPAC 2016:

• Te Kaha + embarked SH2G(I) helo
• CTF Command Team
• NZ Army Company HQ + Light Infantry Platoon
• 2 x P3K2 Orions
• Littoral Warfare Unit (Shallow Water ops)
• National Support Element + augmentees.

The exercise runs from 30/6 - 04/8/2016 and is the 25th iteration.

It was queried on an ex RNZN social media site why the RNZN and RAN weren't invited to / or declined an invite to the large USN / RN mine hunting exercise currently being held in the Middle East. I don't know myself, but in NZ'S case it might be budgetary, especially with RIMPAC coming up.

 

[Rob c]

The flipside of that argument, is that with four ANZAC-class FFH's requiring upgrades, there would also be four such frigates available for operations and deployments. This number would be sufficient to permit one away on a deployment, another in refit, a third on a training cruise, with the fourth available for immediate deployment as needed.

With the exception of the requirement for ice strengthening, additional frigates would have given the RNZN a much greater range of options than the OPV's do

Now the arguments over the OPV's at this point is much the crying over spilt milk. Little is being accomplished by it. The point which I feel has not stuck though is that at this point, the OPV's are likely to be in service at least to 2030, and could even be serving into the 2040's if they serve for 30+ years.

With that long a service life, and the very limited numbers of capable vessels in the RNZN, it would seem sensible to permit the greatest level of flexibility in terms of possible future options, without requiring significant time or resources to exercise those future options. Care and consideration needs to be given to what future assets will be tasked to do, and what they might need to be tasked to do.

Using what seems to have been a consideration during the Project Protector selection, that New Zealand had a benign strategic outlook, here we are a little over a decade later, and does the maritime situation NZ is facing over the next few decades still look so benign?

The problem with benign strategic outlooks is that they can change, and they change far more quickly than the politicians can decided that they need to do something about it. the reality is that no country in modern history has ever foreseen a threat in time to re-arm to meet the threat. So a benign outlook should never be an excuse to under arm ships or scrimp on numbers

 

[gf0012-aust]

It was queried on an ex RNZN social media site why the RNZN and RAN weren't invited to / or declined an invite to the large USN / RN mine hunting exercise currently being held in the Middle East. I don't know myself, but in NZ'S case it might be budgetary, especially with RIMPAC coming up.

australia gets involved with between 50-80 exercises per year - so there's a need to prioritise across the services, be they joint or service specific.

 

[shanes_world_05]

The problem with benign strategic outlooks is that they can change, and they change far more quickly than the politicians can decided that they need to do something about it. the reality is that no country in modern history has ever foreseen a threat in time to re-arm to meet the threat. So a benign outlook should never be an excuse to under arm ships or scrimp on numbers

Oh god yes. Run for Prime minister or if we're out of time great supreme leader (dictator).

Out of curiosity what options exist if we had to react to say a growing confrontation between say a Bric block (say without India) and US and allies to sufficiently rearm? What might that look like?

 

[Todjaeger]

Oh god yes. Run for Prime minister or if we're out of time great supreme leader (dictator).

Out of curiosity what options exist if we had to react to say a growing confrontation between say a Bric block (say without India) and US and allies to sufficiently rearm? What might that look like?

Except for the fact that Rob C is really not wrong...

Look at things from a force structure planning POV, with Kiwi examples.

In the June 2000 Defence Policy Framework, it specified what the RNZN's role was to be. In various maritime reviews in 2001 through early 2002, it was determined that the RNZN with current and (at the time) planned future assets could not meet the requirements of the 2000 DPF. Hence the start of Project Protector.

This led to RFP's being sent in mid-2002, a contract being signed in mid-2004. A two year span of time between when a solution to an expected service shortfall starts being sought, and when a solution has been agreed upon.

This in turn led to construction, which for the OPV's at least, was expected to have both in service within ~3 years. The reality is that both were not actually available for service until mid-2010.

What that more or less means, is that it can take about a decade for a naval plan to actually be put into effect. If one looks at the wider SLOC security situation for NZ, how much has that actually changed since the 2000 DPF, and has the situation gotten more or less secure?

 

[Rob c]

Except for the fact that Rob C is really not wrong...

Look at things from a force structure planning POV, with Kiwi examples.

In the June 2000 Defence Policy Framework, it specified what the RNZN's role was to be. In various maritime reviews in 2001 through early 2002, it was determined that the RNZN with current and (at the time) planned future assets could not meet the requirements of the 2000 DPF. Hence the start of Project Protector.

This led to RFP's being sent in mid-2002, a contract being signed in mid-2004. A two year span of time between when a solution to an expected service shortfall starts being sought, and when a solution has been agreed upon.

This in turn led to construction, which for the OPV's at least, was expected to have both in service within ~3 years. The reality is that both were not actually available for service until mid-2010.

What that more or less means, is that it can take about a decade for a naval plan to actually be put into effect. If one looks at the wider SLOC security situation for NZ, how much has that actually changed since the 2000 DPF, and has the situation gotten more or less secure?

It is even worse than this as not only have the combat capable ship numbers reduced but the crew numbers experience in operating these ships has also been reduced. the crewing of a patrol vessel is a vastly different skill set to operating in a combat situation. I will illustrate the problem by showing what would be needed to restart the air combat wing. First you have to train your pilots to be air combat pilots as this is a different skill set to a transport or other skill sets. Then you have to get these pilots experienced enough and good enough to become combat flight leaders after that you have to build them up enough for them to become combat combat squadron leaders and so on . It is estimated that this would take 15 years. The navy would have a similar problem,significantly increasing the size of its combat force, but at least they would have a small core to start with. It is not just a matter of ordering more equipment.

 

[Rob c]

Oh god yes. Run for Prime minister or if we're out of time great supreme leader (dictator).

Out of curiosity what options exist if we had to react to say a growing confrontation between say a Bric block (say without India) and US and allies to sufficiently rearm? What might that look like?

The basic problem with defence is that we cannot see into the future and when we look into the future and see no threat it is because we are blind to it and not that here is no threat. this means how much time we have cannot be determined, it may be 5 years or 500, who knows. The problem we currently have is that everyone is so busy looking at the details and no one is checking on the big picture. A classic case of not seeing the forest for the trees.

 

[Cadredave]

The problem we currently have is that everyone is so busy looking at the details and no one is checking on the big picture. A classic case of not seeing the forest for the trees.

Your surmising that we are being diverted away from the big picture you, I and everyone else here do not have access to what coming out of the FVEY relationship at the highest levels of Government, SIS/GCSB or Defence. I have more confidence of the Intel coming out from FVEY than the crystal ball gazing sensationalism seen in the MSM here in NZ imho.

CD

 

[Rob c]

Your surmising that we are being diverted away from the big picture you, I and everyone else here do not have access to what coming out of the FVEY relationship at the highest levels of Government, SIS/GCSB or Defence. I have more confidence of the Intel coming out from FVEY than the crystal ball gazing sensationalism seen in the MSM here in NZ imho.

CD

I agree that crystal ball gazing is a waste of time, However I was in the air force for 20 years and spent 3 years in defence headquarters, part of the job being to get funding from treasury for certain functions, so I do know how the system works. Intel is only good for the immediate future not the long term which I was refering too. I will quote something I wrote else were which may shed light on my attitude.
What the future holds is unknown to us and not to have a credible defence is simply to gamble with the future freedom of our children and grandchildren. Just because we lack the imagination to see all the possibilities does not mean something we have not thought of won't come and bite us.
Having said that I think this discussion should move to the NZD general discussion page.

 

[t68]

I agree that crystal ball gazing is a waste of time, However I was in the air force for 20 years and spent 3 years in defence headquarters, part of the job being to get funding from treasury for certain functions, so I do know how the system works. Intel is only good for the immediate future not the long term which I was refering too. I will quote something I wrote else were which may shed light on my attitude.
What the future holds is unknown to us and not to have a credible defence is simply to gamble with the future freedom of our children and grandchildren. Just because we lack the imagination to see all the possibilities does not mean something we have not thought of won't come and bite us.
Having said that I think this discussion should move to the NZD general discussion page.

Agree with the sentiment

Defence should be thought of as an insurance policy, you might not claim on it for 20 years but thank Christ you having it when you had a fire and you kept up with the cost of the policy

 

[Rob c]

Agree with the sentiment

Defence should be thought of as an insurance policy, you might not claim on it for 20 years but thank Christ you having it when you had a fire and you kept up with the cost of the policy

And its no good ringing the insurance company when you first see smoke

 

[40 deg south]

Navy's newest vessels haven't left port for years - National - NZ Herald News

NZ Herald trying a beat-up on the Navy. Minister Brownlee in typically combative form rebuffing them.

Complaining that Te Mana isn't at sea when she's in the middle of a long-planned upgrade is stupid, but the limited number of sea days on fisheries patrol is a bit of a concern to me.

 

[kiwipatriot69]

Yes, and i saw Paul Henry roast Gerry Brownlee over the phone on his tv show this morning over the Inshore patrol vessels Taupo and Pukaki being mostly unused 'gathering barnacles' since 2012.2013 respectively, pity Gerry wasnt there in person. Gerry did mention they are still intending to sell them two for an OPV replacement vessel, which despite the tone of the 'interview' is good news .

 

[Lucasnz]

Yes, and i saw Paul Henry roast Gerry Brownlee over the phone on his tv show this morning over the Inshore patrol vessels Taupo and Pukaki being mostly unused 'gathering barnacles' since 2012.2013 respectively, pity Gerry wasnt there in person. Gerry did mention they are still intending to sell them two for an OPV replacement vessel, which despite the tone of the 'interview' is good news .

Given National's track record on the acquisition of naval vessels I'm not optimistic about a 3rd OPV. In addition they're making the same mistake as they made with the FFG and OPV - No redundancy in capability for refits etc. Realistically there are limitations about the ability of any small craft operating on a sustained basis around NZ like the RNZN does. Considering the Draught of the IPV and OPV, the OPV could probably do the job just as well as the IPV in the inshore role if a larger RHIB / Seaboat could be found and carried by the OPV, for close inshore work.

In terms of the lack of capability and sea time there are number of issues that impact on issue. In terms of who is to blame for Project Protector both Labour and National are responsible. Labour was paranoid about the defence establishment and therefore capability was determined by an organisation with no real understanding of operations at sea. National on the other hand forced the NZDF into cost cutting without understanding the manpower requirements and impact on capability. Critically the conditions of service are also an issue. NZ has extremely liberal conditions of service compared to many nations, especially when talking about recruitment and discharge. Its amazing how the cycle repeats in terms of manpower for the RNZN - and I'm talking about the radical swings in recruitment and discharge that have affected the navy since the 1977 change to conditions of service, not the normal stuff. I'm increasingly in favour of following the Irish navy model - short service 4 years for Chefs, Stores etc, 7 years for Tech trades, officers etc. Its the only way the RNZN will be able to build numbers and experience without losing people so rapidly that capability is compromised. Naturally some form of early release mechanism would be required (I could think of several motivating factors to retain personnel).

 

[ngatimozart]

......
In terms of the lack of capability and sea time there are number of issues that impact on issue. In terms of who is to blame for Project Protector both Labour and National are responsible. Labour was paranoid about the defence establishment and therefore capability was determined by an organisation with no real understanding of operations at sea. National on the other hand forced the NZDF into cost cutting without understanding the manpower requirements and impact on capability. Critically the conditions of service are also an issue. NZ has extremely liberal conditions of service compared to many nations, especially when talking about recruitment and discharge. Its amazing how the cycle repeats in terms of manpower for the RNZN - and I'm talking about the radical swings in recruitment and discharge that have affected the navy since the 1977 change to conditions of service, not the normal stuff. I'm increasingly in favour of following the Irish navy model - short service 4 years for Chefs, Stores etc, 7 years for Tech trades, officers etc. Its the only way the RNZN will be able to build numbers and experience without losing people so rapidly that capability is compromised. Naturally some form of early release mechanism would be required (I could think of several motivating factors to retain personnel).

I agree that since the 1977 changes to RNZN, RNZAF & NZ Army enlistment conditions and the 1978 Armed Forces Pay Review had a seismic impact upon recruitment and retention. Some changes were good but the ones making it easier to get out of the forces may have been a mistake. When it first came in, if you wanted early release from service you had to give one years notice and it was at the pleasure of the service. Nowadays i have heard stories of three months and you're gone with the individual being placed higher than service requirements. Maybe I am old fashioned but if I wanted to break my eight year enlistment I had to cough up the equivalent of close to a months pay. Hence maybe fixed term enlistments as Lucas suggests maybe a solution.

Incentives for retention, yes I could think of a few. Maybe a look at some naval history Maybe they could recruit some of us old salts with the proviso that we get our daily tots, all night in and good runs ashore.

 

[RegR]

I don't understand his argument that if by having another OPV we would not have it sitting idle like the 2 IPVs? If it's a manpower issue would'nt we then just have a OPV parked where the 2 IPVs are! They need to sort the recruitment and more importantly retention issues first instead of just moving the goalposts around otherwise it will continue to happen regardless of roles. I can't help but notice these issues became more prevelant when they concentrated all the inshore vessels to Devonport, coincidence maybe?

If the navy (and defence in general) is unable to attract and keep personnel then maybe it needs to look at its conditions, not increase forced contract or release periods as A. You then would begin finding it harder to recruit in the first instance as most do not want to feel 'locked in' these days, B. The root cause for wanting to leave after training is still there anyway and C. You do not want to keep negative pers around against their will as the negativity generally spreads to others. If soldiers, sailors and airmen actually enjoyed their job, felt rewarded and had room to grow then they would be more inclined to stay regardless of pay, certain working conditions, the odd inconveiniance etc. It's a difficult, stressfull job at times so the heads need to find the right balance between getting the job done and keeping the ranks content, a hard ask these days but societies not what it was a decade+ ago and they have to adjust to todays attitudes, culture and competition for talent.

ADF had issues awhile back with retaining the right people in certain trades despite their comparitively good pay scale so offered cash incentives above their regular pay ie 10k bulk payment in exchange for signing on for a set period contract. Could be a possibility for marine engineers, spec trades etc that are struggling for numbers as I think navy in general recruits well it's just the more specialised roles requiring time, experience and knowledge that seem to succumb to the civilian equivalent lure mainly because miltary cannot match the $$$ but again if you enjoy your job, conditions and benefits then that is not so much the issue. Just another option.

Admittedly service perks have slowly been eroded away or robbed from Peter to pay Paul and I beleive this as well to a degree has backfired and led to more than its share of those seeking release from service for so called greener pastures.