NZDF General discussion thread

[Zero Alpha]

There is pretty much no way the major centre-left party (Labour) could form government without the Green Party.

Actually there is - they agree to abstain from votes on confidence and supply (or support the government), but are not a formal part of a coalition. THat's the model that was used for the 1999-2002 term. Winston First has ruled out being part of a coalition with them, which means the only way Labour can govern is if the greens agree to support on confidence and supply but sit outside of Government.

 

[ngatimozart]

Actually there is - they agree to abstain from votes on confidence and supply (or support the government), but are not a formal part of a coalition. THat's the model that was used for the 1999-2002 term. Winston First has ruled out being part of a coalition with them, which means the only way Labour can govern is if the greens agree to support on confidence and supply but sit outside of Government.

Which the Greens have done before. IIRC the earlier leadership had decided not to participate in government but would, as ZA has stated, support Labour in confidence and supply matters. They are a far more stable coalition partner than Winston first (nice name ZA) whose support is totally dependent upon the mood of Winston. The Greens defence policy is still basically roll over and die. On the left of NZ politics there are some small parties that tend towards the far left. Within NZ Labour there was factional infighting and whilst with the current leader this appears to be held in abeyance at the moment it has all possibilities of breaking out at short notice. The NZLP is now run and controlled by interest groups and activists, having forgotten its roots. In recent times it had migrated to the left of the political spectrum. There is no apparent charismatic leader coming up through the party machine at the moment. Helen Clark did a great job of suppressing all opposition to her rule.

 

[Zero Alpha]

Helen Clark did a great job of suppressing all opposition to her rule.

She was wasted in Parliament. With her skills crushing factional opposition she should be running a counterinsurgency campaign in Syria.

 

[KiwiRob]

There is no apparent charismatic leader coming up through the party machine at the moment. Helen Clark did a great job of suppressing all opposition to her rule.

Being far from a Labour supporter myself I think you need to think again, Andrew Little is bashing the shit out of the Govt in Parliament at the moment, he's becoming an interesting person to watch, and he has a pretty tight grip on all his MP's, the old lefty nutters from Helens day are being put out to pasture.

Watch him tear Paula Bennet a new one here, to be honest she desirves everything she got.

https://insightnz.wordpress.com/201...e-tear-paula-bennett-to-shreds-in-parliament/

The problem Labour have is that they need the Greens to help them get in govt, no sound minded Kiwi is going to fall for that twice.

 

[recce.k1]

Being far from a Labour supporter myself I think you need to think again, Andrew Little is bashing the shit out of the Govt in Parliament at the moment, he's becoming an interesting person to watch, and he has a pretty tight grip on all his MP's, the old lefty nutters from Helens day are being put out to pasture.

Watch him tear Paula Bennet a new one here, to be honest she desirves everything she got.

https://insightnz.wordpress.com/201...e-tear-paula-bennett-to-shreds-in-parliament/

The problem Labour have is that they need the Greens to help them get in govt, no sound minded Kiwi is going to fall for that twice.

Lol, do you get back to NZ much Rob, or mostly rely on the internet for NZ news?

As someone who is somewhat centrist (eg voted for both of NZ's two main parties, including Labour for a couple of decades), all I see in that clip is "Mr Angry" (Andrew Little's nickname that even the MSM use at times) spouting off rhetoric, distorting the facts and misleading the public (the very reason I stopped voting them)! The problem for Mr Little (and the Labour Party) is that unfortunately he gets clobbered in Parliamentary question time quite regularly (it's not uncommon for the PM to smack him down, then ask a supplementary question only to get smacked down again, then a third question and another smack down). So much so Mr Little is polling worse than his predecessors (but the reports are, Labour are too scared to roll him prior to the next election but that could change if the polling dips under 30% and stays there).

Having said that if Labour were to get back in Govt with Mr Little as their leader, he does seem a bit more pragmatic than most of his predecessors (including their last PM) in terms of NZ's foreign affairs and place in the world (including supporting airstrikes against IS and perhaps NZ playing a part if we still had the means), and hopefully it means a continuation of restored NZ-US relations, however nothing is a given considering, as you correctly point out, that Labour will be beholden somewhat to the Greens (unless Winston/NZ First manage to screw the Greens over again by being Labour's main coalition partner)!

With Mr Little's background as head of NZ's main engineering union, I was hoping to hear more from Labour on greater self-reliance for the NZDF (eg more local/logistical support for defence projects and manufacturing, boosting NZDF personnel numbers etc) but so far not a peep, just the usual attacking auto-contrarian views to that of the Govt.

 

[40 deg south]

Actually there is - they agree to abstain from votes on confidence and supply (or support the government), but are not a formal part of a coalition. THat's the model that was used for the 1999-2002 term. Winston First has ruled out being part of a coalition with them, which means the only way Labour can govern is if the greens agree to support on confidence and supply but sit outside of Government.

ZA
Fair enough, you are right.

But my view is that with the current gap in polling between Nats and Labour, this isn't a plausible path to government in the near future. If either Labour or (God forbid) Winston First pick up substantially in the poll, forming a government without the Greens might become possible again. At present, combining Labour, Greens and Winston First still doesn't get them across the line.

 

[kiwipatriot69]

You only have to look at the policy making our current National govt has made regards to military spending and deployment, does any one here think if the greens held so much influence, an extra 100 million per yr woud have been allocated for defence, or all of the necessary upgrades/replacements to army,navy,airforce? Yes, i admit, a lot more needs to be done, but i sure dont trust Labour to do it, after the cutting they did to the ACF and Frigate numbers.

 

[ngatimozart]

Strategic Threats and Challenges Facing New Zealand - Part 1 of 3

This is my take on the strategic threats and challenges facing New Zealand. It is taken from my submission to the 2015 DWP. It is a long posting so is in three parts.

“Because there are many other things governments and populations need to spend their money on, they need to be persuaded of the prospective role of their navy and of its value in assuring their prosperity and security. ...... This will be more difficult for a country that has lost, or perhaps never had, much awareness of the importance of the sea. Surprisingly, given its geographic setting, this is often said to apply to New Zealand. In responding to such challenges, it is particularly important that the navy at least knows what it is for.” (Till, G. (2004). Sea Power: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century (Vol. 23). London, UK: Frank Cass Publishers.)

THREATS AND CHALLENGES FROM WITHIN
There are significant challenges to New Zealand’s security from within and without and both, if not addressed, will have detrimental impacts upon the wellbeing of the nation. There appears to be the perception that New Zealands geographic isolation protects us from foreign enemies. Whilst this may have done in the 19th Century modern technology certainly negates any defence that geography may give us. We are the most isolated country in the world, geographically, with our closest neighbour being Australia that hasn't prevented foreign enemies from operating in our waters during World War One and our waters and airspace during World War Two. Later there have been reports of Soviet and other unidentified submarines operating in or close to New Zealand waters, plus now the Russians are reportedly operating their Borei class nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) in the Antarctic waters. Since these submarines are based with their Pacific fleet at Vladivostok, it may be assumed that the Ross Sea would be one likely patrol area for them.

Sea Blindness
Within New Zealand there is the apparent apathy towards defence by the political elite, the establishment within the public service and the public. The quote of Tillman's is an accurate description of both the New Zealand political elites and the general public's attitude towards the need for a navy, especially a blue water navy. This concept is sea blindness and can be defined as the lack of recognition that our national economical lifelines are inextricably linked to and totally dependent upon our Sea Lines Of Communication (SLOC) (Haydon, P. (2010). Maritime Blindness, You Say? Canadian Naval Review, 6(3), 2 - 3).

Being an island nation New Zealand is a maritime nation and as such our SLOC are our lifelines through which 99.5% of our trade, by volume, is transported by sea. An example of our SLOC dependence is our reliance upon energy in the form of oil. During 2014 indigenous production of oil products was 1,890,260 tonnes; we imported 7,262,200 tonnes and exported 1,833,980 leaving a deficit of 5,371,940 of tonnes required to be imported to meet consumption demands (Till, 2004).

Hence in New Zealands case this is the crux of sea blindness, in that political elite and the population either are unwittingly ignorant of the country's dependence upon the sea or choose to ignore it, which in our case does seem, as Till states, surprising especially considering our geography and the fact that we are known for our sailing ability such is Round the World Ocean races and Americas Cup racing. I would go further and extend this to defence overall because of the perceived "protection" that the surrounding ocean gives us. However in today's world that distance is actually our Achilles heel; a substantial weakness in our defences.

Lack of Long Term Political Foresight and Cohesion in Defence Planning and Acquisition
Since approximately the mid 1980s there has been a noticeable lack of long term political foresight and cohesion in defence planning and platform acquisitions which has resulted in a somewhat fragmented defence force structure, which may be good for certain activities in isolation but, detrimental to others as a complete Defence Force. A Defence Force is system of systems and each system can and will have an impact upon super and sub systems. Therefore if one system is not fully compatible or compliant then it has the potential to create expensive problems. In a defence force this is the same and New Zealand has had expensive examples of this, such as the Multi Role Vessel HMNZS Canterbury where a Roll On Roll Off Ferry design was adapted to create an amphibious force ship. Whilst this vessel is now performing for New Zealand after expensive and time consuming remediation work, it is not a fully fit for purpose ship. It cannot fully fill it's required capability of disembarking vehicles and heavy or awkward offshore in seas states greater than Sea State Two because it utilises a stern ramp methodology rather than a well dock which can be utilised up to Sea States Five or Six. The same can be said for the NHI NH90 helicopters which are to be utilised on the Canterbury when needed. They were not marinised because of cost, hence can only be operated at sea on seas no greater than Sea State Two. These restrictions defeat the purpose of the acquisitions and restrict the capabilities of NZDF. A third example was the HMNZS Charles Upham which was an acquisition disaster and cost the country financially. Finally, the tanker HMNZS Endeavour acquisition where the flight deck was a very good idea but was only built for the Westland Wasp helicopter weight and not for a heavier helicopter which meant that after the Wasp was retired its' replacement could not use the flight deck unless the flight deck was strengthened at significant cost. Hence I would argue that over the last 30 years, probably hundreds of millions dollars have been wastefully expended in defence acquisitions, due to poor and ill-informed decision making by the political elite, because of political philosophies and placing too much reliance upon advice from experts, in departments who have no experience of defence or defence related procurement.

New Zealand politicians tend to think in a three year electoral cycle which may inhibit their long term foresight especially with regard to defence policy, structure, strategy and procurement. Secondly within New Zealand defence has became politicised and there is no longer an agreement between the main political parties regarding long term defence policy. This was evident during the 1990s and 2000s and to a slightly least extent currently. The collary to this is that in the long term there is no stable long term defence policy and NZDF has difficulty planning long term acquisitions because the rules and policies may substantially change when there is a change of government. Capability requirements may change which will involve expenditure. Therefore I argue that there needs to be a long term defence policy agreement negotiated between the main political parties which is ring fenced. This agreement should be periodically renegotiated, for example very five years.

Dupont has recently published an analysis piece regarding Australian defence strategy and it he has identified six weaknesses of Australian defence strategy. It is worthwhile noting them here with some adjustments for the New Zealand defence environment:

• Declaratory Confusion and Poor Messaging where after a number of published defence white papers there is no clear statement of defence strategy.
• Geography as Dogma where Australias' (like New Zealands') distance and location were a protection from most conflicts and challenges. However with the advent of modern technologies this spatial locality is no longer the barrier it once was.
• The Limitations of a Maritime Strategy which in Australias' case may be correct but in New Zealands' case there is no obvious maritime strategy. In fact it appears that New Zealand has an Army based strategy and little else which in itself is a limitation.
• Contestable Force Structure Assumptions where strategies are based around planning principles to help determine force sizes, capabilities etc., when in fact no defence force gets to choose where and when it will fight and that the type of fighting can change quite quickly. The point is we cannot choose the fights we become involved in and we have to be prepared for most if not all contingencies. The old adage about taking a knife to a gun fight comes to mind.
• The False Promise of Strategic Warning where it is thought that sufficient warning will be given of any major threat in order for the expansion of the defence forces and that white papers have the foresight to sufficiently forecast events 20 to 30 years into the future hence allowing for informed decisions upon strategy and future force structures which require procurement to start now.
• Knowing Our Friends Too meaning we should know our friends as well if not better than any adversaries. With Australia being our closest defence partner and ally, it is essential that we understand how it sees and understands the ANZAC defence relationship and not just view that relationship through a New Zealand lens which I suspect happens especially at the political level. It is also essential that we what impacts any changes in Australian strategy will have upon New Zealand and the ANZAC relationship. The second friend whom it is essential that we have to understand is the United States. Again it is any changes in their strategy and dispositions that will or may impact upon New Zealand and Australia because of the ANZAC relationship.

Dupont suggests the following to improve defence strategy, which I have adjusted to the New Zealand defence environment:

• Clarify Defence Strategy in which a clear unambiguous statement is made which clearly states New Zealands defence and military strategies and their main objectives.
• Evolve the ANZAC Relationship, the US Relationship and Diversify Regional Defence Relationships meaning we need to work on those relationships and at the same time become more involved with regional states that broadly share our strategic values such as Indonesia, Vietnam, Philippines and India by having closer more encompassing defence relationships.
• Evolve the ANZAC Relationship, the US Relationship and Diversify Regional Defence Relationships meaning we need to work on those relationships and at the same time become more involved with regional states that broadly share our strategic values such as Indonesia, Vietnam, Philippines and India by having closer more encompassing defence relationships.
• Develop a "Full Spectrum" Military Strategy and Matching Capabilities where full spectrum strategy recognises the need for provision of protection from military treats emanating from sea, land, air cyber space and outer space. This type of defence is an integrated five domain military strategy that has connectivity and investment across the five domains, something which New Zealand would have to look at doing in conjunction with Australia in areas where it is impractical for New Zealand to field such capability, such as in Airborne Early Warning and Control aircraft. This type of strategy will enable NZDF to operate with far greater flexibility and fight against enemies more powerful and against non state actors. It requires advanced C4ISR systems which are vital on the modern day and future battlefield, plus have the advantage of being very good enablers for other takings such as Humanitarian Aid and Disaster Relief (HADR). The most important point is that this cannot be done piecemeal because NZDF must be a balanced force requiring modern strike aircraft, frigates and armoured vehicles and that the NZDF must be able to fight in all domains including the air, urban areas, open ground, mountainous areas and maritime areas because adversaries are illiberals who will choose to fight on grounds of their choosing, not ours negating any strengths that NZDF have here possible.
• Implement a Comprehensive Strategic Risk management Process which requires a rigorous approach to defence planning replacing force structure determinants with more flexible planning considerations an principles that guide planners towards thinking about the optimum size, balance and capabilities of the future force. A comprehensive risk assessment process that would assess threats against defence vulnerabilities would have to be quickly implemented and " all significant force structure, acquisition and resource decisions must be subject to a full strategic risk assessment".
• Shorten Acquisition Response Times And Rethink Mobilisation where it is need to reduce the excessively long time frames in deploying new defence capabilities from the time of studying the requirement to the actual deployment. Rapid mobilisation and enlargement today is far more difficult than it was in the 20th Century due to modern warfare complexity and the speed with which new or hybrid threats can occur such as the Russian intervention in the Ukraine or the rise of Daesh have shown.

To be continued.
Part One ends.

 

[ngatimozart]

Strategic Problems facing New Zealand - Part 2 of 3

PART TWO - THREATS AND CHALLENGES FROM WITHIN Continued
Communication with the Public
There needs to more and better communication with the media and public by defence as an organisation and especially by the Minister. Not everything is a State Secret nor is Operational Security involved in everything. Defence is like Justice - it needs to be seen to be done. Whilst the Ministry of Defence, NZDF and the three Services have web pages, plus the three services and service chiefs operate on social media, there is also a lack of detail of news or information compared to the Australian Defence Forces or United States Armed Forces. For example the Australian government publicise electronically their long term acquisition plans, such as the Collins Submarine replacement program. The Minister needs to be more forthcoming with media statements on various trips, for example, in order to help raise the visibility of defence. Again in Australian where their defence ministers issue a short statement after each trip or important meeting. Many times more is stated in foreign sources about New Zealand defence events or happenings than is provided or published within New Zealand by official sources. It would be helpful for example to have a New Zealand Defence Ministers input on a AU-NZMIN meeting rather than just having the Australian version. This includes the media briefings afterwards.

Apathy about Defence
This apathy is symptomatic of the previous three discussions and the lack of an ongoing discussion in the public arena about defence, unlike those in Australia, the United States and the United Kingdom. The only time there appears to be any real discussion amongst the general public about defence is when particular acquisition issue is seized upon by a politically motivated group, such as happened with the ANZAC Frigate acquisition and the F16 acquisition or when a world event resonates amongst a particular group such as the Vietnam War did during the 1960s and 1970s. When these happen defence discussions become emotive and at times any worthwhile discourses can be lost in the noise of the emotion. The other problem is that these discussions only occur at irregular intervals rather than continually.

Whilst the idea of a continual discussion on defence may not appeal to some in the political elite and the media because they exceed the two minute news bite, they do however fill a very vital need in a democratic society. Defence and security are very important in any society, but more so in a democratic society because they can imply a possible restriction of some rights in situations of extremis. It also means that society as a whole can discuss how large amounts of the national treasure are being or need to be spent and when or if blood should be spilled. This apathy is symptomatic of the previous three discussions and the lack of an ongoing discussion in the public arena about defence, unlike those in Australia, the United States and the United Kingdom. The only time there appears to be any real discussion amongst the general public about defence is when particular acquisition issue is seized upon by a politically motivated group, such as happened with the ANZAC Frigate acquisition and the F16 acquisition or when a world event resonates amongst a particular group such as the Vietnam War did during the 1960s and 1970s. When these happen defence discussions become emotive and at times any worthwhile discourses can be lost in the noise of the emotion. The other problem is that these discussions only occur at irregular intervals rather than continually. However in New Zealands case, as mentioned above, this rarely happens now since the end of World War Two. Many of those who served then and the population who lived through it, have passed on and the national collective memory of that event is exponentially receding. My generation - the baby boomers - and the generations that follow don't know that and that is what I think is one of the reasons why there is this apathy. The other reason is that we were never directly attacked unlike Australia and that probably accounts for the large difference in attitudes between New Zealanders and Australians regarding defence.

EXTERNAL THREATS AND CHALLENGES
There are various military and security external threats to New Zealand with the two significant ones emanating from the Peoples Republic of China and the non state religious based extremism that is prevalent in the Middle east at the moment. A third threat that whilst not local to New Zealand is the current Russian aggression against the Ukraine that has the potential to escalate rapidly. Lesser threats would be destabilisation of states within South East Asia by extremists and / or failed states with the region especially around the main trade routes and maritime choke points. Destabilisation of Melanesian and Pacific Island states are also possible. Fiji has recently held an election but the possibility of another coup exists given previous history.

Peoples Republic of China
China is pursuing its right to be a Great Power. It once was and will be again and nobody has a real problem with that. What is causing the tensions is Chinas methodology in asserting its place in the world and right to be a Great Power. For example, the recent Air Defence Identification Zone would not have raised hackles if it had followed international norms. However, it did not because China is trying to assert Chinese domestic law on international airspace. Another form of attempted Chinese dominance is when the Provincial Government of Hainan enacted a law that came into effect (1 January 2014) that prevents all foreign fishing vessels from fishing in the South China Sea including the Spratley Islands. This area extends into the Philippines EEZ and the closest point to the Chinese coast is 600 nautical miles. China is a signatory to the United Nations Convention on Law Of the Sea (UNCLOS). Hence, this begs the question of what are Chinas real intentions? Actions speak louder than words and on July 8, 2013, the Hong Kong pro-PRC Chinese-language newspaper, Wenweipo published a story entitled "Six Wars China Is Sure to Fight In the Next 50 Years"

• The 1st War: Unification of Taiwan (Year 2020 to 2025)
• The 2nd War: “Reconquest” of Spratly Islands (Year 2025 to 2030)
• The 3rd War: “Reconquest” of Southern Tibet (Year 2035 to 2040) - part of India
• The 4th War: “Reconquest” of Diaoyu Island [Senkaku] and Ryukyu [Okinawa] Islands
  (Year 2040 to 2045)
• The 5th War: Unification of Outer Mongolia (Year 2045 to 2050)
• The 6th War: Taking back of lands lost to Russia (Year 2055 to 2060)

Whilst this cannot be taken as "gospel”, such an article wouldn't be published without sanction from within the higher echelons of the Chinese government. Many articles have appeared in the mainland Chinese media written by Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) officers, mostly Colonels that have called for the use of force to regain "lost territories". They play on the 100 years of shame that is embedded in current Chinese society. It is the 100 years from the 1840s to 1949 when China was plagued with foreign invasions and having to kow tow and pay tribute to foreigners, especially the west and Japan. These Colonels and other officers of the PLA making these statements in public and in the media would not be doing so, without the sanction of higher authority and that would in this case be the Politburo and Xi Jinping in particular. Xi has taken steps ensuring that the PLA answers to him and he has it fully under his control. (The “Century of Humiliation” and China’s National Narratives, US Congress, 26 December 2013 Session).

China is developing a "String of Pearls" across the Asian seascape from China to Pakistan with nexus (pearl) at strategic ports along the string. This is a geopolitical strategy with the Chinese government and Chinese companies funding and building port and infrastructure upgrades. This strategy runs in conjunction with the Silk Road strategy which is eventual the overland route from China through to Europe with the Chinese government and companies again funding and building infrastructure projects. The string of pearls not only is an economic phenomena but also a military and security one with China believed to be also negotiating berthing and logistical support agreements for surface and subsurface vessels of the Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in some countries such as Pakistan and Myanmar, plus surveillance facilities at some locations in the Indian Ocean. China has developed a sea control strategy based upon fixed lines drawn through two island chains crosses other nations territory from the Kuril Islands to the Andaman Islands in the Indian Ocean including United States islands and military bases in the Pacific. It is important to note that the island chains encompass the main shipping routes between the Indian Ocean into the Pacific Ocean via the Straits of Malacca, Sunda Straits and the Lombok with the vast majority going through the South China Sea to nations such as Singapore, China, Thailand, Taiwan, Brunei, South Korea and Japan. Furthermore there is shipping lanes to nations such as Australian and New Zealand. This would be an issue to these nations if China was to develop a security hegemony over the area.

The current South China Seas disputes with Chinese assertiveness and "island" construction is increasing tensions within the region. Since Xi has been appointed General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), China has been more aggressive in asserting its perceived claims to territories, within the Chinese nine dashed line map, that China legally has no claim to under current international law. The CCP in 2012 determined that the South China Sea was a core national asset. The 2015 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Yearbook, cited by Gady, states that is increasing tensions in Asia by its efforts in reshaping the "regional military - security dynamic" China has been coercive in its approach to its claims in the South China Sea. Whilst it hasn't overtly used open military force this time it is using the paramilitary Chinese Coastguard to enforce its claims whether or not they have any legal status under the UNCLOS. This is a direct challenge to the rules based world order that has existed since the end of the Second World War.

China is using this dispute in the South China Sea to obtain as much maritime territory as it can in order to enforce a new status quo arrangement that will see it remain in control of the territory that it has coerced from neighbouring states without a return to the status quo ante. This redefinition of the status quo is not going to cease until China either achieves hegemony or is shown that it cannot continue down this path without some form of consequences. China is reclaiming land and building artificial islands in order to bolster its claims and artificial islands are excluded from territorial claims in UNCLOS. Furthermore it has not honoured the agreement it signed with the Association of South East Asian Nations in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, regarding conduct about disputes in the South China Sea.

On a wider scale there is the relationship between China and Japan over the Senkaku Islands and other areas that China lays claim to. There is a historical enmity between China and Japan, that has been fuelled by the extremely harsh Japanese occupation of China during the early 20th Century. The CCP and the Chinese government have not been adverse in using this in fuelling nationalistic sentiments within China against Japan. Again this follows the pattern that has been established in the South China Sea in that China is aggressively pursuing its claims of territory. However the Japanese are not easily intimidated and unlike the South East Asian nations they do have a defence and security treaty with the United States.

Part Two ends.
To be continued.

 

[ngatimozart]

Strategic Problems Facing New Zealand - Part 3 of 3

EXTERNAL THREATS AND CHALLENGES Continued
Russia
The Russian Federation is the next nation of concern with its ongoing aggression against Ukraine the annexation of Crimea from the Ukraine, the five day war against Georgia in 2008, and its increased military activity in the Baltic, North Sea and beyond. The west has responded with targeted economic sanctions that are driving Russia into a closer relationship with China. It is thought by some that this relationship may one day turn into an alliance that, if crystallized, would create significant difficulties for the United States with its NATO treaty obligations and its treaty obligations to Japan, because it would be forced into a war on two fronts, something the United States will have great difficulty fighting using convention weapons. Russia is also pivoting towards Asia because it can see the opportunities in such a pivot. Both Russia and China are founding members and the largest members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization which is a security centred organisation at the moment, focussed more towards their definition of terrorism. Such an organisation could be expanded to cover military threats as well, creating a military alliance with a similar structure and treaty obligations to NATO.

Terrorism
Islamic extremist terrorism has been prevalent in the Middle East and the western regions of Asia since the formation of Al Qaeda. This extreme form of religious terrorism whilst present in western society in the form of sectarian violence in Ireland was taken to another level with the Al Qaeda attacks of 11 September 2001 on the United States where close to 3000 people were killed. These attacks resulted in US and western coalition invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan further fuelling jihadist recruitment amongst radical and extremist Islamic groups.

The most effective and brutal of these groups now is ISIL (Islamic State in the Levant) which was originally formed in west Afghanistan as Jund al Sham (the Army of the Levant), during the 1990s by Abu Musab al Zarqawi (Ahmad Fadeel al Nazal al Khalayleh) a Jordanian criminal. It follows the anti state, anti Shia teachings of famous salafist / takfiri preacher Abu Mohammed al Maqdisi (Isam Mohammad Tahir al Barqawi) whom he met in Afghanistan. After the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, Zarqawi moved the group to Iraq, renamed it and in 2004 after extended negotiations joined Al Qaeda forming Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Zarqawi saw this move as a way to guarantee funds and increase fighters and bin Laden thought that he could keep a modicum of control over Zarqawis worse excesses. In 2006 Zarqawi was killed in a US airstrike and then after an interim leader the group formed with others to become the Islamic State in Iraq under Abu Omar al Baghdadi, who was killed in 2010 and the group was taken over by Abu Bakr al Baghdadi (Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Ali al Badri al Samarrai) its current leader.

ISI was still the local Al Qaeda affiliate and the Syrian uprising had occurred which Baghdadi and most of the leadership had seen as a diversion, preferring to concentrate upon Iraq forbidding their fighters to participate even if they were Syrian. However as the Syrian civil war significantly intensified they relend sending a small group under Abu Mohammed al Golani into northern Syria to fight. Golani had the support of Aiman al Zawahiri the then second in command of Al Qaeda and when Baghdadi stated that Golanis group Jabhat al Nusra li Ahl al Sham (the Support Front for the People of the Levant) was subordinate to him and ISI, Golan refused to acknowledge that situation, appealed to Zawahiri and publicly claimed allegiance to Al Qaeda. Zawahiri was unable to reconcile the two, Baghdadi refused to accept orders to remain only in Iraq, hence Zawahiri publicly disowned ISI which then became ISIS / ISIL.

ISIL is very well funded, plus it's battlefield conquests have given it a goodly supply of weapons. It acquires income mostly through oil revenue from the black market, donations and ransoms. It is different from most other Islamic terror groups in that it has established a caliphate and under Sunni law apparently Baghdadi meets the requirements to be caliph in that he is:

• a Muslim adult man of Quraysh descent
• exhibiting moral probity and physical and mental integrity
• having ’amr, or authority meaning that he must have territory to enforce Islamic law

Having established their territory and funding the group have been successful in attracting jihadists and others from many different countries by using very well produced video material that is published on the internet using social media and websites. They are also encouraging others who cannot travel to Iraq and Syria to fight to commit acts of violence and terror in their homelands against the enemies of Islam as defined by ISIL's very conservative medieval version of it. They are also calling for individuals and groups to swear allegiance and form sub caliphs in areas outside of the Middle East.

If ISIL becomes established in Pakistan and infiltrates the military then serious problems could occur because of Pakistans nuclear weapons. Pakistan already has militant problems especially in the tribal areas in the north west of the country. Further east there are significant Muslim populations in Malaysia, Philippines and Indonesia and if ISIL establishes a foothold creating an insurgency in any or all of those countries then further destabilisation will occur within Asia. It may not be a matter of not if, but when.

CHALLENGES THAT NEW ZEALAND IS LIKELY TO FACE IN ITS IMMEDIATE TERRITORY, INCLUDING ITS EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE, CONTINENTAL SHELF, THE TERRITORY OF THE REALM NATIONS AND THE ROSS DEPENDENCY
China is providing funding and aid to the Pacific Islands with its presence in the region increasing. This is a soft power approach rather than the hard power one seen in the South China Sea and East China Sea. It is also provided support to the Fijian Army. The Fijian Prime minister has also called for Australia or New Zealand or both to be ousted from the Pacific Forum and China to be included. Whilst this is just appears to be politics at the moment and Bainimarama holding a grudge, it should not be discounted that over time the pressure from Fiji may grow for this to eventually occur.

As the worlds access to resources diminish pressure will be placed on Antarctic Treaty nations to enable the prospecting and mining of resources on the continent and surrounding oceanic areas. New Zealand has the claim on the Ross Dependency and at some stage we may be placed in the position of having to either enforce the treaty provisions or and / or New Zealands interests in and around the Dependency. That cannot be done if the NZDF does not have adequate and sufficient resources to do so. For example, it is estimated that there are 50 billion barrels of oil in the Ross and Weddell Seas, second only in size to the Saudi oil fields and something of that value, being worth trillions of dollars, will attract considerable, if not intense, competition and rivalry from other nations and non state actors such as corporations. There is also the probability of fresh water extraction and shipping from Antarctica as supplies of fresh water diminish in the rest of the world due to global warming and climate change. This will create a situation where New Zealand will have to stand its ground, politically, morally and more than likely militarily. It cannot do that if NZDF does not have the equipment and people to defend sovereign New Zealand.

NEW ZEALAND AND ITS DEFENCE RELATIONSHIP WITH AUSTRALIA
New Zealand has lost mana in the eyes of Australia and the wider region because of its lack of commitment to defence. The ANZAC defence relationship with Australia is our most important defence relationship and this has been jeopardised in recent time due to New Zealand defence capability decisions which have resulted in New Zealand not pulling its weight in regional defence like it used too. It has been suggested that some elements in Australia see New Zealand as free riding off Australia defence wise and given some decisions that have been made this may be hard to dispute. Statements by Helen Clark denying that New Zealand and Australia were a 'single strategic entity' and that we existed in a 'incredibly benign strategic environment', her decision to disband the air combat force, not to purchase a third frigate and only partially upgrade the P3K Orions, significantly reduced NZDF capabilities for contributing to the defence of Australia. This lead to one Australian defence analyst to state that New Zealand is now a strategic liability, which is a fair description because the present force structure and levels, prevents complete participation in exercises, such as Pitch Black in the Northern Territory, or with the Five Power Defence Agreement (FPDA) that is both air and sea intensive.

The 2010 Defence White Paper states that: "Australia is our principal defence and security partner. We have no better friend and no closer ally. A wide range of political, economic, social, and security connections underpin what has become a common trans-Tasman space. We would therefore immediately respond to any direct attack on Australia. New Zealand’s own security is enhanced by the investment which Australia has made in its national defence. Australia has military capabilities that we do not have, but which are essential for higher-end contingencies. The ANZAC relationship enhances the overall depth and reach of the NZDF. It is therefore in our interest to add to Australia’s strategic weight." This is a clear and unequivocal statement, yet in practice actions speak louder than words and this statement has not been followed up during the intervening five years with concise actions. There has been very minimal increases in defence expenditure with defence expenditure remaining at around 1.2 - 1.4 % of GDP and there have been cuts in personnel and services since 2009 which have reduced the overall effectiveness of the NZDF. For example in the 2015 budget a total of $3.3 billion has been appropriated for defence that when calculated as a percentage of GDP on the 2014 GDP figure of $229.7 billion is 1.4 % of GDP with no real increase in capability whilst Australias' defence budget is at 1.8% of GDP and heading to 2% GDP. Basically the New Zealand defence budget is standing still in dollar terms and what is important is that it's buying power is potentially decreasing. That buying power is the more important factor at the moment when new equipment is required.53 Relative to Australia, New Zealands defence capabilities have been depleted since 1999 and are no longer have the ability of supporting the Australian Defence Force as we once did. Hence the reason why Australia no longer sees New Zealand as an essential partner in its defence triad being replaced by Japan.

New Zealand can no longer afford to have the attitude and belief that others will step up and carry New Zealands slack in defence, especially when they have issues of their own. We have to take capabilities to the table to be part of any alliance or coalition and most importantly we have to be self sufficient not being a liability, which is how were are being perceived by our closest defence partner. Sending some cooks and vehicle refuellers as the NZDF component of an international exercise, because that is all that we could send is pathetic (Pitch Black 2014). New Zealand has to dramatically increase its commitment to its defence in substantive ways so that we can regain the trust and respect of Australia.

 

[John Fedup]

nagatimozart....thanks, interesting read. I can't but help notice some of NZ's issues with those of Canada, e.g. apathy of citizens and pollies towards defence matters, and not pulling our weight with regards to our most important defence partner, the US.

 

[RegR]

So we could'nt offer any aircraft to Angela Merkel as we do not possess a ACF anymore, thanks Helen, those F16s could have come in handy right about now.

I wonder what physical military options we could realistically offer to such an op? (Other than boots on ground as such) as financial and refugee help is more a govt to govt agreement with nil military input. Seems as though this could well be the future of forseeable conflicts therefore how are we geared to respond, assist, counter etc as part of the coalition of the willing or are we merely a voice in the distance?

 

[ngatimozart]

So we could'nt offer any aircraft to Angela Merkel as we do not possess a ACF anymore, thanks Helen, those F16s could have come in handy right about now.

I wonder what physical military options we could realistically offer to such an op? (Other than boots on ground as such) as financial and refugee help is more a govt to govt agreement with nil military input. Seems as though this could well be the future of forseeable conflicts therefore how are we geared to respond, assist, counter etc as part of the coalition of the willing or are we merely a voice in the distance?

Sometimes I wonder if we are just that, a voice from the great Southern Ocean babbling through broken gums, without teeth, because our pollies have defanged us. The government talks of a credible defence force, but to be brutally honest, NZDF is not credible anymore because it doesn't have the kit and what it has is either numerically not enough or obsolete. The people within NZDF are excellent but again there are not enough of them. Two problems I see are Treasury's excessive power over defence acquisition and policy, plus MFATs interference in defence acquisitions and policy. Whilst both have legitimate input, they shouldn't hold inordinate control and influence on acquisition decisions and policy.

 

[KiwiRob]

So we could'nt offer any aircraft to Angela Merkel as we do not possess a ACF anymore, thanks Helen, those F16s could have come in handy right about now.

And why would we be offering aircraft to Merkel, what would she do with them, straffing refugees flooding into Germany?

 

[John Fedup]

Sometimes I wonder if we are just that, a voice from the great Southern Ocean babbling through broken gums, without teeth, because our pollies have defanged us. The government talks of a credible defence force, but to be brutally honest, NZDF is not credible anymore because it doesn't have the kit and what it has is either numerically not enough or obsolete. The people within NZDF are excellent but again there are not enough of them. Two problems I see are Treasury's excessive power over defence acquisition and policy, plus MFATs interference in defence acquisitions and policy. Whilst both have legitimate input, they shouldn't hold inordinate control and influence on acquisition decisions and policy.

Not only do we have External Affairs and Treasury screwing with defence procurement, we also have Public Works....oh ya and few senior incompetent bureaucrats over at DND.

 

[RegR]

And why would we be offering aircraft to Merkel, what would she do with them, straffing refugees flooding into Germany?

For use in Syria but since you bring it up if terrorists were illegally overunning my borders I would.

 

[Todjaeger]

Something which I feel bears discussing (here on DT and also with the Kiwi public and policymakers) is the impact NZ's location has on defence.

I believe many in NZ look at the remoteness of the island nation and see the water borders as a great moat around Castle New Zealand. Whilst this is true to a degree, and the Pacific and Southern Oceans provide a significant area for defence in depth, something very important is being overlooked. That very same 'moat' which can keep others out, is also a wall which keeps NZ in.

The water can keep others out, but also very much limits where and how the NZDF can deploy if/when Kiwi interests are concerned or threatened. NZ can deploy some forces by air, but realistically would need to be sustained by sea (or by another country...) to move the heavy pieces of kit, munitions, food, fuel, etc. Given the sharply limited sealift and maritime fleet, as well as the escorts available to protect the transport vessels...

In a prior post (either in this or one of the other Kiwi threads) I had pointed out some of the likely difficulties for NZ to intervene in Fiji, without the permission of Fiji or the assistance of a larger nation like Australia or the US. I feel the public and especially the policymakers need to understand just how limited the forces of the NZDF are, as a result of spending and policy decisions by successive gov'ts.

Army can do SFA if they cannot get to a fight in sufficient numbers and with appropriate kit. Given the limited amount of lift (air and sea) that can be a major problem. The problem could grow even worse if the lift has to transit a threatened or contested area, given the ability protect the lift is even more limited than the lift itself.

The RNZAF can, numbers permitting, provide airlift as well as some area surveillance, and a very limited (and potentially dangerous to self) ability to engage a threat.

The RNZN can provide a very limited ability to escort at present, which will get even more limited while the upgrades are being done, due to the limited capabilities of the vessels currently in commission and their limited numbers. The escort ability will improve somewhat once the frigate upgrades are completed, but will still be limited in some areas (ASW and ASuW for instance) as well as in limited numbers. Some sealift is available as well, but the capability itself is limited in terms of size, quantities, and conditions/areas it can operate in. AFAIK there are very few NZ-flagged merchant vessels, which means there is not much available for ships taken up from trade to bulk up the sealift.

From my outsider's perspective, it does seem like much of the NZDF has been structured over the last two decades to only provide additional bodies on overseas international interventions. Interventions where there is little likelihood of direct combat with any sort of peer or near-peer opponent. I personally have an issue with that, since it is basically inevitable that either NZ will end up in such a situation where NZDF personnel are engaged with peer-level or greater opponents, without the ability to achieve overmatch, or that NZ will be forced to give way to a potential opponent, to avoid being drawn into such a conflict.

With this sort of impression, I do have to wonder what sort of vignettes the various policymakers have been exposed to.

 

[kiwipatriot69]

Do we really need to bogged down in a possible ground offensive anyway in Syria, surely we could best help, given our lack of offensive capability, in the refugee camps, in a humanitarian role? We could help build camps,supply food,water,ect also dont forget, we are taking in 1200 refugees as well.

 

[RegR]

Do we really need to bogged down in a possible ground offensive anyway in Syria, surely we could best help, given our lack of offensive capability, in the refugee camps, in a humanitarian role? We could help build camps,supply food,water,ect also dont forget, we are taking in 1200 refugees as well.

This is where the F16s could have provided a decent and somewhat safer contribution to the ISIS offensive. A detachment of 4 jets could have been attached to the aussies (or anyone for that matter) and provided direct action, escort or recon depending on our govts willingness to participate (lack of which IMO led to their demise in the first place). This in lieu of troops in the thick of it and yet still a credible and useful function. Still a level of risk attached but not exactly even capabilities so in fact a safer option, NZGovts go to policy.

Just another tool in the box, if only.

 

[ngatimozart]

This is where the F16s could have provided a decent and somewhat safer contribution to the ISIS offensive. A detachment of 4 jets could have been attached to the aussies (or anyone for that matter) and provided direct action, escort or recon depending on our govts willingness to participate (lack of which IMO led to their demise in the first place). This in lieu of troops in the thick of it and yet still a credible and useful function. Still a level of risk attached but not exactly even capabilities so in fact a safer option, NZGovts go to policy.

Just another tool in the box, if only.

Yes, it reduced the govts options and now we pay for that short sighted decision. I think that this issue will have to be revisited in the future by the NZG, whether they like it or not, because circumstances in the future could force that change. The more I read, the more I think that the Daesh situation is going to become worse and will involve us at a greater level, whether we like it or not. Daesh cells have been reported more often in Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines, plus they have groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan. They are attracting fighters from all over and the ones who survive and return home are dangerous, setting up groups in their home countries. Daesh aren't going to go away any time soon and we are ill prepared to combat them and more pertinently, help nations within our wider region to combat them.

Whilst we do focus upon the South Pacific region, economically the vast majority of our trade is shipped through the Asian region and that is where we need to be able to operate if required, including in a combat role. This includes the South China and the East China Seas. The trouble is the economists in Treasury don't see that and the trade wonks who run MFAT don't want to know about it. It comes back to the sea blindness phenomena.