Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates

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Alf662

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It certainly is. In fact, it's DOUBLE the size.

Does anyone here really imagine that Defence, the Government, the Opposition, or the general public would accept a replacement of the ACPBs with ships the size of the ANZAC frigates? Or that the money would be made available?

Fantasy land I'm afraid. Surely there's a thread somewhere for inventing bathtub fleets.

oldsig
To be more specific, the smallest I could find is 4,500 tonnes:

DAMEN presents CROSSOVER ultimate mission modular naval concept at DIMDEX 2014

I also stated that this type of vessel would need to be much larger than the OPV/OCV currently being considered.
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
The 4500t Legend class National Security Cutter has been seriously proposed for the OCV program. IMO they are too expensive but if anyone cares to read back they will see I have been suggesting that refurbished systems be pulled through from the FFGs and ANZACs which would substantially reduce costs.

A common large hull could be procured, eight with ANZAC systems, including ASMD, and four with Adelaide systems. Even the propulsion diesels could be upgraded and reused, possibly the GTs too, definitely the VLS and 76mm guns, Mini Typhoon, possibly the torpedo tubes, sonar, ESM, Nulka, Nixie, etc. dramatically reducing procurement costs. Probably wouldn't use the Mk-45 5" guns but who knows.

The key would be selecting an affordable hull, reusing as many systems as possible while reducing crewing requirements as much as possible.
 

oldsig127

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
The 4500t Legend class National Security Cutter has been seriously proposed for the OCV program.
Yes, I've seen that too, on Facebook, by people who clearly know nothing about Defence but know which ships look pretty. Maybe someone with a serious professional background has suggested it too, but I've not seen that and would appreciate a link.

A common large hull could be procured, eight with ANZAC systems, including ASMD, and four with Adelaide systems. Even the propulsion diesels could be upgraded and reused, possibly the GTs too, definitely the VLS and 76mm guns, Mini Typhoon, possibly the torpedo tubes, sonar, ESM, Nulka, Nixie, etc. dramatically reducing procurement costs. Probably wouldn't use the Mk-45 5" guns but who knows.

Sounds like a small/medium sized Frigate by another name. It still has no chance whatever of being considered for an OPV role in this political and financial climate.

The key would be selecting an affordable hull, reusing as many systems as possible while reducing crewing requirements as much as possible.
I think the key is - once the DWP and supporting documents are published - to choose something that meets the requirement, as enticing as it might seem to keep useable kit at sea in *warships* and inflating the Naval ego

oldsig
 

ASSAIL

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
The 4500t Legend class National Security Cutter has been seriously proposed for the OCV program. IMO they are too expensive but if anyone cares to read back they will see I have been suggesting that refurbished systems be pulled through from the FFGs and ANZACs which would substantially reduce costs.
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The first few cost north of USD 700 million each!
 

hauritz

Well-Known Member
I best solution might continue to be a mixed fleet. I think Patrol boats still have their place.

A mix of patrol boats, and OPVs including a few larger OPVs with mission bays would be a better balanced fleet IMO.

Also it is unlikely the Armidales will continue to be viable much beyond 2020. A few new Patrol boats might be needed to cover the capability gap until the larger ships become available.
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
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The first few cost north of USD 700 million each!
Yes talk about cost blowouts. HI put a version of the Legend forward as an alternative to the LSC designs but the USN choked at the cost. That said the ABS blokes running the marine survey course I completed did point out that just about every project underway in south eastern US copped a massive hit from Katrina and other hurricanes, Litton for instance ended up underwater and virtually had to be rebuilt.

A given yard, designed to build 8000t destroyers, should be able to build a 4500t bare platform for not much more than a 1500-2000t one. If the 4500t platform reuses existing systems it is conceivable that it could be cheaper than an all new 2000t one.
.
 

t68

Well-Known Member
Someone mentioned the Flyvefisken-class patrol vessel patrol vessel which is Stanflex 300 capable, how difficult would it be to use some of the sensor suite of the Anzac and Stanflex modules on a Damen 2400 OPV
 

rockitten

Member
Someone mentioned the Flyvefisken-class patrol vessel patrol vessel which is Stanflex 300 capable, how difficult would it be to use some of the sensor suite of the Anzac and Stanflex modules on a Damen 2400 OPV
Shouldn't be too hard as some modules (such as harpoon missiles) are on board ANZAC classes as well. And I suppose integration works for other modules like 76mm or ESSM shouldn't be too hard as well.

But, if we fit-out the OPV with so much war-fighting gears that are not essential for constable duties, will that drives up the crew size and up-keep of the vessel?

One design aspect I like the French Floréal-class is that, as the "frigates" are designed to be based in French overseas territories, they are build in civilian spec and armed to the minimum. It don't have gas turbine (only 4 diesel engines, don't know if it is a civilian spec) to give it exceptional range (but not speed).

And articles from some renowned naval analysis (such as Norman Friedman) praised this class as NATO's best "colonial/3rd class cruiser" design.

Of coz, this kind of ship is a widow maker for World War 3. But that's not an OPV's duty.
 

vonnoobie

Well-Known Member
Why it is getting increasing attention among us I don't know, We just went through a phase of being annoyed about such things and now it is starting up again..

It's simple, The CB-90 or any vessel like it are not likely to be considered until after 2025 so pointless us discussing it a decade in advance. There wont be any off the bat 4,000+ ton OPV's/Light Frigates, but likely an evolved version of any 2,000 ton OPV, Again still a long long way off with no guarantee of it occurring or any indication of what type or size of vessel would hold the possible CB-90 which at best is 15 years away if ever.
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
Why it is getting increasing attention among us I don't know, We just went through a phase of being annoyed about such things and now it is starting up again..

It's simple, The CB-90 or any vessel like it are not likely to be considered until after 2025 so pointless us discussing it a decade in advance. There wont be any off the bat 4,000+ ton OPV's/Light Frigates, but likely an evolved version of any 2,000 ton OPV, Again still a long long way off with no guarantee of it occurring or any indication of what type or size of vessel would hold the possible CB-90 which at best is 15 years away if ever.
Keep in mind the role a CB90 would be fulfilling is quite a bit different from one that the ACPB's, and/or a replacement OPV/OCV would be. They also might not be a RAN asset either, instead being Army smallcraft. With this in mind, a CB90-like vessel might very well enter ADF service in less than 15 years.

The original query that I made about small patrol boats was done so because I was unaware of the potential smallcraft available to the RFSU or Sea Rangers. While they are unsuitable for everything I had in mind, they do tick most of the boxes, and certainly things seem to be working well enough.
 

t68

Well-Known Member
Shouldn't be too hard as some modules (such as harpoon missiles) are on board ANZAC classes as well. And I suppose integration works for other modules like 76mm or ESSM shouldn't be too hard as well.

But, if we fit-out the OPV with so much war-fighting gears that are not essential for constable duties, will that drives up the crew size and up-keep of the vessel?
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Fixed or modules, If we go down that route we will need members trained in the equipment, but we won't need the crews for all the ships(20) if 20 ships as the plan states goes ahead, we may only get say 12 set's and between 6-8 ships fitted at one time to keep a pool of personal up to date. If the brown stuff really hit the fan we could re-task the ship into a more offensive capability as needed.

STANFLEX Standard Flexible mission modules Royal Danish Navy Kongelige Danske Marine
 

oldsig127

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Shouldn't be too hard as some modules (such as harpoon missiles) are on board ANZAC classes as well. And I suppose integration works for other modules like 76mm or ESSM shouldn't be too hard as well.
The mission modules on the Damen vessels except maybe the 2600 appear to be under the flight deck.

Good luck integrating Gun or ESSM there. On the other hand the ships all have space forward for a gun "up to 76mm" so that's probably no big deal but any VLS might well be. There's nowhere else.

I should also point out that interchangeable mission modules are a lot more complex to design and integrate than you might imagine.

There is no overarching standard, so Stanflex modules will fit in Stanflex slots, not any other standard. And each standard is about a great deal more than physical size and structure. It will define (but not only) physical connections for power, data, environmental, damage control, but other interface requirements like voltages,power and a/c load, data buses, and how the gear In the module can affect the gear outside. And so on.

In other words, it's not just a cargo container space with a power umbilical. If it was that easy, the USN wouldn't still be working to develop theirs.

oldsig
 

gf0012-aust

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
If this thread continues to dip its toe into dreamworld it will get locked off for a while.

theoretical platforms for the RAN can be discussed somewhere else

 

StobieWan

Super Moderator
Staff member
I'm re-opening this after what I hope will be a period of reflection for some. Quality of contributions here from some members has been below par. I'll turf any wilder ideas out to the RAN dreamland thread in future, or if that can't be made to work, simply prune the thread. What the forum can't tolerate is a useful resource (this thread) being killed due to some really poorly thought out and uncosted suggestions
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Ok a simple fact, sometimes it is cheaper to leave stuff off, or make cheaper or more innovative equipment selections on a more capable design, than it is to sex up a less capable one. If a ship has not been designed to accommodate a medium calibre gun, VLS, sonar etc. the amount of structural work required, the increased power, cooling, crew etc. can make what seems at first to be a minor change, unachievable.

A good example is the USNs Spruance class destroyers, they were designed from day one to be upgraded to full DDG capability with 44 and 24 missile Mk-26 GMLS as well as an 8" MCLWG. These mods were never incorporated yet when the requirement for additional Tomahawks arose there was the space and weight available to fit a 61-64 cell VLS forward.

The opposite end would be trying to turn an OPV with no structural arrangements to support a magazine or VLS into a frigate as some seem to be trying to do. Any changes that require major structural changes will never be easy or cheap.
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Something that may be of interest.
http://www.defence.gov.au/SE/publications/ForceStructureReview1991_opt.pdf

And what I found enlightening:

Surface Combatant Numbers
2.28 The number of surface combatants and the levels of capability that they should possess depend on the number of tasks that could be expected to be undertaken, the nature of those tasks, and the tactical environment in which they will be conducted.
2.29 The use of pairs of surface combatants to patrol the approaches to Australia between, say, Derby and Tones Strait, could require about eight ships. Simultaneous patrol tasks off the north-east coast and North West Cape could involve a further two. With allowance for refit and maintenance, a force of 16 surface combatants, with afloat support, would be required to maintain ten on station.
2.30 The protection of Cocos and Christmas Islands, and offshore resource platforms. could require a further four surface combatants, and if required, convoy operations could absorb a further four. A force of twelve surface combatants would be required to maintain these eight on task. Realistic tasking levels indicate that 16 of the 28 surface combatants should be destroyers or frigates.

Future Destroyers/Frigates
2.31 The last DDG is planned to pay off in 2001, leaving the number of destroyers and frigates then at eleven (one more than the present ten). With the progressive introduction of the ANZACs, the total will rise to 14 in 2005. Without a continuing ship building program, numbers will start to reduce in 2008, as the first FFG reaches the end of its life.
2.32 Planning to replace the DDGs will proceed on the basis of an ANZAC derivative. This would also maintain the continuity of Australian shipbuilding, to achieve commonality, to facilitate through life support and training, and to build the number up to 16. ANZAC derivatives could also replace the first four FFGs.
2.33 The AJ\TZAC derivative can utilise the basic ANZAC design concept, but allow for improved capability and future technological developments. The project could start about 1997, allowing first delivery about 2006. This would leave a five year gap between paying off the last DDG and entry into service of the first ANZAC derivative, but this is considered acceptable.

Destroyer Modernisation Refits
2.34 The ADF has for some time followed a program of mid-life modernisations of the destroyer force as a means of providing capability enhancements and life extensions. The modernisation refits, without exception, have been lengthy. Reduced operational availability, together with considerable capital expenditure, have been consequences of these programs. The concept of mid-life modernisations is not cost effective, and will not continue. More modest capability enhancements, generally achieving similar outcomes, can be undertaken within the ship's normal maintenance cycle.

Future Patrol Vessels
2.35 The Fremantle class patrol boats currently conduct patrol and intercept operations within the Australian fishing zone. They are due to commence paying off in 1997, with all 15 boats being retired by 1999. While their replacement by twelve offshore patrol vessels is proposed, it is unlikely that these could be available before the end of life of the Fremantles.
2.36 It would not be acceptable to suspend the conduct of the important peacetime surveillance and law enforcement activities in the maritime approaches and fishing zone pending the introduction of new offshore patrol vessels. Therefore a life extension, to early next century, for the Fremantles is essential. The project for a future offshore patrol vessel could start about 1997, with first delivery in about 2004.
2.37 The offshore patrol vessels ideally should be less limited by sea state and more heavily armed than the Fremantle class patrol boats. An appropriate command and control system, good communications, surveillance and electronic support measures systems are highly desirable.

Summary
2.38 Specific proposals to develop improved maritime patrol and response capabilities are:
a. Plan for a surface combatant force comprising 16 destroyers/ frigates and twelve offshore patrol vessels early next century.
b. Plan for an ANZAC derivative, with first delivery in about 2006.
c. Give high priority to life of type extension and sensor upgrade of the Fremantle class patrol boats.
d. Plan to bring a replacement offshore patrol vessel into service, with first delivery in about 2004.
e. Discontinue modernisation refits of major surface combatants in favour of capability upgrades within normal refit cycles.


It has often been said that an ANZAC derivative could not have adequately replaced the DDGs but this ignores the modular nature of the MEKO design that concurrently led to the German Type 123 and 124 Frigates and also had a much larger concepts available that would have provided the desired capability even to F-100 levels (i.e. AEGIS and SPY-1F or even SPY-1D)
 

oldsig127

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
Very interesting indeed. And twenty four years old. I wonder how much our defence plans have changed in the interim given the enormous changes in strategic outlook and just how different the next DWP and FSR will be.
What is also very interesting, is that areas which have been identified as capability gaps, or where capabilities are weak, were also identified back then.

Which tends to suggest that despite whatever plans that might be made by the RAN, unless/until the Gov't of the day favours the plan(s) it can be all for naught.
 

ASSAIL

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Some local news - the Cape Class Customs PB Cape Byron is now in naval hands and was moving around Darwin Naval Base this week. I guess the details have been sorted because although she remains blue, red and white, all Customs insignia have gone and she now calls herself "warship Cape Byron" on harbour control VHF.
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Very interesting indeed. And twenty four years old. I wonder how much our defence plans have changed in the interim given the enormous changes in strategic outlook and just how different the next DWP and FSR will be.

It'll certainly be worth discussing then, rather than trying to fit something into an almost quarter century old framework.

oldsig
What I find interesting is how many of the findings and predictions came to pass or were found to apply in the early 2000s, 2010 and will probably be rediscovered again in the new DWP. I suspect if a forensic examination of defence and government papers from the 50s, 60s, 70s and 80s were undertaken, similar findings and recommendations would be identified. For instance if I recall correctly one of the reasons a new carrier wasn't pursued by the then coalition government immediately HMS Invincible became unavailable, was the other lesson from the Falklands was we had an inadequate number of combatants and most of those we did have were woefully incapable of defending themselves meaning a massive recapitalization of the fleet was needed. Also in the late 60s when Frazer was Defmin he stated that the RAN needed a minimum of 23 destroyers and frigates as well as a new fleet base in the west.

Going back further, one of the reasons the RAN selected Tartar was because of the need to upgrade the existing Battle and Daring class destroyers into DDGs, a job Sea Slug was to large for, to provide the RAN with eight high end multirole air defense ships to protect the ASW frigates and planned light destroyers. At this time the carrier was planned to convert to a ASW helicopter carrier role.

Go back before WWI and the official recommendations to the CoA by a panel of senior RN admirals who conducted a review of Australia's defenses was that major fleet bases were needed in Sydney and WA and that a force of eight armoured cruisers (battle cruisers) and supporting minor vessels would be needed to defend the commonwealth until such time as a RN and Military relief could be staged. The Fleet unit built around the battle cruiser HMAS Australia, that Australia went to war with, was the first stage of this plan that was meant to come to fruition in the mid 30s.

Battle cruisers gave way to cruisers, cruisers to guided missile destroyers and frigates but it is surprising how similar the required numbers have remained. To me when the same sort of numbers and comparative capabilities keep coming up, over and over again, decade after decade, review after review, there is probably something to it. I would suggest geography is a big part of it, guiding as it does the number of hulls needed to secure the approaches to Australia, to patrol our coast line and achieve sea control within our region. The fact we have never achieved the required force levels doesn't change the fact that those are the numbers required to do the job.
 
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