Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates

[Trackmaster]

Yes. Apparently back in the 1970s the RN and USN had a series of fires on board ships with aluminium superstructures, so they reverted to steel superstructures. The RN Destroyer Sheffield which was sunk at the Falklands was supposed to have had a aluminium superstructure that contributed to the fire but that is supposed to have been refuted. I haven't seen the report on that.

Addition. I remember 3rd Form (Yr 9) chemistry back in 1970 that we set fire to some aluminium ribbon. It burned very well, hot and bright. Same class as one where we dropped sodium into water to see what happened. Does the same thing as putting naked flame to aluminium ribbon

Powdered, shaved or aluminium foil/ribbon will burn, but structural aluminium used in shipbuilding does not burn. It weakens and melts. Structural strength is lost around 300c and aluminium melts around 600-650c. Some of the images taken inside the maintenance shed in Brisbane after the patrol boat fire showed huge patches of bright, shiny solidified aluminium on the concrete floor. Combine aluminium with steel with a higher temperature tolerance, and you could have a problem. The steel may maintain its integrity, while the aluminium melts.
As to the Falklands, HMS Sheffield was an all steel ship, with a compromised fire fighting system. As I recall, the backup fire fighting system was cut as a budget measure during construction, and the missile hit took out the one system left.
The definitive quote was from the Falklands Defence White Paper, published in December 1982. "There is no evidence that aluminium has contributed to the loss of any vessel"

 

[Oberon]

HMS Sheffield was all steel construction.

HM Ships Ardent and Antelope did have aluminium superstructures. In the case of Ardent it was hit by 7 x 500 and 1000 pound bombs. I don't think having all steel structure would have made any difference in this case.

Aluminium deforms and melts at a lower temperature than steel, is harder to maintain than steel but did not contribute to the sinkings of Sheffield, Ardent or Antelope.

Thank you, I stand corrected. Memory gets a bit fuzzy after 30 years.

 

[StobieWan]

Yup - Sheffield was lost to a fire started by unburnt fuel from the missile that hit it and lost due to a shortcoming in DC gear, having a single water main and a few shortcomings in fire resistant cabling etc.

She had no significant ally structure present. Coventry was hit by a pair of 1,000 lb bombs and not a lot of ships that size would have survived I suspect.


That leaves two type 21's off the top of my head - Ardent and Antelope were both built with significant ally superstructure but in the event Antelope was lost to a 1000 lb bomb exploding internally during an attempt to defuse it, and Ardent took an absolute clattering from numerous bombs over a space of a number of hours, eventually being sunk while retiring from the area.

Type 21's did show cracking of the hull during service where the aluminium joined the steel structure and that's endemic with any design mixing these two materials, as is electrolytic corrosion.


Ally does deform more readily under heat and if you want an extreme view of that, dig out some images of Belknap

https://www.google.co.uk/search?q=b...HIIqJYZoM:&usg=__Yg7R8WUVQP5HyqCopJ8rV_pFEO0=

That's messy.

 

[aussienscale]

Powdered, shaved or aluminium foil/ribbon will burn, but structural aluminium used in shipbuilding does not burn. It weakens and melts. Structural strength is lost around 300c and aluminium melts around 600-650c. Some of the images taken inside the maintenance shed in Brisbane after the patrol boat fire showed huge patches of bright, shiny solidified aluminium on the concrete floor. Combine aluminium with steel with a higher temperature tolerance, and you could have a problem. The steel may maintain its integrity, while the aluminium melts.
As to the Falklands, HMS Sheffield was an all steel ship, with a compromised fire fighting system. As I recall, the backup fire fighting system was cut as a budget measure during construction, and the missile hit took out the one system left.
The definitive quote was from the Falklands Defence White Paper, published in December 1982. "There is no evidence that aluminium has contributed to the loss of any vessel"

Correct, and aluminium was one of the media touted issues for the USS Stark as well, by chance the issues almost identical happened, where one of the missiles took out a major section of the Stark's fire system. Declassified report here:

http://www.jag.navy.mil/library/investigations/uss stark basic.pdf

But this has digressed from the subject at hand and that is about Aluminium hulled vessels and their suitability. Different story all together !!

Aluminium superstructures are nothing new going back to the 50's to save top weight, especially in the electronic evolution with more and more gear being placed higher on ships

 

[ngatimozart]

the thing worth remembering is that with a more or less formal acknowledgement of the "valley of death" scenarios (the new favourite buzz phrase) that any numbers will also be through life numbers, and with major acquisitions for navy being bought forward (into the open doesn't necessarily = bringing construction forward that much) then money gets chewed earlier

so the funding models are now up in the air - and they just can't add more ships to the mix as it will just screw up the broader force definition issues. RAN and RAAF can't keep on getting things blessed without it impacting on other service specific programs - and more importantly, chewing into army requirements.

govt policy for the last 6 years has been that whatever gets bought forward or increased in fleet numbers (fleet as in overall platform numbers be they ships, planes, trucks) must show a saving elsewhere. ie there is no extra money for extra platforms, if its not planned for then any increase in fleet must demonstrate a saving elsewhere. be it decommissioning, training cuts, logistics improvements etc....

the notion of getting 18 subs without stuffing up everyone elses reqs and with with just as compelling service development needs gives it 2 chances.

I think that you illustrate a very valid point especially for a cash strapped force. If you want to acquire a new capability or add to a current one and your funding is fixed what other capability(ies) do you give up or degrade to acquire what you want? One way organisations may choose is to civilianise as many back office and support roles and positions that they can, but that is a double edged sword which can cost you quite dearly. Whilst the bean counters main be happy with a short term gain, in thee long term it has the potential to degrade a force through tne loss of intangible assets which over time can be irrevocably lost.

After the 2010 DWP and the 2011 Value For Money (VfM) report (Deans Report IIRC) the NZDF instituted a civilianisation program at the behest of the NZG as a result of the VfM report recommendations. IIRC 500 service positions were targeted and most were at the SNCO / WO and Lt Cdr + level where a significant amount of institutional and corporate knowledge plus many years of service experience was held. Well they stuffed it up and a whole lot of people took the opportunity to leave for many reasons. On top of that some anecdotal evidence suggests that some were given the DCM - don't come Monday. TBH there would have been some Tim servers who's interest was definitely not the services and were marking time becoming promotion blockages etc. However there were some canny ones he resigned as service personnel on a Friday, had their dining out that night and continued in their old jobs as civilians on Monday as public servants on far better pay with no parades and extra duties such as officers of the day or duty senior rates etc. Others who left were highly qualified technical personnel with many years service and this hit the RNZN particularly hard. The money on the outside was better and they were able to get out at short notice. The way that the senior NZDF management group handled this was very poor and I have been told that morale took a long time to recover from it. Some claim it hasn't yet.

Another problem with something like this is he logistics situation. Logistics is arguably the most important function within a military. Without it, you cannot get troops, vehicles aircraft ships and weapons to a fight. Then once you have them there you have to support them with everything from ammo to food to spares to fuel to medical etc. If you start cutting costs by cutting down on personnel, which is usually the largest cost per annum, then the temptation is to take them from non combat areas such as the back end. However it is highly likely that those people in the back end whom you are going to cull could be the very ones who are needed to ensure that the people who need the supplies of food ammo etc., will actually have them when they need them. So it is something that if contemplated has to be done very carefully so that you don't hollow out your force. Efficiency is good but not just for efficiencies sake. It might provide short term gain but prove very costly in the long term, both in treasure and blood.

 

[Todjaeger]

Thanks Todjaeger for feeding me so much about aluminum hulls, granted, notes taken. And again, thanks a lot.

Regarding to the economic part, we all know the economic benefit of spending money in Australia. What you guys don't get my point is, why it has to be spend on shipyards.

May be it can be spend on local build, but it can also achieved by imposing "offset" requirements. How about buy more produce from Australia, how about bio-chemical/medical research and investment in Australia? They save lots of Australian jobs too, and very likely to be more sustainable and more competitive in the global market than a submarine industry.

From my point of view, SEA1000 is a procurement project for our navy's submarine replacement. Not an alliance pack, not a job saving scheme or nation rebuilding project. First thing first should be get our navy the best submarine available. So if our navy found the Japanese bid is more suit to the mission requirement, even if those boats have to be build off-shore, why not? Just request for a 70% economic offset (and most of them can be spent on SA). The compulsory requirement should be fit for the job, not local construction.

But now, the whole navy procurements are getting ridiculously political, even more political than the war in Iraq and Afghanistan, so political that the next government may just scrap them all like the mining tax. And for that, I have a strong sympathy to our navy. While other services have a relatively free hand to choose their gear, our navy has become the receiving end of all those politicians' shit.

Umm... It seems that a number of areas of significance were missed, or perhaps misunderstood.

In a nutshell though, using offsets (IMO at least) only makes sense for a handful of reasons.

The first being that local production will not be done due to a lack of scale/efficiency, and/or the production run would be too short, without any possible follow-on work to be sustained (consider the examples I already provided for modern Australian fighter and tank production.)

The second being that local facilities are already occupied with other projects and programmes, and are therefore unavailable.

The third being that the materials exported for the offsets are materials which Australia and Australian businesses/producers have been having trouble selling due to a lack of markets, or the supply/demand ratio is such that little or none of the costs to produce can be recouped via sales.

I am unaware of any sectors of the Australian economy which is having a problem selling domestically produced goods or materials, to the point where offsets would be useful.

Using the example of a single warship sourced from ASC I used before consider what appear to be the two choices:

1. An AUD$1.3 bil. build for domestic construction of a warship, and AUD$1 bil. in rawmats and/or agricultural products sold domestically and exported, with the various levels of gov't able to collect taxes and fees from businesses and individuals involved.

2. An AUD$1 bil. imported warship, offset by AUD$1 bil. in exported rawmats/agricultural products, with the various levels of Australian gov't only able to collect taxes and fees from the production and sales of the AUD$1 bil. in exports.

This above choices are a bit simplistic examples of the potential scenarios, and it deliberately leaves out the negative costing impact on major ship maintenance, modifications and repairs when vessels are imported. It also does not get into rawmat overproduction, and the impact an oversupply in the global market has on Australian resource companies. IMO offsets can help that situation if/when it occurs, but only to a small degree, unless Australia stops being a producer of a given rawmat which it has stockpiles of which Australia is unable to sell.

 

[ngatimozart]

Yup - Sheffield was lost to a fire started by unburnt fuel from the missile that hit it and lost due to a shortcoming in DC gear, having a single water main and a few shortcomings in fire resistant cabling etc.

She had no significant ally structure present. Coventry was hit by a pair of 1,000 lb bombs and not a lot of ships that size would have survived I suspect.


That leaves two type 21's off the top of my head - Ardent and Antelope were both built with significant ally superstructure but in the event Antelope was lost to a 1000 lb bomb exploding internally during an attempt to defuse it, and Ardent took an absolute clattering from numerous bombs over a space of a number of hours, eventually being sunk while retiring from the area.

Type 21's did show cracking of the hull during service where the aluminium joined the steel structure and that's endemic with any design mixing these two materials, as is electrolytic corrosion.


Ally does deform more readily under heat and if you want an extreme view of that, dig out some images of Belknap

https://www.google.co.uk/search?q=b...HIIqJYZoM:&usg=__Yg7R8WUVQP5HyqCopJ8rV_pFEO0=

That's messy.

The Chief Petty Officer who was in charge of my damage control and fire fighting training when I did my navy training was, IIRC, on Sheffield when it was hit and sunk. He was a very dour person, but we hung on his every word. We knew he had been there done that in the South Atlantic. He had a saying that if you don't do it right you'd better put your Jesus boots on because he'll be the next fulla you'll be seeing. He had different variations of that dependent upon the circumstances. Very extensive vocabulary too especially if he was annoyed

 

[StobieWan]

I'm sure he did

Not spoken to anyone directly who was on the Sheffield but it sounded like a frustrating ordeal that could have been avoided by some very simple and affordable measures (the ship wasn't lost for want of heart in the crew, that much I'm sure of.)

 

[alexsa]

Ok did not see that one, will look it up, but my guess is he was giving the correct political answer while surrounded by people carrying large pieces of aluminium

The consistent message we have seen over the last couple of years is the preference to steel because of the PB's issues and costs, Aluminium is just simply not up to the task.

There are others on here who have direct knowledge of the problems and why, that can answer that one in more detail if they choose to do so, some have an aversion to this thread at the moment and I don't blame them (and that comment is not directed to you or anyone else)

Cheers

Austal claim to be able to build in steel but this means steel hull and aluminium upper works (same as the FFG and CFA were so not new).

Their yard is certainly tailored around aluminium but Tech Port is a common user facility as is the WA facility so they could (in theory) use that.

The government is going to have to be seen to be giving every builder a fair crack at this but if the OPV build were given just to Austal it doe snot provide much work for the other builders (Forgacs, BAE and ASC) to keep going with. Even a 90m OPV can be built in blocks and consolidated to spread the work around.

Looking at aluminium, as pointed out by others aluminium loses tructural integrity much sooner than mild steel. A fact made apparent by how hard it is to get an A-60 or even A-30 bulkhead or division with aluminium (what this means can be found by using google) as both sides of the partitions, and all penetrations, need to be very well insulated and this in incredibly expensive and difficult. With the USS Stark .... it did not get home under its own steam but was carried on a a heavily lift ship. If the vessel had been in the South Atlantic with no ports of support facilities this would have been much harder to achieve and may not have happened.

Final point ..... Austal have moved much of their work offshore to the Philippines for commercial vessels. The only real series production work they have in Australia at the moment is the Cape class.

 

[Oberon]

Yup - Sheffield was lost to a fire started by unburnt fuel from the missile that hit it and lost due to a shortcoming in DC gear, having a single water main and a few shortcomings in fire resistant cabling etc.

She had no significant ally structure present. Coventry was hit by a pair of 1,000 lb bombs and not a lot of ships that size would have survived I suspect.


That leaves two type 21's off the top of my head - Ardent and Antelope were both built with significant ally superstructure but in the event Antelope was lost to a 1000 lb bomb exploding internally during an attempt to defuse it, and Ardent took an absolute clattering from numerous bombs over a space of a number of hours, eventually being sunk while retiring from the area.

Type 21's did show cracking of the hull during service where the aluminium joined the steel structure and that's endemic with any design mixing these two materials, as is electrolytic corrosion.


Ally does deform more readily under heat and if you want an extreme view of that, dig out some images of Belknap

https://www.google.co.uk/search?q=b...HIIqJYZoM:&usg=__Yg7R8WUVQP5HyqCopJ8rV_pFEO0=

That's messy.

Now that's what I call a melt-down!

 

[Muar River]

Definitely need a like button.

I would only add that the calculation of cost benefit to the Australian economy needs to include the amount of skilled labour required and what those workers would be doing otherwise.

During the ANZAC project the workers were the same who had delivered the Australian Frigate Project, were already trained and experienced, working for an established and experienced organisation at a recently upgraded existing facility, in conjunction with a competent designer who was highly experienced in supporting foreign builds and also the project had been planned and evolved for years before hand.

The corresponding submarine project involved a new builder, work force, facility and a designer, that had never worked on on open ocean sub or exported any design, in fact they had only ever worked very closely with one particularly knowledgeable and proactive customer. There was also a completely inexperienced combat system designer that was independent of the prime contractor and often defended by the customer, even though they consistently failed to deliver. Compare the two projects and the amount of funding and effort to deliver the required capability.

The other fact is at the time these projects were running the Australian economy was more balanced, the dollar was lower and there was no skill shortage. By the time the AWD project kicked off much of the capability and momentum gained had been lost and the the government capped this off by first awarding FFG UP to Thales instead of Tenix then AWD to ASC, again instead of Tenix. A new facility had to be built, a designer that had never exported a design or supported an overseas build was selected. Also, in the middle of a never before seen mining construction boom and associated skill shortage, a new work force had to be hired, trained and certified. Perhaps the most damning is there appears to have been nowhere near the level of planning and preparation that the earlier projects received. Is there any doubt why there have been issues?

Now this work has been done it appears we have let momentum be lost again through the decision to build the new AORs offshore. A local build would have involved sufficient steel bashing to keep ASC, BAE (they bought Tenix's defence operations after Tenix lost the AWD bid) and Forgacs busy until the OPVs and frigates came on line. A fourth AWD would have been sensible as well but the AORs would have been sufficient.

Now the economy is returning to it's pre-boom base, minus a number of industries that were not adequately protected from what was obviously a temporary economic distortion, the factors determining the efficiency of a local build are returning to normal as well. The situation now is more like those in the late eighties than the early 2000s meaning many assumptions made about costs and efficiencies probably need to be reassessed. Actually, the governments changing stance on continuous builds and the possibility of local construction of the future submarines suggests that just such a reassessment has occurred.

I enjoyed reading both contributions. Would it have made more sense just to build 12 AWDs in four groups of three with incremental improvements to each which could be incorporated into the earlier ships during normal refits? Surely the savings through economies of scale would have offset some of the costs incurred with the programme start-up (and safeguarded jobs)?

 

[StobieWan]

Now that's what I call a melt-down!

She'd collided with a carrier and opened up some of her fuel bunkers, so that's a "not very likely to happen every day" accident in terms of the decks being showered with several hundred tons of burning jet fuel.

 

[MickB]

Talk on the army site of the Hawkeye 105mm weapon system as a mobile fire support weapon for the ARG.

Would such a system,( light weight, soft recoil, no deck penetration, comparitivly long range and heavy shell) be a good armament for the future OPVs.
Would this use require the development of an auto loader.

 

[Bluey 006]

Talk on the army site of the Hawkeye 105mm weapon system as a mobile fire support weapon for the ARG.

Would such a system,( light weight, soft recoil, no deck penetration, comparitivly long range and heavy shell) be a good armament for the future OPVs.
Would this use require the development of an auto loader.

I doubt it. For what purpose? Naval gunfire support? There are plenty of naval guns that could do the job better. Not to mention the fact it would need to be marinised.

Others here are better equipped to answer than myself though

 

[Stock]

Talk on the army site of the Hawkeye 105mm weapon system as a mobile fire support weapon for the ARG.

Would such a system,( light weight, soft recoil, no deck penetration, comparitivly long range and heavy shell) be a good armament for the future OPVs.
Would this use require the development of an auto loader.

Pretty sure there will be no requirement for shore bombardment for the OPVs. The mount would need stabilisation and marinisation in any case.

A medium calibre stabilised naval gun system (35-57mm) would be more useful all round, although range limited in supporting forces ashore.

 

[MickB]

For what purpose? Naval gunfire support?

I was thinking more to hold the much touted swarm attack at a longer standoff distance, also (unlike a 30mm ) a single hit by a 105mm would sink or disable most FACs.

The ability to provide some NGS would be a bonus.

 

[Stock]

I was thinking more to hold the much touted swarm attack at a longer standoff distance, also (unlike a 30mm ) a single hit by a 105mm would sink or disable most FACs.

The ability to provide some NGS would be a bonus.

Better off using pre-programmed cannon rounds that don't have to actually hit the target to detonate, as in the AHEAD range of ammo. A burst of 5-10 rds per target should do the trick. Ideal for combating small and fast surface craft.

A 35mm round will stretch out to around 3,500m which is still a long way out.

Look at Rheinmetall's Millennium Gun system as an exemplar.

If the target is FAC size and missile armed, the OPV might want to bug out and hand it over to the surface combatants. Won't be its job (I'm assuming) to slug it out with other fighting ships.

 

[MickB]

If the target is FAC size and missile armed, the OPV might want to bug out and hand it over to the surface combatants. Won't be its job (I'm assuming) to slug it out with other fighting ships.

Could not agree more, but if surprised and unable to outrun then a longer ranged defence may be better.

 

[Milne Bay]

Better off using pre-programmed cannon rounds that don't have to actually hit the target to detonate, as in the AHEAD range of ammo. A burst of 5-10 rds per target should do the trick. Ideal for combating small and fast surface craft.

A 35mm round will stretch out to around 3,500m which is still a long way out.

Look at Rheinmetall's Millennium Gun system as an exemplar.

If the target is FAC size and missile armed, the OPV might want to bug out and hand it over to the surface combatants. Won't be its job (I'm assuming) to slug it out with other fighting ships.

The Oto Melara 76mm also takes AHEAD if I am not mistaken, and the six retiring units from the Adelaide class will be available for upgrade and installation if required.
I am thinking that this calibre might just be a little too big for an OPV up to 2000 tonnes which needs the room below decks for other purposes.
MB

 

[Stock]

The Oto Melara 76mm also takes AHEAD if I am not mistaken, and the six retiring units from the Adelaide class will be available for upgrade and installation if required.
I am thinking that this calibre might just be a little too big for an OPV up to 2000 tonnes which needs the room below decks for other purposes.
MB

A bit too big I believe. Going from the 25mm Typhoons of the Armidales to 35-57mm is probably more likely.